HUMINT – Assessing the Veracity of the Information and Source

Human Intelligence or HUMINT is intelligence gathered by human sources and it remains irreplaceable in a world dominated by satellites, cyber tools and Artificial Intelligence. It is indispensable because it is the only form of intelligence that can answer "why", not just "what". It accesses intent and penetrates denial and deception.

HUMINT is often romanticized, but in reality, it’s the most error, prone intelligence discipline. Every intelligence service has learned this the hard way.

Assessing the veracity of intelligence from a human source - HUMINT - is one of the hardest disciplines in intelligence. Two separate things are under the scanner at once:

 1. The source - Is the asset truthful, accurate, and in a position to know?

2. The information - Is what an asset reporting plausible, accurate, and can be corroborated?

 In NATO and most Western agencies this is formalized as the Admiralty System. Every report gets a 2-part grade like B2 or F6.

 

I. Source Reliability - A to F

 The person (agent) is graded, not the report 

A - Completely Reliable: History of accurate reporting, proven access, no motive to deceive. Rarely given.

B - Usually Reliable: Mostly accurate in the past, minor errors due to perception not deception.

C - Fairly Reliable: Mixed record. Accurate sometimes, inaccurate sometimes.

D - Not Usually Reliable: History of exaggeration, poor memory, past fabrications.

E - Unreliable: Proven fabricator, hostile, under opponent control.

F - Cannot Be Judged: New source, no track record, no way to test yet. Most new walk-ins start here.

 

What determines this grade: 

1. Access: Does the source have direct, legitimate access to the information? First-hand observation is very different from second-hand hearsay from a colleague. Always establish: How did you obtain this? When? Where? Who else was present?

 2. Track Record: Has previous information from this source been corroborated? A source who gave you 10 verifiable truths earns higher reliability.

 3. Motivation - MICE +: Why are they talking to you?

Money: Are they being paid? Debt problems?

Ideology: True believer, disillusioned, revenge?

Compromise/Coercion: Blackmail, fear of prosecution, pressure from family?

Ego: Seeking importance, thrill, desire to be a spy?

No motivation = major red flag. Money and revenge are the highest risk for fabrication.

 4. Vulnerability to Control: Is the source under surveillance? Could they be a double agent or dangle? Signs: too perfect information, information that fits your existing gaps too conveniently, reluctance to take a polygraph, inconsistent personal story.

 

II. Information Credibility - 1 to 6

 You grade the information itself, independent of who said it.

 1 - Confirmed: Independently confirmed by other sources, e.g. SIGINT, IMINT, OSINT, another unrelated HUMINT source.

2 - Probably True: Logical, consistent with known behavior, not yet confirmed but no contradictions.

3 - Possibly True: Plausible, but not enough context to judge. Fits some known facts, conflicts with none.

4 - Doubtfully True: Plausible but conflicts with other reliable information, or lacks logic. Needs more work.

5 - Improbable: Contradicts established facts, defies logic or technical reality.

6 - Cannot Be Judged: No basis to evaluate, new topic with no other sources.

 

What determines this grade:

 1. Internal Consistency: Does the story hold together over repeated tellings? Fabricators often add detail on retelling. Truth-tellers often say "I don't remember" - which is actually a good sign.

Use detailed chronological debrief: Have them tell the story forward, then backward, then out of order. Fabricated stories collapse when told backward.

2. Plausibility and Technical Accuracy: Does the information violate physics, economics, or known enemy doctrine? A source claiming a new missile has 10,000km range when their industry can't produce the fuel is suspect. Use subject-matter experts to vet jargon and details.

3. Corroboration: The gold standard.

Does it match other INTs?

Does it match open sources?

Does another independent human source report the same thing without collusion?

Is it corroborated indirectly - e.g., source says Unit X is moving, and you see increased logistics traffic on satellite?

Beware circular reporting - Source A tells Source B who tells you, looks like two sources but is one.

4. Specificity vs. Vagueness: Truthful reporting is often messy, incomplete, with caveats. "I saw 3 T-72s at approximately 14:00 near the crossroads, I think, maybe 4" is more believable than "I saw exactly 10 T-72s of the 42nd Division at grid 123456 at 14:32 hours." Excessive precision is a classic sign of fabrication.

5. Counter-Deception Checks: Is the adversary trying to feed you something?

Is it too good to be true? Does it exactly answer your Priority Intelligence Requirements?

Chicken feed: Is the adversary giving you small true secrets to build credibility for a big lie later?

What does the adversary gain if you believe this?

 

III. Practical Handling Process

 A professional assessment follows this sequence:

1. Pre-Debriefing: Check source file. What has he said before? What is his assessed access? What does he expect in return?

2. Controlled Collection: Don't ask leading questions. Use open-ended: "Tell me what happened." Don't show him you already know something. Hold back some known facts as test questions.

