The Lone Ranger

Iran-US Standoff: The Crisis in the Strait of Hormuz - II

2012-01-23T01:53:00.000-08:00

Maintaining political stability and the free flow of oil to the global economy have been the primary objectives of U.S. foreign policy in the Persian Gulf for almost half a century. The U.S. Navy has been one of the primary instruments of that policy, in both peace and war. These twin objectives have not changed much in the last several decades.

Before examining the nature of deployment of US forces in the area, it is necessary to throw light on a relatively less known but a significant battle that took place between the US and Iranian Navies in 1988 during the Iran-Iraq War.

Operation Praying Mantis

On 14 April, 1988 one of the US naval ships a guided missile frigate, USS Samuel B Roberts struck a mine while deployed in the Persian Gulf as part of Operation Earnest Will, the 1987–88 convoy missions in which U.S. warships escorted re-flagged Kuwaiti oil tankers to protect them from Iranian attacks. The explosion blew a 25-foot (7.6-meter) hole in the Roberts's hull and nearly sank it. The crew saved their ship with no loss of life, and Roberts was towed to Dubai on 16 April. After the mining, U.S. Navy divers recovered other mines in the area. When the serial numbers were found to match those of mines seized along with the Iran Ajr (Japanese-built landing craft used by Iran to lay mines) the previous September, U.S. military officials planned a retaliatory operation against Iranian targets in the Persian Gulf.

Three days after the mine blast, forces of Joint Task Force Middle East executed the American response -- Operation PRAYING MANTIS. During a two-day period, the Navy, Marine Corps, Army and Air Force units of Joint Task Force Middle East destroyed two oil platforms being used by Iran to coordinate attacks on merchant shipping, sank or destroyed three Iranian warships and neutralized at least six Iranian speedboats.

Operation Praying Mantis exposed the weakness of the Iranian naval forces in the event of a conventional conflict. Iran too, must have learnt a lesson or two from this battle. Iran would try and avoid an overt encounter with the US forces. Instead, Iran may adopt irregular warfare in the form of ‘hit and run’ using fast patrol boats and/or try to ram explosive-laden boats against US vessels. The US on its part needs to maintain constant vigil and frustrate Iranian attempts at mine-laying and neutralize speed boats approaching US ships or other commercial vessels in the area. The US given its sophisticated Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capability would be able to effectively counter threats posed by Iran’s diesel submarines. (It is worth mentioning that in the early 1980s, the U.S. Navy began development of a new mine countermeasures (MCM) force, which included two new classes of ships and minesweeping helicopters. The vital importance of a state-of-the-art mine countermeasures force was strongly underscored in the Persian Gulf during the eight years of the Iran-Iraq war, and in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991 when the Avenger and Guardian ships conducted MCM operations. Meanwhile the Iranian semi-official FARS news agency reported that its navy’s sub-surface vessels possessed capabilities to confront enemy’s threats and that its submarines were capable enough to ambush and hit enemy vessels, especially the US aircraft carriers traversing the Persian Gulf.

US Deployment in the Persian Gulf

The Fifth Fleet of the United States Navy is responsible for naval forces in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and coast off East Africa as far south as Kenya. It shares a commander and headquarters with US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT).

In the light of the impending crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, the top US commander on the ground heading the CENTCOM, Marine Corps General James N Mattis warned that additional troops may be required to deal with Iran. In response to the commander’s warning, Pentagon is reported to have quietly approved deployment of additional troops in the Gulf region.

Officials said that the deployments were not to be construed as a buildup to war, but rather was intended as a quick-reaction and contingency force in case a military crisis erupts in the standoff with Tehran over its suspected nuclear weapons program.

The new deployments include two Army infantry brigades and a helicopter unit, a substantial increase in combat power after nearly a decade in which Kuwait chiefly served as a staging area for supplies and personnel heading to Iraq.

The aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson joined the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis in the Arabian Sea recently, giving commanders major naval and air assets in case Iran carried out its recent threats to close the Strait of Hormuz.

US Navy officials have been saying that Iran might be able to temporarily block tanker traffic through the strait using anti-ship missiles, mines and other weapons, but U.S. commanders say they would be able to re-open the waterway quickly if need be.

U.S. officials are divided over how much to publicize the deployments. Regional allies tend to dislike public discussion about their cooperation with Washington. But the Pentagon wants Iran's rulers to know that the U.S. still has adequate forces available in the event of a crisis.

They include the Army's 1st Cavalry Division's 1st Brigade, which shifted to Kuwait from Iraq when the last U.S. forces left last month. The brigade, which has more than 4,500 soldiers and is equipped with tanks and artillery, has been designated a "mobile response force" for the region, according to Col. Scott L. Efflandt, the brigade commander.

According to a US Navy Spokesperson, the U.S. also have deployed a marine expeditionary unit and a group of landing warships, including the Makin Island groups and the USS New Orleans and Pearl Harbor amphibious transport dock ships, to the Persian Gulf.

The sailors, marines and airmen aboard the ships will be reinforced by a general support battalion and attack helicopters. They are to replace U.S. warships and Navy troops who have been patrolling the area for the last 10 months.

A National Guard brigade from Minnesota has been in Kuwait since August, and a combat aviation brigade arrived in December. Another major unit is heading to Kuwait shortly, though officials would not provide details.

Despite the buildup in Kuwait, the total number of U.S. troops in the region has declined with the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraq and the drawdown of U.S. troops that began last summer in Afghanistan.

Sometime in the beginning of this year, Iran’s Army Chief Ataollah Salehi is reported to have warned the US aircraft carrier John C Stennis against returning to the Gulf. The carrier had left the area prior to the commencement of Iranian naval exercises. The state news agency IRNA quoted army chief Ataollah Salehi as saying that "Iran will not repeat its warning ... the enemy's carrier has been moved to the Sea of Oman because of our drill. I recommend and emphasize to the American carrier not to return to the Persian Gulf." In response, the Telegraph reported that Britain, America and France delivered a pointed signal to Iran, sending six warships led by a 100,000 ton aircraft carrier through the highly sensitive waters of the Strait of Hormuz. USS Abraham Lincoln, a nuclear-powered carrier capable of embarking 90 aircraft, passed through the Strait and entered the Gulf without any incident on January 21-22, 2012. HMS Argyll, a Type 23 frigate from the Royal Navy, was one of the escort vessels making up the carrier battle-group. A guided missile cruiser and two destroyers from the US Navy completed the flotilla, along with one warship from the French navy.

Iran-US Standoff: The Crisis in the Strait of Hormuz

2012-01-19T05:21:00.000-08:00

Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons and its threat to close the Strait of Hormuz in response to sanctions aimed at hindering the weapons program is fast becoming a casus belli for the United States. While Israel views a nuclear Iran to be an existential threat, the states of the Gulf consider a nuclear Iran to be a major threat to the region’s stability. The year 2012 could be tumultuous and prove suicidal for Iran if it proceeds to carry out the threats – both of acquiring nuclear weapons and closing the Strait of Hormuz. While it may be early to say in what manner the US, its Western allies and Israel would respond if evidence emerges that Iran in fact has been able to cross the nuclear threshold, certainly a military action would be imminent if Iran closes the Strait to shipping.

The Geography

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow, strategically important strait between the Gulf of Oman in the southeast and the Persian Gulf. On the north coast is Iran and on the south coast is the United Arab Emirates and Musandam, an exclave of Oman.

The strait at its narrowest is 54 kilometres (34 miles) wide. It is the only sea passage to the open ocean for large areas of the petroleum-exporting Persian Gulf. About 14 tankers carrying 15.5 million barrels (2,460,000 m³) of crude oil traverse the strait on an average day, making it one of the world's most strategically important choke points. This represents 35% of the world's seaborne oil shipments, and 20% of oil traded worldwide in 2011.

Ships moving through the Strait follow a Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS), which separates inbound from outbound traffic to reduce the risk of collision. The traffic lane is six miles (10 km) wide, including two two-mile (3 km)-wide traffic lanes, one inbound and one outbound, separated by a two-mile (3 km) wide separation median.

To traverse the Strait, ships pass through the territorial waters of Iran and Oman under the transit passage provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Although not all countries have ratified the convention, most countries, including the U.S., accept these customary navigation rules as codified in the Convention. Oman has a radar site Link Quality Indicator (LQI) to monitor the TSS in the Strait of Hormuz. This site is located on a small island on the peak of Musandam Peninsula.

The navigable waters of the Strait of Hormuz are roughly 20 miles wide at their narrowest point. Commercial and naval maritime traffic, transits two designated shipping lanes inside Omani waters. Each lane (one into the Gulf, one out) is two miles wide and is separated by a two mile-wide buffer. (Almost the entire strait south of Qeshm and Larak islands is deep enough to support tanker traffic, so there is certainly room to shift the traffic further from the Iranian coast.)

Tehran has long been aware of the geo-strategic importance of its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz. The threat of mining the Strait or targeting tankers with anti-ship missiles is an important constituent of Iran’s strategy. By threatening shipping in these waters, Iran may be able to engage in psychological warfare and in fact has to some extent succeeded in pushing the prices of crude upwards (Crude for February delivery on the New York Mercantile Exchange rose as much as 98 cents, or 1 percent, to $101.69 a barrel, the highest price since Jan. 12, and was at $101.56 at 10:56 a.m. London time).

Iran’s Strengths and Weakness

In the light of rising tensions in the Persian Gulf, the question is whether Iran possess the military capability to keep the Strait of Hormuz closed?

It must be in borne in mind that there is considerable difference in closing the Strait and keeping the Strait closed for a considerable length of time. This is not a question of semantics. Strategic experts all across the spectrum have expressed varying opinions on Iran’s capabilities on this issue. Just what is the composition of the Iranian forces? Anthony Cordesman of the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in his paper which was included in the US Institute of Peace’s book “The Iran Primer” states that Iran is comparatively a weak conventional military power. Iran’s defence budget is relatively small and further it is barred from procuring military hardware from the West. According to Cordesman Iran spends about $12 billion to $14 billion on defence. This is very small compared to the expenditure incurred by the Gulf States on defence.

Iran has in its arsenal about 300-odd combat aircraft and out of which nearly 60% have little or no mission capability because of most of the aircraft are of the Cold War era procured during the time of the Shah and are obsolete.

Anthony Cordesman’s assessment of the Iranian navy is most relevant to the present discussion.

Iran’s 18,000-man navy and 12,000- to 15,000-man Naval Guards pose the most serious threat to other Gulf States and the U.S. Navy. Iran’s Navy oversees operations in the Caspian and the Gulf of Oman. The naval branch of the IRGC oversees Gulf operations. Both have serious limitations. They lack modern surface vessel combat capability and depend on four obsolete frigates and three obsolete corvettes from the shah’s era with limited modernization and uncertain combat readiness. Iran is apparently building a prototype Mowaj-class corvette/destroyer, which is not yet operational.

The navy does, however, have three Russian Kilo-class submarines—which some reports indicate can lay smart mines and fire long-range homing torpedoes. The IRGC has four to seven North Korean/Iranian-made Yono and Nahand-class midget submarines, and is producing four more. It also has small, semi-submersible craft. The navy also has an aviation branch with three aging P-3F maritime patrol and airborne command and control aircraft, three Falcon aircraft modified for electronic warfare and intelligence, and anti-submarine and mine warfare helicopters.

The IRGC has a wide range of mine warfare and smaller, more modern missile patrol boats armed with Chinese and Iranian-made anti-ship missiles. It also has land-based anti-ship missile batteries, including HY-2s with ranges of approximately 100 kilometers, which can be directed to a target by an aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicle. (China has anti-ship missiles with 200-280 kilometer ranges, but it is not believed these have been sold to Iran.) U.S. experts note that Iran can attack targeted ships with C-701, C-801, C-802 and Iranian-made anti-ship cruise missiles from its own shores, islands, and oil platforms using relatively small mobile launchers.

The navy and IRGC cannot close the Gulf for an extended period, but they could severely restrict shipping through the Gulf for five to 10 days. IRGC naval forces can operate from bases along the Gulf coast, bases near Strait of Hormuz shipping channels, Gulf islands and in the Gulf of Oman. Its anti-ship missile vessels include 13 Kaman-class and 38-meter Thondor (Hudong)-class vessels with C-802 anti-ship missiles, and 9 C-14 and 10 Mk-13 smaller patrol boats with short range Chinese anti-ship missiles. Iran has made and deployed at least 25 Peykapp II-class missile boats and 15 of its own Peykaap I-class coastal patrol craft. The IRGC also has some 100 other, smaller patrol boats, many of which are small enough to be difficult to detect reliably by radar. A number of Iran’s patrol boats are armed with torpedoes and short-range or man-portable anti-air missiles.

The Iranian Navy and IRGC regularly exercise laying mines. The navy can use submarines and five aging mine warfare ships. But all IRGC patrol vessels and many Iranian commercial vessels can lay mines. U.S. Navy intelligence estimates that Iran has the Chinese EM52, a rocket-propelled anti-ship mine, and that the Iranian purchase of three Russian KILO-class submarines probably included modern magnetic, acoustic and pressure-sensitive mines. Iran also produces its own mines, although these may still be limited to less advanced designs. U.S. experts estimate that Iran had at least 2,000 mines by 2004. This is a key threat. The United States normally deploys limited mine warfare capabilities in the Gulf. And Gulf naval capabilities include only five Saudi mine layers and some helicopters with uncertain readiness and training. The Marines and IRGC could use patrol boats, small craft and commercial vessels to raid key offshore facilities in the Gulf, attack key petroleum facilities on the cost, strike at shipping vessels, or raid shore facilities such as desalination or power plants. Iran could also use marines and specially trained IRGC forces to seize ships and infiltrate land targets. It has amphibious ships, but some exercises include activities that train small craft with teams of IRGC fighters in ways suitable for raids on offshore or coastal targets.

Finding and destroying all of the active elements of the naval branch of the IRGC and Iran’s smaller surface craft would be difficult. While Iran’s smaller craft have limited ability to stay at sea, they can be remotely located and used in a war of attrition to launch sudden raids with anti-ship missiles, using direct fire weapons, or drop mines. The IRGC and some elements of the Iranian Navy regularly practice the use of small craft, commercial vessels and amphibious vessels in moving forces that can defend and seize targets in the Gulf and on its coast, and support the deployment of medium to long-range, land-based anti-ship missiles and operations of small craft and missile patrol boats outside regular peacetime bases.

Possibly the most effective tool that the Iranians have is their mine warfare capability. The Iranians have an extensive (and underrated) naval mining capability, which can be launched from boats, planes, mini-submarines and even from the shore. Mines are the poor man's most lethal naval weapon. Since the end of the Second World War, mines have seriously damaged or sunk four times more US navy ships than all other means of attack combined.

Iran's naval mining capability looks like the wild card in such a conflict. There is no command and control structure in mine warfare that the US type of "shock and awe" strategy could effectively attack and destroy.

According to Christian Koch, Director of the International Studies Research Program at the Gulf Research Center, Iran’s objective was to increase the sense of insecurity. He says the most serious threat posed by Iran is in the form of asymmetrical warfare that employs irregulars or proxies to engage in acts of terror and sabotage. He further adds that Iran doesn’t need to close the Strait of Hormuz to wreak havoc; it could target oil fields, power plants and other critical and vulnerable installations located in the Gulf.

The Iranian Navy and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) may not be able to close the Strait for an extended period of time; these forces by the use of unconventional means of warfare may be in a position to hamper normal shipping for a period of a week or two. This period however, would be critical as it could result in sky-rocketing of crude prices, thereby impacting the global economy. However, considering the fact that the US would be able to augment its force levels in the region in a short time-span and the continued vigil maintained by the Bahrain-based Fifth Fleet, Iranian attempts at hampering shipping could very well be thwarted.

An International Legal Perspective of the British Embassy Attack in Tehran

2011-11-30T04:14:00.000-08:00

Iran

has done it again. On 28^th November 2011, Iranian protestors stormed the British Embassy compound and a diplomatic residence, tearing down the British flag, breaking windows, vandalizing walls and holding six embassy staffers “hostage” for a short time. The protest which appeared to have the full support of the Iranian government was in response to Britain’s harsh new sanctions against Iran for its ongoing nuclear weapons’ programme. The incident brought back memories of the diplomatic crisis between Iran and the US when 52 American Embassy personnel were held hostage for 444 days from 4^th November 1979 to 20^th January 1981 after a group of Islamist students and militants took over the US Embassy in Tehran in support of the Iranian Revolution.

The attack on Tuesday began when about 50 protesters invaded the offices in the vast walled compound housing the British Embassy and its manicured grounds, situated in a busy neighborhood in the heart of Tehran. Outside the gates, thousands of student protesters chanted religious slogans and demanded the expulsion of the British ambassador. In the meantime, 200 to 300 others broke into a British diplomatic residence a few miles north of the embassy, called Qolhak Garden. The facility also houses a school.

Television images showed protesters, some armed with gasoline bombs, rampaging through offices strewn with papers, and at least one vehicle was shown burning inside the compound. There was ample evidence of the state’s complicity in the attack: police was shown as silent spectators in television footage, and in any case the security forces have maintained strict control over all large protests in Iran ever since the disputed presidential election of 2009. Further evidence of Tehran’s complicity in the attack is apparent from the fact that the embassy attack came a day after Iran’s Parliament approved a measure to expel the British ambassador and downgrade diplomatic relations between the two countries, in retaliation for Britain’s new economic sanctions.

Iran’s semi-official Fars news agency reported that police officers freed six British staff members who had been surrounded by the Qolhak Garden protesters and that 12 of those protesters were later arrested.

The Iranian authorities have organized similar political demonstrations against foreign embassies in the past, intervening only after the protest was well under way and the message was clear.

This attack very clearly proves that Iran has scant regard for the provisions of international law and particularly the provisions of Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961.

Article 22 (1) of the Vienna Convention stipulates that the premises of the mission are inviolable and the agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.

Article 22 (2) of the 1961 Convention enjoins on the receiving State (the host country) take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.

So also Article 30 provides that the private residence of a diplomatic agent shall enjoy the same inviolability and protection as the premises of the mission.

Article 29 lays down that the person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.

All the three provisions referred to above were infringed with impunity in the incident in Tehran.

Iran

, by permitting this attack, is also guilty of violation of the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 1973

A diplomat is an internationally protected person within the meaning of the above-mentioned Convention and at the time when and in the place where a crime against him, his official premises, his private accommodation or his means of transport is committed, is entitled pursuant to international law to special protection from any attack on his person, freedom or dignity, as well as members of his family forming part of his household.

The 1973 Convention vide Article 2 provides

1. The intentional commission of:

(a) A murder, kidnapping or other attack upon the person or liberty of an internationally protected person;

b) A violent attack upon the official premises, the private accommodation or the means of transport of an internationally protected person likely to endanger his person or liberty;

(c) A threat to commit any such attack;

(d) An attempt to commit any such attack; and

(e) An act constituting participation as an accomplice in any such attack shall be made by each State Party a crime under its internal law.

2. Each State Party shall make these crimes punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature.

3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article in no way derogate from the obligations of States Parties under international law to take all appropriate measures to prevent other attacks on the person, freedom or dignity of an internationally protected person.

Iran needs to be reminded that apart from the provisions of Vienna Convention, in Islamic tradition too, a messenger should not be harmed, even if coming from an arch-enemy and bearing a highly provocative or offensive message. A hadith attributes this sunnah to the time when Musaylimah sent to the Prophet Muhammad messengers who proclaimed Musaylimah be a Prophet of Allah and the co-equal of Muhammad himself.

Iran has in the past been indicted and held guilty by the International Court of Justice in the case involving seizure of the US Embassy and its personnel in 1979. In the case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran decided on 24^th May 1980 by the International Court of Justice, the Court, inter alia, held that the Islamic Republic of Iran, had violated in several respects, obligations owed by it to the United States of America under international conventions in force between the two countries, as well as under long-established rules of general international law. The Court also held that Iran was under an obligation to make reparation to the Government of the

United States of America

for the injury caused by the events of 4^th November 1979 and what followed from these events.

Given Iran’s past record, it is indeed far-fetched to expect Iran to abide by the rules of international law. In such circumstances, international community must take cognizance of the inherently delinquent behaviour and adopt “strong measures” to deter and prevent Iran from violating the law of nations in general as well as international treaty obligations.

NATO Attack on Pak Check Post - Ramifications

2011-11-28T04:27:00.000-08:00

On 26^th November 2011 (around 2.00 am local time), helicopters/aircraft belonging to NATO/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) carried out an attack, alleged to be unprovoked by Pakistan, on a military border outpost at Baizai area of Mohmand tribal region a lawless border area which abuts Afghanistan's eastern Kunar province, killing about 24 to 28 soldiers including a major and a captain. Fifteen more personnel were wounded and the death toll could rise as condition of some of the injured was reported to be serious. The attack prompted Islamabad to launch strong protest with the United States and close its frontier for supplies to allied forces in Afghanistan. Pakistani authorities responded to the attack by stopping all container trucks and tankers carrying supplies for US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. The attack threatened to further strain the already tense US-Pak relations.

According to the spokesman for the NATO-led ISAF in Kabul the coalition was aware of "an incident" near the border and was gathering information on it. Security forces blocked all entry points to Mohmand tribal agency after the incident and began checking all vehicles, TV news channels reported. Several crossings on the Afghanistan frontier, including Landikotal and Takhtbai, were closed and over 150 NATO supply vehicles sent back to Peshawar.

Pakistan rejected the regret expressed by NATO and warned that the action would have grave consequences. The regret expressed by NATO over the killing of the Pakistani soldiers is "not enough", chief military spokesman Maj Gen Athar Abbas said. "The NATO strike can have grave consequences," he said. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on Sunday said he had written to Pakistan Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani to express regret over the "tragic unintended incident".

Apart from closing all NATO supply routes, Pakistan asked the US to vacate Shamsi airbase within 15 days. The base is believed to be used by Central Investigation Agency for operating drones.

While Pakistan has alleged that the air strike was unprovoked, there are reports suggesting that Afghan troops operating near the Pakistani border came under fire and in response called in NATO air strikes. The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue, said it was unclear who attacked the Afghan troops before dawn Saturday, but that the soldiers were fired upon from the direction of the Pakistani border posts that were hit in the strikes.

The border area where the soldiers were operating contains a mix of Pakistani forces and Islamist militants.

But there are forces working against a total rupture in the relationship. Pakistan continues to rely on billions of dollars in American military and civilian aid, and the U.S. needs Islamabad's help to push Afghan insurgents to engage in peace talks.

Tensions are likely to exacerbate if militants unleash attacks against hundreds of trucks carrying supplies to U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan that were backed up at Pakistani border crossings after Islamabad closed the frontier.

Suspected militants had destroyed around 150 trucks a year ago after Pakistan closed one of its Afghan border crossings to NATO supplies for about 10 days in retaliation for a U.S. helicopter attack that accidentally killed two Pakistani soldiers.

The situation could become worse this time because Pakistan has closed both its crossings. Nearly 300 trucks carrying coalition supplies are now stranded at Torkham in the northwest Khyber tribal area and Chaman in southwestern Baluchistan province. A prolonged closure of Pakistan's two Afghan border crossings to NATO supplies could cause serious problems for the coalition. Recent reports suggest that the closure of the crossings is permanent. The U.S., which is the largest member of the NATO force in Afghanistan, ships more than 30 per cent of its non-lethal supplies through Pakistan. The coalition has alternative routes through Central Asia into northern Afghanistan, but they are costlier and less efficient. According to the Telegraph, although the US is transporting more of its equipment, food and fuel through Central Asia in an attempt to reduce Pakistani leverage, the route through Karachi still accounts for 49% of supplies destined for the 140,000-strong foreign force.

The incident will have far-reaching ramifications not only on US-Pak relations, but also for the ISAF operations in Afghanistan and the US-led war on terror.

Firstly, ISAF will have to explore the possibilities of opening and maintaining alternate routes for transport of food, equipment and fuel for its forces stationed and operating in Afghanistan. Secondly, Pakistan’s action of closure of the border crossings will most likely be met with cut US military and non-military aid to Pakistan, something which it can ill-afford.

Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy is highly suspect. The US Government and its lawmakers are highly skeptical of Pakistani intentions and its policy of hunting with the hounds and running with the hare. Western officials have alleged that Pakistan has played a "double-game" since 2001, by allying with the US but at the same time providing support to the Taliban and other Afghan insurgents. US officials suspected that the Pakistani ISI had conspired with the Haqqani network in the September 2011 attack on the US Embassy in Kabul. The relations between the two sides have nose-dived since then. This incident may give Pakistan a pretext to withdraw support to the US war on terror, particularly because of the unpopularity of the drone attacks inside Pakistan. And the US too may be looking for an excuse to carry out military strikes inside Pakistan because of Pakistan’s reluctance to take action against groups like the Haqqani network, which

Pakistan

considers to be a strategic asset.

The most important ramification of this incident is Pakistan’s call to vacate the Shamsi air base operated by the CIA.

First offered to Washington in the early days after 9/11 by the Musharraf regime when it simpered before the American threat that it will be bombed back to the Stone Age if it did not cooperate, Shamsi's US operations was a well-kept secret till February 2009 when Internet trawlers ferreted out Google earth photos showing drone aircraft at the base. News that the US was using Pakistani facilities to carry out its Predator campaign within Pakistani territory against Pakistani targets embarrassed Islamabad no end, sparking off a campaign to evict American assets. Pakistan, it must be noted managed to get US to vacate the Jacobabad airbase, the second of the air base operated by the US. Reports suggest that Pakistan has not been successful in getting the US to vacate the Shamsi base. How did the

manage to cling on to this base? The answer lay in the fact that the air base was not even under Pakistani control. Like with some other parts of the country like areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir ceded to China and parts of the Khyber Pakhtunwa given up to extremists, Islamabad earned itself the dubious reputation as a rentier state, it turned out that Shamsi Air Base had been leased out to some Gulf potentates.

During the Pakistan national assembly debate following the Abbottabad operation, Pakistan air chief Rao Qamar Suleman reportedly told lawmakers in camera than Shamsi has been under the control of the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan Air Force had no say in the matter. In fact, the Shamsi air strip was originally built for Arab sheikhs who flew into

Pakistan

to hunt for the houbara bustard, a rare bird some Arabs believe has aphrodisiac properties.

Now, the US-UAE arrangement in Shamsi rendered the Pakistani establishment impotent.

In the event of closure of the Shamsi Air Base, the drone operations being carried out by CIA may be adversely affected. The US may have to shift these operations to a secure location in Afghanistan or elsewhere. If such a situation were to arise, then the US may probably adopt a no holds barred approach to taking on terrorists in Pakistan.

In conclusion, Pakistan must realise that playing a dangerous double game as they have done so far in Afghanistan is fraught with serious risks wherein allied forces may carry out military strikes as highlighted by this incident "accidentally". None, but Pakistan alone, will be responsible for such actions.

Hunt for Energy Sources - A Potential for Conflict

2011-09-22T05:04:00.000-07:00

Two potential flash points have come into focus in two different parts of the globe – one in the South China Sea and the other in the Eastern Mediterranean with striking similarities. The two flash points have a common issue linking them and that is the exploitation of natural resources under the sea. In both the cases, a dominant littoral power is seeking to coerce the smaller states in the region in order to prevent these states from carrying out exploration activities.

In the South China Sea, the dominant power China which claims absolute sovereignty over the waters and the islands located on the sea has been warning the lesser power viz. Vietnam to desist from entering into a venture with India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Videsh for oil exploration in two blocks claimed by Vietnam in the South China Sea.

Turkey is at the heart of a gas exploration row in the Mediterranean. Israel and the Greek-speaking government of Cyprus are exploring for gas in the eastern Mediterranean, and

Israel

has laid claim to a massive deepwater gas field discovered in 2009. Turkey, increasingly assertive in the region under Erdogan, disputes Israeli and Cypriot offshore territorial claims and says

Cyprus

should not exploit resources until it resolves a stand-off with its breakaway Turkish-speaking north.

The quarrel over gas escalated in recent weeks, just as relations between Israel and Turkey abruptly broke down over Israel's refusal to apologize for its raid on a Gaza-bound flotilla last year in which nine pro-Palestinian Turkish activists aboard the Mavi Marmara died.

Turkey said it would carry out its own energy surveys with the breakaway Turkish Cypriot state - under escort by its war ships if necessary - if Cyprus pressed ahead with drilling.

Texas-based Noble Energy which is carrying out the drilling operations for Cyprus has been conducting offshore drills in the eastern Mediterranean for

Israel

since 1998.

The recent saber-rattling came as Texas-based Noble Energy Inc. began exploratory drilling farther south between Cyprus and Israel around September 18, despite Turkish warnings to halt the project, the semi-official Cyprus News Agency reported. Noble was operating under license from the Republic of Cyprus, the island's internationally recognized government in the Greek Cypriot south.

The developments raised the stakes in a dispute over drilling rights around the divided island.

Turkish leaders say the Republic of Cyprus shouldn't drill for oil and gas on the continental shelf that it delineated with

Israel

in an agreement last year. Any drilling or maritime agreements, Ankara says, should wait until the island—divided since 1974, when Turkey invaded

Cyprus

in response to a Greek-backed coup—is reunified, so both the Greek and Turkish populations can benefit.

Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz described the Cypriot exploration project as "a political provocation aimed at consolidating the Greek Cypriot administration's status," and so short-circuiting reunification talks for the island, Turkey's state Anadolu news agency reported.

