Paris 13/11

(Source: STRATFOR)

About seven years ago, ten Pakistan’s ISI-sponsored terrorists belonging to the Hafeez Saeed-led Lashar-e-Taiba attacked India’s financial capital Mumbai and caused mayhem leaving about 170 dead and scores injured. The attacks which were coordinated and targeted multiple locations lasted for about 60 hours. It came to be known as Mumbai 26/11. On Friday 13^th November 2015 about eight member fedayeen squad belonging to the Islamic State or ISIS in a manner similar to the November 2008 Mumbai attacks carried out suicide attacks at six sites in the French capital Paris, including a concert hall (where the casualties were reported to be in excess of 80 dead and several injured) and a sports stadium where a soccer match was in progress between the national teams of France and Germany. Paris became a battle zone briefly; this was indeed Paris 13/11.

The Targets

The targets were not random, but carefully chosen by the terrorists. The targets were places where large number of people congregated for the purpose of entertainment, leisure or sports. They targeted young people enjoying a rock concert and ordinary city residents enjoying a Friday night out. In Mumbai too, while the iconic Taj and high-end hotels were targeted, terrorists also struck a South Mumbai Café and the CST Railway Station and attempted to kill patients in a hospital.

Beginning at 21.16 Central European Time (CET) three separate explosions and six mass shootings occurred, including bombings near the Stade de France in the northern suburb of Saint-Denis. The deadliest attack was at the Bataclan Theatre, among the best-known venues in eastern Paris, near the trendy Oberkampf area known for a vibrant nightlife, on Boulevard Voltaire in the 11th arrondissement where the California-based American rock band Eagles of Death Metal were playing to an audience of around 1,500. About an hour into the concert, four black-clad men with AK-47 assault rifles entered the hall. Witnesses heard shouts of “Allahu Akbar” just before the gunmen calmly and methodically opened fire into the crowd.  A witness said that he saw armed men enter the Bataclan, and two or three men not wearing masks fired indiscriminately on the crowd. The attackers also took hostages and engaged in a standoff with police until it was ended at 00.58 CET into the early hours of 14 November 2015. The attack lasted about 20 minutes, with witnesses reporting that the attackers also threw grenades into the crowd.

The first attacks occurred on the Rue Bichat and Rue Alibert, near the Canal Saint-Martin in the 10^th arrondissement of Paris. Attackers shot at people outside Le Carillon, a café-bar, in the same general neighborhood as the Charlie Hebdo offices, at approximately 21.20 CET. They then crossed Rue Bichat and attacked Le Petit Cambodge (Little Cambodia), a restaurant, leaving between four and eleven people dead.  According to the French police, 11 people were killed at the restaurant. The assailants reportedly fled in one or two vehicles after the shootings. One of the vehicles was known to have had a Belgian number plate. Shots were fired at the terrace of La Casa Nostra, an Italian restaurant, in Rue de la Fontaine-au-Roi south of Rue Bichat, by a man wielding a machine gun.

Three explosions occurred near the Stade de France in the suburb of Saint-Denis, and resulted in at least five deaths. At least 10 people were injured or killed in an explosion at a bar near the stadium at approximately 21.30 CET, about twenty minutes after the kick-off in an international friendly soccer match between France and Germany which the President of France Francois Hollande was attending.

Two attackers fired for several minutes at the terrace of La Belle Équipe, a restaurant on the rue de Charonne in the 11^th arrondissement of Paris before returning to their car and driving away at approximately 21.50 CET. At the time of writing this post, about 127 persons were killed, out of 352 persons injured about 100 sustained grievous and life-threatening injuries.   

The targets were not random, but carefully chosen by the terrorists. The targets were places where large number of people congregated for the purpose of entertainment, leisure or sports. They targeted young people enjoying a rock concert and ordinary city residents enjoying a Friday night out. In Mumbai too, while the iconic Taj and high-end hotels frequented by foreigners were targeted, terrorists also struck a South Mumbai Café and the CST Railway Station and attempted to kill patients in a hospital. They also attacked the Jewish Chhabad House and killed innocents.

Were the attacks inevitable?

Though the attacks were shocking, they should not have caught the French intelligence napping. Several French nationals of North African/Middle Eastern descent and from other EU countries were known to have travelled to Syria in order to fight either for the Islamic State or other terror groups in Syria/Iraq and the survivors would have returned home with skills to stage violence. The Charlie Hebdo attack which served as a wake-up call demonstrated that there was a constant risk of terror strikes in France and elsewhere in Europe.

Moreover, the country had witnessed several smaller-scale attacks or attempts since, including an incident on a high-speed train in August in which American travelers thwarted an attempted attack by a heavily armed man.

The French military’s participation in bombing Islamic State targets in Syria and Iraq and fighting extremists in Africa, and extremist groups have frequently threatened France in the past.