3. Post-Debrief Checks:

Time-lag test: Re-interview after weeks. Does detail remain stable?

Lifestyle check: Is his spending matching his income?

Technical validation: Can his claims be tested?

4. Formal Evaluation: Assign Admiralty rating, e.g., C3 - Fairly reliable source, possibly true information. Write a source comment: "Source has indirect access via... No independent corroboration yet. Motivation is financial..."

No single report from a human source, even an A1 source, should drive policy alone. HUMINT is inherently the most prone to human bias, memory error, and manipulation. Veracity is established over time, through consistent, corroborated reporting, not through one brilliant scoop.

 

Key Analytical Steps for Credibility Assessment 

* Evaluate Motives & Leverage: Examine why the source is talking (e.g., financial gain, revenge, coercion, ideological alignment, or self-preservation). Hidden agendas heavily distort HUMINT. 

* Distinguish Primary vs. Secondary Access: Determine if the source witnessed the event firsthand (primary) or heard it through rumors, gossip, or "Chinese whispers" (secondary). 

* Check for Circular Reporting: Ensure the "independent confirmation" isn't just the same rumor echoing back through a different channel.

* Cross-Corroborate with Technical/Open Sources: Triangulate the HUMINT claims against OSINT (open-source intelligence), SIGINT (signals intelligence), or GEOINT (geospatial intelligence) to validate physical realities. 

* Account for Bias & Deception: Remember that human sources filter facts through personal blind spots, fears, or active state-sponsored disinformation (white, grey, or black psyops). 

The strange case of Yehuda Gil 

The classic case of how human source can fabricate intelligence is of Yehuda Gil / RED FALCON - the failure that almost started a war in 1996.

Who was he?

Yehuda Gil, 63 at the time of his arrest, had served 30 years in Mossad. Recruited in 1970, the Arabic speaker from Libya, veteran of the post-Munich assassinations and Operation Moses, instructor at the Mossad academy who taught a course called "lying as an art".

His source, recruited in 1975, was codenamed Red Falcon - described as a relative of a senior Syrian general with proximity to the Syrian military establishment.

For 15 years the operation produced credible intelligence and Gil's reputation became currency inside Mossad.

What did he fabricate?

He fabricated troop movement and war-intentions reports attributed to Red Falcon.

The most dangerous one:

On the morning of September 1st, 1996, the Israeli military moved troops to the Syrian border in preparation for a war

The report said: Syria was planning a lightning strike. Damascus intended to retake the Golan.

IDF Northern Command went to elevated readiness, commanders pushed to strike first. While the IDF went as far as moving troops toward the border, Israel's military intelligence service and Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordecai strongly questioned the validity of Gil's single-source report. They resisted full mobilization, avoiding a devastating war. Prime Minister Netanyahu had the order on his desk - he didn't sign. The alert was stood down.

It was not the first time. In summer 1981 Gil had filed a similar Red Falcon report about imminent Syrian attack that reached Mossad Director Yitzhak Hofi, who had lived through the 1973 surprise attack. That report triggered a push to call up all reserves.

Investigators later found: Gil had fabricated at least one meeting entirely and materially altered others - intelligence he filed was not intelligence, it was invention, his own knowledge, his own assumptions.

Why out of frustration?

The textbook HUMINT failure triangle: access loss + ego injury + financial incentive.

 1. Access collapsed: In 1989 Red Falcon retired from the Syrian army. Whatever access he had was gone - an older man removed from circuits where intelligence was generated. Real flow stops at retirement.

 2. Career frustration: Same year, Gil was passed over for promotion. The organization concluded he was a brilliant individual operator but lacked temperament for senior leadership. His ceiling was where he stood. He formally retired in early 1990s.

Losing the source meant losing the foundation of his standing.

 3. The workaround: Instead of closing the file, Gil came back. He told Mossad that Red Falcon had reactivated, would speak only to him, not a new handler.

Every verification attempt was blocked with a plausible excuse that traced back to the source's preferences:

When Mossad wanted a second officer to join, Red Falcon refused. When they wanted recordings, the equipment malfunctioned.

And the mechanism was simple: Mossad would brief Gil beforehand on what questions they needed answered, and Gil would file reports that answered them. The raw material was his own decades of expertise about Syrian doctrine, not source reporting.

Money intended for the source stayed with Gil - about $35,000 in cash found in a safe in his home, with total diverted funds estimated around $200,000.

How was veracity missed?

This is exactly the dilemma faced by any intelligence organization - source reliability overrode information credibility.

Halo effect: His early genuine record purchased latitude and substituted for scrutiny.

Confirming bias: His reports described a Syria that had not abandoned the military option, even as peace talks advanced. That fit the post-1973 trauma model the institution already believed. As the analysis noted: the reports were not surprising, they were confirming.

Handler-only access: No system for trusted insider threat. The structure requires trust - the handler is the only point of contact.

