Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indian Ocean Region

The post traces the ascendancy of People's Republic of China as a major maritime power and its rivalry with India in the IOR. (This post was written as a Capstone Project paper)

Introduction

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has emerged as an important theatre in global geopolitics in the last decade and half and continues to be so, largely due to the volume of trade and more particularly over 80% of maritime oil trade and about ten billion tonnes of cargo annually that passes through it. The Indian Ocean Region encompasses territory both land and water stretching from the Strait of Malacca in the east to the Mozambique Channel in the west and includes the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, the Gulf of Aden, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and 33 littoral states.

The IOR’s global relevance during the Cold War era was minimal, with the primary focus being on the European continent, the Atlantic and the western Pacific. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the subsequent rise of China and other regional economies of southeast Asia post-1995 shifted the focus to the Indian Ocean. The vital maritime routes called Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) which connect the Middle East with South Asia, Southeast Asia, Far East and Oceania are extremely strategic in nature from a military and economic perspective and in particular from the point of energy security because the bulk of the countries in this region are extremely dependent on the Middle East for crude oil and petroleum.

China’s Growing Presence

The importance of the Indian Ocean is reflected by China’s maritime ambitions. China does not have a direct access to the Indian Ocean; its access is through the South China Sea (SCS) which connects to the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca. China’s maritime ambitions stem from its burgeoning economy which has been experiencing significant growth and transformation. Over a period of few decades, China became a major manufacturing hub, producing a vast array of goods from consumer products to industrial to hi-tech ones. Chinese naval expansion was prompted by the rapid economic progress. To keep pace with its economic progress and secure its SLOCs, China embarked on rapid expansion of its navy. Its desire to achieve great power status is also another contributing factor. China is heavily dependent on crude oil and petroleum from the Gulf which passes through the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean is also vital for China’s engagement with Africa, Europe, the Middle East, South Asia and the region’s island states. In addition, an Indian Ocean presence is crucial for Beijing to establish itself as a credible naval power with grand ambitions.  

Around 2013, the Chinese President Xi announced what came to be referred to as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and it comprised the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road. The two were collectively referred to as the One Belt One Road initiative, but later came to be referred to as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 

The original Silk Road[1] arose during the westward expansion of China’s Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), which forged trade networks throughout what are today the Central Asian countries of Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, as well as modern-day India and Pakistan to the south. Those routes extended more than four thousand miles to Europe.

The BRI on the face of it, ostensibly was a China-led infrastructure development and investment project aimed at enhancing connectivity and cooperation between China and the rest of the world, primarily through land and maritime trade routes. It involved Chinese investments in transportation, energy, and telecommunications infrastructure, among other areas, with the goal of boosting trade, stimulating economic growth, and fostering regional integration. This was only a part of this seemingly attractive project. This project entailed investments in infrastructure projects like ports and unsustainable debt was imposed on the host state

Nine-dash line

The nine-dash line is a historical claim, first appeared on Chinese maps in the 1940s encompassing a vast area of the South China Sea including the islands and reefs. China claimed that the SCS constituted historical waters encompassing nearly 90% of the Sea on the maps by using a U-shaped boundary line of 9 to 11 dashes (commonly referred to as Nine dash line).  This claim was fallacious and had no basis in international law.  According to Robert Beckman, director of the Centre for International Law at the National University of Singapore, “The dotted-line map was first produced by the Chinese government in 1947 and has nine dashes drawn in a u-shape around the islands in the South China Sea. Although China has used this map on several occasions, it has never clarified its position on exactly what it is claiming inside the dotted-line. This has led some to conclude that China is claiming all the waters within the dotted-line as its territorial waters or historic waters. Such a position would be contrary to UNCLOS.

While much attention has been given to the dotted-line map attached to China’s Note Verbale, it should be remembered that the Note does not assert sovereignty over the waters in the dotted-line except for the waters “adjacent” to the islands which arguably only refers to a 12 nm territorial sea. The Note contains no language suggesting that China claims that all the waters inside the dotted-line are its territorial waters or historic waters, or that it has any historic rights in the waters inside the dotted-line. This suggests that China’s claim is only to the islands inside the dotted-line, and to the maritime zones that can be generated from such islands, a position consistent with UNCLOS.”  

The SCS contains vital shipping lanes and being rich in hydrocarbons and fish, China constructed artificial islands in the South China Sea, militarized them with airstrips, radar systems, and other facilities in order to assert its rights over the SCS. China has laid claim to the key land features in the SCS like Scarborough Shoal, Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands and subsequent seizure of the reefs and islands have become a bone of contention between China and the littoral states including Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and other states.

The Malacca Dilemma

Apart from the fact that China is geographically distant from the Indian Ocean and bulk of its crude oil import is by sea, the heavy reliance on the Strait of Malacca as a waterway adds to its problems. This is compounded by the fact that China has very little influence over it. Its reliance on the Strait makes it vulnerable to disruptions such as naval blockade, piracy or terror attacks or asymmetric warfare or harassment attacks by one of the littoral states inimical to China which could have a damaging impact on the Chinese economy. The Malacca dilemma as the vulnerability is referred to, is further complicated by geopolitical tensions in the region, particularly the presence of major powers like the United States or India, which could potentially exploit China's vulnerability and hamper the movement of its vessels. China has been seeking to use Gwadar and China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) or Sittwe as overland routes in order to overcome the vulnerability posed by the Malacca Strait.