Brian Michael Jenkins, a terrorism expert and senior adviser to the president of the Washington-based RAND Corporation said the tactic used — "multiple attackers in coordinated attacks at multiple locations" — echoed recommendations published in the extremist group's online magazine, Dabbiq, over the summer.

"The big question on everyone's mind is, were these attackers, if they turn out to be connected to one of the groups in Syria, were they homegrown terrorists or were they returning fighters from having served" with the Islamic State group, Jenkins said. "That will be a huge question." The first important part of the post-attack investigation for the Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure, DGSI would be to determine the identity of the attackers; whether they were French nationals or nationals of neighbouring countries like Belgium or were they illegally brought into France for the purpose of executing these strikes. (There have been reports that one of the killed terrorist was a French national). An equally important challenge would be to trace out the cell members or accomplices who gave the terrorists logistical support. The men who perpetrated and their accomplices who were possibly French or Belgian residents were highly trained and motivated. Again these issues have transnational repercussions because EU citizens can travel freely in the Schengen area. At the time of writing this post, France had closed its international borders. International borders cannot be kept closed permanently. There is a need to increase surveillance on minority groups in France, Belgium, Germany, and Netherlands and beyond. It is a nightmarish period for the French External Intelligence Agency, the  Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure DGSE. There is an urgent need for concerted effort to track the sleeper cells in these countries and members neutralized (liquidated).  In all likelihood the men who executed this operation had sufficient knowledge of the targets because it would be impossible to execute this kind of coordinated strike without reconnaissance.

Political Repercussions

The attacks will surely have serious political consequences. They come days before France's aircraft carrier, the Charles de Gaulle, is due to set sail for the Persian Gulf for actions against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. France has been carrying out airstrikes in Syria since late September. Since the Islamic State has claimed responsibility for the attacks and certainly appears to be a case of the attackers being IS members France will have little choice but to target the IS with vigour both within France in the form of a crackdown and militarily strike in Syria and Iraq at notwithstanding the fact that the Syrian battlefield in particular is becoming crowded and complicated.

France will have to seriously re-think and re-consider admitting so-called refugees from the troubled hot spots of North Africa and Middle East. While the German Government led by Ms Merkel has been foolish enough to allow and admit large number of migrants from Syria and other states in the region to enter Germany, this incident can be expected to strengthen the argument of those groups that have been calling for a halt in the flow of immigrants and the closing of borders in countries such as Germany, Sweden and much of Central and Eastern Europe

According to STRATFOR, in the wake of these attacks, Marine Le Pen and her far-right National Front party could see their popularity rise. Le Pen kept a low profile after the Charlie Hebdo shooting in January 2015 and still saw an increase in her party's popularity because of its longstanding anti-immigration stance. Hollande also saw a brief upward trend in popularity after the Charlie Hebdo attack because of his reaction to the events, but a repeat of this trend is not expected because people will now question whether the anti-terrorism measures that were approved this year actually worked. The leader of the center-right Republicans Party, Nicolas Sarkozy, also has a history of taking a strong stance on security issues; he was campaigning on the subject only last week.

Conclusion

Mumbai 26/11 had become a template for jihadis world-wide. If lessons of Mumbai 26/11 were learnt, France could have at least partially thwarted the designs of the terrorists. Of course, unlike Mumbai, the attacks ended within a few hours and the French Special Forces,RAID and SWAT teams deserve to be commended.

The Paris attacks only underscores that open societies / liberal democracies will continue to be susceptible to terrorism. Terrorists have often found it easier to carry out such dastardly attacks on the West as compared to, say, Moscow or Beijing.

The ISI’s Lankan Connection – An Unfolding Spy - Terror Network

Arun Selvaraj or Selvarajan is no David Coleman Headley. He however, adopted modus operandi similar to Headley, namely, setting up a cover for the purpose of espionage and scouting targets for a possible attack to be carried out by Pak-sponsored terrorists. He and the other Pakistani spies had a task to lay the groundwork for the ISI to execute a 26/11 style attack in either Chennai or Bengaluru (formerly Bangalore).

The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) along with its protégé the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) have either shifted their focus from Western India to the South of the country or have expanded their operations in the South. This is apparent from the arrests of ISI agents made by the Indian law enforcement agencies in the last few months. 

In April 2014, the law-enforcement agencies arrested a Sri Lankan national Sakir Husain in Chennai who revealed a Pakistani conspiracy to attack US and Israeli consulates in Chennai with help from two Maldivian nationals. Sakir Hussain, told his interrogators that he had been hired allegedly by an official in Pakistani high commission in Colombo as part of the ISI’s alleged plans to conduct reconnaissance of US consulate in Chennai and Israeli consulate in Bangalore. Hussain was arrested on April 29 in a coordinated operation involving various countries. (See http://kumar-theloneranger.blogspot.in/2012/07/is-another-2611-in-offing.html wherein the threat posed from Maldives was highlighted) A month later, his associate Mohammed Sulaiman, another Sri Lankan, was arrested in Malaysia on similar charges.