The warning had existed since 1981. Aman Syria desk chief Ayi Halakmi had written in the margins of Gil's report that it did not match collateral intelligence and blocked the reserve call-up. Those notes were filed and never actioned.

The case was only reopened in the mid-90s when Paris station chief Yehia Mart and other analysts ran independent checks on Gil's claims and found they did not hold up, leading to attorney-general approval for a formal investigation.

Gil was arrested in 1997, tried in secret, sentenced to 5 years.

Lesson for HUMINT assessment: 

A single-source report should not drive policy. 

The most dangerous fabricator is not a new source who lies badly. It is a celebrated handler who knows exactly what real looks like, knows what headquarters wants to hear, and has become unverifiable because his legend became the outer wall of the operation.

 

Jus in Bello in the Digital Domain - When Code Becomes a Combatant

This post may be read in continuation with  the previous posts 'The Jus ad Bellum Dilemma' and 'The Resilience of International Law in the Digital Domain'

The previous posts examined the breakdown of jus ad bellum - the right to resort to force - in digital and cognitive theatres. Even if the ad bellum dilemma is solved and it is established that a cyber operation amounts to an armed attack under Article 51, a more intractable problem remains: jus in bello - how the laws of war are to be fought. 

Jus in bello which was codified in the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I, rests on three non-negotiable pillars: Distinction, Proportionality, and Military Necessity. These principles assume a physical battlefield, a uniformed combatant, and a kinetic weapon. The digital domain dissolves all three.

1. The Crisis of Distinction

Article 48 of Additional Protocol I requires parties to distinguish at all times between civilian and military objectives and to direct operations only against military objectives.

A kinetic missile can be guided to a radar station. A cyber weapon cannot.

Modern military networks ride on civilian infrastructure. The same fiber optic cable that carries a commander's order carries a hospital's ICU data. The same cloud server that hosts a logistics application hosts civilian banking data. The Stuxnet worm, while precisely engineered to target Siemens PLCs at Natanz, spread to over 100,000 computers globally, including in India, Indonesia and the US.

Consider a scenario: to degrade an adversary's air defense network, a state deploys malware that disables Windows-based command and control servers. That same Windows vulnerability exists in the civilian air traffic control system. If the malware escapes - as worms are designed to - and causes civilian aircraft to crash, has the attacker violated distinction?

In a hyper-connected state, almost everything is dual-use because the lines between civilian infrastructure and military capability have completely blurred. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 (Rule 92) attempts to address this by stating that cyber operations must not be directed against civilian objects, but it offers no technical test for dual-use infrastructure. Rule 92 of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 provides a legal standard, but it lacks a technical or operational architecture to handle ubiquitous dual-use infrastructure.

When the underlying protocols, routing infrastructure, data centers, and fiber-optic cables are shared by hospitals and military command centers alike, distinguishing between a civilian object and a military objective becomes nearly impossible in practice.

Cognitive warfare compounds this further. When an adversary uses AI-generated deepfakes and algorithmic amplification to incite communal violence, who is the combatant and who is the civilian? The bot is non-human, the server is in a third country, and the victim is the civilian population's psyche itself. The principle of distinction, which was meant to protect civilians from war, is inverted - the civilian mind becomes the battlefield. 

2. Proportionality in a Cascade Failure

Proportionality under Article 51(5)(b)[1] prohibits an attack which may be expected to cause incidental civilian damage excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

In kinetic warfare, proportionality can be calculated: a 500 kg bomb on a munitions depot may damage 2 houses. In cyber warfare, damage is non-linear and cascading.

Disabling a power grid to neutralize a military base is a classic case. The direct military advantage is clear. But the indirect effects - hospitals losing power, water treatment plants failing, financial systems collapsing, winter deaths - may far exceed the initial advantage. Unlike a bomb, the full extent of a cyber effect is often incomprehensible at the time of launch because the attacker may not have a complete map or understanding of the adversary's interdependencies.

The "scale and effects" test we discussed for ad bellum thus becomes a trap for in bello. A commander who launches a proportionate operation by his own estimates may end up committing a disproportionate attack due to cascade effects he probably could not reasonably foresee. Does this impose an absolute duty to conduct a network mapping of civilian dependencies before any cyber operation? If so, it would render most offensive cyber operations legally impossible - which may be the intent of the law. The commander will weigh the risks against the benefits of the operation before giving the go-ahead. 

3. Military Necessity and the Lethal Autonomous Layer

The most dangerous evolution is the merging of cyber with Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS)[2].

Jus in bello assumes human judgment in the loop. A human can assess military necessity in real time and call off an attack. When AI systems are trained to autonomously find and patch vulnerabilities, or autonomously launch counter-strikes at machine speed (a concept known as active defense), the time for legal deliberation shrinks to milliseconds.