Mr. Yildiz also reiterated a Turkish warning that it would make its own agreement with the de facto government of Northern Cyprus to delineate the continental shelf north of the island, if Noble Energy were to proceed with its drilling plans. Ankara would then authorize the Turkish Petroleum Corp. to send research vessels to begin exploration in the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot waters, he said.

The Republic of Cyprus is a European Union member state, but isn't recognized by Turkey. By contrast,

Turkey

is the only country to recognize the administration of the government of the island's ethnic-Turkish North. The two sides are divided by a United Nations-monitored green line.

Ankara's threat of military action came on the heels of similar threats Turkey made in recent weeks to send naval vessels to escort future aid convoys that attempt to break Israel's naval blockade of Gaza. Those combative policies risk confrontation with Cyprus and Israel, as well tensions with the EU and Washington, diplomats said, noting that Cyprus is an EU member and Noble Energy is a

U.S.

company.

A spokeswoman for the European Union's foreign-affairs service said Monday in Brussels that the EU urged "

Turkey

to refrain from any kind of threat or sources or friction or action" that could damage relations in the neighborhood or border settlement talks.

Noble Energy is also involved in developing Israel's Leviathan field, which contains an estimated 16 trillion cubic feet, or about 453 billion cubic meters, of natural gas. Noble's partner in that project,

Israel

's Delek Drilling LP, has applied to the Greek Cypriot government to activate an option to take a 30% share in the Cypriot exploration license, too, said a senior industry executive familiar with the project.

Washington has not only given Noble Energy a go-ahead to start drilling off Cyprus but backed it up with a State Department statement: "The US supports the efforts to enhance energy diversity in Europe, noting the fact a US company was involved was also positive."

Since September 13, 2011 Turkish troop reinforcements have been reported by debkafile's military sources as having landed in North Cyprus along with drilling equipment. These preparations indicated that Turkey was planning to start drilling in the Cypriot EEZ without reference to Nicosia. This meant that Prime Minister Erdogan, while spouting high-sounding pledges to "preserve "freedom of navigation in international waters," was preparing a wildcat breach of international law and treaties. Athens warned Ankara against pursuing this step.

Since September 14, Turkish warplanes and fighters kept watch on the Homer Ferrington rig belonging to Houston-based Noble Energy as it moved from Israel's offshore field Noa opposite Ashdod to Cyprus's Aphrodite (Block 12) field ready to start work.

It was the first time since the Mavi Marmara episode of May 2010 that Turkish warships came less than 80 kilometers from

Israel

's territorial waters. debkafile's military sources report that Israeli missile ships and drones kept watch from afar on the Noble rig's movement and tracked Turkish surveillance. As the rig moved into position opposite

Cyprus

, so too did two Turkish frigates. A Cypriot spokesman said Turkish warships and fighters had not entered the island's territorial waters.

Ankara has questioned Israel and

Cyprus' rights

to drill for hydrocarbon reserves in the respective Exclusive Economic Zones marked out in an accord they concluded last year.

Interestingly, Greece and Israel concluded a mutual defense pact on September 4, 2011. Ten days later, Prime Ministers George Papandreou and Binyamin Netanyahu agreed to activate the pact in the light of Turkish threats against Israel and to exploration activity in the Mediterranean basin. Israel and Greece have therefore begun to coordinate their fleet movements in the eastern Mediterranean and around

Cyprus

The Eastern Mediterranean could become a potential conflict zone involving Turkey, Israel, Greece and Cyprus and possibly even the US if the Turkish Prime Minister in defiance of international law and norms prevents exploration work by resort to use of force. As of now it remains to be seen whether Erdogan in his quest for becoming another Nasser of the Islamic world opts for a military confrontation particularly with Israel or take recourse like other Muslim rulers and vent his ire on Israel.

INS Airavat Incident – A Legal Analysis

2011-09-08T05:06:00.000-07:00

The INS Airavat, a Shardul-class amphibious warfare ship belonging to the Indian Navy paid a friendly visit to Vietnam between July 19 and July 28, 2011. On July 22, INS Airavat sailed from Nha Trang port in south central Vietnam towards Haiphong, where it was to make a friendly visit. About 45 nautical miles off the Vietnamese coast on the South China Sea, the Airavat was "buzzed" on an open radio channel. (Nha Trang was a key U. S. military base during the Vietnam War, and is an important military port).

The caller identified himself as belonging to the Chinese navy and after asking the Indian ship to identify itself, warned, "You are entering Chinese waters. Move out of here". However, officers on the ship confirmed that no Chinese ship or vessel was seen on the horizon or picked up on the radar. The INS Airavat did not respond to the message or identify itself as demanded and continued on its way. This incident did not get much media attention considering the fact that Indian authorities decided not to make an issue out of it. However, the fact remains that China in conformity with its aggressive behaviour has been trying to act contrary to the tenets of the recognized principles of international law. This insignificant incident brings back memories of the incident involving the USNS Impeccable in March 2009 when the US ship was shadowed and harassed by Chinese ships while operating 75 miles south of Hainan Island. (http://kumar-theloneranger.blogspot.com/2009/03/impeccable-incident-legal-perspective.html)

Basis of China’s action

The underlying basis of China’s action in July 2011 which has not received much attention in the context of the present incident is the fact that China claims much or all of the South China Sea as its territorial waters. It is relevant to note that South China Sea is replete with disputes. The South China Sea contains several islands, atolls, shoals, reefs and sandbars, many of which are naturally under water at high tide, and some of which are permanently submerged. Given below are the rival claims of the countries of the region in respect of the various islands in the South China Sea:

The Spratly Islands, disputed between the People's Republic of China, the Republic of China, and Vietnam, with Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines claiming part of the archipelago
The Paracel Islands, disputed between the People's Republic of China, the Republic of China, and Vietnam
The Pratas Islands, disputed between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China
The Macclesfield Bank, disputed between the People's Republic of China, the Philippines, and the Republic of China
The Scarborough Shoal, disputed between the People's Republic of China, the Philippines, and the Republic of China

There is a huge amount at stake. Besides fisheries, the sea, particularly around the Spratlys, is believed to be enormously rich in hydrocarbons. The sea is also a vital shipping route, accounting for a big chunk of world trade.

In response to rival territorial claims of the various countries above mentioned,

China

tabled its own map, with nine-dotted lines outlining its claim. Joined up, the dotted lines give China not just two island chains, but almost the whole sea. There seems to be no basis for this in UNCLOS. But China points to history. It says the map has been in use since the Republic of China published it in 1946, and, until quite recently, nobody raised objection. According to Robert Beckman, director of the Centre for International Law at the National University of Singapore, “The dotted-line map was first produced by the Chinese government in 1947 and has nine dashes drawn in a u-shape around the islands in the South China Sea. Although China has used this map on several occasions, it has never clarified its position on exactly what it is claiming inside the dotted-line. This has led some to conclude that China is claiming all the waters within the dotted-line as its territorial waters or historic waters. Such a position would be contrary to UNCLOS.

While much attention has been given to the dotted-line map attached to China’s Note Verbale, it should be remembered that the Note does not assert sovereignty over the waters in the dotted-line except for the waters “adjacent” to the islands which arguably only refers to a 12 nm territorial sea. The Note contains no language suggesting that China claims that all the waters inside the dotted-line are its territorial waters or historic waters, or that it has any historic rights in the waters inside the dotted-line. This suggests that China’s claim is only to the islands inside the dotted-line, and to the maritime zones that can be generated from such islands, a position consistent with UNCLOS.”

Maritime claims in South China Sea (Ref: Wikipedia)

The Law

It is necessary here to refer to some of the relevant provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention 1982 –

Article 89 Invalidity of claims of sovereignty over the high seas

No State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty.

Article 87 Freedom of the high seas

1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States:

(a) freedom of navigation;

(b) freedom of overflight;

(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under international law, subject to Part VI;

(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2;

(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.

2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the Area.

Article 95 Immunity of warships on the high seas

Warships on the high seas have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State.

For the purposes of this Convention, Article 29 defines "warship" to mean a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.

A warship enjoys sovereign immunity from the interference of authorities of states other than its own flag state. A warship cannot be required to consent to an on board search or inspection, nor may it be required to fly the flag of the host nation. (Arts. 32, 58(2), 95, 236).

A reference may also be made to the relevant provisions of the Convention on the High Seas 1958 –

Article 1 – The term “high seas” means all parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State.

Article 2 – The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal States:

(1) Freedom of navigation;

(2) Freedom of fishing;

(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;

(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.

These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.

The provisions of the this article seem to have been derived from Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius’ famous treatise Mare Liberum (The Free Sea or the Freedom of the Sea) Grotius had argued that the sea was free to all, and that nobody had the right to deny others access to it. Grotius formulated the new principle that the sea was international territory and all nations were free to use it for seafaring trade. The argument was directed towards the Portuguese Mare clausum policy (meaning closed sea) and their claim of monopoly on the East Indian Trade. The “freedom of the seas” has thus legal as well as political connotations, and it has been one of the cornerstones of maritime law.

Article 8

1. Warships on the high seas have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State.

2. For the purposes of these articles, the term “warship” means a ship belonging to the naval forces of a State and bearing the external marks distinguishing warships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government and whose name appears in the Navy List, and manned by a crew who are under regular naval discipline.

Article 95 of the 1982 Convention and Article 8 of the 1958 Convention expressly provides for complete immunity to warships from jurisdiction of any State except the flag State.

Assuming for the sake of argument, the Indian ship entered Chinese territorial waters, the international maritime law provides that ships are entitled to right of innocent passage through the territorial sea of the coastal state. Hence, PLA-N personnel questioning the right of the Indian ship to be in the South China Sea and asking it to leave the area is contrary to international law.

Conclusion

China is a known bully and in the recent past it has been coercing foreign vessels in the South China Sea. The harassment of INS Airavat was one of various such incidents. China needs to understand that international waters and waterways are terra nullius and not capable of appropriation. International community and the littoral states of the Asia-Pacific region must co-operate in order to counter aggressive Chinese behaviour.

STEPS IN THE FORMATION OF TREATIES

2011-06-27T02:28:00.000-07:00

[Note: This article is primarily meant for students of International Law studying the subject at the graduate or post-graduate level]

Introductory Note

According to Martin Dixon and Robert McCorquodale , treaties are evidence of the express consent of states to regulate their interests according to international law. It is important to remember that treaties are the most important source of international law and are increasingly used to codify and develop international law. Since international legal relationship between States and international organizations came to be increasingly governed by written agreements, a need was felt for developing a set of general rules to govern the obligations of the parties to treaties. In 1966, the International law Commission adopted its final report on the law of treaties and in a Conference attended by representatives of more than 100 states, held in Vienna, Austria in two sessions, in 1968 and 1969, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties came to be adopted. The Convention entered into force on January 27, 1980. Another Convention was held in 1986 at Vienna on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations. The 1969 Convention deals with the formation of treaties, entry into force, reservations, and procedure relating to invalidity, termination, withdrawal, and suspension of operation of treaties as well as their interpretation.

Definition and Meaning of the term ‘Treaty’

(1) Oppenheim : International treaties are agreements, of a contractual character, between States, or organizations of States, creating legal rights and obligations between the parties.

(2) McNair : The term treaty means a written agreement by which two or more states or international organizations create or intend to create a relation between themselves operating within the sphere of international law.

Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 defines the term treaty: Treaty means an international agreement concluded between States in a written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.

The term ‘treaty’ is used in a generic sense rather than a reference to a particular form of international agreement. The term treaty covers convention, agreement, arrangement, protocol, exchange of notes, exchange of letters, etc. International law makes no distinction between agreements referred to as treaties and other types of agreements. The name or designation given to an agreement is in itself unimportant and of no legal consequence.

There is no formal requirement in international law for a treaty to come into existence Treaties usually are in written form and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties applies only to those treaties which are in written form. However, it cannot be categorically stated that oral agreements have no legal validity.

Unilateral statements-whether binding: A question that has not infrequently arisen is whether the unilateral statements or pronouncements of a State create any legally binding international obligations. The Legal Status of Eastern Greenland is a case in point. In 1919, the Danish government through its representative in Norway informed the Norwegian government that they would not raise any objection to Norway’s claim over Spitzbergen at the Paris Peace Conference if Norway refrained from challenging Danish claims of sovereignty over all Greenland. M. Ihlen, the Norwegian foreign minister, informed his Danish counterpart that Norway would not create any difficulties in respect of the Danish claim of sovereignty over Eastern Greenland. When the matter came up before the PCIJ, Denmark argued that Norway by the “Ihlen Declaration” had recognized Danish sovereignty over Eastern Greenland. The Court denied that the “Ihlen Declaration” constituted recognition of Danish sovereignty. However, it held that Norway had incurred a legally binding obligation to refrain from contesting Danish sovereignty over Eastern Greenland. The Court did not characterize the “Ihlen Declaration” as an oral agreement, nor did not delineate the circumstances, if any, when a unilateral statement could be binding. The Court in this case appeared to regard the Norwegian statement as being given in return for a Danish commitment not to oppose a Norwegian claim to Spitzbergen.

The agreement entered into between the parties must be governed by international law. Agreements which are subject to some national system of law will not constitute treaties. Where the parties do not possess international legal personality, the agreements entered into by and between such parties will not be governed by international law.

Formation of treaties

No specific form or procedure has been prescribed in international law for the conclusion of a treaty. The parties negotiating a treaty are free to agree upon a language or languages in which the treaty is to be expressed. Though a precise procedure or standard does not exist, following steps are generally adopted in concluding a treaty.

1) Accrediting of Persons by the Contracting States

2) Negotiation

3) Adoption of the text

4) Consent of the States

5) Entry into force

Accrediting of Persons by Contracting States

Normally, the treaty-making capacity of States is exercised by Heads of State or by their governments. However, today, this treaty-making power is rarely exercised by them in person, and is done through representatives. If they appoint a representative for the purpose of negotiating, adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty, or for expressing the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty, he is provided with a formal instrument called Full Powers. Art. 2(1)(c) of the Vienna Convention defines Full Powers: ‘full powers’ means a document emanating from the competent authority of a State designating a person or persons to represent the State for negotiating, adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty, for expressing the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty, or for accomplishing any other act with respect to a treaty.

Full Powers is not necessary if the treaty is concluded by the Heads of States or Governments, Minister of Foreign Affairs and heads of diplomatic mission.

Negotiation

The stage of negotiation is the most crucial stage in the formation of a treaty where the participating States put forth proposals for discussions. After detailed deliberations, the proposals are harmonized and the parties arrive at a tentative agreement.

Adoption of the Text

After negotiations, the form and content is settled by drawing up a text setting out its provisions. The normal rule is that consent of all the participating states is required for adopting the text of the treaty. The principle of unanimity in preparing the text of the treaty in the case of international conferences is unrealistic and is not normally the rule. Article 9 (2) of the Vienna Convention provides that adoption of the text of a treaty at an international conference takes place by two-thirds of the states present and voting, unless by the same majority they decide to apply a different rule.

Consent of the States

The treaties may bind states only when they have given their consent. Some of the ways in which a State may express its consent to be bound by a treaty are by means of signature, exchange of instruments, ratification or accession.

Authentication

In many cases authentication is not seen as a distinct step as the act of signature serves as authenticating and an expression of willingness to be bound by the treaty. However, in cases where the unsigned text of a treaty is incorporated in the final act of a conference, or where the treaty adopted in an international organization is authenticated by the president of the organization, authentication may be a separate step.

Signature

The act of affixing the signature by a State’s representative may express the consent of the State to be bound by the treaty. This can happen only where the negotiating or participating States have agreed that signature should have that effect, by providing in the treaty itself or where it appears from the full powers that a State had intended to give that effect to the signature of its representative or it was so expressed during negotiations. Sometimes, a representative’s signature may be qualified, that is to say it may be affixed ad referendum, i.e. subject to the State’s confirmation. In such a case, the State’s subsequent confirmation constitutes signature of the treaty. In certain cases, where the signature may be subject to ratification, a State will not be bound by the treaty till ratification is complete.

Exchange of Instruments

Article 13 of the Vienna Convention provides the consent of States to be bound by a treaty constituted by instruments exchanged between them is expressed by that exchange when:

(a) the instruments provide that their exchange shall have that effect; or
(b) it is otherwise established that those States were agreed that the exchange of instruments should have that effect.

Ratification

Article 2(1) (b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 defines ratification as ‘the international act so named whereby a States establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty’.

Ratification is mainly required for the States to re-examine the over-all effect of the treaties on their national interests. The other reason for having the step of ratification is to give the States sufficient time to enact legislation to give effect to the obligations which they would assume under the treaty.

Article 14 of the Vienna Convention provides that the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when:

(a) the treaty provides for such consent to be expressed by means of ratification;

(b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States were required that ratification should be required;

(d) the intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its representative or was expressed during the negotiation.

Form and Mode of Ratification

International law does not prescribe any form of ratification. According to Oppenheim, ratification normally takes the form of a document signed by the Heads of the States or their foreign ministers. It is usual to draft as many documents as there as parties to the treaty, and to exchange these copies between the parties.

Entry into Force

A treaty enters into force in accordance with its provisions. Article 24 of the Vienna Convention provides that a treaty enters into force in such manner and upon such date as it may provide or as the states negotiating the treaty may agree. If the treaty is silent, it enters into force as soon as consent to be bound by the treaty has been established for all the negotiating states. Bilateral treaty enters into force when States exchange documents of ratification. Where ratification is not required, the treaty comes into force after signature and exchange or deposit of signed copies. Multilateral treaties enter into force from date when prescribed number of ratifications or accessions has been made.

References:
1. Martin Dixon and Robert McCorquodale, Cases and Materials on International Law (1995) p 48
2. Oppenheim, International Law Vol. 1 (8th Edition) p 877
3. McNair, Law of Treaties p 4

Krittika Biswas Case – Scope of Diplomatic Immunity

2011-06-14T23:59:00.000-07:00

Krittika Biswas, the eighteen year old daughter of Debashis Biswas, a Vice-Consul serving at the Indian Consulate General in Manhattan was falsely accused of sending obscene emails to her school teacher and subsequently wrongfully arrested and kept in custody for more than 24 hours in February 2011. She was also sent for more than a month to a special suspension program by her school despite being cleared by investigators. On 6th May 2011 Ms Biswas filed a notice of claim stating that she was suing New York City for $ 1.5 million. The girl is reported to have claimed diplomatic immunity. However, a State Department spokesman, Mark Toner said that immunity did not extend to family members of diplomats. "As a family member of consular officer, rather, she does not enjoy immunity from jurisdiction or inviolability," he told reporters.

Indian Consul General in New York stated that the US State Department was wrong in its reading of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and asserted that diplomatic immunity is extended to family members of consular officers.

Insisting that Toner had got it wrong, Dayal pointed to article 53 (2) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963, which says "Members of the family of a member of the consular post forming part of his household and members of his private staff shall receive the privileges and immunities provided in the present Convention..."

The State Department, however, said that it was sticking by Toner's earlier remarks.

This incident involving the Consul’s daughter has resulted in a spat between both the countries. This paper seeks to examine the role of consuls and the nature and extent of immunity available to Foreign Service officers posted in Indian missions abroad.

Consuls – Roles and Functions

There is an assumption that diplomats and consuls hold the same office. Although diplomats and consuls work hand in hand to create and develop foreign relations between States, they are different; not only in the function that they perform, but also in the immunities and privileges that are afforded to them.

Their primary duty is to protect economic interests and any trade relations between the sending and receiving State. Other consular duties include issuing passports, the registration of birth and the solemnising of marriages, executing notarial acts and exercising disciplinary jurisdiction over the crews of vessels belonging to the sending State. The protection of the sending State’s nationals who find themselves in difficulty in the receiving State is an important function and failure of the receiving State to allow right of access to and communication with such nationals may result in action being initiated before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), as did Germany and Paraguay against the US. McClanahan states three provisions with reference to communication and contact with nationals of the sending State. Firstly, that consuls shall be free to communicate and have access to nationals of the sending State and vice versa; secondly, that consuls are to be informed swiftly by the authorities of the receiving State regarding the arrest and detention of any of their nationals, and the nationals shall be informed of such rights; and thirdly, that consuls have the right to visit the nationals and arrange for their legal representation.

Immunities

The rights, privileges and immunities of consular officers

Article 53 of the Convention provides –

(1) Every member of the consular post shall enjoy the privileges and immunities provided in the present Convention from the moment he enters the territory of the receiving State on proceeding to take up his post or, if already in its territory, from the moment when he enters on his duties with the consular post.

(2) Members of the family of a member of the consular post forming part of his household and members of his private staff shall receive the privileges and immunities provided in the present Convention from the date from which he enjoys privileges and immunities in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article or from the date of their entry into the territory of the receiving State or from the date of their becoming a member of such family or private staff, whichever is the latest.

Article 41 of the Convention provides –

(1) Consular officers shall not be liable to arrest or detention pending trial, except in the case of a grave crime and pursuant to a decision by the competent judicial authority.

(2) Except in the case specified in paragraph 1 of this article, consular officers shall not be committed to prison or be liable to any other form of restriction on their personal freedom save in execution of a judicial decision of final effect.

(3) If criminal proceedings are instituted against a consular officer, he must appear before the competent authorities. Nevertheless, the proceedings shall be conducted with the respect due to him by reason of his official position and, except in the case specified in paragraph 1 of this article, in a manner which will hamper the exercise of consular functions as little as possible. When, in the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article, it has become necessary to detain a consular officer, the proceedings against him shall be instituted with the minimum of delay.

The definition of “grave crime” depends on the statute obtaining in the receiving State and its interpretation by its judiciary. By no stretch of imagination can sending obscene or threatening emails by a student to his or her teacher be construed as a grave crime.

Consular immunity offers protections similar to diplomatic immunity, but the protection is not absolute and as extensive, given the functional differences between consular and diplomatic officers. For example, consular officers are not accorded absolute immunity from a host country’s criminal jurisdiction (they may be tried for certain local crimes upon action by a local court) and are immune from local jurisdiction only in cases directly relating to consular functions.

In general, consular privileges and immunities are dramatically more limited in scope than those afford¬ed to diplomats, particularly with respect to immunity from the jurisdiction of the receiving state. Consular officers and other employees at consulates have criminal, civil, and administrative immunity only with respect to acts performed in the exercise of consular functions. With limited exception for serious crimes, consular officers cannot be arrested or detained pending trial. Members of the consular staff, however, have no such protection.

The family members of consular employees have es¬sentially no immunity from the jurisdiction of the host state as they do not perform official acts. The determination of whether something qualifies as an “official act” or “consular function” is generally determined by the courts of the receiving state.

In order to appreciate the scope of immunity available to family members of a consular officer, it is relevant to make reference to Article 37 of Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961 which reads as follows:

The members of the family of a diplomatic agent forming part of his household shall, if they are not nationals of the receiving State, enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in articles 29 to 36.

This article provides for a near total immunity to both the diplomat and his family from arrest and detention in any form, inviolability of his person, residence and premises, immunity from criminal jurisdiction, exemption from taxation and social security. This level of immunity is not available to a consular officer and his family.

Article 42 of the 1963 Convention provides for notification of arrest, detention or prosecution. The article stipulates that in the event of the arrest or detention, pending trial, of a member of the consular staff, or of criminal proceedings being instituted against him, the receiving State shall promptly notify the head of the consular post. Should the latter be himself the object of any such measure, the receiving State shall notify the sending State through the diplomatic channel.

In his essay, “Rethinking Diplomatic Immunity: A Review of Remedial Approaches to Address the Abuses of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities”, Mitchell S. Ross says “The executive branch possesses exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an alien in the United States has diplomatic immunity. President Jimmy Carter delegated this function to the Secretary of State in 1978. The Secretary of State's power to confer or deny immunity is strictly a political determination and is not subject to judicial review.”

In the case of Krittika Biswas, assuming without admitting that the family member of a Consular officer was not entitled to immunity from jurisdiction and from arrest or detention, the local authorities in the US, particularly the New York Police Department ought to have notified the Indian Consulate about the arrest of the girl and permitted consular access as provided in the said Convention. It must be noted that this case is not the first instance of the US being in violation of the letter and spirit of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963. The US has been guilty of serious breaches in the past. In 1996, Paraguay came to know that its national Angel Francisco Breard was imprisoned in the United States and had been sentenced to death after being convicted of culpable homicide. However, the national was not given consular access. Paraguay initiated proceedings against the US before the International Court of Justice for violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963. “The Court unanimously indicates the following provisional measures:

The United States should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings, and should inform the Court of all the measures which it has taken in implementation of this Order;

II. Decides, that, until the Court has given its final decision, it shall remain seised of the matters which form the subject-matter of this Order.”

In the case of LaGrand Brothers, too, the accused were denied consular assistance under the Vienna Convention. The facts of the case are as under:

On January 7, 1982, brothers Karl and Walter Bernhard LaGrand bungled an armed bank robbery in Marana, Arizona, United States, killing a man and severely injuring a woman in the process. They were subsequently charged and convicted of murder and sentenced to death. The LaGrands were German nationals, having been born in Germany. While they had both lived in the United States since they were four and five, respectively, neither had acquired U.S. citizenship. As foreigners the LaGrands should have been informed of their right to consular assistance, under the Vienna Convention, from their state of nationality, Germany. However the United States authorities (the State of Arizona) failed to do this even after they became aware that the LaGrands were German nationals. The LaGrand brothers later contacted the German consulate of their own accord, having learned of their right to consular assistance. They appealed their sentences and convictions on the grounds that they were not informed of their right to consular assistance, and that with consular assistance they might have been able to mount a better defense. The federal courts rejected their argument on grounds of procedural default, which provides that issues cannot be raised in federal court appeals unless they have first been raised in state courts.

Diplomatic efforts, including pleas by German ambassador Jürgen Chrobog and German Member of Parliament Claudia Roth, and the recommendation of Arizona's clemency board, failed to sway Arizona Governor Jane Dee Hull, who insisted that the executions be carried out. Karl LaGrand was subsequently executed by the state of Arizona on February 24, 1999, by lethal injection. Walter LaGrand was then executed March 3, 1999, by lethal gas.

Germany then initiated legal action in the International Court of Justice against the United States regarding Walter LaGrand. Hours before Walter LaGrand was due to be executed, Germany applied for the Court to grant a provisional court order, requiring the United States to delay the execution of Walter LaGrand, which the court granted.

Germany then initiated action in the U.S. Supreme Court for enforcement of the provisional order. In its judgment, the U.S. Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction with respect to Germany's complaint against Arizona due to the eleventh amendment of the U.S. constitution, which prohibits federal courts from hearing lawsuits of foreign states against a U.S. state. With respect to Germany's case against the United States, it held that the doctrine of procedural default was not incompatible with the Vienna Convention, and that even if procedural default did conflict with the Vienna Convention it had been overruled by later federal law—the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which explicitly legislated the doctrine of procedural default.

The U.S. Solicitor General sent a letter to the Supreme Court, as part of these proceedings, arguing that provisional measures of the International Court of Justice are not legally binding. The United States Department of State also conveyed the ICJ's provisional measure to the Governor of Arizona without comment. The Arizona clemency board recommended a stay to the governor, on the basis of the pending ICJ case; but the governor of Arizona ignored the recommendation and Walter LaGrand was executed on March 3, 1999.

Germany then modified its complaint in the case before the ICJ, alleging furthermore that the U.S. violated international law by failing to implement the provisional measures. In opposition to the German submissions, the United States argued that the Vienna Convention did not grant rights to individuals, only to states; that the convention was meant to be exercised subject to the laws of each state party, which in the case of the United States meant subject to the doctrine of procedural default; and that Germany was seeking to turn the ICJ into an international court of criminal appeal.

On June 27, 2001, the ICJ, rejecting all of the United States' arguments, ruled in favor of Germany. The ICJ held that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963 (Vienna Convention) granted rights to individuals on the basis of its plain meaning, and that domestic laws could not limit the rights of the accused under the convention, but only specify the means by which those rights were to be exercised. The ICJ also found that its own provisional measures were legally binding. The court also found that the United States violated the Vienna Convention through its application of procedural default. The court was at pains to point out that it was not passing judgment on the doctrine itself, but only its application to cases involving the Vienna Convention.

Given its past track record, it is not surprising that Krittika’s rights as foreigner and that of a family member of an Indian envoy were denied by the US. However, the critical aspect is whether the teenager was entitled to immunity. It must be said that though the US authorities, particularly the NYPD were responsible for mishandling the case by their acts of wrongful arrest and detention, in view of the foregoing analysis on diplomatic and consular immunity, immunity may not have been available to Krittika Biswas from arrest and detention.

Lastly, what does India need to do? Indo-US relations are quite strong and bilateral ties cannot become hostage to unfortunate incidents like that of Ms Biswas and frisking of Indian dignitaries at US airports. The official Indian reaction to Ms Biswas’ case has by and large been circumspect, while the Indian media has been less than mature in its coverage of the incident. Having said that it is necessary for India to convey to the US, its displeasure and the fact that there is a sense of outrage in India in the way this case was handled by the US authorities. If the US Administration is not sensitive to Indian concerns, then India may be forced to adopt a similarly narrowed interpretation of the Vienna Convention while dealing with its consular officers stationed in India.

Sources:

[1] The Supreme Court of Hong Kong in the case of Juan Ysmael v S.S. Tasikmalaja ILR 1952 Case No. 94 stated that some of the functions of a consul are similar to those of diplomats, but these functions do not transform a consul into a diplomat.