Husain’s interrogation revealed that the ISI was planning to send two men from Maldives to Chennai and that he had to arrange for their travel documents and hideouts. He was chosen as he was engaged in human trafficking and in forging passports and smuggling fake currency.

Husain’s name cropped up during an investigation in a Southeast Asian country (possibly Malaysia) which tipped a security agency in India about possible attack on US and Israeli consulates, the sources said.

An immediate surveillance led the investigators to Husain who had been constantly shifting his base in neighbouring Sri Lanka prompting the sleuths to seek cooperation of the island nation, the sources said.

After Husain’s arrival in Chennai, he was picked up and subjected to sustained interrogation during which, the sources claimed, he spoke about a possible terror strike on the two consulates and that his handler was Amir Zubair Siddiqui, Counsellor (Visa) at the Pakistani mission in Colombo.

The sleuths recovered pictures of US and Israeli consulates showing various gates and roads leading to the two premises, the sources said, and claimed that these pictures had been mailed to his alleged handlers in Pakistan and its high commission in Colombo.

Cyber signatures showed that the pictures were downloaded at a computer within the premises of Pakistan high commission at Colombo and the same had been shared with Sri Lankan authorities, the sources claimed.

Arun Selvarajan, a Sri Lankan national and suspected to be a member of the Tamil Tigers was recruited by the ISI’s Amir Zubair Siddiqui, the handler of Husain and was arrested by National Investigation Agency (NIA) in Chennai. Selvarajan’s assignment was to carry out a recce of possible targets in and around Chennai (similar to what Daood Sayed Gilani better known as David Coleman Headley carried out in Mumbai to enable Pakistan to 26/11 attacks) for a possible repeat of Mumbai 26/11 in Chennai. The Times of India reported that Selvarajan had posed as a bartender at a dinner party organized for the Army Officers at the Officers’ Training Academy in Chennai in August 2009. For the party held in 2009, OTA had given the bartending contract to a star hotel in Chennai. NIA officials said Selvarajan tagged along a friend who worked in the star hotel for the officers' party. "He served drinks and managed to take some photographs of senior officers in the academy, using a pen camera. He downloaded these photographs and sent them to his handler called Shaji in Sri Lanka. Shaji worked for the Pakistan high commission in Sri Lanka. He carried out this ‘assignment’ before he set up an event management company called “ICE Events” as a cover for his espionage activities. The modus operandi has been more or less similar to that adopted by David Coleman Headley. While it is not clear when he was recruited, the very fact that he was operating since 2009, proves that he was able to evade scrutiny of the intelligence agencies. Another factor that possibly worked in his favour, like that of Headley, was he was a Sri Lankan Tamil Hindu and may not have aroused suspicion.

Selvarajan is also reported to have conducted reconnaissance of Kalapakkam nuclear plant site.

The other ISI spy Thameem Ansari, a native of Thajavur, was arrested pursuant to a joint operation carried out by the Indian Intelligence Bureau (IB)-Q Branch of Tamil Nadu Police while he was on his way to Trichy airport carrying a digital dossier on defence installations in South India in the third week of September 2012. He was scheduled to catch a flight to Colombo the day he was arrested. Ansari was arrested after six months of surveillance in 2012.

A failed onion trader, Ansari was contacted by Pakistani agent Shaji when he was in Colombo. Pakistani diplomat Siddiqui was suspected to be their handler.
Ansari was caught with Compact Discs and a pen drive that had data on important military areas and also landing points on the southern coastline. He was carrying a DVD of training paratroopers landing in some desert and also a Signal Corps parade. He was also carrying visuals of the Indian Army insignia that army officers wore on their shirts which raised suspicion that it was meant to smuggle terrorists into Wellington and other sensitive places dressed like Indian army officers.

An official recalled that he was carrying CDs of extensive footage that he had shot of the Defence Services Staff College at Wellington and other military places.

Intelligence sources said, there was information that not only was ISI regularly recruiting youth from this troubled region of Sri Lanka for espionage and covert operations against India but even the LeT has set up a base and now wielded some sort of influence in the region. "The region has been in some ethnic turmoil of late and Pakistan has been fishing in troubled waters. For its intelligence-collection and covert action operations directed against India, ISI uses four external bases - Kathmandu, Dubai, Bangkok and Colombo. The last one has traditionally been used as a base to collect intelligence about developments in sensitive Indian nuclear and missile establishments, many of which are located in south India, particularly in Tamil Nadu and Kerala. But the last few arrests show that these elements could now be used to mount an attack. This is worrying," said a security establishment officer. 