If an AI-driven defensive system, upon detecting an intrusion, autonomously disables the attacking server which happens to be located in a hospital in a neutral country, who is responsible for the violation of neutrality and proportionality? The coder? The commander who deployed it? The machine?

This is where jus ante bellum assumes importance. The legal obligation cannot start at the moment of attack. It must start in peacetime, in the design, testing, and training data of these systems. During the phase of a critical operation, the commander may find it extremely difficult to abort or cease leading to irreparable consequences.

Towards a Doctrine

The resilience of international law in the digital domain will require three adaptations:

a) A presumption of civilian status for data: Like the presumption under Article 50(1) that a person is civilian in case of doubt, we need a presumption that data and infrastructure are civilian unless proven to be making an effective contribution to military action. When a person holds dual occupations—such as being a part-time journalist, doctor, or teacher while also serving as a member of an armed group—it creates significant legal, ethical, and practical challenges. 

b) A duty of cyber-reconnaissance and containment: Before any offensive operation, a state must demonstrate it undertook all feasible measures to map civilian interdependencies and to build containment / kill-switches into the weapon, akin to the duty of precautions in attack under Article 57.

c) Meaningful Human Control as a legal requirement: For any cyber operation that may cause physical damage, death, or severe disruption to essential civilian services, meaningful human control over target selection and proportionality assessment must be retained. Full autonomy in such operations must be deemed inherently indiscriminate.

If democracies ignore in bello in the rush to win the ad bellum argument, they risk winning the legal right to respond but losing the moral legitimacy of how they respond.

The code may be a weapon, but the law must still see the human behind the screen and the human at the other end of it.

 

 

 

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[1] Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions codifies the core international humanitarian law principle of proportionality, prohibiting attacks expected to cause incidental civilian harm that is excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. 

[2] Lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) are military systems that use sensors and artificial intelligence algorithms to independently identify, select and engage targets without direct human intervention.

The Jus ab bellum Dilemma

 This post may be read in continuation with the earlier post 

https://kumar-theloneranger.blogspot.com/2026/09/the-resilience-of-international-law-in.html

The jus/ius ad bellum[1] dilemma in the digital and cognitive theatres represents a critical breakdown in classical just war theory and international law, as traditional framework are inherently ill-equipped to govern non-kinetic, non-physical warfare. Enshrined in Article 2(4) (prohibition on the use of force) and Article 51 (the right of self-defense) of the UN charter, jus ad bellum requires an identifiable state-backed, physical attack across the boundaries of a state to trigger a lawful casus belli. It is generally considered that the prohibition under Article 2(4) applies strictly to military/armed force and does not legally encompass economic blockages, or other coercive measures or cyber operations unless they reach the gravity and scale of a kinetic armed attack. 

Digital and cognitive operations fundamentally exploit the legal grey zones between peace and conflict, rendering these definitions obsolete.

In modern operational theatres non-kinetic warfare represents a challenge as well as a dilemma for the states. For instance, whether Iran could have invoked Article 51 in response to the Stuxnet a malware which was used as a cyber weapon that destroyed roughly 1000 uranium enrichment centrifuges in the Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz  or whether interfering in elections in another state could justify kinetic response by that state.

What constitutes “use of force”

Traditionally, a state could respond with armed force in exercise of the right of self-defense if it was faced with an armed attack. In the digital theatre, this traditional definition is inapplicable. There is legal consensus, (such as those mentioned in the Tallinn Manual) to rely on the “scale and effects” test. (Scale and effect test is the primary legal standard used an international law to determine when a cyber operation arises to the level of an armed attack under Article 51 of the UN charter. First articulated by the international court of justice in the case of Nicaragua versus United States in 1986, this test was later adapted for the digital age by international legal experts in the Tallinn Manual 2.0. Scale refers to the physical magnitude, scope and intensity of the operation. Effects refer to the resulting damage, which must necessarily include physical destruction, injury or death.) If a cyber operation disables a power or transport grid or causes aircraft to crash, it could be classified as an armed attack, though there is no direct kinetic operation involved. However, when an operation causes economic or political injury without any physical destruction or loss of life, it is difficult to state with certainty whether the aggrieved state can resort to measures under Article 51.

Cognitive warfare targets the human mind. Using AI deep fakes, algorithmic amplification, and disinformation an adversary can destabilize a state incite civil strife, or compromise a population’s psyche. These actions being non-kinetic in nature they do not trigger the traditional jus ad bellum definition of force, thereby allowing states to achieve their strategic or military objective with zero kinetic friction.

The Attribution and Anonymity Problem

Jus ad bellum assumes a clearly identifiable, aggressive state.