[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LaGrand_case

Indian Special Forces - Capabilities and Shortcomings

2011-06-07T00:23:00.000-07:00

Does India have the ability to launch operations similar to Operation Neptune’s Spear? What are the requirements for undertaking such missions?

The US operation in Abbottabad has raised the question whether India can carry out similar strikes on Pakistani soil or any where around the globe against fugitives wanted in India on terror charges.

India, like any other country does have its own Special Forces – the Army has Para Commandos, which are elite airborne units and the Ghatak Platoons which are attached to each infantry battalion of the Army, the Navy has the Marine Commandos (MARCOS for short), and the Air Force the Garud. Besides, India has the National Security Guards (NSG), a Special Response Unit which is primarily tasked with counter terrorism activities, the Special Frontier Force whose one squadron is responsible for counter-terrorism duties and the various state police have their own Special Task Force for special operations, like for instance Jammu and Kashmir Police has the Special Operations Group to tackle terrorism.

Opinion seems to be divided if we really have the intelligence and military capabilities to emulate the operation carried out by the US Navy SEALs in Abbottabad on May 2, 2011 to neutralize Osam bin Laden.

In the backdrop of Osama bin Laden’s killing in Abbottabad, India’s Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik and Indian Army chief General V.K. Singh declared their forces have the capability and competence to carry out a commando operation outside the country to target terrorists.

‘There is no doubt about it. The army, navy and air force are paid to be ready. None of the services chiefs is going to say he does not have the capability,’ says retired Commodore C. Uday Bhaskar, director of naval think-tank National Maritime Foundation, when asked about the services chiefs’ comments.

Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal, director of army think-tank Centre for Land Warfare Studies, concurs with Uday Bhaskar. ‘We virtually have the same capability (as the US Navy SEALs),’ Kanwal told IANS, pointing out that the army itself has over half-a-dozen special forces battalions trained to carry out such attacks on strategic targets. Brigadier Kanwal, however added that India should look at energising its external intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) for getting its wanted, rather than use its armed forces.

‘To be very honest, it is not possible to disclose if we have these capabilities or not. But, yes, we have the joint strategic capability for any special task that the government assigns to the armed forces, not necessarily in the neighbourhood, but anywhere around the globe,’ Air Marshal P.K. Barbora, former Indian Air Force (IAF) vice chief, told IANS.

‘But the decision on such operations is not taken by the uniformed personnel. It is taken by the political leadership after receiving all inputs including the implications and fall- out, and after planning for all exigencies, be it a nuclear conflict,’ Barbora said.

The Contrary View

According to Lt. General R. K. Nanavatty, who has been involved in planning aspects of Indian Special Forces and has been studying the subject for years, India does not have the capabilities of executing an operation similar to Operation Neptune’s Spear. Nanavatty said “We are not capable for a variety of reasons. Political understanding of special operations is very important then only you can commit money, time and technology for nurturing such a force. “Special Operations today are controlled by men who do not understand them”.

Lt Gen P C Katoch, a former SF officer and a leading expert on Special Operations, said major operations by Indian troops have at various stages demonstrated what was wrong with them. “There are problems of intelligence, logistics etc. Our SF forces are doing what conventional troops can do and there is an overall lack of political willpower to nurture the capability with long term vision,” said Katoch, who led an SF unit in Sri Lanka with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in the 80s and has also been involved in planning of Indian SFs. “Our men are ready, but minus intelligence, support etc,” Katoch pointed out.

General Katoch pointed out that many of the mistakes of 1988 when Indian troops carried out an unsuccessful operation to capture the top leadership of the LTTE including its supremo Prabhakaran from Jaffna University were there to be seen in November 2008 in Mumbai when NSG commandos were deployed to take on the Pakistani terrorists. A decade back in 1999, a team of NSG commandos tailed hijacked IC814 aircraft to the Gulf region but returned. They couldn’t also think of carrying out a surgical operation in Kandahar for a host of reasons including lack of airlift and political will.

According to Colonel Anil Athale, the Indian State does not have the will to carry out such operations and hence has not created the wherewithal to carry out strikes like Operation Neptune’s Spear.

The Essentials

The two essential pre-requisites for conducting a successful special operation are availability of hard intelligence and sophisticated technical support. To elaborate, the planners and executors of this type of operation must be fed with concrete real time intelligence about the mission or objective to be accomplished. For instance, when the Israelis executed the raid at Entebbe in 1976, the commandos and the senior military commanders sitting in Tel Aviv were fully aware of the location of the hostages, the number of terrorists, the layout of the terminal building, etc. The commandos knew where their targets were, where precisely the Ugandan troops were stationed and how reinforcements, if any, were to be neutralized. There were no loose ends. In the absence of human intelligence (HUMINT), it may be impossible to carry out a successful operation. America's Central Intelligence Agency maintained a safe house near Abbottabad town for a small team of spies who conducted extensive surveillance on slain Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden's compound for months before President Barack Obama signed an order to kill the most wanted terrorist on April 29. It is estimated that the US has had about 3000 operatives active in Pakistan at the time of the Abbottabad raid.

The second essential is the availability of technological support such as satellite imagery of the target area, stealth technology for the purpose of infiltrating and exfiltrating of the operatives undetected and secure communications. India’s Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) capabilities are quite limited. India, in April 2009 launched its first dedicated radar reconnaissance satellite Radar Imaging Satellite 2 (or RISAT-2). The radar has an Israeli-built primary sensor which allows RISAT-2 to return images at any time of day, and in any weather conditions. India also has Cartosat-2 launched in 2007, which according to some experts may be used for military purpose. India needs to augment its space-based intelligence gathering capabilities.

Another important essential for carrying out special operations is political will. India lacks the political will to carry out any type of surgical strikes against non-state as well as state actors, notwithstanding the fact India has repeatedly been subject to terror strikes sponsored by Pakistan. In 1999, when IC 814 was hijacked and flown to Kandahar, Indian commandos merely tailed the hijacked aircraft but did not attempt a hostage rescue mission. Again in 2001, in the aftermath of the attack on Indian Parliament, the political masters could not muster the political will to carry out surgical operations against Pak-based terror outfits. It was the same story in 2008. Israel on the other hand, has displayed considerable amount of political will in striking back at its adversaries and has the unique distinction of having struck against non-state actors far from its borders.

India’s past experience of special operations (involving its Special Forces) have been limited in its scope. Barring Operation Cactus (1988) in Maldives, the failed mission to nab the leadership of the Tamil Tigers in Jaffna in 1988 and Operation Khukri (June 2000) in Sierra Leone all Special Forces’ operations have been carried out within the country, mostly in Jammu and Kashmir and in the North-East. In Operation Cactus a battalion of the Parachute Regiment was air-dropped to rescue and assist the government of Abdul Gayoom against the mercenaries belonging to the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and Operation Khukri was a daring rescue mission conducted by the Para Commandos in Sierra Leone resulting in the rescue of 21 hostages. In Operation Blue Star (June 1984), commandos of the 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment were unsuccessful in reaching the edge of the sacred pool to the Akal Takht. The National Security Guards (NSG) was established pursuant to an Act of Parliament called the National Security Guard Act, 1986. It was set up in the aftermath of the infamous Operation Blue Star wherein apart from the high casualties suffered, the shrine itself suffered severe damage. The operation necessitated the need for setting up a highly specialised and efficient force for counter-terrorist operations. Thus, NSG was deployed initially to combat the militancy in Punjab. In Black Thunder I (April 1986) about 300 National Security Guards commandos stormed the Golden Temple along with 700 Border Security Force troops and captured about 300 separatists. Two years later, in May 1988, the Golden Temple was again besieged and the security forces conducted Operation Black Thunder II and were successful in eliminating about 40 militants and forced the surrender of 200 militants. Operation Ashwamedh was an operation conducted in April 1993 when NSG commandos stormed a hijacked an Indian Airlines aircraft with 141 passengers on board at Amritsar airport. The lone hijacker, Mohammed Yousuf Shah, was killed in the operation. In September 2002, again the NSG carried out Operation Vajrashakti to flush out two heavily armed LeT terrorists who had caused carnage in the Akshardham Temple, Gandhinagar. In this operation, while the terrorists were killed, nearly 29 devotees and two commandos and one state police officer were also killed. About 79 devotees were also injured in the terrorist attack.

It is important to remember that all operations carried out by Special Forces have not been successful. The US which is lauded today for its operation against the terror master-mind Osama bin Laden had to face embarrassment and political backlash in April 1980 when the then US President Carter authorized an operation to rescue fifty-three American citizens held hostage in Iran ended in disaster. Operation Eagle Claw, as the ill-fated rescue mission was called resulted in the death of eight US servicemen. The fireball in the Iranian desert took the Carter presidency with it.

Concluding Observations

In conclusion, it must be said that though India has Special Forces, they have been largely used as a kind of super-infantry - employing them on missions which the regular army would baulk at. India does not lack brave men and officers, but what it does not currently possess is the right blend of political will, politico-military-intelligence integration and specialized technology that make these operations possible.

As former Intelligence Bureau chief Ajit Doval says "What we need is to have a national political will accepting active national self defence as a doctrine to neutralise the enemies of India”. "The nature, instrumentalities and deniability quotient of covert actions should be determined by our mission objective, intelligence capabilities and requirements of consequence management," he added.

By their very nature, all Special Forces operations are fraught with not just physical danger, but grave political consequences may ensue from failure. A goof-up in Abbottabad would have led not only to the possible capture and death of the US Navy Seals, but a possible sinking of Barack Obama's presidency as in the case of Operation Eagle Claw.

An edited version of this article appeared in the website of Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=859&u_id=158

More on the bin Laden Operation

2011-05-10T23:44:00.000-07:00

A lot of questions have been raised in connection with the operation carried out by the US to neutralise bin Laden. The Indian weekly Outlook (issue dated May 16, 2011) in its cover story on the killing of Osama bin Laden has raised questions on the raid titled “Eight Question Marks in Abbottabad.” The author has made an attempt to answer the questions raised both in Pakistan and outside in this post as well as in the earlier post. The questions and the author's answers are as follows:

1. The Choppers: Were there two or four? How many SEALS were involved, 20 or 79? If one chopper collapsed, could the lone returning one carry them all, plus Osama?

Answer: There were four, two of which were believed to be Chinooks. In all, 79 SEALS were part of the team that went to Abbottabad. However, two dozens SEALS actually took part in the raid on Waziristan Haveli. The rest probably formed the reserve or back-up team. The Chinooks have capacity to ferry about 50 to 55 troops.

2. The Take – Off: Where did the choppers take off from, Jalalabad in Afghanistan or Tarbela in Pakistan? Could they have hovered on without the Pak army or its radars noticing?

Answer: The choppers took off most probably from Tarbela Ghazi Airbase in north-west Pakistan. Two of the choppers used were probably modified MH-60s. It is believed that the MH-60S has no offensive sensors but can carry the ALQ-144 Infrared Jammer.

3. The Town: Local residents, including coffee-shop owner Shoaib Athar who live-tweeted the incident, say power had been cut off in Abbottabad 40 mins earlier. Was this a routine outage?

Answer: The town was known to have power cuts. Hence this seemed to be a routine affair.

(See http://www.dawn.com/2011/01/09/power-outages-paralyse-life-in-abbottabad.html)

4. The Police: At whose orders was the Pashto-speaking local police shooing away residents of Abbottabad who wondered about the choppers and the “big blast” creating a blaze in the sky?

Answer: According to BBC Urdu, when the helicopters landed outside (it appears that two of the choppers carrying the back-up team landed outside Waziristan Haveli), men emerged from the aircraft and spoke to locals in Pashto. The members of the CIA’s Special Activities Division possess the ability to converse in local language.

5. The Gunfight: Why has the narrative ranged from a “firefight throughout the operation” to “the only shots fired by those in the compound came at the beginning of the operation”?

Answer: The US Administration made several changes to the narratives in the days following the operation, some of which were contradictory. One can only guess that different versions were given by different officials leading to some sort of confusion.

6. The Capture: If he had an AK-47 and a Makarov pistol at arm’s reach, why didn’t Osama use them? If he was unarmed, as it is now being said, why was he shot so brutally for his photo not to be shown?

Answer: The raids such as the present one are not an orderly affair; there is very little intelligence on the exact number of residents, whether they are armed or otherwise and very little time for decision-making. The raiding team certainly was not expected to give the quarry time to surrender. Also, this was an operation primarily meant to neutralize the Al Qaeda chief – it was an ‘operation designed to kill’. A woman resident was also killed in the cross-fire.

7. The Families: Apart from Osama’s, there were two other families in Waziristan Haveli. Five of the 23 residents were killed, the rest were tied up and left behind. Have they spoken to the officials yet?

Answer: The US has sought access to the widow or widows of bin Laden. News reports indicate that Pakistan has agreed to permit US officials to interrogate the youngest wife of bin Laden.

8. The Burial: US says Osama’s body was ferried to USS Carl Vinsen and buried in the North Arabian Sea, with due Islamic rites. Was an Imam readily available on board the ship, or was US prepared for only one eventuality: Osama dead.

Answer: As stated in answer to Question No. 6, it appears that taking Laden alive was a remote possibility considering the nature of the operations. However, it is now emerging that two specialist teams were on standby, probably on the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson in the Arabian Sea: one to bury Bin Laden if he was killed, and a second team of lawyers, interrogators and translators if he was taken alive.

Operation Geronimo renamed Operation Neptune Spear

2011-05-05T06:12:00.000-07:00

(Note: The information contained in this post is drawn from various sources)

(Originally reported as Operation Geronimo it was subsequently reported as Operation Neptune Spear, with Jackpot as the code name for bin Laden as an individual and Geronimo as the code word for bin Laden's capture or death)

May 2, 2011 will go down in history as a red-letter day in the War on Terror. The world’s most wanted terrorist Osama bin Laden was killed in a pre-dawn operation in a highly fortified compound housing a mansion in the Pakistani town of Abbottabad, located about 30-40 miles north of the capital Islamabad. (Abbottabad is an important military cantonment and sanatorium, being the headquarters of a brigade in the Second Division of the Northern Army Corps).

The Operation

With heavy cloud rolling in over the town of Abbottabad, conditions were perfect for the raid to take out Osama Bin Laden after ten years on the run. The operation which was scheduled to take place the previous night was cancelled because the weather was clear and the U.S. aircraft would have been spotted from a distance. From Tarbela Ghazi Air Base in Pakistan, the modified MH-60 helicopters made their way to the garrison suburb of Abbottabad. Aboard were Navy SEALs, flown across the border from Afghanistan, along with tactical signals, intelligence collectors, and navigators using highly classified hyperspectral imagers. The entire operation which lasted less than 45 minutes was carried out by members of the elite and highly secretive Naval Special Warfare Development Group commonly known as DEVGRU and informally by its former name SEAL Team Six and backed by members of the CIA’s Special Activities Division (SAD). It appears that about 20 to 25 Special Forces operatives in four helicopters carried out the raid. Some reports indicate that nearly 79 members of the US Special Forces/SAD were involved in the raid. (Apparently 79 personnel traveled in four helicopters. However, the actual raid was conducted by about two dozen operatives).

The target of the operation was the compound, which had at its centre a three-storey building known as Waziristani Haveli or Waziristan Mansion. This house was in a residential district of Abbottabad's suburbs called Bilal Town and it was known to be home to a number of retired military officers from the area.

When the helicopters landed outside, men emerged from the aircraft and spoke to locals in Pashto, witnesses told BBC Urdu. People living in the area, known as Thanda Choha, were told to switch off their lights and not to leave their homes. According to residents of the area, there was no electricity in the area at the time of the operation.

Two dozen U.S. Navy Seals wearing night-vision goggles dropped into the high-walled compound. They stormed inside to secure the terror chief’s hideaway room by room, with head cameras relaying the action to the President and the director of the CIA, Leon Panetta, who was overseeing the operation at the agency’s headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Bin Laden and the DEVGRU team encountered each other on the second floor or third floor of the residence; bin Laden was "wearing the local loose-fitting tunic and pants known as a shalwar kameez". He was later found to have €500 and two phone numbers stitched into his clothes. Although there were weapons in the room, including an AK-47 and Makarov pistol, bin Laden was unarmed at the time he was shot. "The encounter with bin Laden lasted only seconds," according to Politico, and took place during "the last five or 10 minutes" of the raid. Bin Laden was killed by at least one and possibly two American bullets, one of which struck the left side of his head, another shot was widely reported to be a bullet to the chest.

Following the shootout with bin Laden, his body was carried out and taken away in one of the helicopters. Three men, including one of his sons, and a woman, who tried to act as a human shield to save him, were also killed. The raiding team did not suffer any casualty.

The raid was intended to take 30 minutes. All told, the time between the team's entry in and exit from the compound was 38 minutes. Time in the compound was spent neutralizing defenders; "moving carefully through the compound, room to room, floor to floor" securing the women and children; clearing "weapons stashes and barricades" and searching the compound for information. U.S. personnel removed computer hard drives, documents, DVDs, thumb drives and "electronic equipment" from the compound for later analysis.

At some point in the operation one of the helicopters crashed, either from technical failure or having been hit by gunfire from the ground.

The compound was about 3,000 sq yards in size but people from the area told the BBC that it was surrounded by 14ft-high walls, so not much could be seen of what was happening inside.

The walls were topped by barbed wire and contained cameras.

There were two security gates at the house and no phone or internet lines running into the compound, according to the Associated Press (AP).

Intelligence and Planning

For nearly a decade, American military and intelligence forces have chased the ghost of Bin Laden throughout Pakistan and Afghanistan, once coming agonizingly close to capturing him in a battle at Tora Bora, in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan. As Obama administration officials describe it, the real breakthrough came when they finally figured out the name and location of Bin Laden’s most trusted courier, whom the Qaeda chief appeared to rely on to maintain contacts with the outside world.

A trusted courier of Osama bin Laden’s whom American intelligence had been hunting for years was finally located in a sprawling mansion 35 miles north of the Pakistani capital, close to one of the hubs of American counterterrorism operations. The compound was so secure, so large, that American officials guessed it was built to hide someone far more important than a mere courier.

What followed was eight months of painstaking intelligence work, culminating in a helicopter assault by American military and intelligence operatives that ended in the death of Bin Laden, and concluded one of history’s most extensive and frustrating manhunts.

Detainees at the Guantánamo Bay prison had given the courier’s pseudonym to American interrogators, and said the man was a protégé of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the confessed mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. However, it was not until August of 2010 when they tracked him to the compound in Abbottabad, a medium sized city about an hour’s drive north of Islamabad, the capital.

C.I.A. analysts spent the next several weeks examining satellite photos and intelligence reports to determine who might be living at the mansion, and a senior administration official said that by September the C.I.A. had determined there was a “strong possibility” that Bin Laden himself was hiding there.

It was hardly the spartan cave in the mountains where many had envisioned Bin Laden hiding. Rather, it was a large mansion on the outskirts of the town center, set on an imposing hilltop and ringed by 12-foot-high concrete walls topped with barbed wire.

The property was valued at $1 million, but it had neither a telephone nor an Internet connection. Residents of the compound were so concerned about security that they burned their trash, rather putting it on the street for collection like their neighbors.

American officials believe that the mansion, built in 2005, was designed for the specific purpose of hiding bin Laden.

Months more of intelligence work would follow before American spies felt highly confident that it was indeed bin Laden and his family who were hiding in the compound — and before President Obama believed the intelligence was solid enough to begin planning a mission to go after the Qaeda leader.

On March 14, President Obama held the first of what would be five national security meetings in the course of the next six weeks to go over plans for the operation.

Four more similar meetings to discuss the plan would follow, until President Obama gathered his aides one final time last Friday.

Even after the president signed the formal orders authorizing the raid, Mr. Obama chose to keep Pakistan’s government in the dark about the operation.

“We shared our intelligence on this compound with no other country, including Pakistan,” a senior administration official said.

It is no surprise that the administration chose not to tell Pakistani officials. Even though the Pakistanis insisted that Bin Laden was not in their country, the United States never really believed it. American diplomatic cables in recent years show constant American pressure on Pakistan to help find and kill Bin Laden.

US officials, who did not want to be named, said the discovery that Osama bin Laden was holed up in an army town in Pakistan raised pointed questions about how he managed to evade capture and whether Pakistan's military intelligence knew about his whereabouts and sheltered him. Most intelligence estimates figured that bin Laden was holed up in Pakistan's tribal areas, close to the Afghan border, possibly in a cave sheltered by loyal tribesmen.

The house were bin Laden was holed is just 100 yards from the gate of the Kakul Military Academy, an army run institution where top officers train. Giving a graphic account of the operation, ABC quoting officials said some 10 years after the abortive US bid to nab him in the caves of Tora Bora, a small group of American forces in helicopters took just 40 minutes to land in a well-guarded mansion in a secure neighbourhood.

Questions – Answered and Unanswered

Firstly, a question that arises is why did the elusive AQ chief chose Abbottabad to hide? And whether the Pakistani establishment was aware of his presence in Pakistan? It is indeed strange that the world’s most wanted man chose a garrison town in which a brigade headquarters and a premier military training institution is located to hide. The Waziristan Haveli (in Bilal Town) itself was four kilometers north-east of the center of Abbottabad, 650 meters southeast of the PMA-Kakul Road, and 1.3 kilometers southwest of the PMA at 34°10′09″N 73°14′33″E34.16917°N 73.2425°E. There had been connections between Abbottabad and elements of the Al Qaeda in the past. On September 28, 2001, Indian intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing, provided the United States with a list of 71 al-Qaeda training camps spread across Pakistan proper, at locations as diverse as Abbottabad, Peshawar, Quetta and Warsak In July 2002, The Christian Science Monitor published the results of a week-long investigation, which provided evidence that "Al Qaeda and an array of militant affiliate groups" had staff offices near the Karakoram Highway - from Abbottabad along the western perimeter of Kashmir - with the tacit approval of Pakistani intelligence. In June 2004, Pakistani intelligence agents killed one al-Qaida suspect as three other fled from a car in Abbottabad as part of a major Pakistani operation to "flush out al-Qaida suspects and their local supporters from hide-outs in a remote region near Afghanistan" that left 72 people dead, including 55 terrorists. On January 25, 2011, Pakistan authorities arrested one of the most wanted al-Qaeda-linked Indonesian terror suspects, Umar Patek, in Abbottabad while Patek carried one million US dollars head money, but waited until March 30, 2011 to make Patek's arrest public. Hence, it should come as no surprise that the emir of Al Qaeda was hunted down at this place. To answer the question, Abbottabad was probably not chosen by bin Laden, but rather by the Pakistani ISI. Abbottabad, it was felt, was the most unlikely place where the world’s most wanted man would choose to hide. Moreover, Abbottabad had well equipped medical facilities (belonging to the Pakistan Army) which could provide treatment for bin Laden’s renal ailment and other medical problems. It is thus incomprehensible that the Pak military establishment was unaware of the fact that bin Laden was staying in this place.

The second question is whether, Pakistan was aware of the operation to apprehend bin Laden? Whether the Pakistanis played any role in Operation Geronimo? Experts are divided as to whether Pakistanis were aware of the operation against Laden. Prima facie, it appears that the US chose to deliberately keep the Pakistanis in the dark about the raid. The US intelligence community has had reasons to believe that the fugitive was sheltered and protected by Pakistan and secondly in the past, when the CIA was close to apprehending him, Laden had been tipped off and thereby enabling him to escape capture. There was an apprehension in the US security establishment that Pakistan could not be trusted and made privy to such a sensitive operation as sharing intelligence relating to Laden would have jeopardized the operation. Others believe, that Osama bin Laden was a bargaining chip and he was bartered away pursuant to a deal which would enable Pakistan to have a significant role in the future political dispensation in Afghanistan.

The US, it is alleged is attempting to cover up certain aspects of this operation. Some questions remain unanswered or at any rate, not satisfactorily answered.

 Why did it take the US nearly ten months to execute this operation after it had some intelligence about Osama hiding in Abbottabad. The US received information about the possibility of Laden hiding in his Bilal town residence sometime in August 2010. Since Laden had evaded capture on previous occasions, one would have expected the US Administration to move quickly on the kill, rather than carry out surveillance for this long a period.

 Why were no photographs of Laden’s body made public, especially when there is a lot of disbelief about the entire operation in Pakistan and elsewhere?

 Why have the DNA test results not been made public?

 While acknowledging that Pakistan had no role to play in the operation why have top officials including the US President been thanking the Pakistanis for co-operation?

Conclusion

The operation from a purely military standpoint was a success with few parallels. The operation was backed by accurate and timely intelligence and the raiding team came out unscathed after fulfilling its mission successfully. In other words, it was a classical Special Forces operation executed with near perfection. The only hiccup was the loss of a helicopter. (It is now speculated whether the chopper that went down was a stealth helicopter).

The use of sophisticated technology enabled the US Navy SEALs to achieve their objective.

The operation also was the culmination of a joint effort by different organizations within the US intelligence community, the roles of some of which may never be made public for obvious reasons.

Osama’s death will most certainly result in a violent backlash either within Pakistan or in the form a terrorist attack targeting US interests in any part of the globe. At the time of this writing, India has issued a high security alert for its missions in Afghanistan.

Indo-Pak Dialogue: The Futility of Engaging the Devil

2009-07-15T08:46:00.000-07:00

Pakistan Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani will meet his Indian counterpart Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Sharm El-Sheikh on July 16, 2009. Prior to this meeting the Indian and Pakistani Foreign Secretaries will also meet on the sidelines of the summit.

While the Indian Prime Minister has agreed to meet his Pakistani counterpart, it remains to be seen whether this meeting scheduled to take place on the sidelines of the NAM summit will re-start the composite dialogue process which was suspended after the 26/11 terror attacks in Mumbai. While Pakistan is only interested in highlighting and internationalizing the Kashmir issue, India is ready to discuss Kashmir provided Pakistan gives assurances of curbing anti-India terror groups based on Pakistani soil.

Pakistan’s terror history: There is not only animosity but a deep sense of mistrust in Indo-Pak relations. The last two decades saw this animosity increase manifold and distrust aggravated. In 1989 the late General Zia-ul-Haq initiated a low-cost proxy war against India. His successors, both civilian and military only continued this low-intensity conflict. The two neighbours were on the brink of war at least on three occasions in the last one decade alone. When the Indian PM Vajpayee was visiting Lahore in February 1999, the Pakistanis were busy plotting the incursion in Kargil. Thereafter, Pakistan actively aided in the hijack of the Indian Airlines plane IC-814 to Kandahar. After the failed summit at Agra in July 2001, the Indian Parliament was attacked by terrorists belonging to Jaish-e-Mohammed headed by Masood Azhar, one of the terrorists who were released by India in exchange for the passengers of the hijacked Indian Airlines plane. In July 2008, a terror group led by Sirajuddin Haqqani (Haqqani network) with the active assistance of the ISI carried out a suicide bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul. Thereafter, in November 2008, Pakistani terrorists carried out the worst ever terrorist strike in the heart of India’s commercial capital, now infamously referred to as Mumbai 26/11.

In a majority of the incidents listed below, there was clear evidence of Pakistani involvement, directly or indirectly.

July 11, 2006, Mumbai: At least 200 killed in seven serial blasts in suburban trains.

July 11, 2006, Srinagar: At least eight people, including tourists and pilgrims, killed in five hand grenade attacks.

May 25, 2006, Srinagar: Four tourists killed in a powerful explosion at Batpora.

May 21, 2006, Srinagar: Seven people including two guerrillas killed as militants attack a Congress party rally.

March 7, 2006, Varanasi: Triple bombings killed 23 people and injured 68 others at an ancient temple and crowded railway station.

Dec 28, 2005, Bangalore: One retired professor was killed in an attack on the Indian Institute of Science.

Oct 29, 2005, New Delhi: Three blasts in the capital ahead of Hindu festival of Diwali killed 65 people and wounded about 200.
Aug 15, 2004, Assam: Three bomb explosions across the state, killing 16 people, mostly school children, in Dhemaji district.
Aug 25, 2003, Mumbai: serial blasts killed about 60.

May 14, 2003, Jammu: Militants attack an army camp near Jammu, killing more than 30, including women and children.

Sept. 24, 2002, Gandhinagar: Two terrorists attack the Akhsardham temple, killing 39 visitors.

Dec 13, 2001, New Delhi: Terrorists attacked Indian parliament, killing 12 people including six policemen. All five terrorists were also killed.

Oct 1, 2001, Srinagar: Militants attack Jammu-Kashmir assembly complex, killing about 35.

In June 2009, at Yekaterinburg on the side lines of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) summit, the Indian PM gave a strongly worded statement to the Pakistani president Zardari in presence of the international media - “Excellency, I am pleased to meet you. But I have a limited mandate to tell you that the Pakistani territory can’t be used for acts of terror against India.” With his curt message to Zardari, said in full view of the waiting media, Singh made sure it reached a much larger audience, particularly in India and Pakistan. The one-liner left Zardari embarrassed. The media ambush left Pakistan fuming and they made a hue and cry of the so-called badtamizi on part of the Indian PM. This badtamizi language ought to have been uttered long back. What Pakistan has conveniently forgotten is that India has been tolerating the Pakistani badmashi of terrorism for the past several years.

President Zardari recently made a candid confession about the fact that Islamabad created and nurtured Islamic terrorist groups for short-term tactical objectives. But what Zardari says and what Pakistan does are totally different. Either there is a disconnect between the President and the government that he is supposed to be in charge or Zardari is merely engaging in an international PR exercise.