In an unrelated development a leading Indian newspaper reported that a partially burn diary was found by a security guard of Hanging Gardens (a well known garden in South Mumbai) on the evening of 15^th September 2014 warning the city police of a repeat of 26/11 attacks to avenge the deaths of ten Pakistani terrorists (who were killed in the 26/11 attack). A letter in the diary said that ten jawans (soldiers) of Pakistan would be assisted by five Indians, including three police personnel, in the attack. "The security guard told the police that a man informed him about a diary lying in the garden. When the security guard opened it, he found a two-page letter in Hindi. He suspected something suspicious and informed the police about it. However, the man who had informed the security guard about the diary had by then left," a police officer said.

The letter read: “You will feel the same pain the way my brother, Ajmal Kasab, was executed. You take care of Mumbai, we challenge you. Remember 26/11 when my brother Kasab and his associates proved to be tough for the Mumbai police. Forget 26/11 and remember a new date 26/9 (September 26, 2014). First blast at Taj (Taj Hotel) will be followed by strikes at Churchgate, CST, Airport, Dadar, Andheri RTO, Kurla, Tilak Nagar and between Church (probably referring to Churchgate) to Mira Road, anywhere, there could be an attack.”


The letter warned of a tehelka (sensation) at Byculla station between 10 am – 6 pm. “If the Maharashtra police is powerful enough, stop it,” it said. The letter said Aamir Kasab would win the war on 26/9. Sixteen names, including those of the attackers were mentioned. In the end, the letter mentioned about hoisting the green flag in Kashmir.

While the letter seems to be prank, it cannot be taken lightly for the following reasons: Firstly, the last week of September witnesses a very important Hindu festival of Dusshera which commences on 25^th September. Being a festival which is celebrated on a mass scale where people in large numbers congregate in Puja Pandals and processions, a terror strike is certain to cause mass casualties and panic. Secondly, the Maharashtra state elections are scheduled to be held in mid-October and any 26/11 type attack will impact the polls and its outcome. Thirdly, the November 2008 attack (26/11) was to have been originally carried out in September 2008 (according to the late B. Raman on 26^th September 2008) but was postponed due to various reasons. The security agencies in Mumbai cannot let their guard down in the light of the contents of the letter.   

Mumbai 26/11 – Lest We Forget

This post is not a re-run of the tragic 60 hours which the city of Mumbai was subjected to; it is a reminder to the nation to be vigilant and review the preparedness and plug the gaps in our security. 

Four years have passed since Mumbai was witness to one of the worst terror attacks. A fedayeen or fidayeen (suicide) squad of ten Pakistanis belonging to the Lashkar-e-Taiba  who entered Mumbai through the sea wreaked havoc at some of South Mumbai’s significant landmarks such as the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST) Railway Station, Cama Hospital, the iconic Taj Hotel, the Trident and Chabad House (Nariman House) and Leopold Café. The November 2008 carnage left about 166 persons killed and more than 300 injured and equally important it left the commercial capital and the nation shocked. These series of well coordinated attacks caught Mumbai and its police off guard; the police force was not prepared or equipped to face this kind of a challenge. This unprecedented situation led to a failure of command and control and resulted in chaos. In the face of this adversity, there were individual acts of valour displayed by officers and men in khaki who took upon themselves to brave the terrorists’ bullets against all odds. A mention must be made of the brave attempts made by police personnel with obsolete weapons who took on the terror duo Ajmal Kasab and Ismail Khan at CST, the then Additional Commissioner of Police Sadanand Date who along with a few brave personnel fought the terrorists, Kasab and Ismail at Cama Hospital, the three brave officers Hemant Karkare, Ashok Kamte and Vijay Salaskar who were martyred in the lane leading to Cama Hospital and late Assistant Sub-Inspector Tukaram Omble whose bravado was instrumental in Kasab being captured alive. The bulk of the responsibility of neutralizing the other eight terrorists who were holed up at the Taj, the Trident and Chabad House were shouldered by the commandoes of the elite National Security Guards who were flown in from their main base at Manesar, Gurgaon.

The attacks on Mumbai showed that India, in general and metropolis like Mumbai were extremely vulnerable to a fedayeen-type terrorist strike. The attacks demonstrated that there were serious shortcomings in matters of intelligence gathering and analysis and response mechanisms. Thus the Central and the Maharashtra governments embarked on an ambitious program of overhauling the security infrastructure.

Firstly, at the centre, India set up the National Investigation Agency (NIA) in December 2008. The Act establishing the Agency empowers the Centre to probe terror attacks in any part of the country, covering offences, including challenge to the country's sovereignty and integrity, bomb blasts, hijacking of aircraft and ships, and attacks on nuclear installations.  In the opinion of this author, setting up a new outfit after a debacle was another case of knee-jerk reaction on India’s part. Multiple agencies with over-lapping jurisdictions only result in turf wars and shirking of responsibility. 