In the digital and cognitive theatres, operations are heavily shrouded by proxy servers, spoofed, routing autonomous, botnets, and decentralized non-state actors. It is difficult to determine whether a state has been responsible for carrying out a cyber-attack, especially when they are carried out by individuals across the globe. This switched to a problem of accountability. If a state basis, a devastating, cognitive or digital disruption it cannot legally invoke the right to self-defense under article 51 without concrete high threshold attribution. Proving that a foreign government was responsible for the cyber-attack or any non-kinetic operation is legally complex leaving targeted states with very few options for response.

Jus ante bellum – The new layer

Jus ante bellum is an emerging concept in just war theory meaning “justice before war”. It focuses on how states must ethically behave during peace time, specifically, when preparing for potential conflicts, managing structural global issues, or regulating emerging technology like Artificial Intelligence and Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems.  Jus ante bellum adds a proactive layer before a crisis even starts. Legal scholars like Asaf Lubin and others argue that the traditional framework misses how peace time actions set the stage for future suffering. Excessive stockpiling of offensive weapons, military exercises and defense alliances trigger a sense of insecurity and a security dilemma for other states in the region which may be perceived as offensive threats, inadvertently accelerating the march towards conflict. 

In the final analysis, this insecurity dilemma leaves modern democracies, highly vulnerable: if they respond kinetically to a devastating, cognitive or digital operation, they are at risk of losing the moral high ground and being accused of aggression; if they do not respond, they may succumb to a non-kinetic sub-threshold warfare and defeat.

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[1] Ius ad bellum governs whether a state has the legal right to resort to war or force

The Resilience of International Law in the Digital Domain: Adapting International Frameworks to Cyber Warfare

The march of innovation has always been a double-edged sword. From the explosive power of gunpowder to the invention of aircraft, every paradigm-shifting technology has brought immense opportunities alongside profound, destabilising challenges. Today, digital technology drives global connectivity and economic growth, but it has also birthed a complex landscape of vulnerability. As malicious actors increasingly exploit the digital domain, the international community faces a critical imperative: developing robust defensive capabilities while fiercely preserving the international legal order.

Historically, the chaos of conflict tempted observers to invoke the ancient Roman maxim inter arma enim silent leges—"in times of war the law falls silent." In the modern era, a similar skepticism has emerged, with some arguing that the borderless, rapid, and often anonymous nature of the digital age renders existing legal systems obsolete. However, neither assertion holds true. Just as nations previously established rules to govern conventional conflicts, the international community has firmly recognized that existing international law, including International Humanitarian Law (IHL), applies seamlessly to cyberspace. The law does not fall silent in the digital age; rather, it adapts to ensure that peace, security, and stability are maintained.

The Dual Nature of Digital Innovation

Technology may be neutral, but human intent and purpose defines its impact. The digital revolution has democratised information, streamlined global commerce, and enhanced state governance. Yet, these tightly integrated systems have created an unprecedented opening for asymmetric warfare. A malicious cyber operation can breach geographical borders instantly, allowing state and non-state actors to project power without deploying a single soldier or firing a single bullet.

This environment creates a fragile balance for state defense. To protect their citizens, infrastructure, and economies, states must develop sophisticated digital capabilities. However, because the line between defensive resilience and offensive posturing in cyberspace is often thin, the acquisition of these tools can trigger digital arms races. It is therefore the collective responsibility of the international community to regulate these capabilities, ensuring they are developed and deployed strictly within the bounds of international norms.

Rejecting the Legal Vacuum

The argument that cyberspace is a "Wild West" beyond the reach of international law fundamentally misapprehends the evolutionary nature of law in general and international in particular. Treaties and customary international laws are designed around core principles rather than specific mechanical tools. When states forged the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, they did not restrict their definitions of warfare to the physical weapons of the mid-20th century.

The rapid weaponisation of cyberspace has shifted the paradigm of national security. As state-sponsored cyber operations increasingly target critical national infrastructure, the long-standing philosophical debate over whether cyberspace is a "lawless wild west" has been decisively resolved.  

As warfare expands into the digital domain (cyber warfare) and the cognitive domain (mind-space, algorithmic perception manipulation, and neuro-weapons), the traditional legal triggers for self-defense begin to break down. 

The Three Core Dilemmas 

1. The Threshold Problem: Use of Force vs. Interference Under the UN Charter, a state can only respond with kinetic military force if it experiences an "armed attack" (Article 51). 

• The Digital Domain: International experts (such as those behind the Tallinn Manual) argue that "use of force" in case of a cyberattack arises only if its scale and effects mirror a physical attack—meaning it causes direct physical death, injury, or tangible destruction. If a hostile nation permanently locks down a state's financial grid or disrupts the power supply or steals its entire intellectual property database it is devastating, yet legally sits in a "grey zone" below the threshold of an armed attack. 

• The Cognitive Domain: Cognitive warfare targets the human mind through AI-driven disinformation, engineered socio-political paralysis, and psychological subversion. Because it targets perception and decision-making without crossing kinetic lines, it is legally classified as "coercive intervention" or an infringement on state sovereignty rather than a use of force, leaving target states without a legal justification to retaliate forcefully. 