Pakistan’s sincerity in tackling terror aimed at India questionable: Post 26/11, while doing nothing concrete or substantial against the perpetrators of the Mumbai attack or anti-India terror networks, Pakistan has been indulging in what can be crudely termed as a “tamasha” (show or spectacle). While sufficient evidence was made available by Indian authorities to Pakistan to nail the Lashkar-e- Toiba (LeT) for Mumbai 26/11 and dismantle the terrorist infrastructure, Pakistan vacillated between denial and floating conspiracy theories on their television channels of possible Mossad-RAW involvement and eventually under international pressure did what was largely symbolic – arrested a few terrorists and placed the chief of LeT under house arrest. Saeed was treated more like a guest of the state and less like a terror accused; in fact he was charged under Maintenance of Public Order law under which persons could be temporarily detained. Hafeez Saeed’s release was orchestrated through a court process, seen more as a sham in India. Prior to his release, LeT organized rallies, protest marches through Lahore against Saeed’s incarceration.

After the terror strikes in Mumbai, India submitted a formal request to the U.N. Security Council to put the group Jamaat-ud-Dawa, (JuD) the parent organization of the LeT and Saeed on the list of individuals and organizations sanctioned by the United Nations for association with terrorism. In response to the UN resolution and the government ban, the JuD reorganized itself under the name of Tehrik-e-Tahafuz Qibla Awal (TTQA).

A Pakistani journalist, Arif Jamal in his book, Shadow War – The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir writes that right from the time of partition, Pakistan was and has always been on the lookout for opportunities to foment trouble in Kashmir. There were occasional pauses in Pakistani efforts, particularly after the 1971 war. These pauses were more circumstantial rather than a change of Pakistani heart. It is difficult to see why Pakistani military leadership which refers to terrorists as “strategic assets” will be sincere about peace or the peace process.

The Road Ahead: Nothing concrete has emerged out of Indo-Pak talks in the recent past, except for spurt in terrorist activities. The Pakistani leopard cannot be expected to change its spots in the near future either. India cannot be pressurized to re-start the composite dialogue with Pakistan without any pre-conditions by the US or any other party. At this point of time, the focal point of discussion is the presence of terror networks aimed at India and steps Pakistan is taking to curb this menace. Any talks on Kashmir or any other issue will be seen as a sign of Indian weakness and send a wrong signal to terror outfits based in Pakistan as well as to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence. Since Pakistan understands the language of coercion better, India must talk to Pakistan with a big stick in Sharm El-Sheikh or at any time in the future. That is the bottom-line.

Post-Script: At the time of this writing, there has been a warning of terrorist threat to 7 targets in and around Mumbai from LeT, possibly by sea.

The Impeccable Incident – A Legal Perspective

2009-03-14T02:48:00.000-07:00

On March 8, 2009, the USNS Impeccable was operating 75 miles south of Hainan island belonging to China, while it was using its sonar array to monitor Chinese submarines near the island of Hainan a major submarine base. It was engaged by several Chinese ships. According to the Pentagon, the unarmed Impeccable was shadowed by five Chinese ships, including a Bureau of Maritime Fisheries Patrol Vessel, an Oceanographic Administration patrol vessel, a Chinese naval ocean surveillance ship, and two small Chinese trawlers, which manoeuvered close to the Impeccable, with two of the ships coming as close as 50 feet (15 m), waving Chinese flags, and ordering the Impeccable from the area. The civilian crew of Impeccable sprayed water at one of the nearest Chinese ships; the Chinese sailors stripped down to their underwear and their vessel closed in to within 25 feet of the American ship. Shortly after the incident, the Impeccable radioed the Chinese crews, informing them of its intentions to leave the area, and requesting a safe pass to travel. When trying to leave the area, however, the two Chinese trawlers stopped directly in front of the Impeccable, forcing it to do an emergency stop to avoid a collision. Once the Impeccable got underway, the crew aboard one of the Chinese ships used a grappling hook to try to snag Impeccable's towed sonar array.

This was the latest in a string of incidents involving the Impeccable and Chinese vessels. On March 5, 2009, a Chinese frigate approached Impeccable, crossing its bow at a range of approximately 100 yards. This was followed less than two hours later by a Chinese Y-12 aircraft, conducting 11 flyovers of Impeccable at an altitude of 600 feet (180 m) and a range from 100–300 feet (30–90 m). The frigate then crossed Impeccable's bow again, this time at a range of approximately 400–500 yards, without notifying Impeccable its intentions.

On March 7, a Chinese intelligence collection ship contacted the Impeccable over bridge-to-bridge radio, informing her that her operations were illegal and directing Impeccable to leave the area or "suffer the consequences."

The United States lodged formal protests following the incident.

This is the second time that the Chinese warships have been involved in a controversial incident in the past couple of months. In the middle of January 2009, an Indian submarine played "cat-and-mouse" with two Chinese warships off the coast of Africa before it was spotted and “forced” to surface in the latest round of cold-war games between the two countries.

Neither India nor China officially confirmed or denied the reports. But Chinese media reported the incident and an Indian Navy source said “we do not discuss our deployments”.

Why were the Chinese provoked? In order to understand the Chinese apprehensions it is necessary to understand the background of this vessel and its operations.

The ship USNS Impeccable is an Impeccable-class ocean surveillance ship aquired by the US Navy in 2001 and assigned to the Navy’s Special Missions Program.[1] Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) is a towed array sonar system of the US Navy. SURTASS systems developed in the 1980s were deployed on Stalwart-Class Ocean Surveillance Ships and were passive, receive only sonar systems. The array was towed miles behind the ships and were designed for long range detection of submarines.

SURTASS Low Frequency Active (LFA) systems were designed for long range detection using both active and passive sensors. The active component transmits an audio signal between 100 Hz and 500 Hz from an array suspended below the ship while the passive SURTASS array is towed miles behind to receive the signal. LFA has been criticized for its potential to injure undersea wildlife.

SURTASS Twin-Line consists of either the long passive SURTASS array or the Twin-line array consisting of two shorter passive arrays towed side by side. The Twin-line Engineering Development Model was installed on USNS Assertive, and the first production model was installed on USNS Bold. Both ships are no longer serving as SURTASS units. As of 2006, SURTASS was deployed on T-AGOS 19 Victorious class and T-AGOS 23 Impeccable class Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull (SWATH) vessels as well as MV Cory Chouest, the developmental ship for SURTASS LFA.

China alleged that the US Navy ship involved in a confrontation with its vessels off the southern island of Hainan violated international and Chinese law. Admittedly, the USNS Impeccable was 75 miles off the coast of Hainan, much beyond the territorial waters (12- nautical miles) of China. According to Beijing the ship was conducting activities within the waters of its exclusive economic zone.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze key legal issues from the perspective of international law The question that arises is whether the activities conducted by USNS Impeccable, viz. surveillance or gathering intelligence in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) was in violation of international law?

The Law of the Sea: The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea or United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) adopted on 30th April 1982 for the first time provided that coastal states had sovereign rights in a 200-nautical mile zone – called the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) with respect to natural resources and certain economic activities and exercise jurisdiction over marine science research and protection of the environment.

“Article 56 of UNCLOS 1982 provides for the rights and duties of the coastal state in the Exclusive Economic Zone –
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention.
It is important to note that the coastal states do not enjoy complete sovereignty over the EEZ, but only sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources and jurisdiction with regard to establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; marine scientific research; the protection and preservation of the marine environment. The coastal states cannot in any manner impede the freedom of navigation, which China sought to do in this case.

Article 58 of UNCLOS 1982 stipulates the rights and duties of other states in the Exclusive Economic Zone –
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part. (These provisions relate to the High Seas)
3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.”

Article 301 of the 1982 Convention also provides: “In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention, States Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”

Can the Impeccable’s mission be construed as a hostile act or be considered in any manner as a threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of China? The US ship, assuming that it was indulging in surveillance or intelligence gathering, was firstly unarmed and was not part of any naval fleet or battle group. Hence, it would be stretching the law, particularly Article 301 a bit too far to bring its alleged surveillance activities within its ambit.

From a purely legal perspective, although aircraft and ships are expressly prohibited from spying in the twelve mile territorial zone, they are not so prohibited from engaging in spying in the EEZ. Indeed, Article 19(2) (a), applicable to the territorial zone, contains virtually the same provision as Article 301 requiring states to refrain from any threat or use of force. In addition, however, Article 19(2) (c) then expressly prohibits intelligence-gathering activities. This suggests that the drafters and state signatories meant to distinguish between (i) spying and “any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the Coast state” and (ii) spying in the territorial zone and the EEZ or high seas. Had the states wanted to make spying in the EEZ illegal, they could have included an express prohibition against it just as they did for spying in the 12 mile territorial zone. Moreover, a general principle of international law is that whatever is not explicitly prohibited is permitted (see S.S. Lotus (1927)). Had the Chinese gone ahead with their threats and by their acts caused loss or damage to life and property, it would have been their action that would have been contrary to international law and the Chinese would have been guilty of impeding maritime freedoms.

[1] Military Sealift Command's Special Mission Program controls 24 ships that provide operating platforms and services for unique US military and federal government missions. Oceanographic and hydrographic surveys, underwater surveillance, missile flight data collection and tracking, acoustic research and submarine support are just a few of the specialized services this program supports.

Pakistani Terror and India’s Options

2009-01-08T05:34:00.001-08:00

Pakistan’s historical ties to jihadi terror

Pakistan’s jihadi factory has been in operation since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Pakistan’s focus shifted to India when it started assisting Sikh separatist groups who were fighting India for a separate homeland – Khalistan. When the Khalistan movement failed, Pakistan in the late 80s started concentrating on training, financing and actively assisting so-called indigenous Kashmiri militant groups to achieve freedom (azaadi) from India.

The extent of Pakistani involvement in terrorism aimed against India is documented in a book titled Frontline Pakistan The Path To Catastrophe And The Killing Of Benazir Bhutto authored by Zahid Hussain, the Pakistan correspondent for The Times, London, and The Wall Street Journal. Very early in the book, Hussain lays out, in considerable detail, the extent of Pakistan's involvement and active support for terrorism by trying to 'Islamise a secular separatist movement' in Kashmir. The book also gives an account of how the ISI was used by its head Javed Nasir beyond Kashmir in the 1993 Mumbai blasts.

The book also reveals the close co-ordination of the Hafiz Saeed-led Lashkar-e-Tayiba with the ISI to infiltrate terrorists into Kashmir. The author wryly mentions the 'hundreds of LeT centres operating openly across the country.'

These centres drew recruits not merely from the unemployed but also from university students, thereby giving the lie to the still-repeated myth of an absence of education and material comforts being a contributory factor to terrorism.

Interestingly, most Lashkar terrorists are Pakistani Punjabis with few, if any, Kashmiris in their ranks.

Given Pakistan’s close links with terror it is stupid on India’s part to talk about co-operation and to expect any co-operation from terrorists to combat terror emanating from within their borders.

Pakistan’s reactions to Mumbai 26/11

After the terrorist attack on Mumbai, President Asif Ali Zardari said that he felt hurt and was pained by the carnage. The Prime Minister offered to send the Director General of the ISI to help in the investigations. The President later back tracked saying it was a case of misunderstanding on the part of the Indians and offered to send a lower ranking functionary. As the Pakistani hand in the terror attacks became apparent, it was a case of somersaults and flip-flops. Thereafter it was “show us the evidence and then we will take action.” Pakistanis did everything possible from denials to whipping up war hysteria and deflect world attention to a potential all out Indo-Pak war. However, India and the US kept up the pressure on Pakistan and the world saw Pakistan as the epicentre of Islamic terror.

After nearly 45 days of 26/11, India compiled a dossier comprising evidence of Pakistani involvement in the terrorist strike on Mumbai. The evidence was handed over to the Pakistanis on 5th January 2009. Pakistan’s reaction to the evidence submitted by India has been on expected lines – rejected as being insufficient. It has stated that the dossier on 26/11 given to it by India was based on interrogation of the sole surviving terrorist Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab, a resident of Faridkot, Pakistan. Pakistan has reportedly told the US that the evidence provided by India is insufficient and no action can be based upon it.

"India's dossier contained nothing new and it was compilation of allegations against Pakistan that had already appeared in Indian media," the Nation quoted a Pakistan official, as saying.
Questioning the authenticity of Kasab's confession, Pakistan said: "The proof given by India are too insufficient to be made a ground for any action and that the statement evoked from Kasab under torture and violence of investigation agencies has no legal status," the Pak official said.

Naïve, it would have been for India to have even remotely expected the terrorist state to have looked into the evidence and acted upon it. A state which has denied that the lone surviving terrorist was Pakistani after the Pakistani media reported that he indeed was one; the denial of the evidence was only to be expected. But then how will Pakistan would react to the findings of the US law enforcement agencies which have been working closely with the Indian police and intelligence agencies in the investigation into 26/11? It remains to be seen whether Pakistan would do a limited “investigation” to satisfy the US and the West. Pakistan’s rejection of evidence dashes all hopes of so-called Pak co-operation in the war against terror. At least now India needs to realize that it cannot expect any responsible behaviour or neighborliness from an entity whose India-centric foreign policy has been based on spreading jihadi terror and bleeding India by means of thousand cuts.

The Poonch Encounter – Hill Kaka or worse a mini Kargil?

While India is cornering Pakistan with proof of its complicity in Mumbai 26/11 an encounter (which is considered quite routine in Kashmir) which started in the Batidhar forest of the Mendhar sector in Poonch on January 1, 2009 is turning out to be a sort of mini-Kargil with possibly well entrenched Pakistani army personnel passing of as Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Toiba, militants battling the Indian security forces for over 5 days. The terrain i.e. Mendhar has been well chosen, being forested and the techniques adopted quite similar to the one adopted at Mumbai. The reaction within India has been muted only because the combat zone is removed from civilian areas and close to the Line of Control and there have been no civilian casualties so far. However, this infiltration and engagement only shows the defiant approach of the Pakistanis and the determination to continue the proxy war against India.

The terrorists are suspected to be taking shelter in concrete hideouts, built deep inside the forest area. According to media reports, ten terrorists are believed to be holed up with adequate food, arms and ammunitions. 1500 security force personnel, comprising of troops from Rashtriya Rifles, Army's para commandos and special ops group of the J&K police are involved in the operations against the terrorists. The operation is spread over 8 square kilometers of forests. India has so far lost a Junior Commissioned Officer and a jawan, while four infiltrators are reported to have been killed in the encounter. At the time of this writing, the encounter was still continuing.

Like Mumbai 26/11, a dozen or so well-trained militants have been engaging more than one thousand troops thereby sapping our resources. Again an operation of this nature could not have been possible without the active support of the Pakistani army.

How does India move forward?

India while appealing to the UN and the international community for tackling terrorism emanating from Pakistan must hasten the pace of counter-terror measures. Firstly Pakistan with the evidence provided by India as well as Western security/law-enforcement agencies will not only NOT ACT, but try to avoid the pitfalls in the execution of future terrorist strikes. (The biggest pitfall in 26/11 was the capture of Ajmal Kasab, which provided evidence of Pakistani hand as well as a source of embarrassment)
India by giving evidence is only indirectly aiding Pakistan perfect the technique of asymmetric warfare. Sharing evidence with a criminal and seeking his assistance to solve a crime is ludicrous.

There is an immediate need for India to draw plans to bleed Pakistan with at least a hundred cuts in response to its policy of thousand cuts. India needs to recognize that Pakistan is a failed state (Pakistanis being unable to control large parts of North-West Frontier Province and FATA, day is not far when Pakistan may cease to exist as a state as understood in international law) with little or no control over its subjects and the army. India must not make the mistake of giving benefit of doubt to the civilian government of Asif Ali Zardari. Pakistani civilian government is as much culpable as the Army and ISI. India ought also not to make any distinctions between state and non-state actors. Pakistan has all along being stating that non-state actors may have been involved in the Mumbai carnage. In Kargil too, the Pakistanis kept repeating that Kashmiri freedom-fighters were battling Indian forces, till they were exposed.

India needs to talk less and act. Indian politicians including the Hon’ble Prime Minister and his cabinet colleagues must exercise restraint while tackling this issue. A spokesman must be authorized to brief the media about developments to avoid conflicting opinions being aired on the issue.

India’s Options

Firstly, an undeclared policy that Pakistani citizens and Pakistani interests world-wide will be considered legitimate targets. This may include Pakistani missions abroad as well as its commercial interests.

Secondly, targeted assassinations of the military leadership of Pakistan, the ISI apart from terrorist operatives of all terrorist outfits operating from Pakistani soil or with Pakistani sponsorship.

Thirdly, a difficult but not impossible option is targeting financiers of terror outfits based in Pakistan and the Middle East. This will affect the fund flow to the groups.

Fourthly, targeting terror infrastructure in Bangladesh, (including the Bangladesh military intelligence) which serves as a launch pad for the ISI-backed HUJI and other groups through covert action.

Several experts have opined that surgical strikes on terror training camps need to be carried out. However, it must be pointed out that once the surprise element and stealth are lost, these strikes will have only symbolic value. Further, precision attacks on terror camps will be futile because these training camps consist of tents which are moved from place to place. Terror training camps may shift to virgin and new areas. According to B Raman, a noted counter terrorism expert, “air strikes may temporarily put a training infrastructure out of action, but not permanently. The American Cruise missile attacks of October, 1998, and their post 9/11 air strikes have not destroyed the training infrastructure of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The terrorists did suffer some casualties, which they were able to absorb and move to other places.” Moreover, these attacks will necessarily have to based on real-time intelligence and involvement of Special Forces.

According to Mr. Raman, a state cannot succeed against terrorism if it targets terrorists operating from foreign territory and not against the States sponsoring them and using the terrorists. For the same reason, the US-led coalition is unlikely to succeed in Afghanistan so long as they do not end the Pakistani sponsorship of the Taliban and its complicity with Al Qaeda. He also opines that Israel was unlikely to succeed against the Hezbollah and the Hamas so long as sponsorship by Iran and Syria did not end. In other words, in order to combat terror originating from Pakistan, India must be ready to take on Pak militarily.

In case of jihadi terrorism, the world needs to go one step further. The terror financing which comes primarily from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states must be stopped. As long as finance is available and the cause of jihad exists, terrorism will continue. It is difficult to root out the latter, namely the cause. But certainly efforts can be made to cut off the finance. One way would be targeting the financiers of terror by means of selective assassination/liquidation. The day we are able to instill fear in the minds of the so-called charitable organizations, jihadi terror will come to an end.

Another option which India should consider is physical elimination of families staying in India of certain wanted fugitives who are given asylum in Pakistan. This, though an unconventional option was used by the KGB in Lebanon in 1985. Four Soviet diplomats were kidnapped on September 30, 1985. Arkady Katkov, a consular attaché, was killed by his captors; the other three (Oleg Spirin, Valery Mirikov, and Nikolai Svirsky) were released a month later. KGB operatives in the area had identified several Hamas and Hezbollah operatives in the area. Prior to the release of the Soviet hostages a Hamas leader had been kidnapped by operatives from the Soviet Alpha Group. His mutilated and castrated body was left on the steps of the local headquarters with a note attached reading 'Two of yours a day until we get ours back’.

India must consider adopting a suitable option or a combination of measures which befits the situation; measures and options which will undermine the enemy’s ability to wage this type of war while at the same time impacting India minimally.

Mumbai - 26/11

2008-12-13T09:03:00.000-08:00

Calm, albeit uneasy, seems to have descended on Mumbai after it was witness to an unprecedented carnage perpetrated by a group of fidayeens (suicide) in the up-market area of South Mumbai from 26th November to the morning of 29th November 2008. The mayhem left about 190 dead and nearly 250 people injured. Amongst those killed were high ranking officers of the Mumbai Police and several other security personnel from the Mumbai police, National Security Guards (NSG), scores of foreigners and ordinary civilians. The terrorists struck at five places – Leopold Café at Colaba, Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus Station (CST for short; formerly known as Victoria Terminus), the Taj Hotel, Colaba, Oberoi-Trident, Nariman Point and Nariman House (renamed Chabad House) at Colaba which housed the Chabad Lubavitch Jewish Community Centre. The terrorists also placed bombs in two taxis which exploded at Wadi Bunder and Vile Parle respectively.

The terrorist attacks started with several news channels reporting gunfire exchanged at Colaba (South Mumbai) around 2115 hours. (This later turned out to be the first reported attack on Leopold Café, where the first casualties occurred). Thereafter news started coming in of firing at the Chatrapati Shivaji Terminus Station explosions inside the headquarters of the Bombay Municipal Corporation (BMC) which is located opposite CST, firing at Cama Hospital adjacent to the Metropolitan Magistrates’ Courts close to the BMC and later farther end of the road near the Metro Cinema. Later it was revealed that the firing at all these places, namely at CST to Metro junction, were the handiwork of the two terrorists. And it appears it was these two who were responsible not only for the large number of civilian casualties but also for the deaths of the top police officers as well as various ranks who with hand guns and rifles tried to take on these terrorists. At around the same time a group of terrorists had started indiscriminate firing at two of the premier five-star hotels – Oberoi-Trident and Taj located at Nariman Point and Colaba, near the Gateway of India respectively. Little did the world and the residents of Mumbai realize that this battle with hardcore fidayeens would involve 477 commandos from the elite National Security Guards (NSG), 400 policemen, one unit of the Navy’s elite marine commandos (MARCOS), 6 army columns and would take 60 hours to reach conclusion.

While the two terrorists who went berserk firing indiscriminately from CST to Metro Cinema (where they killed the chief of ATS and two senior police officers) and thereafter towards Girgaum Chowpatty where they were neutralized by a police team (one was killed in the encounter and the other Ajmal Amir Kasab, was taken alive though injured. Incidentally he was the only terrorist caught alive in the entire episode that unfolded in Mumbai). This drama on the streets lasted only for a few hours. It was the long haul at the two hotels and at Nariman House where Jewish families from Israel were taken as hostages that traumatized Mumbai. By late night of 26th November it was apparent that the attack was no ordinary terrorist strike but a meticulously fidayeen operation executed out by a group of highly motivated and trained foot soldiers from across the border in Pakistan. (The on-going investigations clearly point to the involvement of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET)[1] and the Pakistani military in the terrorist strike). This attack was a typical case of urban guerilla warfare at its best. The attackers it turned out were heavily armed with AK-47 assault rifles with seemingly endless rounds of ammunitions, Chinese hand-grenades, plastic explosives, small arms and ration in the form of dry fruits to last them for several days.

Investigations reveal that the Lashkar men got into an Indian fishing trawler that had either been arranged or hijacked for this purpose just before entering Indian territorial waters. Having monitored Coast Guard patrols closely, sources said, a mother ship (Pakistani vessel Al Hussaini) dropped them off in small boats from where they moved into an Indian fishing trawler (MV Kuber) to avoid detection. Once they reached close to the alighting point, they lowered themselves again into smaller boats arranged for them locally and then split into at least two groups for the attacks. The terrorists thus embarked in Karachi and either halted at Porbander (Gujarat) or off the coast of Porbander headed to Mumbai on MV Kuber. [Intelligence sources said that at least one of the boats used to carry out the attack was Kuber, a private Indian fishing boat from Porbandar in Gujarat. Kuber was found abandoned some five nautical miles off the Mumbai coast].

In the aftermath of the terrorist strike there has been an outpouring of emotions ranging from grief to anger and frustration in Mumbai and various cities of India. People in large numbers gathered to protest not only the shortcomings of the government and the politicians but also to impress on society that action was needed to tackle this menace. Heads have rolled with the Home Minister and Maharashtra’s Chief Minister and his deputy resigning within a few days of the attacks.

However, it must be pointed out that public anger and other varying emotions which were displayed on the streets of Mumbai and elsewhere cannot provide quick-fix solutions to the kind of terror that India is facing today.

The aim of this paper is a dispassionate and objective analysis of the shortcomings and the formulation of a strategy to combat terror.
First and foremost the terrorist strike in Mumbai was no ordinary terror strike. It was unique in that multiple locations, carefully chosen were targeted to cause maximum damage as well as impact. Instead of one or more bombings at distinct sites, the Mumbai attackers struck throughout the city using military tactics. Secondly, the choice of targets was also exclusive; all located in up-market South Mumbai (the five star hotels like Oberoi-Trident or Taj or the Leopold Café, a watering hole frequented by foreigners). The choice of the CST Railway Station was to cause fear and panic among the local populace and publicity for the jihadi cause. The Nariman House at Colaba was targeted primarily because it housed Jewish/Israeli families. The targets were selected for their visibility, (with the exception of Nariman House) impact, lax security, easy accessibility, hostage taking, and to find convenient fortifications to counter police action.

This choice of the fidayeens’ target particularly the Nariman House gives an indication as to the extent of planning that went into the execution of the terror strike. It must be remembered that though the Jews and in particular Israelis are vulnerable to terror strike the world over, little did anyone realize that Nariman House would be a terror target. It must be pointed out that even locals were not aware of the existence of a Jewish Centre till 26/11. This leads one to believe that a detailed recce (reconnaissance) had been carried out of all the targets in Mumbai much prior to 26/11. Considering the magnitude of the operation and the choice of targets, it can reasonably be assumed that more than the 10 member suicide squad, who were accounted for, may have been part of this operation.

The Pakistani Angle

Investigations indicated the attack to be the handiwork of the dreaded Pak-based terrorist group the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET). The LeT was formed in the Kunar povince of Afghanistan as the armed wing of the Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI), an Islamic fundamentalist organisation of the Ahle-Hadith sect in Pakistan. The MDI is based in Muridke, near Lahore. It has subsequently changed its name to Jama’at-ud-Da’wah and is headed by Prof. Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, who is also the amir of Lashkar-e-Taiba.The group has the complete backing of the Pakistani military. Pakistan however denies this allegation. However, the Indian government and many non-governmental think-tanks allege and rightly so, that the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence is actively involved in training the members of this group in military skills as well as financing its activities directed against India. Pakistan vehemently denied that any of its citizens were involved in the Mumbai carnage. The Pakistani denial boomeranged when Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab confessed that he hailed from Faridkot, Pakistan and that he was instructed to cause mayhem. His father in an interview to a leading Pakistani daily the Dawn also admitted that the arrested terrorist was his son who had left home about four years back and the family had very little contact with him. Pakistan is also reported to have sought consular access for the arrested terrorist.

Intelligence

It has become a sort of fashion in this country to pin the blame on the intelligence agencies after almost every terrorist attack. This is because in the past several terrorist incidents in India, there was very little actionable intelligence that was available which could help the law enforcement agencies avert the strikes. However, in this particular case, on September 18, the R&AW intercepted a satellite phone conversation between a known LeT operative and an unknown person making refernce to an operation to be carried out targeting a hotel in Mumbai. September 24 intercept by R&AW identified the hotels – Taj, the Marriot, Land’s End and Sea Rock – considered for the attack. Thereafter, the CIA’s station chief also warned that terrorist might strike Mumbai that would come from the sea. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) also by its communication on November 19 warned Maharashtra government that Yusuf Muzamil (a.k.a. ‘Yusuf’ or as ‘Abu Gure’) a Muzaffarabad-based LeT operative and chief of operations had been in conversation with one HuJI operative identified as Yahhya for arranging foreign SIM cards for an operation. According to the Indian Express, internal inquiries into the Mumbai Terror attacks revealed that despite clear intelligence inputs the Coast Guard and the Navy failed to either spot or interdict Al Hussaini, the Pakistani ship that carried the Lashkar-e-Toiba terrorists from an Indus creek in Azizabad near Karachi. And this took place at a time when warships and some IAF aircraft were participating in an annual exercise for the defence of Gujarat... Therefore it can be reasonably inferred that some actionable intelligence was provided to the government of Maharashtra as well as to the Navy and Coast Guard. The inaction on the part of the various agencies on the ground that there was no actionable intelligence does not appear to be tenable.

However, this is not to suggest that there are no shortcomings in the intelligence gathering abilities and assessment of information gathered on the part of our agencies. There are a host of problems which need to be addressed:

The single biggest problem which needs to be addressed expeditiously is not the lack of intelligence information but an unwillingness to share information and resources among the police and intelligence agencies. This is further compounded by the fact that we have far too many organizations, with separate command and control thereby making it impossible to hold any one entity responsible for the failure. The Kargil intrusion was a case in point. In the case of 26/11, there was quite a bit of actionable intelligence. However there was no proper assessment and hence very little action was taken at the ground level by the concerned agencies.

The second problem is that of coordination. The blame game that necessarily follows the lack of coordination between intelligence agencies bring to mind a satire about four people named Everybody, Somebody, Anybody and Nobody. There was an important job to be done and Everybody was asked to do it. Everybody was sure Somebody would do it. Anybody could have done it, but Nobody did it. Somebody got angry about that, because it was Everybody's job. Everybody thought Anybody could do it, but Nobody realised that Everybody wouldn't do it. It ended up that Everybody blamed Somebody when Nobody did what Anybody could have done. Our agencies work more or less in this manner.

The Kargil Committee Report observed: “The Committee has drawn attention to deficiencies in the present system of collection, reporting, collation and assessment of intelligence. There is no institutionalised mechanism for coordination or objective- oriented interaction between the agencies and consumers at different levels. Similarly, there is no mechanism for tasking the agencies, monitoring their performance and reviewing their records to evaluate their quality. Nor is there any oversight of the overall functioning of the agencies. These are all standard features elsewhere in the world. In the absence of such procedures, the Government and the nation do not know whether they are getting value for money. While taking note of recent steps to entrust the NSCS with some of these responsibilities the Committee recommends a thorough examination of the working of the intelligence system with a view to remedying these deficiencies.” Nearly a decade after Kargil nothing seems to have changed on the ground.