The Government of India embarked on an ambitious plan of setting up the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) an intelligence sharing network which would collate data from the stand alone databases of the various agencies and ministries of the Government of India. NATGRID is being implemented in four phases, the first two of which will be operationalised by the year 2014 and the first data sets would be retrievable by early 2013.

According to Ajai Sahni, the Execute director of the Institute for Conflict Management & South Asia Terrorism Portal, by simply labelling organisations with names remnant of American agencies doesn’t make them effective. He argues, “by creating a new agency at the top of the pyramid you are not solving the problem. The problem of intelligence gathering and counter-terrorism is not at the agency level, it is the lack of capacity at the bottom. The problem is with training, man power, aptitude of law enforcement personnel on ground, application of technology and no one is fixing that. NCTC is replacing MAC, but MAC till now has been unable to create a terror database (formed in 2009), by changing how will the database come about. You are creating a new body that will run like the rest, so basically it will not run.”

The National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) is a proposed federal anti-terror agency to be created in India modelled on the NCTC of the USA. The NCTC was mooted as an apex body, a single and effective point of control for all counter terrorism measures. The Indian Prime Minister had in his address to the Chief Ministers’ Conference in May 2012 stated that the antecedents of the NCTC lay in the recommendations by the Group of Ministers and by the Administrative Reforms Commission, commencing from the lessons learnt in Kargil.

Another move was the formation of four NSG hubs in major cities, namely, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Hyderabad. It is difficult to say whether this move was sound or not as the hubs where the commandoes are based do not have the kind of infrastructure and training facilities that are available at the NSG headquarters in Manesar. The government at Delhi instead of setting up regional hubs ought to have considered taking steps in order to ensure quick transportation and rapid deployment of the Special Forces to deal with 26/11 like situations. 

At the regional level, Maharashtra government set up Force One, an elite commando force to combat terror strikes like the one that occurred on 26/11 on the lines of the National Security Guards (NSG). This step was taken due to the fact that non-availability of aircraft in Delhi and lack of ground transportation in Mumbai the operations to flush out the terrorists by NSG commandoes was delayed, thereby leading to higher casualties.

The state government also set up a jumbo State Security Council comprising of 66 members. It is anybody’s guess as to how this body has been functioning since its inception and in what manner has it contributed to the state’s security. These imprudent moves of the government of the day are laughable to say the least.

The Mumbai attacks raised questions about the quality of intelligence or the lack of it, its timely availability to the end-user, surveillance, security of vital installations, deficiencies in coastal security, and the lack of quality equipment like bullet proof jackets, bomb suits, weaponry, communication tools and disaster management including hospitals with trauma care facilities. Serious questions were raised about the response by the Mumbai/State police to the terrorist strike. The Maharashtra Government appointed what was officially known as the High-Level Enquiry Committee (HLEC) on 26/11, comprising of R.D. Pradhan, a former Union Home Secretary and V Balachandran a former Special Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat to probe the lapses and to identify systemic failures on 30^th December 2008. The committee submitted its report to the Chief Minister of Maharashtra in April 2009, but the government did not release it, citing security concerns. In December 2009, after substantial portions of the report were leaked to the media and after much agitation by the opposition in the state assembly, a Marathi translation was tabled before the state assembly.

While procurement of sophisticated communication equipments, bullet proof jackets, bomb suits and weaponry can be streamlined, the collection and dissemination of intelligence, surveillance and upgrading coastal security are matters which deserve closer scrutiny. For instance, lot of questions were raised about the quality of bullet proof jackets available for use with the police and had the late Hemant Karkare worn a better quality jacket, his life may have been saved. This prompted the state to procure high quality bullet proof jackets immediately after the attack. However for three years, citing technical reasons, no company was awarded the contract. Finally, the state got quality jackets from the agencies that supplied protective gear to outfits like the NSG. Thus procurement issues are not insurmountable.

The issues which require attention are the following:

Intelligence:

A lot has been written on intelligence gathering and its dissemination by various experts on the subject as well in this blog written in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks on 26/11 (read http://kumar-theloneranger.blogspot.in/2008/12/mumbai-2611.html). Having said that, it must be pointed out that the responsibility of intelligence gathering cannot be vested in specialized agencies like the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), Intelligence Bureau (IB) or the Special Branch of the local police. Some of the most reliable pieces of information can be garnered at the police station level by beat constables through their network of informers.  Intelligence collected at the grassroots level and shared with other consumers/end users will go a long way in thwarting terror strikes. It is also extremely necessary to have handpicked personnel at the police station to handle collection of intelligence and liaise with other intelligence agencies for expeditious dissemination of intelligence. There is today too much emphasis on technical intelligence (TECHINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT). TECHINT has its own limitations and needs to be used in conjunction with human intelligence (HUMINT) particularly in counter terror operations. The human asset who is able to penetrate a terror network or module is undoubtedly the best source of accurate information which will enable the security agencies to foil terror strikes. It was HUMINT which enabled the US to carry out Operation Neptune’s Spear – the operation which led to the killing of Osama bin Laden. Unfortunately, classical tradecraft appears to be a dying art.