Chinese Bases and Debt-trap Diplomacy

India has been apprehensive over the increasing Chinese footprint in the Indian Ocean over the past few years, which it considers to be its backyard. China has used its diplomatic clout and subtle coercive economic tools, corruption and predatory loans to achieve its objectives in the Indian Ocean Region. China has been using economic machination to obtain bases/facilities for its fast-expanding naval fleet. The BRI has served this purpose. The Sri Lankan port of Hambantota is a classic example, according to some experts of debt-trap diplomacy. Here, China advanced loans to Sri Lanka for construction of the port and when Colombo struggled to repay the loans, it was forced, in 2017 to lease Hambantota to the Chinese entity China Merchant Port Holdings for 99 years. Thus, strategic influence is gained by granting predatory loans with highly unfavourable terms, completely opaque and a key infrastructure gets taken over. However, according to a leading think tank, Chatham House, the Hambantota case is more complex than a simple debt-trap policy and the lease was not a quid pro quo for the loan. Apparently, China paid Sri Lanka for the lease and the original loans remain in place. Notwithstanding the Chatham House view, the debt-trap diplomacy has been the of used modus operandi by China. According to the Associated Press, in May 2023, many countries including Pakistan, Kenya, Zambia, Laos and Mongolia were on the brink of economic collapse under the weight of crushing foreign debt, much of it from the world’s biggest lender, China. India has tried to warn countries that BRI is not an economically enriching venture but part of a geopolitical strategy by Beijing to dominate the region and Asia and keep India encircled with bases obtained through the devious debt-trap and take control of regional choke points. India, on its part has tried to ease the financial burdens of some of the states like Sri Lanka. India converted loans worth over USD 100 million into grants and reduced interest rates on existing credit in the six months leading up to April 2025, providing immediate relief to the Sri Lankan people.

SAGAR and MAHASAGAR – India’s Maritime Doctrine and Diplomatic Outreach

India has always emphasized on a free, open, and inclusive region that thrives on trade and investment. In the naval doctrine of 2004, India stressed on the freedom of navigation and securing vital maritime trade and communication pathways. India has been a net security provider in the region which means reinforcing collective security by tackling common threats like piracy emanating primarily from Somalia, rendering humanitarian assistance at sea and co-ordinating disaster relief efforts as was seen during the tsunami. The emergence of Indo-Pacific as a geostrategic concept which considered the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific as a single strategic theatre had a telling impact on the entire security architecture. The Indian Prime Minister, in 2015, inaugurated the “Security and Growth for All in the Region” called the SAGAR doctrine which conceptualises the idea of Indo-Pacific and advocates for the Indo-Pacific region to be free, open, inclusive, peaceful and prosperous. This doctrine aimed to position India as a net security provider in the region. In 2025, the Indian Prime Minister articulated a revised framework for the country in the Indian Ocean Region called MAHASAGAR “Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth for All in the Region.” The basis for MAHASAGAR is the incontrovertible fact that India is a first responder in the region, be it for rendering humanitarian assistance or disaster relief and developmental aid. India has also been endeavouring to strengthen maritime security cooperation in the region through the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) which is a voluntary and inclusive initiative that brings together navies of the IOR littorals to enhance maritime cooperation and security and serves as a platform for discussing maritime issues and formulate responses to various challenges like natural disasters. The Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR), an initiative under the IONS which is jointly managed by the Indian Navy and the Indian Coast Guard is a regional maritime security centre established in Gurugram, India, in December 2018 and serves as a hub for maritime security information sharing with a view to strengthening maritime safety and security in the IOR. The Colombo Security Conclave formed in 2020 is a framework for maritime cooperation between India, Sri Lanka and Maldives. Mauritius and Bangladesh joined the grouping subsequently. Its core objective is to address regional security challenges related to maritime security, counter-terrorism and transnational crime. India has thus been actively pursuing a policy of keeping China out of the region’s affairs since China is not geographically located in the region. These initiatives and the objectives that they seek to achieve may be noteworthy, but their importance in the larger geopolitical scenario has been limited because of domestic political compulsions obtaining in the member countries.

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) is an informal strategic forum established in 2007 comprising four states, namely the US, India, Australia and Japan whose primary objective is to work for a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific region. The core objective of this forum is to secure a rules-based international order, freedom of navigation and a liberal trading system. Though viewed as an anti-China alliance, the QUAD does not target China directly, but its objective of having a free and open Indo-Pacific runs counter to Chinese belligerence in the SCS, its disputes with the littoral states of the region and beyond. Thus, in a way QUAD does act as a counterweight to China’s growing assertiveness and influence in the region. Chinese leaders, less than a decade ago were dismissive of the QUAD as the members had divergent interests and lacked coherence. According to the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the grouping was merely “a headline-grabbing idea” without much substance and like the ocean foam would dissipate. China between the 2020s and 2035 saw an opportunity to be the dominant economic, technological and military power and that its dominance in Asia and the world was inevitable. China, being a revisionist power had dreamt of re-writing the rules of international order and establish its position as a global leader without firing a shot.

Within a few years of the November 2017 gathering of QUAD members in Manila, however, Beijing had started to rethink its initial dismissiveness. The forum got further impetus after the Indian and Chinese forces clashed in the Galwan Valley in June 2020. India, which till then had reservations on the “security” aspect of the QUAD, realised that China’s belligerence had to be countered strongly and, if necessary, by the use of force.  By March of 2021, when the QUAD held its first leader-level summit and issued its first leader-level communique, Chinese officials had begun to view the QUAD with growing concern. Since then, Beijing has concluded that the QUAD represented one of the most significant challenges to Chinese ambitions in the years ahead. From the Chinese perspective the geopolitical wei qi board was beginning to look grim.

Naval Capabilites

Much of India’s energy imports pass through the IOR and the Arabian Sea. The Indian SLOCs through the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea is important as it is challenging; they are critical for its economy and security. Indian SLOCs face challenges in the form of piracy, terrorism and threats from PLA-N and Pakistani Navy in the event of a conflict. Being in close geographical proximity, these waters can be monitored on a continuous basis effectively without the Indian Navy having to stretch its resources thin. The Indian Navy’s capabilities at its current level can pose serious challenges to the PLA-N. Having said that, India needs to be cognizant of the fact that the PLA-N with 370 ships is the world’s largest navy, if not the most powerful. And this number is likely to increase to 435 by the year 2030 as per projections. The sheer numbers that the PLA-N can deploy in the event of a conflict is quite overwhelming. Though it must be emphasized that numbers alone cannot determine the outcome of a conflict because the PLA-N lacks combat experience at sea, unlike India and its western partners. Operating a fleet or carrier group in peacetime or for anti-piracy operations is one thing, while engaging in a full-fledged sea battle is quite another. The Chinese have another distinct disadvantage – lack of operational bases, (save and except Djibouti), either in the vast expanse of the Indian Ocean or in the Arabian Sea. This will most likely hamper PLA-N operations for an extended period of time. The geographical challenge to the Chinese navy acts as a significant and arguably the most important structural limitation on PLA-N’s ability to wage high-intensity naval warfare in the Indian Ocean. The tyranny of geography would require the Chinese navy to either reload in a friendly port (extremely remote possibility in the event of war) or to replenish at sea.  This scenario may change in the foreseeable future if China can manage to obtain bases in Gwadar, Sittwe (Myanmar) or Chittagong or in Maldives. It must be said that these are possible bases for the future because no arrangement is in the offing as of today. While China has been building aircraft carriers, operating carrier-based aircraft requires extensive training and the competence of the pilots is questionable.