The consensus among legal scholars and state frameworks—codified in initiatives like the Tallinn Manual[1]—is that cyber operations triggering physical destruction or severe disruption must be evaluated under established legal concepts. The fundamental pillars of IHL remain fully operational in the digital realm:

Distinction: Belligerents must always distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. Launching a cyberattack that indiscriminately targets a nation's power grid, water supply, or hospital networks violates this core tenet.

Proportionality: The anticipated civilian harm or disruption caused by a digital strike must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

Military Necessity: Cyber operations must be limited to measures strictly required to achieve a legitimate military objective, prohibiting unnecessary suffering or wanton destruction of digital infrastructure.

Core Policy Challenges & Tallinn Applications

A. Defining Sovereignty and the "Use of Force"

The Challenge: At what point does a state-sponsored hack violate our nation's sovereignty or cross the threshold into an "armed attack" under Article 51 of the UN Charter?

The Tallinn Approach: Under Tallinn 2.0/3.0 rules, a cyber operation violates a state's sovereignty if it interferes with an inherently governmental function (e.g., altering election data) or causes physical damage/injury. 

Policy Direction: Our military rules of engagement must treat cyber disruptions that lead to a "scale and effects" equivalent to a physical attack (e.g., disabling a power grid in winter) as a use of force, justifying defensive countermeasures. 

B. The Attribution Dilemma

The Challenge: Malicious actors mask their tracks using proxy servers, routing chains, or independent hacking collectives, creating a veneer of plausible deniability for hostile states.

The Tallinn Approach: State responsibility is triggered if an operation is conducted by an organ of the state or by non-state actors acting under the direction or control of that state (Rule 15, Tallinn 2.0).

Policy Direction: Establish an "aggregate evidence" standard. When absolute technical proof is missing, diplomatic and defensive responses should rely on a combination of forensic data, behavioral patterns, and geopolitical motives to hold sponsor states accountable. 

C. Applying International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in Cyberspace

The Challenge: Digital weapons can spread unpredictably across global networks, threatening civilian populations.

The Tallinn Approach: Reaffirms the core IHL principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack. Cyber weapons must target strictly military objectives and must not cause disproportionate civilian harm.

Sovereignty and State Responsibility

Beyond the active theater of armed conflict, general international law governs peacetime cyber interactions. The principle of state sovereignty dictates that a state has exclusive control over the cyber infrastructure located within its territory. Consequently, state-sponsored hacking, intellectual property theft, and electoral interference can constitute unlawful interventions or violations of sovereignty.

Furthermore, the doctrine of state responsibility ensures accountability. If a malicious cyber operation is traced back to a state organ or individuals acting under a state's direction and control, that state is legally responsible for the wrongful act. This framework incentivises governments to police their own digital borders and prevents them from using proxy hacker groups to evade legal consequences.

Conclusion

The digital age has undoubtedly complicated the geometry of global security, turning code into a potential weapon and networks into battlefields. However, new technology does not dissolve old obligations. The international community’s stance is clear: the rule of law is resilient enough to govern the virtual world. By actively applying international humanitarian law and state sovereignty frameworks to cyberspace, nations reject the cynical premise that technological advancement outpaces ethical and legal constraints. Preserving peace and stability in the 21st century relies not on abandoning the law, but on enforcing it with digital precision.

 

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[1] While the Manual is non-binding, it serves as the definitive legal benchmark utilized by global legal advisors, military strategists, and policy experts.  

 

Quantum Chaos: The Impending Shift in Global Order

Quantum computing is poised to fundamentally reshape the global order, acting as a disruptive force in geopolitics, national security, and the global economy. By enabling the simulation of complex molecular structures, optimization of massive logistical networks, and the ability to crack current cryptographic standards, this technology will create a "winner-takes-all" dynamic, where early adopters—likely the U.S. and China—gain a significant strategic edge. The technology is anticipated to become a major commercial reality by roughly 2030–2035, with a potential economic value addition of $1 trillion to $2 trillion to the global GDP. 

Quantum Computing could be leveraged to break pre-Quantum encryption such as Rivest – Shamir – Adelman (RSA) encryption and other public key cryptography (PKC). When combined with cyber infiltration capabilities, the first country to achieve quantum advantage will be able to put at risk essentially all encrypted data – communications, financial information, health-related information and sensitive government information. China, for instance, is already engaged in “harvest now decrypt later” operations, that is to say collecting encrypted data today with intent to decrypt it on a later date, as and when quantum computers become available. Analysts warn that China’s investment in quantum computing and communications could undermine existing encryption standards and accelerate surveillance-driven governance models. Quantum computing will give the first mover country unprecedented advantage in matters of intelligence; and China could very well be that first mover country.