In India the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), headed by an all-powerful, politically-appointed National Security Advisor (NSA) is at the top of the intelligence pyramid. Intelligence gathering within the country is carried out by the Intelligence Bureau (IB) which functions under the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) was carved out of the IB and formed as a ‘Wing’ of the Cabinet Secretariat in September 1968 for collection of external intelligence. R&AW's legal status is unusual; it is not an "Agency" but a "Wing" of the Cabinet Secretariat. Hence R&AW is not answerable to Parliament on any issue.

As per convention, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) under the Cabinet Secretariat is responsible for co-ordinating and analyzing intelligence activities between R&AW, the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). In practice, however, the effectiveness of the JIC has been varied.

India's hi-tech spying agency, the National Technical Facilities Organisation (NTFO), now known as National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) is believed to be functioning under R&AW, although it remains autonomous to some degree. While the exact nature of the operations conducted by NTFO is classified, it is believed that it deals with research on imagery and communications using various platforms.

The Girish Saxena Committee which examined the state of the country’s intelligence apparatus recommended a ‘multi-agency set up’ to confront the challenges of terrorism, and this was, at least formally, implemented through the creation of two new wings under the IB – the Multi Agency Centre (MAC) and the Joint Task Force on Intelligence (JTFI). MAC was charged with collecting and coordinating terrorism-related information from across the country; the JTFI is responsible for passing on this information to the State Governments in real-time. Regrettably, both MAC and JTFI remain under-staffed, under-equipped and ineffective, with even basic issues relating to their administration unsettled. Their principal objective, the creation of a national terrorism database, has made little progress. The JTFI was also given the responsibility of upgrading counter-terrorism capabilities in the State Police Forces, as part of its mandate to improve intelligence-gathering across the country, but no actual programme of training or capacity enhancement has been initiated. The mission objective was to run an umbrella organization comprising state-level units called SMACs and the development of a national counter-terrorism database supported by state-level police-intelligence Joint Task Forces and inter-state Intelligence Support Teams. Conceived after the pattern of the CIA's Counter-Terrorism Center, the MAC was to be responsible for the joint analysis of intelligence flowing from different quarters and coordinating relevant follow-up actions.

The GoM had recommended the setting up of MAC as an immediate answer to charges of "intelligence failure" during the 1999 Kargil conflict. According to the GoM's recommendations, for wider and faster accessibility of intelligence information, it was necessary to set up a National Intelligence Grid along with a National Memory Bank.

Five years after MAC was approved, it is today composed of a skeletal staff and five SMACs, using a database hosted on a bare-bones computer system designed in-house, with no real-time links to state police forces or other intelligence agencies. There is no sign of the development of the comprehensive database on terrorists on which the entire counter-terrorism information grid was to be built. Senior intelligence officials have pointed out that the interrogation reports of 16,000 Islamist terrorists caught between 1991 and 2005 could prove to be a goldmine of actionable intelligence. The interrogation report of the LeT operative Fahim Ansari by the UP police could have provided a wealth of information had this been made known to the police in Mumbai. It turned out that it was Ansari who did the recce of Mumbai’s targets for the fidayeens.

Paramilitary organizations like the Central Reserve Police Force and Border Security Force maintain their own intelligence units (G Branch) to support counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir and North-East.

Apart from the security agencies under the Ministry of Home Affairs, there are departments under the Ministry of Finance such as Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), Central Economic Intelligence Bureau (CEIB), Enforcement Directorate, Narcotics Control Bureau, etc. which deal with foreign exchange violations, hawala, money laundering, smuggling, tax evasion and crimes related to revenue.

At the bottom of the pyramid are the intelligence branches of the states police whose intelligence networks remain the primary source of information and main agency for implementing action on the ground.

In the aftermath of the recent terror attacks the government has proposed setting up of a National (or Federal) Investigation Agency to investigate and prosecute terror-related crimes. This is likely to be patterned on the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is anybody's guess as to how one more agency will help India to combat terror effectively.

India’s Response

Indian response must necessarily be formulated in the context of Indo-Pak relations. The terror strike clearly indicates the involvement of Pakistani elements, if not the political establishment directly. Though, it must be said that this attack could simply not have been possible without the tacit knowledge and blessings of the ISI and the military. India can now ill-afford to have knee-jerk reactions and half-measures in dealing with this growing menace.

Pakistan’s so-called crackdown on terrorist groups like the LeT and JeM within its borders hardly inspires confidence. The action which is seen to be taken under intense pressure from the US and the UN is at best half-hearted. This type of Pakistani action was seen after the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001. One can expect these leaders to be free within a couple of months of house arrest or detention and the organizations which came to be banned will probably begin operations under a new name. The Pakistani President has already rejected India’s demand for handing over the leaders of the LeT, and chief of Jaish-e-Mohammed, Masood Azhar to India for standing trial.

Democracies cannot successfully combat terror by DEMOCRATIC MEANS. There is no denying the fact that harshest measures are needed to counter terror of the jihadi type emanating from a Talibanized Pakistan. The US which is the largest democracy and Israel which happens to be one of the smallest democracies could not combat terror through democratic means. India cannot do so either. The acts of terror perpetrated from across the border are not isolated acts or sporadic in nature. They are part of a concerted effort to destroy India. It is war of attrition.

India in the present scenario has the following options to deal with the crisis emerging out of Pakistan’s intransigence and reluctance:

India has been successful in mobilizing international opinion against terrorism sponsored by Pakistan and operating from Pakistani soil. Pakistan stands isolated today at the UN with very little support except probably from the Chinese. In the immediate short run, coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions can make life difficult for Pakistan. However, the so-called non-state actors (read LeT, JeM and other terrorist groups) in conjunction with the nefarious ISI may still be able to function from within Pakistani territory.

Ø Suspend bilateral talks with Pakistan on all issues including Siachen Glacier.
Ø Recall its High Commissioner to Pakistan and downsize both its own mission at Islamabad and call Pakistan to downsize its mission as well.
Ø Impose travel restrictions by suspending issue of visas indefinitely to Pakistani nationals.
Ø Snap of air, road and rail links to and from Pakistan.
Ø Stop PIA flights over Indian territory.
Ø Suspend cultural and sporting ties with Pakistan

Military Option

Though under the circumstances, a military option seems unfeasible. It also seems improbable that India would take recourse to the use of force till it has exhausted all its other options. However, India can adopt an ambivalent policy of “no war-no peace”. This will keep Pakistan guessing about India’s military options.

If India were to look at the military option then the scenario changes drastically for India has to take into consideration the fact that Pakistan is a nuclear power and any action of this nature run the risk of escalating into a full blown conflict with attendant nuclear dangers. According to Stratfor, Pakistan expects that the Indians might launch air strikes against Islamist training camps and bases in Pakistani-administered Kashmir. In Pakistan’s view, this is not a serious problem. Mounting air strikes against training camps is harder than it might seem. The only way to achieve anything in such a facility is with area destruction weapons — for instance, using B-52s to drop ordnance over very large areas. The targets are not amenable to strike aircraft, because the payload of such aircraft is too small. It would be tough for the Indians, who don’t have strategic bombers, to hit very much. Numerous camps exist, and the Islamists can afford to lose some. As an attack, it would be more symbolic than effective. Attacks on training camps sound more effective than they are. Concentrating troops on the border is impressive only if India is prepared for a massive land war, and a naval blockade has multiple complications.

India needs a military option that demonstrates will and capability and decisively hurts the Pakistani government, all without drawing India into a nuclear exchange or costly ground war. And its response must rise above the symbolic.”

The military option that India must consider is not war but measures short of war. Reprisal, for instance, under such special and compelling circumstances could be considered legitimate and justified under international law. “A reprisal is an act of SELF-HELP… by the injured state, responding—after an unsatisfied demand—to an act contrary to international law committed by the offending state….Its object is to effect REPARATION from the offending state for the offense or a return to legality by the avoidance of further offenses." [Naulilaa Case (Portugal v. Germany), 2 UN Reports Of International Arbitral Awards 1012 (Portuguese-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, 1928)] A reprisal is a form of self defense and can only be used as a last resort; it must be executed with the view of restoring a sense of equilibrium in international relations and ensuring future compliance with legal norms.

There has been a lot of debate over whether India should carry out covert operations across the border to neutralize terrorists and terror infrastructure. Though clandestine operations have the advantages of surprise, stealth and deniability, such operations are also fraught with the danger of escalating into a full blown war. The pre-requisite for successfully executing such operations is having considerable HUMINT capabilities inside Pakistan along with logistical facilities. India must develop these covert action capabilities in order to retaliate deep inside enemy lines if it wishes to deter 26/11 type attacks in the future. Till date India’s war on terror is being fought within Indian territory militarily and otherwise. India must strive to fight such wars on enemy soil in future.

This war on terror (sponsored by Pakistan) is India’s war alone. We cannot expect and should not expect others to fight this war for us.

At the time of this writing, Pakistan under pressure from the US and India responded by detaining Masood Azhar, chief of the Jaish-e-Mohammed and certain leaders of the LeT. In the past too, Pakistan had temporarily detained certain leaders of the terrorist outfits based in Pakistan and released them after a few months. This “action” has been viewed with suspicion by India. At the same time Pakistan has also refused to hand over or extradite the 20 most wanted operating from Pakistan
[1] http://www.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/lashkaretaiba.asp Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET), a Pakistani-based Islamic terrorist organization, founded in 1986, seeks to drive out Indian security forces from the disputed Jammu and Kashmir regions of South Asia and establish an Islamic caliphate.

LTTE – Is it the Beginning of the End?

2008-10-21T04:16:00.000-07:00

Sri Lanka’s counter-insurgency campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) entered a critical phase with the Lankan army tightening the noose around the rebel capital of Kilinochchi. If this were to happen, the LTTE would be confined to Mullaitivu. According to analysts, the fall of Kilinochchi could be the precursor to the opening of the Elephant Pass, leading to the Jaffna Peninsula.

The latest success achieved by the Lankan army came in the form of the capture of the strategic village of Vannerikulam, west of Kilinochchi following a two-month long hard-fought battle.

On September 15, 2008 a fierce battle started in the area of Akkarayankulam, which is located in the proximity of Kilinochchi. Military's spokesman said SLA troops were now just 5.5 km (3.4 miles) away from the rebel headquarters at Kilinochchi. BBC sources on the ground said that civilians were fleeing Kilinochchi into areas to the east, and rebel fighters were also going in the same direction.

On October 17, 2008 SLA troops cut-off Mannar-Poonaryn (A-32) road north of Nachchikudha, thus effectively encircling Nachchikudha, which is the main remaining Sea Tiger stronghold on the northwestern coast of the Island[i].

Task Force 1 of the Sri Lankan army which had bypassed the rebel stronghold Nachikuda, captured Manniyankulam and Vanneikulam advance along the A32 route to Pooneryn. It is probable that the LTTE’s access to sea routes to Tamil Nadu from the northern Mannar coast may be severely impeded. However, the top leadership of the Tigers may still be able to sneak out through the Uppu Aru Lagoon or through the Piramanthan Aru to the Indian Ocean. The possibilities of escape are quite high considering the topography of the region.

According to the Sri Lankan newspaper, Daily News, (20th October 2008) fierce fighting was on in Akkarayankulam west on 19th October as the LTTE continued to launch counter attacks on the troops which were holding the massive earth bund west of Akkarayankulam tank as they were aware that the loss of this earth bund would result in the loss of the Akkarayan village also to the security forces.

Task Force I operating under the command of Brigadier Shavendra Silva in the Kilinochchi district moving towards Nachchikuda by afternoon of 19th October completed the task of capturing the earth bund from west of Pandiveddikulam to Akkarayan west, capturing one kilometre stretch of earth bund in the east of Vannerikulam.

With the capture of the one km stretch of earth bund in the east of Vannerikulam the Task Force I troops have fully captured the 10 kilometre stretch of earth bund between the west of Pandiveddikulam and towards the east of Vannerikulam.

Pandiveddikulam is located some 7 kilometres north east of Nachchikudha.

There is only a kilometre stretch of the earth bund west of Akkarayankulam to be captured by the 57 Division to take full control of the earth bund from west of Pandiveddikulam to Akkarayankulam.

The Task Force I troops continued their march towards the north of the earth bund capturing Adampamodai village which is located 10 Km north east of Nachchikudha by yesterday afternoon.

With the capture of the Adampamodai village Task Force I can launch attacks towards Pooneryn in the North, Kiranchi or Valaipadu in the West, Nachchikudha in the South or Kilinochchi in the East, as they are now operating in an area with access to all directions.

Factors responsible for the Tigers’ downfall

The single most important factor which dented the Tigers’ combat capability was the split between its northern and eastern wings. In March 2004, eastern province military commander, V. Muralitharan, a.k.a. Karuna, wrote two letters effectively formalising the rift. The first to the LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran requesting that the LTTE’s eastern wing be allowed to “function independently” and called for a separate administration structure in the eastern Batticaloa-Ampara districts. The second letter was addressed to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), which oversaw the ceasefire, calling for a separate truce arrangement with the Colombo government. The central LTTE leadership, based in the northern Wanni area, first attempted to downplay the crisis describing it as a “temporary” episode. But on March 6, leader of the political wing, late S. Thamilchelvan, announced that Muralitharan had been removed and replaced by his deputy, T. Ramesh, and that other Prabkakaran loyalists had been appointed to eastern regional posts. He declared that Muralitharan’s move had been “instigated by some malicious elements” opposed to “Tamil liberation struggle” and that he had acted “traitorously to the Tamil people.”

Thamilchelvan’s statement amounted to a virtual death sentence for Karuna and his men. Karuna, however, had an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 guerrilla fighters—about one third of the LTTE’s total military forces—under his control. Far from backing down, he moved quickly to consolidate his position in Batticaloa-Ampara districts.

Secondly, LTTE became increasingly isolated internationally. The US and Canada besides India declared it a terrorist organization making it extremely difficult for the Tigers to raise funds and procure arms for its campaign against the security forces. The assassinations of Tamil politicians and the indiscriminate use of violence made it virtually impossible for the international community to recognize it as a representative of the Lankan Tamils.

Thirdly, the Sri Lankan navy achieved unprecedented success in 2007 when it was able to sink a number of ships of the Eelam navy. (Read the Author’s The LTTE: On the Backfoot November 3, 2007) The naval operations had a big impact on the illegal arms shipment network.

Further the death of Anton Balsingham who was a political strategist and negotiator was a body blow to the separatists.

Sri Lanka also obtained necessary support from China, Pakistan and military hardware (read Kfir C-2 aircraft-6 Nos) from Israel in 2006 and radars from India and the US. Eelam War IV saw the Lankan navy and air force playing a more meaningful role in the war against Tamil terror.

In conclusion, it remains to be seen whether the rains in Sri Lanka will bog down the armed forces making it difficult for them to speed up operations. Any respite at this point of time will only enable the Tigers to carry out a tactical retreat and later regroup to fight another round another day.

[i] Wikipedia

India's War on Terror

2008-09-18T00:04:00.000-07:00

[At the time of writing of this post, the prime suspect and probably the most wanted in India for his role in the serial blasts in Ahmedabad and Delhi, Indian Mujahideen’s Abdul Subhan Qureshi alias Taufeeq Bilal is reported to have fled to Bangladesh via the Malda border. Such is the co-ordination (or the lack of it) between the various law-enforcing / security agencies of the country that in spite of keeping track of the suspect, he was not picked up].

Four blasts in five months. Major cities – Jaipur, Bangalore, Ahmedabad and Delhi (And one failed attempt in Surat) have been targeted from May 2008 to September 2008 by a relatively little known Islamic fundamentalist group called the Indian Mujahideen. An expert rightly remarked that India had become a picnic spot of terrorists where they could gaily carry out their activities without fear of reprisals or punishments. In fact there is no deterrence. As a result India seems to have been rendered so vulnerable that Islamist terrorist groups merrily strike at will with increasing frequency and intensity. It is quite unthinkable for any rationale human being to fathom as to how a country which has been repeatedly ravaged by terrorism does not even have an anti-terror law. Thanks largely to our politicians, national security concerns have been sacrificed at the altar of political expediency. Every time there is a big terror attack outside Jammu and Kashmir an oft heard remark is that it is time to get tough with organized terror. It is just a lip service to assuage the feelings of the common man who bears the brunt of these attacks. If we had really acted tough in 1993 after Mumbai was rocked by serial blasts, we would not have found ourselves in this predicament.

After every terrorist strike in India, a comparison is made with US and how even a country as large and powerful as the US was not immune to terror strikes. However, what is important to note is that post-9/11 there has been no incident of terrorism in mainland USA. This is primarily due to the fact that the US adopted some of the harshest measures apart from declaring an all out war on terror. The measures included enacting tough anti-terror legislation, incarcerating terror suspects captured in Afghanistan in Guantanamo Bay, etc.

India which has been a victim of Pak-sponsored jihadi terror, on the other hand, has had to its credit, two anti-terror laws (TADA and POTA) repealed. This is the sincerity with which India has been tackling the cancer of jihadi terror.

India’s policy on national security has always been a hostage to vote-bank politics. How else does one explain the support given by politicians like Laloo Prasad Yadav and Mulayam Singh Yadav to Students’ Islamic Union of India (SIMI) a banned terror outfit responsible for most of the recent terrorist strikes in India? Should not action be taken against these two leaders for openly supporting the revocation of ban on SIMI? Are these rogue politicians not as culpable as the ones who commit the dastardly acts of terror?

Jihadi terror’s root cause is Pakistan. So any measure initiated for containing terror within the country must be taken by keeping Pakistan and its closest terrorist ally Bangladesh in mind. For measures taken within the country will only address the symptom and not the disease.

At the time of writing this post, the country’s cabinet had not been able to come up with any concrete proposals to counter terror. The Government said “no” to a strong anti-terror law; rather it proposes tightening the provisions of the existing law. We continue to adopt the soft, laid-back approach to terror with of course some cosmetic changes like, more CCTV cameras in public places and raising the issue of cross-border terrorism with Pakistan.

Terrorism especially of the jihadi type can be countered only by ruthless measures not by lip service and cosmetic changes.

Firstly, there is an urgent need to cleanse the Home Ministry of nincompoop ministers – the boss Shivraj Patil, the serial dress changer who has had no clue how to tackle the terror menace and one subordinate Jaiswal attending inauguration function in his home constituency and the other, Ahmed defending his boss. No, there is nothing political about this. The continuance of this trio does not augur well for the nation’s security. The political leadership at its own peril and that of the country can permit these three gentlemen to function in their present capacity.

A policy of no compromise – India’s counter terror strategy has been compromised by successive governments by giving in to terrorists’ demands at various points of time. A strategy to counter organized terror cannot be subject to and subservient to narrow electoral politics and populist measures.

India lacks the political will and resolve to fight terror. After every terrorist strike all we get to see is political blame game; condemnation by ministers and politicians and compensation for the victims. On the ground there is very little progress in connection with the terror crimes. Otherwise how does one explain India’s inaction over the Indian Embassy bombing in Kabul? In the aftermath of the attack on Indian Parliament in December 2001, India mobilized its army on its Western borders but stopped short of going all out against Pakistan. All our initiatives have turned out to be half-hearted attempts. Contrast this with the US Special Forces action in Pakistan from across the Afghan border. India must gear up for attacking terror infrastructure in Pakistan or Bangladesh or elsewhere with all necessary means possible. Even if it means risking an all out confrontation.

Carrying out assassination and abduction of foreign nationals responsible for terrorist activities against India or its nationals and interests. So also to carry out sabotage and counter terrorist activities in enemy states to protect national interests.

Incarceration of known terror suspects in Guantanamo Bay type detention camps. And curtailing rights of the detainees.

Stepped up surveillance of madrassas and places of worship like Mosques.

These measures may not be easy to adopt or implement. However, India has not too many options excepting taking measures undemocratic and extra-judicial.

Finger Area: The Indian Response

2008-05-27T04:57:00.000-07:00

China’s fresh claims on 2.1 sq. km “Finger Area” of Sikkim amounts to the re-opening of that portion of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) which was considered settled. It also raises doubts about China’s sincerity in resolving the boundary issue. While the northernmost tip of Sikkim was always part of Indian Territory, the Army earlier used to send in only regular patrols and had a few traditional defensive positions in the area. The 'Finger Area', which falls north of Gyangyong in Sikkim and overlooks a valley known as the Sora Funnel, is considered a strong defensive position to ward off any move by China to enter the Sikkim plateau.

According to Beijing which has backed up its claims over the Finger Area by producing maps which it states are more accurate because the map is purported to have been plotted using advanced technology – It has been reported that the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) was attempting to prove the authenticity of the claim by using GPS and other satellite-based navigational equipment.

India, instead of refuting Beijing’s claims and reiterating the validity of the 1924 Survey of India map on which it has been relying for backing its claim over the area, directed the Survey of India to carry out fresh survey of the region in northern Sikkim using latest methods to validate and verify Indian positions. While the Chinese conveyed threats through diplomatic channels to destroy the cairns in the area, the Indian External Affairs Ministry chose to adopt an over cautious line bordering on appeasement. This Indian move may well open a Pandora’s Box encouraging the Chinese to “create” more disputes along the LAC as well as harden its position on the issue of Tawang.

India can ill-afford to ignore the overt Chinese threats to resolve the present territorial claim militarily as well as its veiled threats over Tawang.

According to sources, the Army always had a permanent presence in the area and had constructed bunkers and temporary posts since 1962. The stone cairns, which China had threatened to destroy, had also been modified as defensive positions by the Army. The Kalimpong-based 27 Mountain Division is responsible for the defence of Northern Sikkim and the Finger Area. India proposes to set up two mountain divisions (about 30,000 troops) dedicated for Arunachal Pradesh, a fleet of medium lift helicopters to service these troops and three bases for Sukhois at Tezpur, Hashimara and Panagarh.

India needs to do more than setting up two divisions and a few bases. It needs to expeditiously improve the infrastructure of the entire North Eastern Region including building all weather roads not only for rapid troop deployment but also for the development of the entire region. India must also step up reconnaissance of the areas particularly where there have been increased Chinese military activities and incursions in order to avoid a “Kargil” in the eastern sector.

Chinese Hand in the Finger Area - Flashpoint in Sikkim

2008-05-18T10:05:00.000-07:00

In a move which took India by surprise, China laid claim to a small tract of land in North Sikkim, referred to as the “Finger Area” by the Indian Army and even threatened to demolish existing stone structures there. India has strongly rebutted these claims, lodged an official protest and barred Chinese troops from entering the area. The area is in the northernmost tip of Sikkim, north of a place called Gyangyong, and because it appears like a protruding finger on the map, it is referred to by the name Finger Area. This territory overlooks a strategically important valley known as the Sora Funnel. It contains several stone cairns, which are essentially heaps of stones that can be used for shelter.

The row began last year when Chinese troops started incursions in the area frequently — this year itself about 50 Chinese transgressions have been reported in this area — and then started building a road towards the end of the year that crossed this tract of land. The official Indian response as usual was muted. In the past too Chinese troops used to cross the area during patrolling. However, this was attributed to the general confusion that occurs during patrols along the Line of Actual Control. In many other areas, Indian troops, too, would cross Chinese territory for the same practical reasons like taking the shorter and negotiable route which may involve bit of transgression.

China seems to have upped the ante because of largely India’s knee-jerk reaction to Chinese incursions in the past one year. Further, though it openly appreciated India’s efforts to curb Tibetan activities within India during the height of the agitation China views Indian role in the Lhasa flare up with suspicion. The Indian body language in response to any Chinese action on either the Sikkim or Arunachal border appears to be weak. This naturally encouraged the Chinese to lay claims to the Finger Area.

Chinese intentions are suspect; there seems to be an effort to revive claims over Sikkim which is an integral part of India by creating tensions along the border. Earlier, China destroyed a makeshift bunker at Doka La near the Sino-Sikkim-Bhutan trijunction sources have said, was a Chinese effort to bring Sikkim back into the boundary controversy. India needs to beef up its ground forces all along the Chinese border but also its air force sending a strong signal to China warning against any misadventure. However, India again has chosen to downplay the incident as well as the Chinese threat in the area.

Sino-Indian Border Dispute – A Perspective

2008-01-16T02:29:00.000-08:00

The whole gamut of Sino-Indian relations have revolved around the unresolved boundary row between the two neighbours, culminating in the 1962 conflict. Years later there appeared to be a thaw in relations with trade ties between the two countries improving. However, the relations have been far from normal and India had more than adequate reasons to be suspicious of Chinese intentions and motives particularly in relation to the border issue.

It is necessary to delve into history in order to determine why resolution of this dispute has been difficult.

India and China have for long found it difficult to resolve the border dispute which has impeded normal ties between the two Asian giants for about four and half decades. The cause of the conflict in 1962 was a dispute over the sovereignty of the widely-separated Aksai Chin (in Kashmir) and Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh border regions. Tawang district is located around latitude 27° 45’ N and longitude 90° 15’ E in North-West Arunachal Pradesh. Tawang was the scene of intense fighting during the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Chinese troops had then occupied Tawang and destroyed portions of the monastry. After the Chinese troops withdrew, Tawang was once again under Indian administration. Aksai Chin in Kashmir’s Ladakh region is the other disputed territory which is at present under the control of the Chinese. This article primarily focuses only on the disputed border area in Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh.

The core issue:

The status of Tibet is central to the border dispute for the simple reason that for two millennia, there never was a border between India and China. Lt Cmdr Calvin James Bernard of the US Navy in his paper titled “China-India Border War (1962)” stated that the roots of the conflict goes back to the 18th century, when both China and British India asserted claims to desolate, remote mountain areas between China and India. Military expeditions, intrigue and unproductive diplomatic exchanges marked decades of relations between the two countries. Rather than resolving the border issue, Chinese and British Indian actions only set the stage for conflict.
According to Mohan Guruswamy, the roots of India’s problem with China go back a couple of centuries when Emperor Napoleon and Tsar Alexander met in July 1807. As the Russian empire began its eastward expansion, which many felt would culminate in the conquest of India, there was a shadow contest for political ascendancy between the British and Russian empires. The Russians’ desire for an empire and a warm water port did not diminish and so the game continued. The British response to meet the Russian threat was to establish a forward defensive line in the northern region so that a Russian thrust could be halted well before the plains of Hindustan. This called for making Afghanistan and Tibet into buffer states and for fixing suitable and convenient borders with these states. In other words, British India did not have a border with China.

It is only in October 1950, when Communist China’s troops entered Tibet to 'liberate' the Roof of the Word that suddenly India acquired a new neighbour. Tibet was always a buffer between the Chinese and the British Empire. In 1914 at Simla an agreement came to be signed between the Dalai Lama's Representative and Sir Henry McMahon to define the border between Tibet and India. The McMahon Line came into being. The border agreement was arrived at bilaterally during the tripartite Convention between British India, China and Tibet. Though the Chinese subsequently refused to ratify the Convention, they did not object to the bilateral accord between Delhi and Lhasa. The Chinese were more concerned by the demarcation of their border with Eastern Tibet. The Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (or Chou-en-lai) convinced Nehru that the British were 'imperialists' and therefore all treaties or agreements signed by them were 'imperialist treaties.' The inference drawn by the clever Chinese premier was that the McMahon line was an imperialist creation and therefore not acceptable by New China: The Chinese Premier conveniently presumed and told India's ambassador to China K N Panikkar that India had no intention of claiming special rights arising from the unequal treaties of the past. Nehru while concurring that the British were imperialists could not follow Zhou's conclusion on the McMahon Line. However, he did not want to raise the issue first. Since nothing was heard from the Chinese side about the issue of the frontier, Nehru deduced that McMahon Line was a foregone conclusion.

In 1954 the Panchsheel Agreement (known as Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India) came to be signed between the two countries. This agreement too was silent about the border.

The Chinese Premier Zhou did not bring up the topic of the border till the end of the fifties. And by that time it was a bit too late for India as the Aksai Chin was fully in possession of the Liberation Army. The Chinese stand was unequivocal that it had never accepted the McMahon line and NEFA belonged to them.

Zhou's visit to India in 1960 was followed by several rounds of detailed discussions which were held between June and December. While India presented detailed maps and documents proving its claims, the Chinese hardly gave any evidence of their 'possessions.'

Could India have averted the 1962 War?
Thus by failing to negotiate with the Chinese on the border through the fifties, India lost the opportunity to settle the contentious issue once and for all. According to Col. (retd) Anil Athale, another opportunity (which was missed by India) to avoid the conflict came in December 1960 when Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai made a brief stopover in Delhi. Under the so-called 'Krishna Menon Plan' it was mooted that India would lease the Aksai Chin area to China and in return the Chinese would lease the strategic (from the Indian point of view) Chumbi valley that is like a dagger pointed at the line of communication with Assam and the Northeast. This would have been a very fair deal as the Aksai Chin area, besides being strategically useless to India, was also very difficult to defend. But it is believed that under the pressure from the right wing of the Congress and fear of vociferous opposition, Nehru rejected it. It is difficult to say now whether the course of history would have been different had India gone ahead with this proposal.

The border war of October 1962:
The war itself was limited both in terms of place and time duration. Fighting started on 10th October 1962 and ended on 20th November 1962. The cease-fire came into effect at 0000 on 21st November 1962. Actual fighting was limited to 3 distinct areas, namely Walong, Tawang and Aksai Chin.