India has its fair share of worries as well. It is lagging behind the PLA-N both quantitatively and qualitatively because for nearly a decade from 2004-05 to 2014 India had not acquired any significant naval weapons platform. There has been a big gap in numbers between India and China. India’s challenges lie in its somewhat depleted underwater capabilities. India operates seventeen diesel powered attack submarines; importantly none of them are equipped with Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) and one nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine. The AIP technology allows submarines to stay submerged for longer durations. India is in the process of actively integrating Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) systems into its submarine fleet, primarily for the Kalvari-class (Scorpene-class) submarines. This involves retrofitting existing submarines with indigenous AIP modules developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). It is unclear how successful will this integration of indigenous modules be in an imported platform. India's long-term plans include the construction of six additional submarines with AIP systems under Project 75(I), though these are not expected to join the fleet until after 2033.    

To offset the advantage gained by the PLA-N, India must look to develop indigenous weapons systems, particularly underwater drones for surveillance and offensive operations. The Indian Navy is in the process of actively developing and acquiring underwater drones, also known as unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), to enhance its capabilities in maritime surveillance, reconnaissance, and potentially, even offensive operations. These advancements include both smaller, autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) and larger, extra-large UUVs (XLUUVs) with potential strike capabilities. The development is largely driven by the need to monitor and protect India's vast maritime interests, including the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), the South China Sea, and the Indo-Pacific. 

Conclusion

From an Indian perspective, the power disparity is a matter of concern for Indian policy makers and strategic thinkers. This is offset to some extent by the geographical advantage enjoyed by India. India also has the benefits arising from strategic partnerships with the US, Japan and France and that gives it greater flexibility and manoeuvrability in the Indian Ocean.  Beijing has far too many problems to tackle; it has the US and Japan to counter in the Pacific; reunification of Taiwan and the problems associated with it and the littorals in the SCS are hostile. Thus, China, notwithstanding a huge navy will still be better off addressing issues closer home than expand its area of operations to the Indian Ocean where it clearly faces logistical problems. This is the critical time for India to beef up its naval capabilities both quantitatively and in quality and narrow the gap with the PLA-N.

---

[1] China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative – Council For Foreign Relations, February 02, 2023

 China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative | Council on Foreign Relations

Operation Sindoor - A brief analysis

This post is being written while the ceasefire is in force and Operation Sindoor is paused. This is by no means a detailed analysis, just a perspective.

Key pointers:

Operation Sindoor was a cold, calculated, high precision military response to not just the Pahalgam attack which took place on April 22, 2025, resulting in the deaths of 26 tourists and a pony owner, but to the brazenness with which Pakistan operated terrorist training centres and launchpads in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Pakistan. According to John Spencer, Chair of Urban Warfare Studies at the Modern War Institute this operation was a new doctrine for India.

The response from India on the intervening night of 8th May and 9th May have resulted in a new red line - any terror attack launched from Pakistan will be treated as acts of war. There would be no difference between terrorists and terrorist sponsors or backers. Thus, no distinction between the jihadis and their masters/handlers. The question is whether India will respond in the same way as they did on 7th May in response to every terror attack that may take place in future. 

The Indian military response on 7th May and 8th/9th May were conducted under a nuclear overhang, meaning that the potential for nuclear escalation was a significant factor in their actions. This effectively put an end to the nuclear blackmail which prevented strong and decisive kinetic action by India.

Operation Sindoor showcased jointness; an "absolute synergy between the three services in every single domain." The coordination between the army, air force and navy was near perfect. While strikes were carried out primarily by the Air Force with the Army playing a supporting role, the Indian Navy remained deployed in the northern Arabian Sea in a deterrent posture with full capacity to strike select targets at sea and land including Karachi.  

India projected its offensive power and defensive capabilities by use of a blend of indigenous (BrahMos, Akash, Nagastra) and foreign platforms (Harpy and S-400) in a high intensity conflict.

While drones revolutionised warfare and has been used extensively in the Ukraine conflict and in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, it cannot win wars. Pakistan was probably induced by Türkiye to use drones to overwhelm Indian air defences much like Armenian air defences. The ploy failed miserably. Drones can complement other weapons systems; they cannot replace them.

Pakistan's retaliation to India's action on 7th May was neutralized and within a few hours, India struck Pakistan targeting it with such ferocity decimating its air bases and other facilities. The attack was very calibrated and controlled in manner and India ensured that it didn't escalate into an all-out conflict.

India's military actions have been described as "non-escalatory, proportionate, calibrated and responsible because it didn't commit ground forces, especially the Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) as an integral part of the Cold Start doctrine for shallow incursions. There was no visible action for occupying territory under Pakistan's control.

India through Op Sindoor achieved all three key objectives - military, political and psychological. Spencer aptly described the operation as a limited war conducted for limited but vital aims to re-establish deterrence, impose costs on Pakistan's terror infrastructure and re-define the rules of engagement between two nuclear armed states.

Restraint is not to be construed as weakness; it is discipline in pursuit of strategic objectives.

       

Counter Terrorism Operations - A Failed Rescue in Africa

Explained: Understanding Escalating Israel-Gaza Conflict & Regional Rami...

Inside the Mossad: Israel's ELITE Secret Service THWARTING Iran Nuclear ...

USS John Paul Jones FONOP - A Perspective on the Extent and Limits of the EEZ

After a long hiatus.....

A Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) by a US warship brought into fore the extent and legal limitations of the exclusive economic zone.

A US guided missile destroyer sailed through India’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 130 nautical miles west of Lakshadweep Islands, without intimating India – in alleged violation of Indian law. Almost all Indian news channels/websites accused the US Navy of having violated Indian law/international law. It is not clear whether the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer was merely transiting the Indian EEZ or carrying out manoeuvres.  

A statement released by the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet said, “On April 7, 2021 (local time) USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53) asserted navigational rights and freedoms approximately 130 nautical miles west of the Lakshadweep Islands, inside India’s exclusive economic zone, without requesting India’s prior consent, consistent with international law.”

It said India requires prior consent for military exercises or manoeuvres in its EEZ or continental shelf, and added that this claim was inconsistent with international law.

This Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) upheld the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea recognised in international law by challenging India’s excessive maritime claims, it said.

In a statement issued, India’s external affairs ministry said it had raised the matter of the USS John Paul Jones passing through the EEZ with the US.

“The USS John Paul Jones was continuously monitored transiting from the Persian Gulf towards the Malacca Straits. We have conveyed our concerns regarding this passage through our EEZ to the Government of U.S.A through diplomatic channels,” it said.

India reiterated its adherence to the UNCLOS and said that the laws under this “does not authorise other States to carry out in the Exclusive Economic Zone and on the continental shelf military exercises or manoeuvres, in particular those involving the use of weapons or explosives, without the consent of the coastal state.”

This incident has politico-diplomatic dimensions and international legal implications. This post is an attempt to analyse the international legal ramifications in the light of the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982 in respect of the coastal state’s rights and limitations vis-à-vis the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

For the purposes of the present incident, it is relevant to refer to Articles 55 to 58 of UNCLOS 1982.

Article 55 of the 1982 Convention stipulates that the exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established under the Convention. The zone starts from the outer edge of the territorial sea but shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. In other words, the zone would effectively be only 188 nautical miles with the territorial sea being 12 nautical miles.

Article 56 provides that the coastal state in the EEZ has inter alia sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds. 

The key phrase in the above provision is “sovereign rights”. Sovereign rights are not the same as “sovereignty” which is conferred on a coastal state with reference to the territorial sea. In order to distinguish between sovereign rights and sovereignty, in this context, it is necessary to refer to Article 2 of the 1982 Convention which defines the territorial sea. Sub-clause 1 of Article 2 of the Convention of 1982 provides that the sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea. Sub-clause 2 of Article 2 provides that the sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil. Sovereignty in international law, is the exercise of power by a state. The sovereign rights, in Article 56 refer to the coastal state’s rights below the surface of the sea; surface waters are international waters. Thus, the rights available to a coastal state are confined to exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources in the waters superajacent (that is lying over or above something else). The USS John Paul Jones was not violating India’s sovereign rights in the exclusive economic zone. In fact, under the Freedom of Navigation Operation it was merely transiting through India’s exclusive economic zone. Hence there was no infringement of either India’s sovereign rights or sovereignty. The only cause for provocation was the statement issued by the Seventh Fleet.

Article 58 of the Convention stipulates that in the exclusive economic zone, all states whether coastal or land-locked enjoy subject to the relevant provisions of the Convention, the freedoms referred to in Article 87 of navigation (which was purported to be exercised by the USS John Paul Jones), overflight and laying of submarine cables and pipelines and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines. The Article also provides that the states in exercising their rights and performing their duties, due regard should be had to the rights, duties and laws of the coastal state (something being emphasised by India). 

The latter part of the above provision in italics was interpreted by the maritime powers to imply that the naval manoeuvres was legal in a coastal state’s exclusive economic zone which was covered broadly under the phrase “associated with the operation of ships.” However, some of the coastal states dissented and interpreted the said provision narrowly contending that the said provision did not entitle the other states to carry out military activities in the zone and that prior consent was necessary before carrying out such activities.

The question of whether a foreign country has the right to conduct military activities in the exclusive economic zone of a coastal state was subject matter of controversy when the text of the 1982 Convention was being negotiated. The maritime powers pitched for a broad range of military activities in consonance with the traditional high seas freedom (which are provided for in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas). The maritime powers have sought to interpret the phrase “other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms” to include military activities such as task force maneuvering, flight operations, military exercises, naval surveys, intelligence gathering and weapons testing and firing.[1] Many years ago one operational commander from the United States wrote that the EEZ regime did not permit the Coastal State to limit traditional non-resources related high seas activities in the EEZ, such as task force maneuvering, flight operations, military exercises, telecommunications and space activities, intelligence and surveillance activities, marine data collection, and weapons testing and firing”. This was vehemently objected to, by some coastal states because these activities posed a threat to these states. The Convention itself is silent on this controversial issue. And further this issue has not come up for judicial interpretation before the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the Law Of the Sea.    

Maritime Zones Schematic

Source: Chapter 2: Maritime Zones – Law of the Sea (tufts.edu)

India’s legal position

India enacted the Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act, 1976. Sub-section (9) of Section 7 of the said Act provides: “In the exclusive economic zone and the air space over the zone, ships and aircraft of all States shall subject to the exercise by India of its rights within the zone, enjoy freedom of navigation and over flight.”

However, India, at the time of ratifying the UNCLOS in June 1995 issued the following declarations:

Declarations:

“(a) The Government of the Republic of India reserves the right to make at the appropriate time the declarations provided for in articles 287 and 298, concerning the settlement of disputes.

(b) The Government of the Republic of India understands that the provisions of the Convention do not authorize other States to carry out in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf military exercises or manoeuvres, in particular those involving the use of weapons or explosives without the consent of the coastal State.”

While recognizing the freedom of navigation and overflight in the EEZ, India carved out a reservation while ratifying the 1982 Convention prohibiting other States from carrying out military exercises or manoeuvres without its consent. The legal validity of the above reservation, in the opinion of the writer, is questionable.