Here is a detailed breakdown of how quantum computing will affect global order:

1. Geopolitical Power Shifts and a "Quantum Cold War" 

• Techno-Strategic Rivalry: The race for quantum supremacy is creating a new bipolar dynamic similar to a "Cold War," particularly between the United States and China, which are investing billions in research.

• The "Quantum Divide": A significant disparity is emerging between a handful of nations with advanced quantum programs (U.S., China, EU, Japan) and the rest of the world, risking a divide where non-leading nations become technologically subservient.

• Redefining Power Dynamics: Access to quantum capabilities will shift power towards nations and entities (including major corporations) that can control the next era of computation, changing the basis of influence from traditional metrics like land or oil to data control and encryption security. 

2. Disruption of Global Security and Digital Trust 

• Breaking Encryption (Q-Day): A "cryptographically relevant" quantum computer (CRQC) will break public-key encryption methods (RSA, ECC- Elliptic-curve Cryptography) that currently protect everything from banking and power grids to state secrets. [Q-Day or Quantum Day Y2Q is the predicted future moment when quantum computers become powerful enough to break current public-key encryption standards (such as RSA and ECC). It is not a specific calendar date, but rather a milestone expected by experts to occur in the 2030s or later]. 

• "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later": Adversaries are already stealing and storing encrypted data to decrypt in the future, rendering long-term secrets (military, medical, diplomatic) immediately vulnerable.

• Impact on Critical Infrastructure: A quantum breach could cripple energy grids, telecommunications, and transportation networks, creating existential risks for national security.

• Collapse of Digital Provenance: Blockchain and digital signatures could be forged, undermining trust in digital transactions and international trade. 

3. Economic and Industrial Transformation

• Unprecedented Modeling Power: Quantum simulations will revolutionize pharmaceuticals (rapid drug discovery) and materials science (creating new, efficient batteries and catalysts), accelerating the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

• Logistics Optimization: Quantum algorithms will calculate optimal routes for global logistics, significantly increasing efficiency for companies like Amazon and FedEx, potentially driving a 600% profit increase in some cases.

• Financial System Transformation: The finance sector stands to benefit heavily from better risk assessment, fraud detection, and portfolio optimization, with quantum computing potentially adding over $20 billion in value to the sector annually by 2030. 

4. Evolution of War and Peace

• "Temporal Warfare": The capability to "harvest now, decrypt later" acts as a form of "temporal warfare," where adversaries wait for the technology to mature to sabotage past communications and logistics.

• Quantum Sensors: The technology will enable ultra-precise quantum sensors, allowing for superior navigation and stealth detection (e.g., finding submarines), challenging existing military superiority.

• AI Symbiosis: The combination of quantum computing and artificial intelligence ("Artificial Super Intelligence") will accelerate innovation, making it harder for humans to govern and potentially creating autonomous weapons. 

5. Essential Mitigations and Future Outlook

• Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC): Organizations are in a race to implement PQC—new encryption algorithms that are resistant to quantum attacks—to prevent a total breakdown of digital security, a transition that could take over a decade.

• International Cooperation: To manage the risks, new, internationally recognized frameworks for regulating quantum capabilities may be necessary, similar to nuclear arms treaties. 

Ø 6. The Path Forward: Post-Quantum Cryptography 

·       Quantum-Safe Algorithms (or post-quantum cryptography, PQC) are cryptographic methods designed to resist attacks from future, powerful quantum computers, which are expected to break current public-key encryption (RSA, ECC). These algorithms, primarily based on complex mathematics like lattices, hashes, and code-based puzzles, are being standardized by NIST to ensure long-term data security. 

·       Urgency for Migration: Businesses and governments are advised to begin adopting post-quantum cryptography before quantum computers reach the necessary scale.

👉 In summary, quantum computing is not merely a technical upgrade, but a paradigm shift that will reorder the global hierarchy, with its impact being felt in nearly every facet of the global economy and security structure. In conclusion, while quantum computers aren’t yet cracking all encryption in practice, the threat is real and approaching. The smart move is to prepare now rather than wait until it’s too late.

 

 

 

AI - A Modern-Day Leviathan?

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly described as a modern, technological "Leviathan"—a supreme, centralized authority managing security, surveillance, and societal order, much like the sovereign entity - Leviathan - described by Thomas Hobbes in 1651. As algorithmic systems, rather than people, take on roles like governing, predicting, and automating, they are likely to reshape global power structures. 

• Technological Sovereign: Similar to Hobbes’s concept, AI acts as a "digital sovereign" to which society grants power (through data and usage) in exchange for order, efficiency, and safety.
• "Algorithmic Leviathan": This term highlights AI's role in governing via code, data, and infrastructure, bypassing traditional political, legal, and bureaucratic institutions.
• Surveillance and Control: AI systems, such as advanced cameras and predictive analytics, enable a new form of surveillance that regulates behaviour and ensures security, much like a 17th-century sovereign ensuring order.
• Shifting Power: The rise of AI as a Leviathan signals a transition where authority moves from nation-states to private tech conglomerates. 