Post 1962

Nathu La: September 1967
In 1965, two significant events took place on the Sino-Indian border. The first was the warning issued to India about Chinese sheep not being allowed to graze on their side of the border by India. This happened in September 1965 when the Indo-Pak war was simmering on India’s western border.

At the same time, in September-December 1965, the PLA sent probing missions on the entire Sikkim-Tibet border. According to one account, there were seven border intrusions on the Sikkim-Tibet border between September 7 and December 12, 1965, involving the PLA. In all these border incursions, the Indian side responded “firmly” without provoking the other. Though details of casualties of these PLA border incursions are not reported, there were reports indicating that the PLA suffered “heavy” casualties against “moderate” loss by India.

Two years later, in September 1967, in spite of their setbacks in 1965, the PLA launched a direct attack on the lndian armed forces at Nathu La, on the Sikkim-Tibet border. The six-day “border skirmishes” from September 7-8 to 13, 1967, had all the elements of a high drama, including exchange of heavy artillery fire, and the PLA soldiers tried to cross the border in large numbers. Again the attack was repulsed at all points by the Indian troops.

The Sumdorong Chu Incident: June - October 1986
In 1986 China decided to flex its muscles again with India. In mid-1986, it came to the notice of India that the PLA had built a helipad at Wandung in Sumdorong Chu Valley referred to as Sangduoluo He in the Chinese media in Arunachal Pradesh. India reacted swiftly and the PLA had an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with the India Army in Sumdorong Chu Valley of Arunchal Pradesh in August 1986. After a week of tense moments both sides mutually agreed to withdraw their forces inside their respective territories and create a no man’s land.

In August '87, Indian and Chinese troops moved their respective posts slightly apart in the Sumdorong Chu Valley, following a meeting of the field commanders. During the 8th round of border talks on November '87, it was decided to upgrade the talks from the bureaucratic to the political level. Following then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988, a Joint Working Group (JWG) was set up to discuss, among other things, the alignment of the LAC. In 1993, an agreement was inked between the foreign ministers of the two countries on the reduction of troops along the LAC. This was possibly first of the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). It was decided to pull back from respective forward check posts in the Sumdorong Chu Valley from a situation of "close confrontation" and in 1994, the Indian External Affairs Ministry described the situation as one of "close proximity" where the respective posts were 50-100 yards apart. Following the JWG meeting in April 1995, the two sides agreed to a simultaneous withdrawal of their troops from the four border posts - two Indian and two Chinese - in the Sumdorong Chu Valley. As of June 1999, the valley was unoccupied by either the Indian army or Chinese, and their respective posts in the area were close to a kilometre apart [18].

A View from China:
According to a leading Chinese scholar on India Ma Jiali, China's claim to the whole of Arunachal Pradesh may only be a negotiating ploy. However, he added that the demand for Tawang might well be non-negotiable. According to Ma Jiali, the disputed area in Arunachal Pradesh is very large. Tawang was the birthplace of the 6th Dalai Lama, Tsangyang Gyatso. The Tibetan people thus have very strong religious sentiments towards Tawang. It must be noted that in 1938, the Survey of India published a map of Tibet, which showed the Tawang tract as part of that country. Even the first edition of Jawaharlal Nehru's Discovery Of India showed the Indo-Tibetan boundary as running at the foot of the hills. The Tibetans did not accept this 'annexation' of the Tawang tract and challenged the British attempts to expand their government into this area. But they tacitly accepted the rest of the McMahon demarcation. It is clear that, but for the Tawang tract, there is little basis for the Chinese claim on the whole of Arunachal Pradesh. According to other Chinese scholars, India should accept the Chinese view that McMahon Line was illegal and unacceptable and once it is done, the border settlement would be easy. Scholars have also warned that “substantial adjustments” would have to be made if the border issue between India and China is to be resolved. The hint here is towards major concessions by India on Tawang. As far as the other sector of dispute, namely, Aksai Chin is concerned the Aksai Chin road is strategically too important for the Chinese, as it is the only link between its two western provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang. Thus the question of relinquishing the occupation of this area does not arise. It is important to appreciate that there have been subtle changes in the Chinese position on the border dispute. At a point of time it was felt that the North-East was the bargaining chip or the ‘pressure’ for a de jure control of Aksai Chin. Today, while Aksai Chin has become non-negotiable, China seeks concessions from India on Tawang. The pressure on Tawang has been kept up by raking up issues of the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh and even Sikkim. China is in no hurry to resolve the issue. One reason could be the repeated incursions into Tawang could provide legitimacy to China for exercising de facto control over the territory. But at the core is also the assessment that the time for striking a deal with India is not now and when that would be would depend on how the mandarins assess the respective strengths of the two sides and whether China holds the upper hand.

Don’t ignore the Sun Yuxi factor:
Just a week ahead of Chinese President Hu Jintao's state visit to India in November 2006, Beijing's envoy to New Delhi Sun Yuxi claimed that Arunachal Pradesh was a Chinese territory.

“In our position the whole of what you call the state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory, and Tawang (district) is only one place in it. We are claiming all of that—that's our position,” he told the news channel CNN-IBN just days ahead of the Chinese President’s visit to India.

Sun was the man who drove Beijing's policy of stirred up tensions along the border in Arunachal. From incursions into the state, to demolition of Indian army observation posts along the Bhutan border and objections to road building in Sikkim, Sun carried out his mission with a bullheadedness that drove South Block to silent fury and prompting them to demand the recall of the envoy.

The South Block was infuriated by Sun’s manipulation of the bilateral talks on border issue: from Aksai Chin in Ladakh to thousands of miles east in Arunachal, where India's insecurities ran the deepest.

The Indian government angrily rejected the statement, and a year later Sun was recalled. New Delhi conveyed to Beijing a message that unless Sun was recalled, the Indian Prime Minister would not send a final list of dates for his visit to China. The Prime Minister’s Office held its ground despite China’s initial refusal to concede. Delhi may seem to have been one up on the Chinese but it must be remembered that it could well be a case of two steps forward and one step backward. It is important to note that the envoy could not have taken a unilateral decision to claim the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh. Surely, there was some sort of official backing for him to make this provocative statement. Secondly, it took nearly a year for the Chinese to concede to the Indian demand for withdrawing him. Sun’s statement could very well be the unstated Chinese policy on the border issue. India can ill-afford to ignore the Sun Yuxi factor.

The Nation needs to know:
On the eve of the Indian Prime Minister’s recent visit to China, India’s External Affairs Minister Mr. Pranab Mukherjee candidly admitted in an interview to a TV news channel that Chinese incursions in the Tawang area of Arunachal Pradesh were taking place. He also added that though it was matter of concern, the incursions were not worrisome and that there was no reason to press panic buttons. The manner in which it was said gave the impression that it was China’s prerogative to intrude and India’s privilege to ignore it. This is only inference that can be drawn considering the fact that about 141 incursions had taken place in the past 12 months as of October 2007. It is quite disturbing as to why the government had chosen to play down the incursions. The interviewer also did not question the Hon’ble Minister about this. The incursions were highlighted by the MP from the area who repeatedly raised this issue in Parliament.

The Hon’ble Minister added that they (meaning the Indian government) took it up with the Chinese and that mechanisms were in place through which these types of problems were addressed. The nation is entitled to know, what are these mechanisms in the first place and if such mechanisms existed how effective have they been in dealing with the incursions.

According to B Raman, there have been recurring instances of innumerable border intrusions by the Chinese troops. Two of these incidents are of great concern. The first was an intrusion into Bhutan and the second was about the Chinese raising an objection to the construction of two military bunkers inside Indian territory in Sikkim.

Apart from the incursions which are regularly taking place, the Indian Army is also concerned about an all weather highway being laid by the Chinese towards the Jechepla Pass in Myanmar. The pass provides direct entry into Arunachal and other sensitive eastern states. Farther west in Tawang, similar concerns have been raised about the pace at which China's network of roads and highways is being laid close to the Line of Actual Control. The Indian Prime Minister, after his recent trip to China is convinced that the border talks will make headway. However, it remains to be seen how sincere are the Chinese in negotiating a settlement.

Sources: Articles by Lt. Col. (Retd) Anil Athale, Claude Arpi, Mohan Guruswamy published in Rediff.com, V Natarajan (Bharat Rakhshak), Sreedhar's "China Becoming a Superpower and India's Options", Lt. Cmdr Calvin James Bernard's paper - China-India Border War (1962), Wikipedia.

Who Killed Benazir?

2007-12-28T06:29:00.000-08:00

Former Prime Minister of Pakistan and a leading opposition leader Benazir Bhutto was assassinated on 27th December 2007 in a suicide bomb attack at an election rally Liaquat Bagh Park, in garrison town of Rawalpindi. About 20 persons were also killed in the attack.

More than 24 hours after the gruesome incident, there are conflicting theories surrounding the assassination. One theory doing the rounds was that 5 bullets were fired at Benazir by a sniper who later blew himself. Police said a suicide bomber fired shots at Bhutto as she was leaving the rally venue in a park before blowing himself up. According to columnist Hamid Mir Benazir was shot at by a sniper rifle from close range and a few moments later a suicide bomber blew himself to make sure that she did not survive. It was a determined effort. They made sure she didn't survive the attack. She died due to the injury in her neck. Some reports suggest that Bhutto was shot by two men with AK 47 rifles as she was entering her car after addressing an election rally. She was injured in the head and chest. At the same time a blast took place close to her car. She was rushed to the hospital where she was declared dead at 6.16 pm nearly 40 minutes after the attack. (The spokesman for the Pakistani Interior Ministry, Brigadier Cheema in an interview claimed that Benazir died due to shrapnel injuries and not due to bullets fired at her). Though no terror group or organization has so far claimed responsibility for the attack, the blame game has begun with former PM Sharif blaming Musharraf and the establishment of carrying on the attack. Musharraf in turn has blamed the Islamic militants for the assassination.

An Al Qaeda leader Mustafa Abu Al-Yazid based in Afghanistan has claimed responsibility for the assassination of former Pakistan Premier Benazir Bhutto, whom he described as 'the most precious American asset.' "We terminated the most precious American asset, which vowed to defeat (the) mujahadeen," Al Qaeda commander and spokesman Mustafa Abu Al-Yazid told Italian news agency Adnkronos International in a phone call from an unknown location. "The radical elements of Pakistan viewed Bhutto as a Westernised heretic and an American stooge and had repeatedly threatened to kill her. Earlier in October, two Pakistani militant warlords based in the country's northwestern areas had threatened to kill her. One was Baitullah Mehsud, head of Tekrik Taliban-e-Pakistan - a coalition of Pakistani Taliban groups, a top militant commander fighting the Pakistani Army in South Waziristan, who has ties to al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. The other was Haji Omar, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, who is also from South Waziristan and fought with the Afghan Mujahidin against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

Al-Yazid was described by AKI as the 'main Al Qaeda commander in Afghanistan.' It reported that the decision to kill Bhutto was made by Al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri in October. The veracity of the Al Qaeda claims is yet to be verified.

Though Al Qaeda has claimed responsibility for the assassination, according to British media reports, Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence and Islamist militants are the main suspects in the assassination of former premier Benazir Bhutto. There is considerable force in this belief as Musharraf and the radical mullahs were the ones who would have benefited most from her death.

A suicide bomber killed nearly 150 people in an attack on Bhutto on October 18 as her cavalcade was passing through the southern city of Karachi after returning home from eight years in self-imposed exile. She narrowly escaped being killed in that attack. Shortly after the failed attempt on her life, Bhutto wrote to Musharraf naming four persons whom she suspected of carrying out the attack. She named Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi, a rival PML-Q politician and chief minister of Pakistan's Punjab province, Hamid Gul, former director of the ISI, and Ijaz Shah, the director general of the Intelligence Bureau.

Incidentally, Liaquat Bagh Park is where Pakistan's first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated in October 1951. Bhutto's father Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was hanged in April 1979 at a spot not very far from where his daughter was killed.

US Radars in Sri Lanka: War on Terror or Snooping on India

2007-11-16T22:07:00.000-08:00

On 8th November 2007, the US handed over a radar-based surveillance system and Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs) to Sri Lanka to enhance its maritime surveillance capabilities and security. The radar and the boats were given to the Lankan navy to help them in their ongoing war against the LTTE. The location of the facility in the Vavuniya region of North-Eastern Sri Lanka is a cause of concern for India as this post can be used to snoop on India’s key strategic assets such as Kalpakkam nuclear station in Tamil Nadu, naval dockyard at Vishakapatnam and the Thumba rocket launch station near Thiruvananthapuram.

The Sri Lankan Armed Forces have been dependent on Indian radar systems. However as a result of the three ‘successful’ air raids by the Tamil Eelam Air Force, questions were raised about the effectiveness of these systems. Whether the Lankans approached India for assistance and if so what was the Indian response is not quite known. India, however, has been unwilling to mediate directly in the conflict despite appeals from both Sri Lankan government and the Tamil Tigers. New Delhi had post-Rajiv Gandhi assassination refused to negotiate with the LTTE, which it has banned as a terrorist outfit. However, at the same time, it has also not implicitly endorsed or armed Colombo's crackdown on the Tamil rebels, since that would have direct repercussions in the present political dispensation and the regional politics of Tamil Nadu. India decided to play safe by steering clear of the conflict. Which is why when approached by Colombo for military aid, New Delhi offered everything else but weaponry. While, India was willing to provide non-lethal military aid, it avoided entering into a defence agreement with Sri Lanka on one or the other pretext, and then had to watch helplessly as Colombo took its military wish list elsewhere, including China and Pakistan. It has also been reported that Pakistan is involved in training the Sri Lankan Air Force. Though Lanka has denied involvement of Pakistan in training its armed forces.

In another move aimed against the LTTE, the US froze all assets of the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), a front of the LTTE, as part of its aim to financially isolate terrorist groups and their support networks.

The US Department of the Treasury on 15th November 2007, announced that it would freeze the US held assets of the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation, a charitable organisation which has been involved in fund-raising and procurement for LTTE.

India, as usual, expressed concern over the induction of the surveillance system. India needs to do better than expressing its concerns. Firstly, it needs to understand that appeasing its alliance partner in government is one thing and national security is totally another. Secondly, India has been perceived to be insensitive to the bona fide defense requirements of Sri Lanka. Sri Lankan media reported that the Lankan government has sought to purchase 3D radars from China. However Lanka acceded to India’s protests and security concerns and accepted 2D radars which India offered. The Lankan authorities later denied this report.

India’s policy or the lack of it has resulted in big powers slowly encroaching in India’s neighbourhood. The Chinese with its string of pearls policy has led to ‘encirclement’ of India. The recent US-Lankan bonhomie has brought the US close to Indian shores. Today the southern neighbour has sought and received military assistance from the US and Pakistan. Because of its intransigence, tomorrow, India may have to face the stark reality of facing a full-fledged US naval facility at Trincomalee. And of course India may very well have lost out on a chance to play a meaningful role in the strife-torn island nation.

RAW facts

2007-11-11T21:18:00.000-08:00

K Shankaran Nair who succeeded Rameshwarnath Kao, the founding father of RAW, as its chief has recently written a book “Inside IB and RAW: The Rolling Stones that Gathered Moss” narrating his experiences. Morarji Desai who became prime minister in 1977 was out to wreak havoc not only on the Gandhi family but also on the top civil servants and intelligence officers. The late PM's policies had a serious impact on intelligence collection and operations.

His hatred for the head of the premier intelligence organization can be seen from the excerpts of the conversation which appeared in the book Inside RAW by Asoka Raina.

M. Desai: I believe RAW was involved in the internal affairs of the country during emergency.

Nair: No Sir. That is not correct, all were external operations.

MD: But your activities were highly immoral, highly irregular.

Nair: These are RAW’s external operations, sir….

MD: This does not reduce the immorality – stop operations you are handling at present.

Nair: If we do that, sir, some of them might mean a loss of faith in our promises and in the credibility of the government.

MD: I do not care. Stop all operations and also reduce the RAW strength by 50%.

This resulted many an operations being aborted and operatives compromised. One such was “Tiger” Siddiqui of Bangladesh who felt betrayed. Mr. Nair is reported to have remarked that Morarji Desai was the greatest enemy of India’s national security. Pakistan certainly would have celebrated on that fateful day.

This act of Desai was nothing short of treason for which he ought to have been severely punished.

Pakistan at the Crossroads-I

2007-11-06T00:26:00.000-08:00

Experts have been debating about the future of Pakistan given the nature of civil strife and political instability that has dogged that country for the past few years.[1] It needs to be emphasized that Pakistan’s problems are not of yesterday’s making. They are systemic and congenital, if one can use the expression for a nation-state.

The Beginnings

The state of Pakistan was doomed since its birth in 1947. The creation of Pakistan in 1947 was tumultuous and marked by violence unprecedented in the sub-continent. Pakistan came into international limelight by invading Kashmir in 1948 which was contiguous to both India and Pakistan In just over a year after its independence, its first founding father, Jinnah passed away. In October 1951, its first PM Liaqat Ali Khan was assassinated. His assassin, an Afghan was killed and hence the causative factors behind the assassination remained unknown. In the absence of leaders of stature and substance to lead Pakistan post-Jinnah and Khan, Pakistan’s troubles began.

Pakistan became a republic on March 23, 1956, with Maj. Gen. Iskander Mirza as the first president. The first Constitution was adopted in 1956, nearly 9 years after its independence. But it was suspended in 1958. The first elected President of Pakistan, Iskander Mirza was deposed in a bloodless coup carried out by martial law administrator, General Ayub Khan.

Thus within a decade of its birth, Pakistani polity started dithering. Institutions of democracy that were nurtured in neighbouring India were not allowed to take roots in Pakistan. Forces of democracy were subverted by the Army, which came to play a pivotal role in its governance. Pakistani society also came to be divided on regional or linguistic lines, with the Punjabi elite dominating the West and the East being dominated by Bengali-speaking Muslims. This division was to cost Pakistan dearly in 1971 with the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent state.

Though political parties such as Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) (led by Z A Bhutto) and MQM emerged, what Pakistan failed to get was an able leader; a statesman who would take the nation on the path of progress and prosperity.

Pakistan was under military rule from 1958 to 1972, with two generals Ayub Khan (1958-69) and Yahya Khan (1969-71) being at the helm of affairs. Pakistan went to war twice with India in 1965 and 1971 under both the generals; the 1971 war resulting in the emergence of Bangladesh. Pakistan returned to civilian rule under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1972 after the debacle in East Pakistan in 1971. Under Z A Bhutto, a new constitution was framed which came into effect on 14th August 1973. The constitution represented a compromise consensus on three issues: the role of Islam; the sharing of power between the federal government and the provinces; and the division of responsibility between the president and the prime minister, with a greatly strengthened position for the latter. Neither Bhutto nor his government lasted long. In 1978 he was deposed in a bloodless coup and sent to the gallows and General Zia-ul-Haq took over the reigns of the country. General Zia’s policies took Pakistani society on the path of radical Islam.

In December 1978, on the occasion of the first day of Hijra, Zia delivered a nationwide address to usher in the Islamic system in Pakistan. The government began a programme to enforce Nizam-e-Islam (Islamic system) and established Sharia benches to enforce Islamic law. By enacting draconian laws such as the Zina ordinance and Hudood Ordinance[2], Zia ensured that Pakistan would become Talibanized or at any rate Islamicized.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 saw Pakistan being catapulted as a frontline state in the war against communism. The Mujahideen backed by Pakistan’s ISI with financial assistance from the West carried out attacks in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan. Pakistan was deeply involved in this jihad against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. After the pull-out of Soviet troops in the late eighties, Pakistan continued to be involved in the internecine conflict in Afghanistan.

On August 19, 1988, Zia was killed in a midair explosion of a Pakistani Air Force plane. Elections which were held at the end of 1988 brought longtime opponent of General Zia, Benazir Bhutto, into office as prime minister. Civilian rule meant political instability and a constant struggle to survive rather than rule.

The corruption, brutality and incessant fighting of the Mujahideen prompted Mullah Omar and his students, the Taliban, to rid Afghanistan of these rebels. The Pakistan-trained Taliban let loose a reign of terror in the war-ravaged country. The Taliban gained control of the country with the active assistance of Pakistan. The casualty of these policies were economic progress. It is said violence begets violence; these very policies have come back to haunt Pakistan post-9/11.

Part II Pakistan at the Crossroads - The Musharraf Regime

[1] Emergency was declared in Pakistan on the night of 3rd November 2007.
[2] Under Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood Ordinance 1979), the punishment of imprisonment or fine, or both, as provided in the existing Pakistan Penal Code for theft, was substituted by the amputation of the right hand of the offender from the joint of the wrist by a surgeon. For robbery, the law provided for amputation of the right hand of the offender from the wrist and his left foot from the ankle.

Is the LTTE behind Thamilchelvan Killing?

2007-11-04T22:39:00.000-08:00

Some experts have speculated that the killing of the head of the political wing of the LTTE may have been an inside job, executed by the LTTE itself to prevent him from becoming a threat to Prabhakaran. And the reason for this primarily was due to the fact that the Air Force did not make any immediate claims of success achieved by the air strike. And that it did not make any sense to kill him especially considering the fact that he was an acceptable and human face of the LTTE. The question then is why has the Air Force claimed ‘credit’ for the killing. It is also quite baffling as to how the body of the slain LTTE leader could have been intact had he been killed in the air raid.

Further the question of the air strike on the basis of precise information defies logic because Thamilchelvan’s whereabouts were not shrouded in secrecy. He was known to receive international mediators and interlocutors at his residence.

The Tamil Tigers has been plagued by groupism since its inception. The biggest fallout of this groupism was the split from the LTTE by the special commander of the eastern Batticoloa-Amparai districts, Colonel Karuna suspected to have been engineered bythe Sri Lankan Army. Even after this split, there has been a lot of infighting among the top leadership of the LTTE for the past 2-3 years. LTTE’s intelligence head Pottu Amman joined by S P Thamilchelvan on one side and the head of international operations Veerakathi Manivannan alias Castro and the Tamileelam Police head P Nadesan on the other side were said to be involved in the in-fighting. Castro has evidently established his own intelligence network within the LTTE.

By eliminating Thamilchelvan, the Castro faction has exerted its authority and has extended the Valvettithurai/Myliddy control over the administration of the LTTE. The LTTE leader Prabhakaran hails from northern fishing village of Valvettithurai. And so also is Nadesan who has succeeded Thamilchelvan. In fact Natesan’s appointment as political head only confirms the Castro faction’s influence over the LTTE.

It is no secret that the LTTE in the past have ruthlessly eliminated rivals and enemies both within the organization and outside by adopting this modus operandi. The killings of Chellakili and Victor in the past were carried out in a clandestine manner to ensure that the control of the organization remained with the Valvettithurai/Myliddy group. It remains to be seen as to what would be the fate of Pottu Amman who hails from Nayanmarkaddu in central Jaffna.

The LTTE: On the back foot?

2007-11-03T00:00:00.000-07:00

The much-hyped euphoria after the daring attack on the Sri Lankan Air Force base at Anuradhapura on October 22, 2007 was short lived. Within a span of just ten days of the attack carried out by a 21-member suicide commando team belonging to the Black Tigers on the base, jets belonging to the Sri Lankan Air Force carried out precision raid in an area at Thuruaiaru in Iranamadu, Kilinochi district about 70 kms north of Vavuniya in the early hours of November 2, 2007. 6 top members of the Tamil Tigers were reportedly killed in the air strike. The LTTE confirmed the death of the chief of its political wing Suppaya Paramu Thamilchelvam, self-styled Lt. Col Anupumani alias Alex who headed the “strategic communication division” of the Tigers, Mikuthan, Neathaji, Aadchiveal and Vaakaikkumaran.

According to sources in the Sri Lankan Defence Ministry, the raid was successfully carried out due to the synergy achieved through excellent co-ordination between the military intelligence and the air arm.

On October 31, 2007 the Sri Lankan government decided to impose press censorship under the Public Security Ordinance on news coverage related to military confrontations and offensive operations. The clamp down came in the wake of the recent LTTE raid on Anuradhapura air base. It could also signal the start of a possible ground offensive to be launched by the army in the north to take out the Tigers.

LTTE’s recent setbacks:

Over the past two years, since the breakdown of the truce and the split in the LTTE, the Tigers have been facing reverses on the ground.

Kokkadicholai, approximately 20 km south-west of Batticaloa, fell on March 28, 2007

In July 2007, the security forces had captured Thoppigala (Baron's Cap ), the last stronghold of the Tigers in the east.

The Sri Lankan Navy for the first time in the conflict achieved unprecedented success against the LTTE.

Sri Lankan Navy sank the 10th LTTE ship "Matsushima", with a capacity of 3000 tons was the largest ever arms smuggling vessel that belonged to the LTTE, about 1700 km south of Dondra point, the southern tip of Sri Lanka on 07th October 2007, around 0930 hrs.

“Manyoshi” was destroyed on September 10, 2007 at 7.00 a.m.

The second LTTE ship to be destroyed was “Seishin” on 10th September at 5.00 p.m.

The third LTTE ship, “Koshia”, was destroyed after a hot pursuit, which lasted well over four hours, on the 11th around 3.30 a.m.

Since the bulk of the arms and equipment for the LTTE came from the sea, the loss of the ships dealt a severe blow to their arms shipment network.

It remains to be seen whether the LTTE will retaliate with a sensational strike or a suicide bombing on a high value target to boost the flagging morale of its cadres or has the will to resist been broken with the loss of key leaders and reverses on the ground.

Bangladesh - From Secularism to Talibanization

2007-10-25T23:20:00.000-07:00

During the British rule, the Wahabis led by one Syed Ahmed declared India 'Darul Harb'[1] and locked themselves in a war against the Sikhs in Punjab and against the British in a bid to establish the 'Darul Harb' brand of Islam. The brand of Islam that had been preached by the Sufis in the sub-continent was by and large liberal. The Sufis were very tolerant towards other faiths and adopted certain elements from Hinduism, Buddhism and the local culture, which helped spread Islam all over India.

In 1947, Pakistan emerged as an independent state as a consequence of the partition of India. Pakistan was divided into the Punjabi-dominated West and a Bengali-speaking East. The Indian land mass divided the two wings of Pakistan. The Bengali-dominated East Pakistan emerged as the independent state of Bangladesh in 1971 after facing ruthless military repression at the hands of the Pakistani Army. An indigenous nationalist movement, the Mukti Bahini with active Indian assistance helped the people of East Pakistan achieve statehood.

In its infancy, religion had very little role to play in Bangladesh polity, primarily because the founding father of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, following the Indian model, had sought to make the state a secular democratic republic. However, even during the turbulent period preceding the birth of Bangladesh, certain sections of the East Pakistani society, especially members of the Jamaat-e-Islami actively supported the Pakistani Army in perpetrating atrocities and were subsequently accused of complicity in the massacres that took place. Hence they were marginalised after the formation of Bangladesh. Before democratic institutions could take roots, Sheikh Mujib was assassinated and his regime overthrown in August 1975. In November 1975, General Ziaur Rehman seized power. Gen. Ziaur Rahman and his followers met in Kurmitola cantonment and drew the blueprint for a nationwide transformation from democratic secularism to nationalism. Gen. Ziaur Rahman was abetted by many intellectuals including newspaper editors, lawyers, barristers, educationists, businessmen, etc., when the Pakistani trained military man had consolidated his power. He sowed the seeds of radicalism by encouraging return of Islamist elements who had collaborated with the Pakistani Army and built ties with the Jamaat. This was done with a view to legitimizing his rule. General Ziaur Rehman was assassinated in May 1981. There was a brief period of civilian rule under a former Supreme Court Judge, Abdul Sattar. He was also overthrown in a military coup in March 1982. General H.M. Ershad took over the reigns of Bangladesh. During his tenure, both society and state continued to be Islamicized. General Ershad amended the constitution and declared Islam the state religion. Bangladesh limped back to civilian rule after the military ruler was ousted as a result of mass popular uprising. However, by this time the "Military-Islamist Complex" had taken roots in Bangladesh. Bangladesh had embarked on a journey to becoming Islamicized or more precisely 'Talibanized'.

The Militant Islamist Groups

In January 2005, a Bangladeshi human rights group had claimed that 31 Islamic militant outfits were operating in the country targetting non-Muslims and seeking to establish a "greater Islamic nation" including parts of some adjacent Indian states.

The Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) is reported to be the youth front of Al Mujahideen, the parent organization that began working in the mid 1990s and which has continued to remain obscure even today. Other organizations, such as Jama'atul Jihad, JMB, Ahle Hadith Andolan Bangladesh (AHAB), Ahle Hadith Jubo Shangha, Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami (HuJI), Hizbut Tawhid, Tawhidi Janata, Islami Jubo Shangha, Islami Shangha, Al Falah A'am Unnayan Shanstha and Shahadat-e al Hiqma are believed to be part of the Al Mujahideen network. JMB was reported to have been formed in 1998 in the Jamalpur district. While the exact origins of this group is not clear, its existence became known on May 20, 2002 with the arrest of eight Islamist militants at Parbatipur in the Dinajpur district along with 25 petrol bombs and documents detailing the outfit's activities. Subsequently, on February 13, 2003, the JMB is reported to have carried out seven bomb explosions in the Chhoto Gurgola area of Dinajpur town in which three persons were wounded. The Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (Party of the Mujahideen) aims at establishing the rule of Islam in Bangladesh through an armed struggle. The outfit is opposed to the establishment of democracy and calls for the conduct of government under Islamic law. Thus the JMB's aim is to replace the current state of Bangladesh with an Islamic State. The JMJB follows the ideals of the Taliban militia and propagates a movement based on Jihad.