It is pertinent, here, to refer to the Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v Ukraine) 2009 ICJ 61, wherein the International Court of Justice was asked to consider a RUD (reservations, understandings and declarations) adopted by Romania when it ratified UNCLOS, a treaty that prohibits most reservations but allows interpretative declarations as long as they do not purport to exclude or modify the legal effect of the convention. Romania had issued an interpretative declaration regarding Article 121 which lays down the definition of an island as “a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide” and distinguishes rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own in Article 121 (3) as not having an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. The interpretative declaration allowed for a more preferable delimiting boundary by not considering rocks as part of the delimitation of maritime spaces. The ICJ while holding against Romania observed that the declaration could not modify the legal effect of the UNCLOS provisions. So also, India could not import vide a municipal legislation (the 1976 Act) a restriction on the navigational freedom and other lawful uses of the sea with respect to the exclusive economic zone.[2]

It is also relevant to point out that the US Navy protested this restriction in 2007 and has stated that it did not recognize this claim and in pursuance thereof also conducted operational assertions in 1999, 2001 and 2008 through 2014 thereby attempting to establish a state practice.[3]

In conclusion, it needs to be pointed out that FONOPS are well recognized in law and practice and the statement issued by the Seventh Fleet and its fallout needs to be tackled at the diplomatic or political level in the larger interests of securing India’s geopolitical objectives in the Indo-Pacific through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD).   

---

[1] Hyun Soo Kim, Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: Preventing Uncertainty and Defusing Conflict; International Law Studies – Vol 80

[2] Eric Chung, The Judicial Enforceability and Legal Effects of Reservations, Understandings and Declarations; The Yale Law Journal Vol 126 2016-17 Yale Law Journal - The Judicial Enforceability and Legal Effects of Treaty Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations

[3] www.jag.navy.mil/organization/code_10_mcrm.htm.

 

The Syrian Conundrum

In the second half of the 19^th century, a “Great Game” was played out between the British and the Russian empires seeking dominion of Central Asia. More than a century and half later, a new “Great Game” is being played out in Syria for dominance of the Middle East. The only difference is that there are multiple players in this great game. While the United States and its European allies and Russia are the primary actors in this game, the role played by the regional powers like Israel, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states as well as non-state actors/terrorist outfits have added to the complexity. The Syrian civil war ceased to be an internal conflict a long time ago. It has turned into a battle ground for influence in the Middle East, a realignment of forces and the balance of power that it accompanies.

The Beginning

 In 2011 successful uprisings that brought about regime change in Egypt and Tunisia and came to be known as the Arab Spring gave hope to Syrian pro-democracy activists. In the March of 2011 peaceful protests erupted in Syria’s southern city of Daraa after the arrest and torture of fifteen teenagers who wrote graffiti and other revolutionary slogans in support of the Arab Spring. One of the teenagers, thirteen year old Hamza al-Khateeb was brutally tortured and later killed. The Assad government responded to the protests by opening fire on demonstrators, killing many of them.

Till the first week of April, the main demand of the protesters was democratic reforms, release of political prisoners, an increase in freedoms, abolition of emergency law and an end to corruption. In the second week of April, there was a shift towards a call to overthrow the Assad government. By 22^nd April, the protests had occurred in twenty cities. By the end of May 2011, nearly 1000 civilians and about 150 security personnel had been killed and thousands detained.

Significant armed resistance against the government took place in the first week of June 2011. The protests led rapidly to an armed uprising. On 30^th September 2015, Russia intervened in response to an official request from the Syrian government. Russia began a sustained air campaign targeting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (or Levant) ISIS and the anti-Assad Free Syrian Army – a faction comprising of defectors of the Syrian military which was formed in July 2011.

The Power Vacuum, US Policy and Russian Intervention

Nature abhors a vacuum. The Iraq experience demonstrated that withdrawals created a vacuum that inevitably may be filled by other players or powers. A hastened and unplanned withdrawal of US forces from Iraq sowed the seeds for the growth of the Islamic State. Eight years of Obama Administration transformed the strategic calculus of the Middle East. It was once said that the U.S. was the guarantor of security in the Middle East. The Obama years replete with intransigence and indecisiveness, and in particular, its failure to act when the Assad regime forces used chemical weapons against its own citizens in August 2013 gave a fillip to the Kremlin to step in.  President Obama, in fact reneged on his self-imposed red line and decided against a military response to the use of chemical weapons. Instead in a naïve and fool-hardy manner, he acquiesced with Kremlin’s proposal to allow its client Syria to “surrender” its chemical weapons stockpile. This summed up the US policy in Syria. With the exception of Syria, Russia does not have much influence in the larger Middle Eastern region. Moscow is aware that any change in the domestic situation in Syria is bound to impact Russia and its policies. 

There are three components to Russia’s policy towards Syria and elsewhere: 1) in a kind of modern version of the Brezhnev Doctrine, Putin will fight to ensure Russia does not lose influence in Syria, and that influence is tied to the fate of the Assad regime; 2) Russia becomes unnerved when it sees states crumble from within with what it believes to be the help of outside actors like the United States—e.g. what they believed happened in Ukraine; and 3) Putin wants the world to know that Russia is back; it is a power that must be reckoned with and cannot be ignored.

And the Americans did just that – IGNORE. Russia under Putin was fast becoming a revanchist power and the US and the West simply failed to comprehend this reality. The West was slow to recognize the dangers posed by the Russian President Vladimir Putin’s revisionist policies. At the Wales Summit in September of 2014, NATO identified the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as a “grave threat” to its members. While expressing great concern about and condemning Russia’s aggressive policy in Ukraine—and noting the various steps taken to deal with the challenges of that policy—the Alliance declined to characterize Russia as even a threat. Indeed, although the Summit statement spoke of the need to provide “assurances” to Allies in Eastern Europe, it did not speak of deterring the Kremlin.

This same reluctance was evident nearly a year later, in the summer of 2015, when General Joseph Dunford testified before Congress as President Barack Obama’s nominee to be the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Dunford identified Russia as an existential threat. Later that day, however, Josh Earnest, the Presidential press spokesman, said that Dunford’s observation “reflects his own view and doesn’t necessarily reflect the view—or the consensus—of the President’s national security team.” This was further exacerbated when the next day Secretary of State John Kerry also stepped in and made clear that he did not view Russia as an existential threat. It was amateurish to say the least.