While this "AI Leviathan" offers immense efficiency, it brings challenges concerning privacy, bias, and accountability. Whether Artificial Intelligence (AI) is an "uncontrolled leviathan"—a massive, uncontrollable entity—is a subject of intense debate among experts, with growing concerns that AI is rapidly evolving beyond human control. While some researchers and industry leaders argue that this potential for a "superintelligent" system to become uncontrollable is a real, existential threat, others argue that the term is alarmist and that the real danger lies with the humans controlling the development of AI. 

Increased Insecurity and Uncertainty

AI presents a dual-use paradox, significantly increasing risks to global security and uncertainty while simultaneously offering major potential benefits. It enhances cybersecurity threats, deepfake misinformation, and autonomous weapon risks, while fuelling societal anxiety over data privacy, job displacement, and opaque, biased decision-making. 

Impact on Security

•  Cyber and Physical Threats: AI empowers more sophisticated and frequent cyberattacks, threatening critical infrastructure, while autonomous systems could lead to unpredictable, rapid escalation of conflicts. Cyber and physical threats are increasingly merging into combined, hybrid attacks, often referred to as cyber-physical systems (CPS) risks, where digital breaches cause tangible, real-world damage. These threats target integrated infrastructure, such as manipulating industrial control systems (ICS), disabling security cameras, or using compromised IoT devices to breach networks. 
•  Weaponisation: AI can be used to develop novel chemical weapons or enable autonomous weapon systems, raising fears of catastrophic outcomes.
• Surveillance and Control: AI increases the ability of regimes to implement pervasive surveillance, eroding civil liberties.
• Risks of over -reliance: Over-automation reduces human vigilance, leaving systems vulnerable to novel attacks that AI fails to detect. 

Impact on Uncertainty

• Distrust and Disinformation: The inability to distinguish between synthetic and real content (deepfakes) erodes trust in media and democratic institutions.
• Ethical/Legal Ambiguity: AI bias in hiring, policing, and credit, along with "black-box" decision-making, creates uncertainty about fairness and accountability. ["Black-box" decision-making refers to systems, particularly in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning, where inputs are processed to produce outputs without disclosing or allowing humans to understand the internal logic, algorithms, or reasoning behind the results. While these systems are capable of high performance and accuracy in complex tasks, their opacity makes them difficult to audit, debug, or trust]. 
• Unpredictability of the Future: The rapid evolution of AI makes it difficult for regulators and society to predict long-term impacts, leading to a "flash war" or "flash crash" scenario of rapid escalation. 

Mitigation and Future Outlook

• Human-AI Symbiosis: Experts suggest that combining AI capabilities with human judgment—"Authentic Intelligence"—is crucial for managing risks and reducing uncertainty. [Authentic Intelligence (AQ) refers to the unique, innate human capacity for emotional intelligence, empathy, creativity, and ethical judgment, which complements artificial intelligence (AI). Unlike AI, which analyzes data patterns, AQ focuses on lived experience, moral reasoning, and genuine human connection to drive innovation and understanding. Key aspects of Authentic Intelligence include:

Ø Human-Centric Skills: Emphasizes qualities such as curiosity, perspective, and moral choice.

Ø Relationship Management: Focuses on building, nurturing, and managing human relationships, which cannot be automated.

Ø Complementing AI: Rather than replacing AI, authentic intelligence serves as a guiding force to ensure AI is used ethically and effectively, often termed a "symbiotic relationship".

Ø Contextual Understanding: Involves interpreting situations based on experience, context, and emotion rather than just probabilistic data. 

Ø Why Authentic Intelligence Matters Now
As AI becomes more prevalent, the demand for "human-centric" skills increases. The World Economic Forum highlights that authentic intelligence is essential to harness AI for growth while maintaining human values. In business, it helps bridge team alignment, ensuring technology acts as an amplifier rather than a replacement for human judgment]. 

• Regulation:  Active regulation is needed to address the security risks posed by autonomous systems and to establish accountability in decision-making.
• Proactive Security: While AI is a tool for attackers, it is also necessary for building robust, automated defenses to keep up with the speed of modern threats. 

Conclusion:

The perception of AI as an uncontrolled leviathan is driven by its unpredictable, fast-moving development and the difficulty of aligning it with human ethics. While many experts, such as Geoffrey Hinton and Yoshua Bengio, consider this a serious threat, others emphasize that it is not inevitable and depends heavily on how AI is developed, regulated, and managed. While some view these fears as "neophobia" or irrational alarmism, the consensus among many researchers is that the potential for AI to become an uncontrollable force is real enough to require immediate, global safety standards.