On March 30, 2007, six top militants of the JMB, including its 'supreme commander' Maulana Abdur Rahman and second-in-command, Siddiqul Islam alias Bangla Bhai were executed in different jails in Bangladesh. The other senior leaders of the outfit who were hanged were Majlish-e-Shura (the highest decision-making body) members Abdul Awal, Khaled Saifullah and Ataur Rahman Sunny and suicide squad member Iftekhar Hasan Al-Mamun. All of them had been pronounced guilty by the Supreme Court of involvement in the killing of two judges in Jhalakathi in November 2005.

Prior to the March 30, 2007 execution, JMB was led by a triumvirate consisting of its ‘supreme commander’ Abdur Rahman, a former activist of the Jamaat-e-Islami, Siddiqul Islam alias Bangla Bhai of the Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) and Muhammad Asadullah al-Ghalib, an Arabic language lecturer at the Rajshahi University and chief of the Ahle Hadith Andolon Bangladesh (AHAB). Of these, Maulana Rahman was projected as spiritual leader of the organisation while Bangla Bhai functioned as the second-in-command and the outfit’s 'operational chief'. The outfit is known to maintain about 10,000 fulltime and 100,000 part-time cadres.

The Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami (HuJI) meaning Movement of Islamic Holy War was established in 1992, reportedly with assistance from Osama bin Laden’s International Islamic Front. It is a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist organization whose activities extend not only within Bangladesh but also in India. On April 30, 1992, several of the HuJI leaders addressed a press conference at the Jatiya Press Club in Dhaka and demanded that Bangladesh be converted into an Islamic State. The HuJI is led by Shawkat Osman alias Sheikh Farid. Imtiaz Quddus is the general secretary of the outfit. HuJI aims to establish Islamic Hukumat (rule) in Bangladesh by waging war and killing progressive intellectuals. It draws inspiration from bin Laden and the erstwhile Taliban regime of Afghanistan. The slogan, Amra Sobai Hobo Taliban, Bangla Hobe Afghanistan (We will all become Taliban and we will turn Bangladesh into Afghanistan) itself speaks volumes about the radicalisation of Bangla society and polity.

With an estimated 2,000 dedicated fighters among 15,000 odd members, HuJI is closely affiliated with Al Qaeda and is a member of Bin Laden’s International Islamic Front.

The coastal area stretching from the port city of Chittagong south through Cox's Bazaar to the Myanmarese border, notorious for piracy, smuggling and arms running, is the principal area of activity of the HuJI.

The madrassas have been a major source of recruits for HuJI. The group reportedly maintains six camps in the hilly areas of Chittagong, where its cadres are trained in the use of weapons. Unconfirmed reports have also indicated that it maintains six training camps near Cox's Bazaar.

The HuJI cadres allegedly also infiltrate frequently into the eastern corridor of India to maintain contacts with terrorist and subversive outfits of the region.

Although there is no authoritative information on the actual cadre strength, most reports mention it to be around 15,000. Several of these recruits were trained in the Kormi and Kasia areas of Bangladesh. Further, many hundred recruits were reportedly trained at various training camps in Afghanistan, primarily during the reign of the Taliban.

The HuJI reportedly receives financial assistance from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan through Muslim Non-Governmental Organisations in Bangladesh, including the Adarsa Kutir, Al Faruk Islamic Foundation and Hataddin.

Since 2002, some of the major terrorist strikes that have been carried out in India (outside Kashmir), have been attributed to HuJI. It is reported to have the backing of some sections of the Bangladesh polity, the army and intelligence agencies and may have been engaged by ISI and other Pakistan based groups to carry out terrorist activities within India.

Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) meaning Awakened Muslim Masses of Bangladesh is an Islamist vigilante outfit that espouses the ideals of the Taliban. It has been reported in the Bangladeshi media that the JMJB is an outgrowth of the Islamist militant outfit Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB).

When the JMJB first came in the news in April 2004, it was also known by other names like Mujahidin Alliance Council, Islami Jalsha and Muslim Raksha Mujahideen Oikya Parishad.

JMJB does not approve of the prevailing political system in Bangladesh and that it aspires to "build a society based on the Islamic model laid out in Holy Quran-Hadith." Its stated objective is neutralizing the left-wing extremists, especially the cadres of the PBCP and its professed long-term goal is to usher in an ‘Islamic revolution’ in Bangladesh through Jihad.

The JMJB reportedly has a three-tier organisation. The first tier of the outfit consists of activists called Ehsar who are recruited on a full-time basis and act at the behest of the leadership. The second tier, known as Gayeri Ehsar, has over 100,000 part-time activists. The third tier involves those who indirectly co-operate with the JMJB.

The JMJB created strong bases mostly in north-west Bangladesh, in the districts of Rajshahi, Satkhira, Naogaon, Bagerhat, Jessore, Chittagong, Joypurhat, Natore, Rangpur, Bogra, Chittagong, and Khulna. It has allegedly spread its network to most Madrassas (seminaries) and other educational institutions in these districts.

The outfit also established at least 10 camps at Atrai and Raninagar in the Naogaon district, Bagmara in Rajshahi district, and Naldanga and Singra in Natore district. There have been reports of JMJB recruits being given training through recorded speeches of Osama bin Laden and the video footages of warfare training at the Al Qaeda's Farooque camp (now defunct) in Afghanistan.

Some JMJB leaders reportedly stated that the outfit is headquartered in Dhaka. However, media reports indicated all activities of the organisation revolving around Jamalpur.

JMJB is reported to have 300000 activists across the country and has about 10,000 full-time activists.

JMJB cadres during their vigilante operations in 2004 were seen with firearms. They also reportedly wielded swords, other sharp weapons, hammers and hockey sticks. JMJB also had access to crude explosives.

Purba Banglar Communist Party (PBCP) headed by Mofakkar Chowdhury is one of the many Maoist splinter organizations in Bangladesh. It was formed in 1968 after splitting with the Bangladesh Communist Party (BCP). It has been outlawed since the military regime of Zia-ur-Rehman. However, there has been a spurt in the activities of the PBCP since 2002.

Like Maoist groups around the world, the objective of the PBCP is capturing state power through armed struggle. Its draws inspiration from the Chinese revolution. In the opinion of the PBCP, oppression by the people of the then West Pakistani was the principal reason that lead to the liberation war in the territories of the then East Pakistan following which Bangladesh was formed. The PBCP is strongly opposed to the presence of feudal elements in Bangladesh. Ideologically, it is closer to the Marxist-Leninist groups of India and desires to launch a joint movement along with progressive parties in India, particularly the Naxalites of West Bengal. The PBCP is hopeful that China would, at some time in the future, provide significant assistance in realising its goals. The PBCP operates in south-west Bangladesh, bordering the Indian State of West Bengal. Its presence can be noticed in districts such as Khulna, Satkhira, Bagerhat, Magura, Meherpur, Narail, Kushtia, Jessore, Jhenidah, Chuadanga and Pirojpur.

PBCP cadres have reportedly been involved in acts of murder, robbery, extortion, land grabbing and abduction for ransom. Like the mafia, they are allegedly involved in settling land disputes in rural areas. In the process of adjudicating disputes, PBCP cadres collect money through their strong-arm tactics from both the parties to a dispute. In its strongholds, the PBCP levies a ‘tax’ on civil contractors who undertake construction works such as laying roads and bridges and constructing culverts and schools. This has resulted in impeding development work in southwest Bangladesh. The PBCP also publishes a journal Purba Bangla, meaning East Bengal.

Islami Chhatra Shibir is the student wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, which came into existence in 1941.

A person at the time of joining the organisation is considered as Karmi, meaning worker. When a Karmi meets a predefined standard of knowledge, rituals, moral status and leadership quality, he is promoted to a Shathi meaning comrade. When a Shathi is able to meet a higher standard of knowledge, rituals, moral status and leadership quality, he is promoted to a Shadashawa meaning member.

Nurul Islam Bulbul is the Central President of the ICS. Mohammed Nazrul Islam is the Secretary General of the outfit. Other important leaders are: Kamal Ahmed Sikder, A S M Faruq, Muhammad Mujibur Rahman Manju, Muhammad Raisul and A S M Ashraf Mahmud Uzzal. The Executive Council is the highest decision-making body of the outfit.

The group's objectives, inter alia, are to change the existing system of education on the basis of Islamic values, to inspire students to acquire Islamic knowledge and to prepare them to take part in the struggle for establishing Islamic way of life. A very important aim of the outfit is to establish an Islamist regime on the Taliban model in Bangladesh similar to the one that existed in Afghanistan. Consequently, the outfit is opposed to forces of modernization, secularism and democracy. The group is one of the strongest student fronts in the Universities of Chittagong, Dhaka, Rajshahi and Jahangirnagar. It is also emerging as a dominant group in the Khulna and Sylhet Universities. Within the vast madrassa (religious seminary) structure in Bangladesh, this group is reported to be a dominant and uncontested organisation.

The Shibir also been maintaining close links with the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and has been working to support Islamist subversive agenda particularly in areas bordering Bangladesh. It is also reportedly has close links with various terrorist outfits operating in South Asia and Afghanistan.

(to be continued)

[1] "Abode of War." A land ruled by infidels that might, through war, become the "Abode of Islam," dar-ul-Islam. In the nineteenth century, some Muslims argued that India had become dar-ul-harb because of British rule.

Source:
1. South Asian Terrorism Portal www.satp.org
2. Wikipedia

China’s String of Pearls Policy: A Perspective

2007-10-17T23:42:00.000-07:00

The String of Pearls: The “String of Pearls” is not merely a naval or military strategy. Neither is it just a regional strategy. It is a manifestation of China’s ambition to attain great power status and secure a self-determined, peaceful, and prosperous future.

An examination and analysis of Chinese policy towards the South Asian region in general and India in particular shows that China has been making in-roads into India's neighbourhood by forging ties with countries in the sub-continent and South East Asia.

According to Lt.Col. Christopher J. Pehrson[1] The “String of Pearls” describes the manifestation of China’s rising geopolitical influence through efforts to increase access to ports and airfields, develop special diplomatic relationships, and modernize military forces that extend from the South China Sea through the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the Arabian Gulf.

There is a view that this geopolitical strategy has evolved because of increasing Chinese dependence on energy resources from Middle East, Central Asia, Africa, and the Americas and the need for securing the energy supply routes and its maritime trade.

Each “pearl” in the “String of Pearls” is a nexus of Chinese geopolitical influence or military presence. For instance, Hainan Island with recently upgraded military facilities is a “pearl.” An upgraded airstrip on Woody Island, located in the Paracel archipelago 300 nautical miles east of Vietnam, is a “pearl.”

China and Pakistan signed an agreement of US$ 22.26 million for additional dredging of the Gwadar Deep Sea Port Project on March 24. The development of the port is regarded as a shining example of Pakistan-China cooperation and the port is expected to be ready for operation by 2007.[2]

Beijing has already established electronic eavesdropping posts at Gwadar. The posts monitor vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Sea.

China has deepened ties with the Bangladesh government and built a container port facility at Chittagong. In that country, China has sought extensive naval and commercial access.

China has developed close ties with the military regime of Myanmar and has turned the country adjacent to the Malacca Straits, through which 80 percent of China’s total crude oil imports pass, into Beijing’s satellite.

In November 2003, China and Cambodia signed a military agreement on providing training and equipment. Cambodia has helped China construct a railway from southern China to the sea.

China may have economic interests which requires to be safe guarded. However, what is disturbing is the listening post in Coco Island (taken on lease from Myanmar in 1994). Coco Island and the northern-most tip of the Andamans are separated by just 18 kilometers of sea. Officials say that Coco is visible from the Andamans. The Coco Islands are thus an ideal location for monitoring Indian naval and missile launch facilities in Andaman and Nicobar Islands to the south and movements of the Indian Navy and other navies throughout the eastern Indian Ocean. Construction of the Great Coco Island station began in late 1992 with the emplacement of a 45-50m antenna tower, radar sites and other electronic facilities forming a comprehensive SIGINT collection facility. With China controlling the Myanmar ports of Akyab, Cheduba and Bassein, India's approaches to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands could be threatened.China has another listening post at Hainji Island.

China has been working aggressively towards building a blue water navy including acquiring aircraft carriers and long-range nuclear submarines. China's acquisition of Varyag, the ex-Soviet vessel, ten new destroyers, mostly from Russia and two Sovremennyy-class destroyers (now renamed the Hangzhou and Fuzhou, respectively) equipped with 200-km-range supersonic SS-N-22 Moskit Anti Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) are part of the modernization programme undertaken to build a blue water navy.

The modernization of the PLA is a tangible manifestation of China’s growing national power. According to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, of the major and emerging great powers, China is considered to have the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could, over time, offset traditional U.S. military advantages. Regardless of China’s intent today, powerful and modernized armed forces provide China with military capabilities that the United States must consider. With near-term focus on Taiwan, PLA modernization efforts appear to be aimed specifically at combating U.S. maritime forces that might be called to defend Taiwan and at denying the United States access to regional military bases in locations such as Japan and South Korea. Many of China’s new weapon systems are applicable to a range of operations beyond the Taiwan Strait. The expanding capability of China’s military power threatens not only Taiwan—and therefore the United States—but also challenges U.S. friends and allies throughout the Western Pacific, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. Unchecked or disproportionate, China’s military modernization could lead to a major reordering of the balance of power throughout the Pacific. China began modernizing its armed forces and procuring sophisticated weapons after observing the overwhelming success and technological prowess of the U.S.-led coalition during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. This was signaled by the PLAAF’s purchase of 24 Su-27 advanced all-weather fighters from Russia in 1992, China’s first venture into fielding a first-rate air force. In 1993, China began the acquisition of advanced surface-to-air missiles, towed-array anti-submarine sonar, multiple-target torpedo control systems, nuclear submarine propulsion systems, and technology to improve the range of its undersea launched cruise missiles. The Su-27s and these other military systems procured from Russia enhanced China’s power projection capability and heightened the threat to Taiwan. In 1999, China signed a contract with Russia for 40 Su-30 ground attack aircraft and a contract for approximately 40 more was signed in 2001.

In the 1990s, the PLAN expressed interest in acquiring aircraft carriers, and more recently military leadership has stated China’s intent to build aircraft carriers, true instruments of power projection. Rhetorical statements aside, there is no evidence of China’s furthering this ambition, either because of Chinese restraint and strategic forethought in accordance with the country’s overall “peaceful development’ strategy, or because the PLAN is not robust or mature enough to put a carrier to sea without incurring substantial risk. Deploying an aircraft carrier would not occur overnight, and the PLAN is certainly many years away from actually launching one. Since the inception of the People’s Liberation Army Navy in 1949, submarines have constituted an important component of its fleet. The importance of the submarines increased, when in the 70s, China moved from a coastal-defence strategy to a blue-water strategy. In 1994, China began modernizing its submarine fleet with the purchase of four Russian Kilo-class attack submarines, followed by a subsequent agreement to purchase eight more in 2002. On 18th September 2007, the People’s Daily published photographs of China’s new class of nuclear powered submarine belonging to Shang Class (Type 093). According to naval experts, China started working on this class of submarines sometime in the 80s to replace the older Han-class (Type 091), which were considered to be very noisy. However, the research did not make any significant progress till the St. Petersburg-based Rubin Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering were engaged to render assistance in the development. The new submarine was launched by the end of 2002 and commissioned in 2006. This new platform has noise reduction measures, underwater sensors and sophisticated bow-and flank-mounted sonar arrays. China is also reported to be working on the Jin-class (Type 094) submarines. With this new Jin-class submarine, the Chinese navy would be in a position to cover the Indian Ocean. These recent strides made by the PLAN will have to be seen in the context of the “string of pearls” surrounding India.

[1] String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral
[2] Daily Times, March 25, 2006

Operation Orchard – How the Raiders Sneaked In?

2007-10-16T02:57:00.000-07:00

The question is how did the fighters belonging to the Israeli Air Force manage to avoid detection by Syrian air defense? Neither F-15s nor F-16s used by the Israeli air force in the raids are fitted with stealth technology. The answer lies in the Suter or technology akin to Suter which may have been developed by the Israelis. According to U.S. aerospace industry and retired military officials Israel used a technology similar to the “Suter” airborne network attack system developed by BAE Systems and integrated into U.S. unmanned aircraft by L-3 Communications. The system is reported to have been used or at least tested operationally in Iraq and Afghanistan. The technology allows users to invade communications networks, see what enemy sensors see and even take over as systems administrator so sensors can be manipulated into positions so that approaching aircraft can’t be seen. The process involves locating enemy emitters with great precision and then directing data streams into them that can include false targets and misleading messages algorithms that allow a number of activities including control. It hacks into enemy air defense systems so that they can be taken over. Suter includes some powerful sensors for detecting a large assortment of electronic emissions. Computer software can identify the emitters based on a database of known emitters. Based on this information potential entry points into air defense systems can be exploited. Suter can monitor enemy emitters, mislead them or shut them down. Suter 3 was tested last summer to add the ability to invade the links to time-critical targets, such as battlefield ballistic missile launchers or mobile surface-to-air missile launchers. Aircraft involved in the Suter programs include the EC-130 Compass Call, RC-135 Rivet Joint and F-16CJ strike aircraft specialized for suppression of enemy air defenses.

A Kuwaiti newspaper reported that Russian experts were studying why the two state-of-the art Russian-built radar systems in Syria did not detect the Israeli jets entering Syrian territory. Syria reportedly recently bought two state-of-the art radar systems from Russia, reckoned to be Tor-M1 launchers that carry a payload of eight missiles, as well as two Pachora-2A systems. Iran recently bought 29 of these Tor launchers from Russia for $750m in order to defend its nuclear sites. Iran reportedly had asked the same question, since it was buying the same systems and might have also paid for the Syrian acquisitions. The failure of these systems in detecting and responding to the Israeli raid therefore poses questions for arms manufacturers and armies all the way from Damascus to Moscow and over to Tehran.

For Aviation Week's story click here.

Mystery Behind the Israeli Raid on Syria – Operation Orchard Unveiled

2007-10-14T00:45:00.000-07:00

Intelligence and Planning:
Early in the summer, the Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak had ordered the doubling of Israeli forces on the Golan Heights bordering Syria in anticipation of a possible Syrian retaliation in the event of air strikes by Israel. According to American sources, Israeli intelligence tracked a North Korean vessel identified as “Al Hamed", a 1700-tonne cargo ship that was previously owned by North Korea, purported to be carrying a cargo of nuclear material labeled “cement”. The vessel registered itself as a South Korean ship when it traveled through the Suez Canal. On 28th July the vessel docked at the Syrian port of Tartous. The ship returned on 3rd September and is said to have unloaded the cargo of “cement”. The Israelis continued to keep track of the cargo as it was transported to the small town of Deir ez-Zor, in north-eastern Syria near the Turkish border. Israeli sources revealed that the Israeli satellite Ofek 7, launched in June, was redirected from Iran to Syria. The satellite sent high quality images of the north-eastern area every 90 minutes enabling the air force specialists to spot the facility. Three days after the consignment arrived, the final phase of Operation Orchard got underway. According to Sunday Times, a team belonging to Sayarat Matkal covertly raided the suspected Syrian nuclear facility before the 6th September strike and brought soil samples and other material back to Israel. This confirmed that the cargo was nuclear. Once the material was tested and confirmed to have come from North Korea, the US gave the go ahead to the Israelis for the attack.

Such was the secrecy that the target of the attack was revealed to the pilots only while they were airborne. All that the pilots were told was that the target was a northern Syrian facility that was labelled as an agricultural research centre on the Euphrates River, close to the Turkish border. So also the pilots who were assigned to provide air cover for the strike jets were not briefed about the mission till they too were airborne. The air cover was not required; thanks to the stealth technology and the sophisticated electronic systems, Syria’s Russian-made anti-aircraft systems were blinded. There was speculation that Israel may have used technology similar to Suter airborne network attack system used by the US, to enable its aircraft to pass undetected by Syrian radar. This system makes it possible to feed enemy radar with false targets and even manipulate enemy sensors directly.

The Raid and After:
According to Times Online, just after midnight of 6th September 2007, the 69th Squadron of Israeli Air Force comprising of F-15Is and F-16s equipped with AGM-65 Maverik missiles, 500lb bombs and external fuel tanks crossed the Syrian coastline. The raiding team consisted of 8 aircraft including an ELINT aircraft. On the ground, Syria’s air defences went dead. Operation Orchard was underway. A daring attack on a Syrian target in Deir ez-Zor or Dayr az-Zwar near the village Tal Abyad in northern Syria near the Turkish border had begun.

At a rendezvous point deep inside Syrian territory, a commando team from Shaldag air force commando waited to direct their laser beams at the target for the approaching jets. The team had arrived a day earlier, taking up positions near a large underground depot. Shortly thereafter the target was destroyed.

The only piece of evidence which was left behind were two detachable tanks from an Israeli fighter were found just over the Turkish border which according to Turkey, belonged to a Raam F15I - the newest generation of Israeli long-range bomber, which has a combat range of over 2,000km when equipped with the drop tanks.

Though Israel did not issue any statement acknowledging or denying responsibility for the attack, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated that the IDF was demonstrating unusual courage. And added that it could not naturally reveal to the public everything.

Former officials familiar with both Syria and North Korea have pointed out that an almost bankrupt Syria has neither the economic nor the industrial base to support the kind of nuclear programme described, adding that Syria has long rejected going down the nuclear route.

At this point in time, it is difficult to verify the truth of the allegations against Syria - and Israel has a long history of employing complex deceptions in its operations - the message being delivered is quite clear: if Syria's ally, Iran, comes close to acquiring a nuclear weapon, and the world fails to prevent it, either through diplomatic or military means then Israel will stop it on its own.

The Mystery Behind Israel’s Air Strike on Syria

2007-10-12T04:49:00.000-07:00

There has been speculation of sorts as to what happened in northern Syria on 6th September 2007. Reports emanating from Syria suggested that on 6th September 2007, aircraft belonging to the Israeli Air Force (Hel HaAvir) penetrated Syrian air defenses and dropped some ordnance in a deserted area some where in the north of the country. The aircraft then fled towards the Mediterranean. Turkey, later announced that two Israeli fuel tanks had been dropped inside its territory, one in Gaziantep province and the other in the Hatay province. Dropping of the tanks by the aircraft indicates that it (or they) had come under fire from Syrian air defences and the plane dropped the tanks to increase speed and maneuverability. Apart from these sketchy details, none of the parties, Israel, Turkey or Syria came out with any official statements on the incident. The United States which was probably aware of the goings on chose to keep mum.

A few weeks after the incident, leaks from the American side hinted that the operation was something more than mere testing of Syrian air defenses or reconnaissance. The leaks from the US indicated that a shipment which had been delivered to Syria from North Korea may have contained nuclear equipment. Speculation was rife that Israel was probably preparing for an air strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities and that this was a dry run. Some reports even suggested that the target of the Israeli strike was shipment of arms from Iran to the Hezbollah or a nuclear installation being constructed with North Korean assistance. Israel undertaking such a mission fraught with risk only to destroy a shipment of arms is unlikely while in the latter scenario it was only to be expected.

According to a report appearing in the Sunday Times Israeli commandos were involved in a joint operation with its air force under the direct supervision of the Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak. The operation was targeted against “nuclear material” provided by North Korea to Syria. The operation was reminiscent of a similar attack carried out by the Israeli Air Force on the nuclear facilities on the outskirts of Baghdad[1].

On 1st October 2007, the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad acknowledged that a strike had taken place and that an unused military building was hit.

Israeli silence on the incident was understandable. But what was intriguing was the Syrian silence. Normally, Syria would have been expected to cry hoarse over the Israeli incursion and would have threatened to take the issue to the UN Security Council and other fora. The inference that can certainly be drawn is that Syria was upto something sinister and hence did not raise this issue before any international forum. What? Was it working on its own nuclear program? Was it acting as a conduit for facilitating illegal transfer of nuclear material or equipment? If so, to which country? These questions will remain unanswered for a long time to come. But the fact remains that Israel will not tolerate a nuclear Arab state in its neighbourhood. And also that it would not hesitate to use force if its very existence is threatened.

All said and done, the attack was probably to send a strong signal to the Arab states, particularly those nursing ambitions of acquiring nuclear weapons, that Israel and the US would not tolerate the induction of nuclear weapons in the conflict-prone region. The raid also served a warning to Iran that its nuclear facilities were not safe against an Israeli strike (with or without US backing) and that it should desist from going ahead with its nuclear program.

[1] Operation Opera (also known as Operation Babylon and Operation Ofra) was a surprise Israeli air strike against the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor. On 7th June 1981, a squadron of Israeli F-16A aircraft with an escort of F-15As bombed and heavily damaged the Osirak reactor. The plant, which was intended for the production of nuclear weapons, was destroyed before it became operational; had Israel waited much longer, an attack would have caused radioactive fallout in the area around Baghdad. The attack removed the nuclear threat to Israel.

Quadrilateral Initiative: The View from Beijing and Beyond

2007-09-26T05:42:00.000-07:00

India’s participation in the Quadrilateral Initiative marks a major shift in its foreign policy. Since its independence in 1947, India’s policy has been governed by the principles of not aligning itself with either of the power blocs. India’s principles of non-alignment however sound they may have seemed during the period of Cold War are no longer relevant today. Today, India’s inclusion in the 4-nation grouping is the recognition of India’s geo-strategic importance and the role that it can assume and play in the power game of South East Asia. According to political observers, the idea of a quad cooperation was revived in the aftermath of the tsunami and the relief efforts which were based on the cooperation of the navies of US, Australia, India and Japan.

The Quadrilateral Initiative serves to further and secure US interests in Asia-Pacific region. The US sees the growing Chinese influence on the littoral states of the region as a potential challenge in the future. Therefore the US seeks to contain China in much the same way China itself has sought to contain India and Japan.

What are China’s concerns?

China’s relationship with the South East Asian states and particularly the two main political actors in the region, viz. Japan and India is not very cordial. The Chinese are more concerned about a militarily assertive Japan than of a rapidly developing India.

The Beijing Review[1] in an article – “A Broader Asia Without China” has expressed concerns over the forging of a new 4-nation alliance comprising the US, Australia, India and Japan. According to it this alliance is aimed at China. The article attacks the former Japanese PM Shinzo Abe for this new grouping and states that the former PM’s vision of quadrilateral grouping aimed to expand Japan’s diplomatic frontiers and to marginalize China by citing common democratic values and besiege the country geopolitically.

According to Li Yan, a scholar at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR): "Abe's attempts to promote 'value-oriented diplomacy' and construct a 'four-nation alliance' are apparently directed at China.” Li pointed out that the United States is concerned that Japan's quadrilateral initiative may provoke China into fierce reactions, which could harm Asia-Pacific security and stability. The United States needs to cooperate with China on a series of issues such as the North Korean nuclear issue, the Iranian nuclear issue and anti-terrorism, he said. Provoking China is not in the interest of the United States, he added. Liu Jiangyong, professor at the Institute of International Studies of Tsinghua University, while agreeing, stated that the United States has no intention to shape a strategic alliance against China today, although it made such futile attempts during the Cold War, he said. American national interests demand that the United States collaborate with China instead of running into conflicts with the country.

The Chinese have been suspiciously watching as different aspects of India’s strategic relationship with the US has been evolving and are quite concerned about the quadrilateral grouping between the US, Japan, Australia and India that clearly spans China's borders along the Asia-Pacific rim. During the trip of Indian PM to China last year, the Chinese had clearly indicated that it clearly did not want a strategic alliance, formal or informal, between Japan, India and the US. Though India was initially reluctant to be drawn into any kind of strategic partnership with the US, Australia and Japan, the then PM Abe’s diplomacy seemed to have persuaded India to join the grouping.

What is interesting is that while China was not aligned with either the US or the Soviet Union during the Cold War, it has played a key role in the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization[2]. According to Western observers the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or (SCO, for short) was formed as a counter balance to NATO. (Interestingly, India has an observer status in SCO along with Mongolia, Pakistan and Iran). The SCO is primarily centered around its member nations' Central Asian security-related concerns, often describing the main threats it confronts as being terrorism, separatism and extremism. Members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization during a summit held in June 2006 forcefully asserted their right to regulate affairs in Central Asia. A declaration signed by the heads of state of all six-member states, including Russia and China, was widely viewed as placing the group in direct opposition to the United States in the regional geopolitical contest. This coupled with the rejection of a US application for membership in the SCO is viewed as a bloc aimed at countering the US in Asia. Whether the Quadrilateral Initiative was formed to counteract the SCO, only time will tell.

[1] http://www.bjreview.com.cn/world/txt/2007-09/14/content_76288_2.htm
[2] The Shanghai Five grouping was originally created April 26, 1996 with the signing of the Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions in Shanghai by the heads of states of Kazakhstan, the People's Republic of China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. April 24, 1997 the same countries signed the Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions in a meeting in Moscow. In 2001, the annual summit returned to Shanghai, China. There the five member nations first admitted Uzbekistan in the Shanghai Five mechanism (thus transforming it into the Shanghai Six). Then all six heads of state signed on June 15, 2001, the Declaration of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Source Wikipedia

SELF-DETERMINATION

2007-08-19T03:02:00.001-07:00

Introductory Note:

Self-determination is a politico-legal concept, which advocates the idea that a homogeneous people has the “right” to determine its own destiny as a distinct sovereign nation or the right to maintain its own national traditions within a larger political entity. Yet, ever since the establishment of China in 1523 BC as the first recorded nation in history, the meaning of the basic concept has been highly controversial. Its validity as an absolute and legitimate right to be exercised in the political process within and among nations has been frequently challenged.