According to Col. Robert E. Hamilton “Syria also figures prominently in Russia’s geopolitical calculus for what it represents: a chance for Russia to take a stand against what it sees as a U.S.-engineered series of regime changes that target the stability of Russia itself. From the “Color Revolutions” in the former Soviet Union to the Arab Spring uprisings, many Russians believe the U.S. is carrying out a deliberate and comprehensive program of enforced democratization, with Russia as its ultimate target.

In the Russian view a western process of democratization is catastrophic and is a recipe for chaos and renewed civil war. This apprehension is not entirely unfounded. After all, voters in a country that has experienced years of conflict that morphed into a bitter ethnic and sectarian civil war with considerable interference by outside powers can hardly be expected to have sufficient trust in the democratic process to refrain from casting their votes along those same ethnic and sectarian lines. And the political institutions of a country riven by such ethnic and sectarian violence can hardly be expected to contain the grievances this violence has stoked, especially if those institutions themselves are divided along ethnic and sectarian lines. So the Russian concern with democratization imposed from without, in a country with deep divisions in identities has a potential to plunge the country into renewed civil war.

A second Russian concern, not expressed openly but deeply held, is that if a democratically elected government in Syria does manage to hold itself and the country together, it will turn Syria from a strategic partner of Russia into an adversary. This is because any democratically elected government in Syria, a country with a 74% Sunni majority, is likely to align itself with the other Sunni regimes in the region and against Russia. In this case, Russia stands to lose one of the two pillars of its regional strategy, along with its air base at Latakia (Khmeimim or Hmeymim) and its naval base at Tartus. Russia’s air base at Latakia and naval base at Tartus are extremely significant because they serve as launch pads for possible Russian military operations in the region. Kremlin’s military planners will try to secure these two vital pieces of real estates.

On 18 January 2017, Russia and Syria signed an agreement, wherein Russia was to be be allowed to expand and use the naval facility at Tartus for 49 years on a free-of-charge basis and enjoy sovereign jurisdiction over the base. The treaty allowed Russia to keep 11 warships at Tartus, including nuclear vessels; it stipulated privileges and full immunity from Syria′s jurisdiction for Russia′s personnel and material  at the facility.

According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, there exists within Syria two secret signals intelligence ‘spy posts’ operated jointly by Russia and Syria. The biggest Russian electronic ‘eavesdropping post’ outside Russian territory was established in Latakia in 2012. Another signals intelligence post, “Center S” ("Центр С" in Cyrillic script), operated jointly by Russian OSNAC GRU radio intelligence agency and a Syrian intelligence agency, situated near Al-Harra close to the Golan Heights on the Israeli border was captured by rebels belonging to the Free Syrian Army[i] in October 2014 during the Daraa offensive. Russian Main Intelligence Directorate’s OSNAC unit – its signals intelligence unit, much like the American NSA or Unit 8200 in Israel– had been operating from within a Syrian regime base near the border with Israel. Russian troops had been collecting intelligence against Syrian rebels. This makes sense: Russia is deeply involved in the Syrian civil war and has often filled the role of international bodyguard for Bashar Assad. But the video also revealed that OSNAC officers had been collecting operational intelligence on Israel.

Iranian interests and game plan

Since the Syrian civil war started in 2011, Iran has been dispatching soldiers, militias, money and weapons to support the Assad regime. The result has been the transformation of Syria from an authoritarian military dictatorship friendly to Iran to an Iranian proxy in desperate need of Iranian support just to stay alive. Syria is vital to Iran’s strategic interests in the Middle East and has long been its closest ally. Some believe Tehran has been backing the Assad regime in Damascus because of their shared religious roots. Both ruling cliques claim affinity with the heterodox Shia, who is a minority in an Islamic world populated by orthodox Sunnis.

Little binds the Iranian Shia, known as Twelvers, with the Alawi Shia who rule Syria. The ninth-century founder of the Alawi sect was an adherent of the eleventh of the Twelvers’ religious leaders. He promoted doctrines that were incompatible with Twelverism and was declared an infidel by medieval Twelver scholars. Later Alawi theologians went even farther, abrogating many of Islamic laws such as fasting during the month of Ramadan while advocating the non-Islamic concept of the transmigration of souls. They went so far as to deify Muhammad’s cousin Ali, claiming that he was the true recipient of the prophetic message. They adopted Christian and pagan holidays.

These teachings did not sit well with medieval Twelver scholars. The tenth-century Twelver heresiographer Abu Muhammad al-Hassan ibn Musa al-Nawbakhti claimed the Alawi founder propagated the un-Islamic belief of the transmigration of souls and permitted homosexual relations. Jurists such as the eleventh-century scholar Muhammad bin al-Hassan al-Tusi accused the Alawis of heresy and cursed them for permitting what was forbidden.

This suited the Alawis. They believed they were the true holders of the original Islamic message, and had little affection for Muslims who refused to follow them. The Twelvers viewed them as enemies, and in 1834 raised troops for the Ottomans to quash an Alawi revolt.

Sometimes Alawis did not even identify as Muslims. When European travelers began visiting Syria in the eighteenth century, Alawis informed them they were Christians. Isolated in their mountain strongholds, they had little interaction with Muslims. But modernity shattered these walls. To prevent missionaries from claiming them as lost Christians, the Ottomans asserted they were Muslims. Mosques were built. But the Alawis rejected these attempts of integration into the Islamic community. When the French ruled Syria, they too tried to incorporate them into the Islamic fold. Twelver judges were imported to establish courts. But the Alawis rebuffed them as well. In 1948, Alawi students went to the Twelver center of Najaf, Iraq to learn their doctrines. But after being ridiculed and scorned, most quickly returned home.