Coastal security

Coastal security will continue to be a matter of concern for the security agencies and policy makers considering the fact that India has a very long coast line to safeguard with very limited resources at its disposal. 

The government’s approach towards all matters concerning security and coastal security is no exception has always been reactive. Remedial measures are undertaken only after a major incident has occurred and implemented in a haphazard manner without laying the foundation for the system adopted to function effectively. To begin with, the Coast Guard was set up in August 1978 in response to large-scale smuggling along the western coast with a mandate to protect the maritime and national interests of the country as well as to assist in anti-smuggling operations. But the 1993 serial blasts in Mumbai highlighted the fact that an inadequately manned and ill-equipped coast guard alone cannot safeguard the coasts. Instead of addressing the fundamental issue of lack of manpower and inadequate equipment, the Indian government launched a new scheme to cater for the terror challenge. Pushpita Das of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) in her article  “Why India’s Coastal Security Arrangement Falters?” writes that Operation Swan was launched in August 1993 to prevent clandestine landings along the Maharashtra and Gujarat coasts. It was a three layer security arrangement involving the navy, the coast guard and a joint patrolling team drawn from personnel belonging to the navy, coast guard, state police, and customs. While the underlying idea appeared to be feasible, the bitter fact is that Operation Swan has not resulted in a single seizure even after being for 18 years. According to her inadequate attention paid to overcome the basic problems of coordination, manpower, equipment, and motivation among the various concerned agencies at the ground level has been the main reason for this failure.

The Indian government launched yet another ambitious project in 2005 called the Coastal Security Scheme, which involved setting up a series of coastal police stations to strengthen the surveillance infrastructure along the coast. The scheme was, however, a non starter because the coastal states did not display any enthusiasm in implementing it as they did not perceive any threat to their coasts. Despite Mumbai being a preferred target of the terrorists, Maharashtra too implemented the scheme only in a piecemeal manner. Moreover, the decision to set up coastal police stations with a mandate to patrol shallow waters gave an excuse for the navy to withdraw from joint patrolling immediately. Mumbai’s coastal security was considerably weakened enabling the terrorists to carry out the strike with ease. 

Mumbai 26/11 forced the Indian government to overhaul the coastal security apparatus. Once again it insisted that the navy and the coast guard pool their resources to guard India’s territorial and coastal waters. The state governments were directed to establish coastal police stations and ensure that manpower and interceptor boats were provided to them.

The Maharashtra Government in an effort to beef up coastal security set up the Sagari Police Station in 2009 and another police station at Juhu in 2012. The lackadaisical approach to coastal security can be seen from the fact that Sagari Police Station operates from rooms in governmental quarters at Mahim and cannot even register a First Information Report (FIR) which is essential for investigating a case. Five of their 14 amphibian vehicles and 13 of their 27 patrol boats are in repair yards. Lacking a jetty, Sagari Police Station parks its boats at Malad or near the Gateway of India. Worst of all, most personnel at the two stations neither have the expertise to run the patrol boats nor basic swimming skills. The government ought to have focused attention on imparting training to the personnel for sea patrolling before opening the coastal police stations.

Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) Weapons – The unconventional threat

The continuing possibility of terrorist attacks using nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons is an ongoing concern in the national security policy arena in the face of a clear trend among terrorists to inflict greater numbers of casualties. 

Worldwide, the likelihood of terrorists being capable of producing or obtaining WMD may be growing due to looser controls of stockpiles and technology in the former Soviet states specifically and the broader dissemination of related technology and information in general. However, WMD remain significantly harder to produce or obtain than what is commonly depicted in the press. The Central Intelligence Agency has reported that it is likely that most terrorists will continue to choose conventional explosives over WMD, but warns that the al-Qaeda network has made obtaining WMD capability a very high priority. Indian security establishment needs to take cognizance of threat from unconventional weapons, particularly the “dirty bomb” – a type of radiological dispersal device (RDD) that combines radioactive material with conventional explosives whose objective is to contaminate the area around the explosion with radioactive particles. An RDD explosion could create fear and panic, contaminate property, and require potentially costly cleanup. Making prompt, accurate information available to the public could prevent the panic sought by terrorists.

Medical care and Disaster/Emergency Management

There is an urgent need to augment medical facilities, particularly trauma care which is inadequate even in a major metropolis like Mumbai.  Every time a disaster rocks Mumbai, causing mass casualties, the inadequacies of trauma care facilities at public hospitals get highlighted. During 26/11, most victims were rushed to the state-run but soon they had to be shifted to bigger centres which had better facilities to treat the injuries. Four years on, no lessons have been learnt. The question to be posed is whether the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) has the means to respond appropriately in the event of a terrorist strike. 