Since the establishment of the UN, the principle of self-determination has been espoused with greater vigour. In the past 50 years, the political map of the world has been re-drawn and numerous sovereignty changes were witnessed: dependent areas that have received their independence; dependent areas that have received their independence; dependent areas that have been incorporated into independent entities; territorial transfers from one country to another; creation of new or changed political entities as a result of dissolution of sovereign governments. These changes, some of which have been radical and implemented by force have given impetus to terrorism, guerrilla warfare, insurgency and international conflicts.

Critics of this concept state that it is first and foremost a political weapon, inequitable in its application and unreasonable in its result. Confusion over the nature of the process, and misapplication of its meaning, have distorted self-determination in practice and weakened its potential resolutory role. The concept contributed to promoting conflicts rather than solving them.

Definition
Self-determination is often considered to be the right of a people to shape their own political, economic and cultural destinies.

According to Woodrow Wilson, self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their own peril.

This area is one of great controversy and must be related to the alleged right of peoples fighting for self-determination to seek support from outside states.

As regards the forceful suppression of a people fighting for self-determination, one must not forget the sharp distinction between the legal right of self-determination and the political concept, which is very much wider and vastly more destabilising. States being creators of International Law, it is unlikely that they will agree to a law that allows for a break-up of established states by allowing distinct groups within them to achieve self-determination without using force to suppress them. If such were the case then the Spanish security forces would be illegally using force against the Basque Separatists and the Nigerian government would have been violating Article 2(4) by putting down the rebellion in Biafra in 1967. These are just 2 examples in the vast catalogue of ethnic groups who have sought or are seeking independence from established states. To imbue such a people with a legal right would be tantamount to encouraging civil wars rather reminiscent of the Hobbesian state of nature. Similarly there is little state practice to suggest that the right of self-determination extends to the majority within an already established state.

Origin – The origin of the principle of the phrase self-determination can be traced back to the American Declaration of Independence (1776) and the French Revolution (1789), which signalled the end of the notion that the people as subjects of a monarch were objects to be transferred, alienated, ceded or protected in accordance with the interests of the monarch. The core of the principle lies in the American and French insistence that the government be responsible to the people.

In France, self-determination was propounded as a criterion concerning the transfer of territory. Though proclaimed in 1790, it was incorporated in Article 2 of Title XIII of the Draft Constitution presented by Condorcet to the National Convention on 15th February 1793. Though the French proclaimed a lofty principle, they misapplied it in actual practice. More specifically they used this principle to justify annexation of lands of other sovereigns. As long as the results of a plebiscite held were in France’s favour, annexation was legal.

The contradictory nature of self-determination:

Internally self-determination could be used and has been used as a vehicle for enfranchisement, forever expanding circles of citizens against all manner of ancien regimes. On this score the ‘self’ of the nation has shifted: it is no longer embodied in a Monarch ruling over a state but in the citizens of the state. Self-determination is thus the reflection in international law of a movement that began with the French and American Revolutions and reached its climax in 20th century notions of universal suffrage.

Externally, self-determination has been no less of a challenge to established authority – that of the small circle of ‘civilised nations’ which constituted the international legal order. Self-determination was the vehicle through which the international ancien regime could be challenged by the admittance of new members. One of the major developments of the 20th century international law has been the expansion of the family of nations to include, sometimes after bloody conflict, states of the so-called Third World – a development in which the notion of self-determination was at the conceptual centre.

The notion of self-determination must be viewed in the light of the change in the composition of the world community that has occurred since 1945, with the vast increase in the number of states resulting from decolonisation. It was natural that this new majority would wish to see all colonies become independent, a desire that quickly became embodied in the principle that colonial peoples had the right of self-determination.

Generally the term self-determination is associated with independence and it is assumed that the UN Charter provides for self-determination, when in fact, it does not. The Charter contains very few references to self-determination. The first reference is in Article 1(2), which provides that one of the purposes of the UN is ‘to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’. The second reference is in Article 55 - to promote higher standards of living, solutions to health and cultural problems, and universal respect for human rights in order to create conditions necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations ‘based on equal rights and self-determination’.
In recent times, existing states, in Eastern Europe under Communist rule broke up. The component units of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia claimed independence as separate states.

Who exactly is entitled to the right of self-determination? The question can be answered only after understanding the relationship between self-determination and national unity. The evolving norms on self-determination contained—undeniably and consistently---an anxious refrain whereby self-determination is to be harnessed to, and not the enemy of, territorial integrity. Both GAR 1514 (XV) on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples and GAR 2625 (XXV), the Declaration of Principles on Friendly Relations which place emphasise on self-determination caution against the violation of territorial integrity. Resolution 1514 provides that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN. Resolution 2625 provides: ‘Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign or independent states….’
The Canadian Supreme Court in the Reference Re Secession of Quebec case declared that international law expects that the right to self determination will be exercised by peoples within the framework of existing sovereign states and consistently with the maintenance of territorial integrity of those states and that the right to unilateral secession arises only in the most extreme of cases and even then under carefully defined circumstances. The only arguable exception to this rule that the right to external self determination applies only to colonial situations might be where the group in question is subject to ‘extreme and unremitting persecution’ coupled with the ‘lack of any reasonable prospect for reasonable challenge’ but even this is controversial not least in view of definitional difficulties.

Kashmiris’ right to self-determination:

In March 1995, a Geneva-based international human rights organisation, the International Commission of Jurists had stated that the right to self determination acquired by the people of Jammu & Kashmir at the time of partition of India had neither been exercised nor abandoned and therefore was capable of being exercised. The views of the Commission was reported by Mr Subhash Kirpekar in the Times of India (Mumbai Edition) dated March 4, 1995.

Following are excerpts of the report and the views of the members of the ICJ mission which was published by the above-mentioned daily.

The report said, “The state of J & K comprises a number of different units which should be allowed to exercise the right of self-determination separately. Full or limited independence for Kashmir is a possible option.” The members of the ICJ mission concluded that because of the extent of support for independence within Kashmir, a single plebiscite of the whole state offering a choice between accession to India or to Pakistan would be disastrous. The state contained a number of different units which should be allowed to exercise the right to self-determination separately, if possible, by a referendum approving a previously negotiated solution.

Sir William Goodhart, QC (UK) who headed the mission, while replying to questions posed, stated that the governments of India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri community should negotiate a solution, which should then be put up for approval to the peoples of the state through a referendum. When asked specifically as to who represented the Kashmiri community, Sir William replied that they were an extremely divided lot and had a capacity for dividing into very small units.

Reacting to the Indian government’s criticism of bias Sir William claimed that the report was equally critical of India, Pakistan and the militants, and maintained that if the people of Kashmir had a right of self-determination, “it follows that the insurgency is legitimate. It does not however follow that Pakistan had a right to provide support to militants, as such action would be in breach of the provisions of the Simla agreement.”

Recognition of Insurgency and Belligerency

2007-08-02T20:47:00.000-07:00

When insurrection or civil war breaks out in any State, third States generally will not interfere in the domestic affairs.

The recognition of belligerency is merely an assertion of the fact that the rebels are in a position to exercise authority over the territory in their possession. The recognition does not give cause for any offence to the State concerned. And according this recognition is not a violation of neutrality either.

What is the meaning of the term ‘insurgency’? Insurgency means rebellion, revolt, or mutiny by a section of the citizenry of a State against the established government. It denotes a sustained armed struggle carried out by dissident forces in a State against the established order. It is an internal situation wherein dissident forces resort to the use of violence for the replacement of an existing socio-political order or in order to assert their political rights or overthrowing an existing government. This struggle is carried out for the purpose of obtaining power or self-rule.

International law treats insurgencies and civil wars as internal matters falling within the domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned and it is up to the municipal law to deal with it. Generally, as a rule, States do not interfere in the internal affairs of other States, and especially so when civil strife or condition of insurgency exists within a State. However, when rebels or insurgents come to occupy and effectively control a substantial part of the State territory, it may become necessary for the recognizing States to take cognizance of the state of insurgency. A civil war may not reach a stage to call for the recognition of a formal condition of belligerency by outside powers. The rebel forces may not be acting under an organized command structure and may not be following the laws of war. In such circumstances, outside States may grant the rebels only a form of recognition, viz. as insurgents and refrain from treating them as law-breakers and recognize their de facto authority in the territory under their occupation. They maintain such relations with the insurgents as may be necessary for the protection of their nationals, commerce and for such other purposes connected with hostilities. Belligerency is a formal status involving rights and duties.

Some of the conditions essential for the recognition of insurgency may be enumerated as under:
a) The insurgents must have control over a considerable part of the territory;
b) A majority of the people inhabiting the territory must lend support to the rebels out of their own free will and not as a result of coercive measures adopted by the insurgents;
c) The insurgents must be capable and willing to carry out international obligations imposed upon them.

If the rebels are accorded the status of belligerents, they become subjects of international law and can be held responsible for their acts. Further, the rules governing hostilities become applicable to both the sides.
The concepts of insurgency and belligerency are quite vague and are extremely subjective in that a state or states for political considerations may choose to accord recognition to a rebel group. The issue has gained considerable importance in the years following the Second World War for the colonies resorted to struggle for liberation and independence, many a times by armed means.

International Law - Use of Force - A Historical Analysis

2007-08-02T20:44:00.000-07:00

Historical Analysis:
International Law to a great extent was influenced by the jurists during the Medieval Age, when modern nation-states began emerging after the collapse of religious empires. The mid-seventeenth century was a watershed in international law for, state practice replaced writings of jurists as a major source of international law. In the period preceding the Roman Empire there was some evidence to suggest the existence of rules regulating the conditions in which groups could resort to the use of force against each other. The concept of just war (bellum justum) emerged as an enduring legal concept during the Roman era and it gained acceptance among Christian theorists like St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. According to St. Augustine, “just war was that which God Himself Ordained”, thereby imbuing it with substantive moral conduct. St. Aquinas, in the thirteenth century, wrote that a war was just only if the other the party was at fault, and the attacking sovereign intended ‘advancement of good’ or ‘avoidance of evil’. This principle put forth by St. Aquinas did not lay down any clear rules as to the use of force. However, Thomas Aquinas, who wrote in Summa Theologia in the thirteen century about war stated the three basic elements for the presence of a just war: These three elements were (1) lawful authority, (2) just cause, (3) right intention[1]. Some attributed the lawful authority to wage war only to an emperor or in some cases to the Pope. Some like William of Rennes widened it so as to include all feudal lords who have no superior inside the feudal hierarchy. Some like Pope Innocent IV also concluded that the right belongs to the authorities who have no superior to them[2].

There seems to have been a link between the ready acceptance of this doctrine and the religious wars that were fought quite regularly during the medieval period; a strong link seems apparent between the religious dominance in societies in the 16th and 17th centuries and the just war theory. The emergence of the modern nation-states after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 led to a significant change in the laws of warfare.

Nicolo Machiavelli, wrote in the early 16th century that the sovereign had the absolute right to wage war whenever it was felt necessary and this revolutionary philosophy became strongly embedded for nearly four hundred years. However, other writers like Grotious in 1625 following the just war concept attempted to compile a list of just and unjust causes. Others adopted the Machiavellian view that war was permitted in cases of necessity and expediency as well as in self-defense.

The theory of absolute sovereign power of a state swept away any vestige of control over the use of force in international relations. According to Ian Brownlie, state practice in the period between the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the advent of the League of Nations in 1919 reflected an unlimited right to go to war. The only limitation or a pre-condition for parties to go to war was that they had to first attempt to settle disputes through negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration etc. and these pacific means of settlement should have failed. The limitation on the right to resort to war was embedded in such treaties as the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1907, and was reflected to a certain extent in state practice. The machinery for the pacific settlement of disputes also proliferated in this period with, for example, the setting up of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1899.

It may have been because of these procedural limitations on the right to resort to war, combined with the odium of waging increasingly destructive, less localized conflicts, that states began to make a self-serving distinction between war, on the one hand, and other uses of force, on the other. The same factors may have led to ‘war’ taking on a conceptual, juridical status, often divorced from the factual analysis of the state of hostilities. Thus a full-scale armed conflict could have occurred without either state being at ‘war’ with the other. On the other hand, states could be at ‘war’ without even firing a shot. Whether there was a ‘state of war’ depended on the subjective considerations of the governments concerned. Not to declare ‘war’ had the added advantage for states engaged in hostilities of enabling them to avoid those accepted laws, which regulated the conduct of warfare- the jus in bello such as the laws of neutrality. In the period prior to the establishment of the League of Nations, states concentrated on developing a doctrine of lesser uses of force, which seemingly escaped any requirement that methods of pacific settlement be exhausted and also any of the jus in bello. The principal method was the use of the reprisal, which was designed to punish a previous breach of international law by a state or its nationals. In the Naulilaa Case, Germany carried out an armed reprisal from its colony in South-West Africa against the Portuguese Colony of Angola in October 1914. These hostilities were not formally part of the First World War because Portugal was, at the time, a neutral power. The initial injury to Germany arose out of an incident on the Angolan/ South West African border, which resulted in the killing of three German soldiers. The German army responded by mounting a military expedition into Angola, which caused considerable damage and loss of life. The arbitral tribunal accepted that reprisals could be lawful in response to a prior act contrary to international law. However, Germany had not acted lawfully, on this occasion, in that it had not first made an unsatisfied demand that Portugal remedy its unlawful actions and also because the reprisal was out of all proportion to the wrong that had provoked it. The requirement that a demand be made before any force was used in a procedural limitation of sorts, but it is not as onerous as the requirement that all pacific methods of dispute settlement be exhausted.

The constraints on armed force were not sufficient to prevent the devastation of the First World War. The total nature of the 1914-18 hostilities had profound effects on public and governmental thinking. According to Philip Noel Baker, the League of Nations was the first attempt in history to furnish the international society of nations with a permanent and organic system of International Political Institution. This attempt was an outcome of the World War. The League of Nations thus is often referred to as ‘A Child of War’. Although the desire for the establishment of an effective international organisation had been expressed long before the First World War and the earlier Concert of Europe served as a model for the world body, the League of Nations was given a concrete shape only after the adoption of the Covenant by the Inter-Allied Conference on April 28, 1919. The League of Nations represented the first of two attempts to establish an international body ‘to achieve international peace and security’ by making collective interests of nations paramount over national interests. In the case of the League this was to be achieved, in part, by making states accept an obligation ‘not to resort to war’ in the preamble of the Covenant.

However, as is consonant with the world’s first attempt at constructing such an organisation, the detailed obligations imposed and rights granted in the body of the Covenant were unclear and contradictory. By art.10 of the Covenant, members of the League undertook ‘to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League’. When combined with the obligation in the preamble, this provision could not have been constructed so as to constitute an obligation not to resort to war. Indeed art.11 (1) seemed to complement a ban on war by supporting the idea of collective security in stating that ‘ any war or threat of war.... is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations’.

Unfortunately, subsequent provisions effectively undermined any purported ban on war by allowing for the lawful resort to war in certain circumstances. The Covenant at the first instance provided that members were under an obligation to settle their international disputes through arbitration, judicial settlement or inquiry by Council. Art. 12(1) obliged members to submit their disputes to arbitration or to the Council and not ‘ to resort to war until 3 months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council’. Art 13 (4) obliged members to carry out arbitral awards and not to ‘ resort to war against a member of the League which complies with’ such an award. Art 15 obliged states to submit all disputes to the Council, which, by para 4, was empowered to make recommendations for the settlement of the dispute. Art 15 (6) ‘... the Members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute, which complies with the recommendations of the Council’s report’. However, if this report was not unanimous, then art 15 (7) reserved the right of member states ‘to take such action as they consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice’.

Hence, articles 12, 13 & 15 preserved the rights of states to go to war; all that was imposed were certain procedural requirements which were more elaborate, perhaps, but no less ineffectual than the Roman concept of the just war.

The obligation in article 10 not to resort to aggression, albeit ambiguous in itself, was totally undermined.

It may be argued that although the Covenant did not totally prohibit war, the loopholes were actually reasonably well defined and relatively quite limited. However, the loopholes in the Covenant did suggest that embarking on a war was simply a question of procedural formalities, and that, despite the vague wording of art 10, there was no substantive prohibition in the Covenant outlawing war. States like Italy, Japan and eventually Germany were not inhibited by a set of procedures. The point is that the loopholes created an inherently unstable edifice. States did not exploit the loopholes; instead they simply knocked down the structure of the League. The events that hampered the functioning of the League and eventually led to its dissolution are summarised below:
(1) In 1923, Italy attacked the island of Corfu, which was under Greek sovereignty. Greece brought this violation to the notice of the League, which instead of providing assistance to Greece to resist the Italian invasion gave advice in favour of Italy.
(2) The League Council watched helplessly as Japan, in 1931 attacked and conquered Manchuria and planned the conquest of China.
(3) In December 1934, Italian and Ethiopian troops clashed at Wal Wal, about fifty miles inside Ethiopian territory. Both sides appealed to the League. But the Council took cognizance of the dispute only in September 1935. Sanctions against Italy were approved by votes of fifty-one states but its effectiveness depended upon the full support of Britain and France, which were not forthcoming.

Nevertheless, the absence of a general clear prohibitory norm appeared to have been remedied by the Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy. (Pact of Paris) of 1928.
Art 1 - declaration by the parties that they condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounced war as an instrument of national policy.
Art 2 obligated parties to treaty to settle their disputes by pacific means.
Both the Pact of Paris and the League Covenant had a serious defect. Neither of them mentioned a prohibition on the so-called armed measures short of war. Neither covered a situation in which full-scale hostilities were occurring but technically there was no ‘war’ because neither party recognised a state of war to exist. This meant that neither reprisals, which could escalate into warfare, nor warfare itself, in the absence of a formal declaration, were covered by the Covenant or the Pact, and that both could be viewed as lawful.

[1] Lawrence T. Farley, Plebiscites and Sovereignty: The Crisis of Political Illegitimacy, (London: Westview Press, 1986), p.141

[2] Frederich H. Russel, The Just War in the Middle Ages, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1975) pp. 298-9

International Law -The Use of Force by States

2007-08-02T20:39:00.000-07:00

Ever since the emergence of States in the medieval period, military force has been used to attain economic and political objectives. Grotious, in the 15th century had opined that, nations limited the use of force to three justifiable causes: ‘defence, recovery of property and punishment’. The Industrial Revolution forced the European states to search for markets for the finished products as well as for the easy availability of raw material. The ambit of Grotian ‘justness’ and the Machiavellian ‘necessity’ was widened to encompass the use of force for securing markets in America, Asia and Africa for the finished goods.

The foundation for the edifice of the United Nations was being laid even before the war in the Pacific had ended; it arose rather indirectly from the ‘Declaration by the United Nations’ of January 1, 1942. This Declaration did not envisage the creation of a world body on the lines of the League or an improvised version of it. Instead, the Declaration concerned the allied campaign against the Axis Powers. However, the Big Four (US, USSR, Britain and China), in the Moscow Declaration of 1943 outlined a world body, the United Nations, to be set up at the end of the war to maintain international peace and security in a new world order.

With Allied victory only a few months away, the Big Four agreed on the structure, composition and powers of the new world body at Dumbarton Oaks in October 1944. The aim of the drafters was to provide a more complete, effective and most importantly, a collective security system than that provided by the League. This was sought to be achieved by entrusting the primary responsibility of maintaining peace and international security in the Security Council and endowing it with extensive powers to carry out this onerous responsibility. The Council could not only recommend pacific settlement of a dispute within the ambit of Chapter VI of the Charter but also authorise collective action by land, air or sea under Chapter VII. An attempt was thus made to give the new organisation the collective ‘teeth’, which the League lacked.

After the cataclysmic events of the Second World War, the Allied Powers thought it was necessary to specifically provide in the U N Charter that force would not be resorted to, by individual states, except in self-defense; the other exception being collective enforcement action with the sanction of the Security Council.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force by states. States may resort to force only in exercise of their inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as provided under Article 51 of the Charter or as part of military sanctions authorized by the Security Council. [International humanitarian law applies with equal force to all the parties in an armed conflict irrespective of which party was responsible for starting that conflict. It comprises the whole of established law serving the protection of man in armed conflict.]

Charter prohibition on Use of Force – Article 2(4) states: All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
By prohibiting the use of force, rather than war, this provision of the Charter skirts the question whether a particular conflict constitutes war. Although some writers have endeavoured to read Article 2(4) narrowly, arguing that there are instances in which use of force may occur without it being directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or being in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN, the prevailing view is that any use of force by one state against another will contravene provisions of Article 2(4) unless it can be justified by reference to any of the specific exceptions to that provision.

Right of self-defense: Article 51 states: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in anyway affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.Term ‘armed attack’ is not defined. In its decision in Nicaragua v US, the International Court of Justice held that armed attacks included ‘not merely action by regular armed forces across an international border’, but also ‘the sending by or on behalf of a state by armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another state by such gravity as to amount to [inter alia] an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces….. or its substantial involvement therein. On this basis, systematic terrorist attacks organized, or perhaps sponsored by a state could constitute an armed attack to which the victim state could respond in self-defense. However, the Court went on t set a threshold by ruling that terrorist/irregular operations would constitute an armed attack only of the scale and effects of such an operation were such that it would have been classified as an armed attack rather than as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces.

A Brief Overview of the Modern History of Conflict:

2007-08-02T20:27:00.000-07:00

The period between the end of the Franco- Prussian War in 1871 and the start of the First World War in 1914 was the longest in recent history, covering approximately forty-three and half years without an unlimited war between major powers being fought, and on 6 February 1989 history was created, as 15982 days had elapsed since the end of the Second World War without a similar conflict between major powers having taken place. However it would be erroneous to infer that these four and half decades were peaceful and conflict-free.

The dropping of the atom bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki had ushered in not only the atomic age but also a bipolar world and the Cold War. The northern hemisphere was divided on the basis of political ideologies and the world witnessed uneasy peace and rising tensions. Though no major armed conflict took place in Europe itself, there were many conflicts around the world which were subsidiary to the ideological confrontation between the Superpowers.

Since August 1945, there were conflicts in Korea, Suez and Vietnam, clashes as a result of boundary dispute between China and USSR, China and India and between India and Pakistan. There were conflicts between Iran and Iraq which lasted nearly a decade as well as the Gulf War in 1990-91. These conflicts were few of the inter-state conflicts (with the possible exception of Korea which may be argued as a conflict between two factions and moreover Korea was not a state at that time), which probably could have triggered off a direct military confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. But the myriad conflicts which occurred during this period were internal in nature involving rival communities, as in the case of Lebanon or wars of liberation from colonial rule or between political factions seeking to gain political power with support and aid of groups and agencies from both within and outside, which had the backing of the Superpowers or their allies.

After nearly four and half decades of intense Superpower rivalry, the Cold War came to an end in 1989-90, thereby reducing the chances of an outbreak of a nuclear conflict and a holocaust. Hopes of international peace which seemed to dawn at the end of the Cold War receded with the eruption of ‘internal’ conflicts with international ramifications in various parts of the world. These conflicts had their roots in nationalism, ethnic and racial differences and some had histories dating back to pre- World War I period.The classic case was the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia. This erstwhile Balkan state broke up into units which had their roots in the confrontation between the Russian, Holy Roman (later Austro-Hungarian) and Ottoman Empires. At the same time, non- international armed conflicts erupted in Somalia, Afghanistan, Sudan, Sri Lanka and in certain other parts of the world with varying levels of intensity.

The response of the United Nations, the organisation through which the international community responded to these inter-state and non-international armed conflicts was to a great extent hampered by the rivalry of the Superpowers and the Cold War politics. The Security Council which shouldered the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security and which was empowered to take suitable action in furtherance of these objectives was prevented by the extensive use of veto by the US and Soviet Union.Notwithstanding, the power politics of the Cold War era, the UN to its credit played an effective role in controlling the numerous armed conflicts which occurred during that time. The international community had expected the UN to play a more positive and effective role in the post-Cold War era but this hope seems to have been belied. The main difficulty facing the UN in the discharge of its primary responsibility seems to be the change in the nature of international conflict and the problems at international law in formulating a proper response.

Can China be trusted?

2007-08-02T20:15:00.000-07:00

There have been several rounds of talks on the border row between India and China and a JWG was also set up in the 80s. However, there has been hardly any progress and a solution seems to be nowhere in sight. China itself does not believe that a solution is possible. Yes, there have been certain CBMs which have reduced tensions between the two countries. On the eve of the visit of the Chinese President to India, the Chinese envoy's statement that Arunachal Pradesh belonged to China and the cession of Tawang would be a pre-condition to solving the border dispute dampened the spirits in the South Bloc. Again, these types of statements by Chinese envoys are not new. The reiteration of border claims has been made prior to visits by Chinese dignitaries. What is even more intriguing is the muted response of the government and the main political parties. Except for the BJP which stated that UPA's foreign policy had failed, no other party has commented on this very important issue. Of course one does not expect the left parties to make any public pronouncements on this issue. Secondly, we cannot afford to ignore the fact that China has consistently followed a policy of containment vis-à-vis India. China has supported, assisted and abetted Pakistan's quest for nuclear weapons and missile technology. Besides, China continues to be one of the major suppliers of conventional arms to Pakistan. China has also come out openly against the Indo-US nuclear deal.China is also responsible for proliferation of nuclear technology. China supported and continues to covertly support insurgency movements in India's North East as well as extreme left wing groups. China's interference in Nepal, its growing ties with Myanmar have to be viewed as being not so India-friendly. China resents India's growing ties with the West, particularly the US.China fears India's rapid economic growth. No doubt we must make all out efforts to improve ties with China. But it has to be with certain amount of caution.

Playing Politics with National Security

2007-08-02T20:13:00.000-07:00

Troop relocation in J&K: An irrational move

The Indian government seems to be out of touch with the ground reality in Jammu & Kashmir. In its bid to cling on to power in the militancy-ravaged state, the Centre had no qualms about relocating the Indian Army which has been in the forefront of counter-insurgency operations in the valley for more than a decade. Over the past few weeks there has been a spurt in the attacks by militants on security forces as well as pilgrims going to the Amarnath caves. In a recently conducted operation by the Indian Army near Uri, the Army successfully foiled another infiltration attempt by the Pak-backed LET. In the operation, the Army lost a brave colonel, Col. Vasanth and Lance Naik Bachav Shahkant Ganapat. At the end of the operation 8 intruders were killed. This only shows that Pakistan is neither interested in dismantling the terrorist infrastructure nor preventing infiltration from across the border. Given the situation it is foolhardy on the Government’s part to even think of sending the army back to the barracks.

The coalition partner of the Congress in the state the PDP has been demanding troop relocation (troop pull out) for some time now. This is seen as a populist measure by political observers. The situation on the ground does not certainly warrant troop reduction or relocation. Any troop redeployment will have to be done on the basis of assessment and advice of the field commanders and security experts rather than on the basis of political equations. Troop cut in Kashmir will only embolden Pakistan to carry out infiltration into the Kashmir valley. Troop cut if carried out will most certainly compromise India’s security.

Mufti has undermined the country’s national security once too often. Starting with the release of detained terrorists from Indian jails for securing the release of his daughter Rubaiyya and playing politics with the state’s security, this man is guilty of compromising India’s national security.

Glasgow terror strike

2007-07-06T01:47:00.000-07:00

“The PM resents labeling of terrorists on the basis of nationality” was the headline of Hindustan Times, dated 6th July 2007

One fails to understand the rationale behind the Prime Minister’s telephone conversation with his British counterpart in the wake of the arrest of 2 terror suspects of Indian origin and expressing his resentment on the labeling of terrorists on the basis of nationality. He also went on to publicly empathize with the mother of one of suspects. It was imperative for the PM Dr. Manmohan Singh to have acted with tact and diplomacy. However, both tact and diplomacy seems to have deserted the PM. The PM would have been well advised against speaking through his hat. A statement that India was in close touch with the governments of UK and Australia and was observing the events closely would have sufficed.

The country and the government of the day should wake up to the reality that the Indian Muslim youth (residing outside India) have been targeted for recruitment for carrying out terror strikes outside India particularly in those places with sizable Asian population by international terrorist outfits like Al Qaeda and others. This paradigm shift in recruitment seems to have been caused because of the surveillance and monitoring of nationals of Pakistan and Middle Eastern countries by the intelligence agencies in the West.

The suspects who hail from Bangalore, India have been detained by the police in UK and Australia on the basis of concrete intelligence information and telephone intercepts linking them to the attack on Glasgow Airport and not on the basis of their nationality or religion. The interrogation of the family members of one of the suspects by officials of the Bangalore police lends credence to the claim of the police that indeed these suspects played an active role in the attack.

The PM said, “We have to look for solutions”. What kind of solutions is the PM referring to? Mr. PM, the persons who carried out the attack at Glasgow or for that matter the attacks on local trains in Mumbai last July are fanatics who have no regard for human life and property. The Indians who allegedly played the role had no grudge against the British. It was all for a “religious cause”. Mr. PM the only solution for fedayeens is to neutralize them by physical liquidation or jail sentences long enough to keep them away from civilization.

The PM seems to understand the trauma of being “labeled” but does he understand the trauma of the victims of terrorist acts? This emotion expressed by the PM may not go down well in India as well as outside. Let the law take its own course. Officers of the Indian consulate have been allowed to meet the suspects. They can monitor the case on a regular basis.

Is the PM sending the right message to his countrymen and the international community?