In the 1960s, Alawis officers took power in Syria. But they did not establish cordial ties with Iran. Instead, it was the Iran-Iraq war that proved a turning point. Tehran was an international pariah, rejected by the West and fearful of Soviet communism. It was desperate for allies. The Syrian president detested his Iraqi counterpart and saw the war as an opportunity to weaken him. Iran bolstered a flailing Syrian economy in 1982 by providing free oil. But religious ties between the Alawis and Twelvers were as strained as ever. A 1985 American diplomatic cable noted that Twelver scholars “view the Alawis as heretical and despicable.” Indicative of the abyss between them, Twelvers sought to proselytize among the Alawis. Six preachers were arrested for doing so in 1996.

But Iran’s Syrian strategy derives less from spurious religious ties than it does from geopolitical factors. Surrounded by hostile pro-Western nations, Iran needs all the allies it can find to ensure that its regional interests are protected.

Iran and Syria built a defensive alliance based on mutual adversaries and fears. Historically apprehensive of American and Israeli designs in the Middle East, they share limited interests beyond their anti-Western ideology. But even this was not enough to persuade Syria to put both feet in the Iranian camp. Damascus always tried to keep Tehran at a comfortable distance, so as to not alienate Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries.

Today, Iran fears the fall of the Alawi regime would result in a Sunni government, which would ally with its rival Saudi Arabia. It worries about the regional isolation that would ensue. A regime change in Damascus would wipe out the regional gains that it has carefully cultivated for almost forty years. Since the onset of the civil war, Iran has provided the Assad government with financial, technical and military support, including training and some combat troops. According to some unconfirmed estimates approximately 10,000 Iranian operatives were thought to have been in Syria. But according to an assistant professor and researcher at Webster University, Iran had aided Syria with limited number of deployed units and personnel.  The Gatestone Institute estimated that as of late 2016, Iran controlled over 70,000 troops deployed in Syria (15,000 soldiers of the Iranian military, 20,000 members of the  Iran controlled over 70,000 troops deployed in Syria (15,000 soldiers of the Iranian military, 20,000 members of Liwa Fatemiyoun, an Afghan Shia militia formed in 2014 to fight in Syria and funded by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps - IRGC, 20,000 Iraqi militiamen ten different groups, 10,000 Lebanese Hezbollah fighters, and 5,000 to 7,000 Pakistani and Palestinian militiamen), while also paying monthly salaries to 250,000 "militia and agents" supporting the Assad government.

Iran’s primary foreign military arm, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps – Quds Force (IRGC-QF), appeared to be leading this effort. The U.S. Department of the Treasury (USDOT) designated IRGC-QF Commander Major General Qassem Suleimani and Operations and Training Commander Mohsen Chizari in May 2011 for their role in “the violent repression against the Syrian people.”The extent of IRGC-QF involvement in Syria became clearer in February 2013 when Iranian Brigadier General Hassan Shateri was assassinated in the Damascus countryside while traveling to Beirut, after having travelled to Aleppo. The Quds Force is responsible for Iran’s external operations, and Commander Suleimani played a prominent role managing Iranian activity in Iraq, and hence was given a role in Iran’s Syria policy. The extent of IRGC-QF involvement in Syria became clearer in February 2013 when Iranian Brigadier General Hassan Shateri was assassinated in the Damascus countryside while traveling to Beirut, after having travelled to Aleppo. Shateri was a senior Quds Force commander who had been operating covertly in Lebanon since 2006 as the head of Iran’s Committee for the Reconstruction of Southern Lebanon under the alias Hessam Khoshnevis. Prior to his time in Lebanon, Shateri had operated in Afghanistan and Iraq. The presence of such a high-ranking commander inside Syria highlights Tehran’s commitment to achieving its objectives in the country, as well as its potential vulnerabilities should Assad fall.

Israel’s limited intervention in the conflict

Israel is surrounded by a host of state and non-state actors inimical to its security and national interests. Throughout the Syrian civil war, Israel avoided taking sides and had largely limited its role in the conflict to targeting weapons shipments en route to Hezbollah. As the conflict dragged on and with Iran entrenching in Syria, Israel started broadening the scope of its action to prevent its key adversaries from producing or acquiring advanced weaponry in the first place. This was essentially an extension of the Begin Doctrine, pioneered by Prime Minister Menachem Begin in 1981, which insisted that Israel carry out preemptive strikes to stop its enemies from constructing nuclear-enrichment plants as well as production facilities for advanced conventional weapons.

Israel has, since the eighties post the Islamic revolution in Iran, considered nuclear Iran as its foremost adversary and a threat to its existence. Given the complexity of the Syrian conflict, any Iranian entrenchment in Syria was intolerable from an Israeli perspective. With the Assad regime being propped up by Kremlin’s assistance and direct Iranian involvement, Israel has perceived and continues to see a major threat to its security emanating from Iran’s Quds force personnel and the Iranian proxy, the Shiite terror outfit the Hezbollah. At first Israel had spelt out three red lines, with a fourth added shortly thereafter. The first two pertained to Hezbollah. Israel made clear it would prevent the Shiite group from bringing into Lebanon “game-changing” weaponry, the definition of which has shifted over time, and from building or seizing control of offensive infrastructure across the armistice line in Syria’s south west, including Syrian army bunkers and bases presently under opposition control. This red line extends to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) advisers, other Iran-backed Shiite militias or anyone else.

Second, Israel also declared its intention to block the establishment of offensive infrastructure east of the occupied Golan, whether by Hezbollah fighters and Iranian proxies or by forces linked to al-Qaeda or the Islamic State (ISIS). Israel feared that Iran and its partner forces would entrench themselves adjacent to the armistice line, enabling the opening of a new front – one where Lebanese civilians (especially Hezbollah’s constituents) would be out of the line of fire; Israel would have insufficient justification, its officials fear, to readily reply in Lebanon. An Israeli official described the strikes in January 2015 (killing a prominent Hezbollah figure, Jihad Mughniyeh, along with several other members of the organisation and an Iranian officer) and December 2015 (killing Samir Quntar, who had been released in a 2008 prisoner exchange with Hezbollah and subsequently became a senior figure in the organisation) as the most salient instances of enforcing this red line. From the onset of the fighting until Russia’s September 2015 military intervention, Israeli officials sought a buffer zone – free of any hostile forces, including Assad’s army, which they saw as an extension of Tehran’s – of about 20km; after Russia deployed, and when Iran and its allies later gained the upper hand in the war, Israeli officials began to demand a 60-km buffer, though they grudgingly came to terms with a Syrian military presence within that area.