The issues discussed above are not exhaustive but are merely illustrative in order to assist the policy makers to take suitable steps to counter the scourge of terror within the country.

Is another 26/11 in the offing?

The arrest of one of the key conspirators and terrorist handlers of the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, Syed Zabiuddin Ansari alias Abu Jundal a.k.a. Abu Hamza at New Delhi’s IGI Airport in June 2012 after being deported from Saudi Arabia not only marks a high for the Indian security agencies but also turns the focus back on Islamabad’s complicity in the attack. Abu Jundal who held a Pakistani passport at the time of his capture and deportation is an Indian national from the Beed district of Maharashtra.

During the course of his interrogation, he is reported to have disclosed that he was in Saudi Arabia at the behest of Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) to raise finances for carrying out a bigger attack on India. According to him, the LeT had planned to execute a major terrorist strike in India within a year. He had also been tasked to lure Indian youth working in Saudi Arabia to join the banned terror outfit, the Indian Mujahideen. He is also reported to have told the investigators that the LeT was expanding its naval wing to carry out more terror strikes. At the time of writing it was revealed that he was planning a similar strike with an Indian Mujahideen (IM) module that he was setting up when he was nabbed in Saudi Arabia.

Two implications clearly emerge out of this interrogation – firstly Pakistan (its military establishment and the Inter-Services Intelligence, the ISI) and the India-centric terror groups, particularly the LeT are not sufficiently deterred from executing fedayeen strikes inside India and secondly, there is no change in the Pakistani mindset of using terrorism as an instrument of state policy at least vis-à-vis India. This revelation by Abu Jundal is also likely to have an adverse impact on the Indo-Pak dialogue process. One another thing that emerges from the disclosure made is that LeT and other radical Islamic groups in Pakistan, far from being reined in, are in a position to influence Pakistan’s foreign policy, especially its India policy post 26/11. There is a strong suspicion that Pakistani military establishment will not hesitate to execute another 26/11 – type attack, of course with certain modifications and improvements so as to ensure that the attacks cannot be traced back to Pakistan or the ISI.

The interrogation of Abu Jundal must alert the Indian security establishment to the fact that groups inimical to India have been in the process of plotting and will continue to plot terror strikes against India. While the capture of a key LeT operative like Jundal may be euphoric, it is time for Indian agencies to counter and neutralize this threat emanating from across the western border. The international community expected India post-26/11 to respond appropriately to this “undeclared war”. However, India chose to rely on diplomacy rather than reprisals against Pakistan. Diplomacy and sanctions may not be necessarily successful in countering terrorism. 

Post 26/11, there is very little that Pakistan has done in reining groups like the LeT. India must accept the fact that Pakistan will continue to sponsor or allow outfits like LeT to freely carry out operations against India till such time India does not respond with reprisals. While expecting a repeat of 26/11, India must realize that Pakistani ISI will try to avoid a repeat of the mistakes committed during 26/11. In other words, tactically, Pakistan while planning a strike like 26/11 will try to cover up its tracks in order to ensure that its complicity remains undetected. For one, the ISI will desist from using Pakistani nationals to carry out any future fedayeen attacks inside India. Instead, Pakistan may try to lure the Indian Mujahidden to carry out the attack thereby making it look like an indigenous terror strike. Secondly, ISI in all likelihood would avoid using a control room to give orders and instructions as was the case during 26/11. Either, there may be complete radio silence or a control room may be located in a third country. Thirdly, there is every possibility of any future attack inside India being outsourced, meaning thereby either a group with no Indian link may carry out the attack or individuals belonging to other radical Islamic groups may be assigned to carry out the attack.

Lashkar’s Maldivian connection assumes significance in this context of outsourcing any future attack inside India.

It is important to note that Lashkar’s operations have expanded over the years – it is estimated that the LeT maintains some kind of presence in about 21 countries, including Maldives.

While there are no known organized jihadi groups operating in or out of the Maldives, the country has proven a fertile ground for jihadist recruitment. Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT) and al-Qaeda have both successfully recruited youth already radicalized in Islamic schools there.