Israel’s third red line was enemy fire into territory it controlled: Israel threatened to respond in every instance, regardless of the perpetrator or intent. Until September 2016, Israel’s policy was to retaliate against the regime in reaction to any and all stray fire based on the fact that it was the sovereign power. But when rebels, under pressure, began to fire into Israel to provoke a response against the regime, Israel started firing back at them as well.

The fourth red line was never announced as such. In mid-2015, when a coalition of Syrian rebels moved toward Sweida and Jabal Druze on the south west border with Jordan, and Jabhat al-Nusra, then the Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate, moved northward from Quneitra, Israel cautioned Syrian rebels against attacking the Druze population of the area, particularly in the village of Hader, near the armistice line. The prime minister announced he had instructed the military “to take all the necessary actions” to protect the village’s residents. This de facto red line never attained the same prominence as the others because the risk of carnage in the village quickly faded, reemerging only in November 2017. Israel’s leadership felt forced to commit to this course of action because it faces strong pressures from its own Druze population, who serve in the Israeli army and therefore are linked with Israel’s Jewish population in what they call a “blood pact”, which many Israeli Druze claim extends to defending their relatives in Syria.

Israel is reported to have carried out strikes deep inside Syria, many of which it has not admitted to. On Feb. 10, 2018, an Iranian drone crossed into Israeli territory and was shot down. Israel responded to the Iranian incursion by dispatching fighter jets to attack targets in Syria, including the T4 also known as Tiyas air base, near Palmyra, where the Iranian drone reportedly took off from. Syrian anti-air systems retaliated, striking an Israeli F-16, which crashed after making it back to Israeli territory. This prompted Israel to hit several Syrian targets and four Iranian positions, according to the Israel Defense Forces. The attack on the T4 airbase falls within the context of the last red line that Israel drew, whereby it cannot accept Iran’s military entrenchment in Syria. This is another stage in the accelerated clash between Iran’s determination to entrench itself in the northern theater and Israel’s declared determination to prevent it. In operational terms, Iran’s expected response will be an attack, not necessarily immediate, either with a clear Iranian signature or by proxy, Iran’s preferred modus operandi. The action in all likelihood will not be launched from Iranian territory, but rather from Syria or from other operational theaters, such as Yemen (which is adjacent to the navigation lanes in the Red Sea) or from Lebanon, although an attack from Lebanon would pose a risk of wide-scale escalation. There is also the possibility of attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets worldwide, as occurred in the past. Any retaliatory attack against Israeli or Jewish targets worldwide will invite a punishing reprisal from Israel. And Iran should be aware of it. 

Ankara’s intermeddling

Turkey considers armed Kurdish nationalist groups as major threats to its security. Though it officially considers the Islamic State to be a terrorist organization and a threat, its military operation in Syria has primarily been aimed at Kurdish groups. The latter part of Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016 and Operation Olive Branch in January 2018 which saw the Turkish forces’ offensive in Afrin, were focused on the Kurdish YPG and the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

Since the spring of 2015, Turkey suffered a wave of high-profile terror attacks linked to the self-pro-claimed Islamic State and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). In response, Turkey deployed ground combat forces across the border into Syria, with the aim of pushing the Islamic State and Kurdish forces from a small self-declared “safe zone.” This military operation, dubbed Euphrates Shield, was part of a new Turkish security strategy to attack terrorists in their safe havens, rather than wait for them to infiltrate Turkey.

The regional dynamics of the Syrian civil war were further complicated on August 24, 2016, when Turkey sent an armored battalion and supporting ground forces into northern Syria to fight alongside nearly three thousand allied insurgents. This operation, dubbed Euphrates Shield, faced no resistance when Turkish forces entered Jarabulus, a strategic city that the Islamic State relied upon to move weapons, foreign fighters, and materials across the border. The intervention was carried out in part in Jarabulus to check the advance of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) linked to Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Shortly thereafter, Turkey sent forces across the border to al-Rai; together, these forces turned west toward Sawran and then Dabiq, a symbolic city for the Islamic State. Turkey. Turkey continues to be in illegal occupation of 3,460 square kilometer area comprising towns such as Afrin, al-Bab, Azaz, Dabiq, Jarabulus, Jindires, Raco and Shaykh al-Hadid. Turkey also threatened to attack Manbij where the US is present alongside the SDF. Rising tensions between Washington and Ankara over the coup attempt and the detention of the US pastor Andrew Brunson have not improved matters.

The Turkish army’s incursion is likely to worsen Ankara’s Kurdish problems – no longer can the Kurds be played against other Kurds. Turkish Kurds increasingly radicalized and Syrian Kurds have an active hatred of the common enemy –Turkey.

The Turkish aggression against Syria has also increased Moscow and Tehran’s leverage with Syrian Kurds. If Erdogan decides to occupy parts of Syria to prevent the Kurds from developing further cross border supply lines with the Turkish Kurds, the PKK there is likelihood that Damascus will extend support to the Kurds to bleed the Turks on both sides of the border. In a battle of wills the Moscow – Damascus alliance has the upper hand.

Conclusion

Russia, today, is the predominant power in the Levant. And Russia is trying to broker an understanding between the various players and obviate an escalation of the conflict in the interests of its client state and in its own interests. On the other hand, the Trump Administration has not shown any explicit interest in countering the growing Russian influence in the region. The Trump Administration has not made any new policy pronouncements in respect of Eastern Syria. When it committed forces to Syria to fight ISIS the US had allied with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). However the support seems to have wavered. The SDF also has begun having doubts about the US role especially after Turkish forces took over Afrin which was under the control of Kurdish YPG. According to Shalom Lipner if Pax Americana is dead in the Middle East, it is only because the US has euthanized it. The US needs to reverse the trend in order to play a meaningful role in Syria and the entire region.

---

[i] Free Syrian Army (FSA) emerged in the early stages of the anti-government insurgency in 2011 and comprised partly of former members of the Syrian armed forces.