The December 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean provided an opening in this regard. In the aftermath of the disaster, radical Islamists gained a foothold in the country in the guise of humanitarian charities. The most significant of these was the Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq (IKK), which is affiliated with the Pakistan-based Jammat ud Dawa/Lashkar-e-Taiba. The IKK is linked to the Jamaat Ahl-e-Hadith sect active in the Maldives, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Many Ahl-e-Hadith groups are known to be involved in the jihadi struggle in South Asia, and most are affiliated with Kashmir-centric terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e Taiba and Harkat-ul Mujahideen. Its followers prefer to call themselves Salafis, in order to stress their closeness to the Saudis. Intelligence sources confirm that the IKK has spearheaded LeT’s activities in the Maldives, which prioritizes youth recruitment. The IKK claims to have spent 17.2 million Pakistani Rupees (roughly $282,000) on tsunami relief in the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Indonesia during 2005 as post-tsunami relief although the Maldivian government denies that the organization provided any relief. Ostensibly as part of that aid, the IKK reportedly facilitated trips for many Maldivian youth to Pakistan, enrolling them in various radical madrassas (Islamic seminaries) there.

Sporadic incidents of jihadi activity within the Maldives have also occurred. In April 2005, for example, Indian police arrested Maldivian national Asif Ibrahim who allegedly frequented the Indian state of Kerala to procure arms and ammunition for the LeT's Maldives operation. Ibrahim confessed to planning to blow up a government-run mosque and assassinate then-President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom. An official release from the Maldivian government indicated that Asif Ibrahim had become a member of the UK-based extremist Islamic group Jama'ah-tul-Muslimeen in 2001. In the early weeks of February 2010, nine alleged Maldivian terrorists arrested in Pakistan’s troubled South Waziristan tribal region in March 2009 were repatriated to the Maldives. According to national police, the nine have ties to the bombing that took place in Malé’s Sultan Park in September 2007, and may have left the country for Pakistan via Sri Lanka for further training and indoctrination. 

The Maldivian government admitted that Pakistan-based terrorist groups have successfully recruited hundreds of Maldivian Muslims to fight against government forces in Pakistan.  The bin Laden network has done so as well; an al-Qaeda video circulated in November 2009 featured Ali Jaleel, a Maldivian national who fought alongside pro-Taliban forces in Pakistan.  Soon thereafter, another recruitment video featured a previously unknown al-Qaeda cell operating in the Maldives, and exhorted jihadists to travel to the country, stating "Your brothers in the Maldives are calling you.”

International concerns over the growth of Islamic extremism in the Maldives have risen since the May 2002 arrest of Ibrahim Fauzee. Fauzee, a Muslim cleric (now heading the Islamic Foundation of Maldives), was arrested in a suspected al-Qaeda safe house in Karachi, Pakistan and subsequently held in the Guantanamo Bay detention camp until his release and repatriation to the Maldives in March 2005. The incident sparked concerns about the spread of radical Islam and the penetration of international terror groups like al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba into the social fabric of this Indian Ocean archipelago. 

The Fauzee case was not an isolated event, however. There is growing evidence of Maldivian youths frequenting Pakistan for reasons unknown or suspicious in nature, though enrollment in various madrassas (Islamic seminaries) is usually cited as the prime reason for their travel. Intelligence agencies of the United States and India have noted this development with concern, and believe that growing religious extremism in the Maldives is a Pakistani import.

Another significant aspect which Indian security establishment must look into is the recent reports of three African terrorist groups al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Shabaab in Somalia, and Boko Haram in Nigeria seeking to “coordinate and synchronize” their operations. Since the groups in question are affiliated to the Al Qaeda and with reports of Somalis being trained in terrorist training camps in Pakistan, the possibility of using African nationals to execute an attack cannot be ruled out. It is also important to bear in mind the fact that in August 2010, a blast in the Somali capital Mogadishu left ten Al Shabaab terrorists dead while they were trying to assemble a suicide car bomb. Two of the suspected terrorists were Indian nationals according to the Somali Ministry of Information. A co-operation of this nature is not unknown amongst international terror groups. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-08-23/india/28291614_1_islamist-terror-al-shabaab-jihadis

One of the recommendations made to the US policy makers contained in the report titled “The Menace that is Lashkar-e-Taiba” prepared by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is to destroy the LeT for, left unchecked, it would eventually evolve into a formidable threat. Together with its allies, the US should use all available means to eviscerate the LeT – with or without Pakistan’s help. The US has realized albeit, a bit too late that LeT has assumed dangerous proportions and use of force is the only viable option available to it and its allies to neutralize the Pak-based terror outfits.

India irrespective of the action initiated or proposed to be initiated by the US and its allies must itself draw up a plan of action to counter and neutralize the ISI-backed LeT and other groups. For India, the best option is use of covert operations. While India’s experience in this area is limited, there is now an urgent need to penetrate Pakistani society and carry out subversive activities aimed at disrupting/undermining the ability of ISI and its proxies to carry out terrorist activities against India. Special Forces may also be tasked to carry out limited but punitive strikes across the Line of Control with the objective of destroying terror training camps and launch pads located in the border regions. Briefly put, India needs to wrest the initiative from Pak by its limited offensive actions. India has countered Pak actions on Indian territory since the time proxy war was initiated by Pakistan. It is time to turn the tables now.