The post traces the ascendancy of People's Republic of China as a major maritime power and its rivalry with India in the IOR. (This post was written as a Capstone Project paper)
Introduction
The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has emerged as an
important theatre in global geopolitics in the last decade and half and
continues to be so, largely due to the volume of trade and more particularly
over 80% of maritime oil trade and about ten billion tonnes of cargo annually
that passes through it. The Indian Ocean Region encompasses territory both land
and water stretching from the Strait of Malacca in the east to the Mozambique
Channel in the west and includes the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, the Gulf of Aden,
the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and 33 littoral states.
The IOR’s global relevance during the Cold War era was
minimal, with the primary focus being on the European continent, the Atlantic
and the western Pacific. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the subsequent
rise of China and other regional economies of southeast Asia post-1995 shifted
the focus to the Indian Ocean. The vital maritime routes called Sea Lines of
Communication (SLOC) which connect the Middle East with South Asia, Southeast
Asia, Far East and Oceania are extremely strategic in nature from a military
and economic perspective and in particular from the point of energy security
because the bulk of the countries in this region are extremely dependent on the
Middle East for crude oil and petroleum.
China’s Growing
Presence
The importance of the Indian Ocean is reflected by
China’s maritime ambitions. China does not have a direct access to the Indian
Ocean; its access is through the South China Sea (SCS) which connects to the
Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca. China’s maritime ambitions stem
from its burgeoning economy which has been experiencing significant growth and
transformation. Over a period of few decades, China became a major
manufacturing hub, producing a vast array of goods from consumer products to
industrial to hi-tech ones. Chinese naval expansion was prompted by the rapid
economic progress. To keep pace with its economic progress and secure its
SLOCs, China embarked on rapid expansion of its navy. Its desire to achieve
great power status is also another contributing factor. China is heavily
dependent on crude oil and petroleum from the Gulf which passes through the
Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The
Indian Ocean is also vital for China’s engagement with Africa, Europe, the
Middle East, South Asia and the region’s island states. In addition, an Indian
Ocean presence is crucial for Beijing to establish itself as a credible naval
power with grand ambitions.
Around 2013, the Chinese President Xi announced what
came to be referred to as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and it comprised
the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road. The two were
collectively referred to as the One Belt One Road initiative, but later came to
be referred to as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
The
original Silk Road[1] arose during the westward expansion
of China’s Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), which forged trade networks throughout
what are today the Central Asian countries of Afghanistan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, as well as modern-day
India and Pakistan to the south. Those routes extended more than four thousand
miles to Europe.
The
BRI on the face of it, ostensibly was a China-led infrastructure development
and investment project aimed at enhancing connectivity and cooperation
between China and the rest of the world, primarily through land and maritime
trade routes. It involved Chinese investments in transportation, energy,
and telecommunications infrastructure, among other areas, with the goal of
boosting trade, stimulating economic growth, and fostering regional
integration. This was only a part of this seemingly attractive project.
This project entailed investments in infrastructure projects like ports and
unsustainable debt was imposed on the host state
Nine-dash
line
The
nine-dash line is a historical claim, first appeared on Chinese maps in the
1940s encompassing a vast area of the South China Sea including the islands and
reefs. China claimed that the SCS constituted historical waters encompassing
nearly 90% of the Sea on the maps by using a U-shaped boundary line of 9 to 11
dashes (commonly referred to as Nine dash line). This claim was
fallacious and had no basis in international law. According to
Robert Beckman, director of the Centre for International Law at the
National University of Singapore, “The dotted-line map was first
produced by the Chinese government in 1947 and has nine dashes drawn in a
u-shape around the islands in the South China Sea.
Although China has used this map on several occasions, it has never
clarified its position on exactly what it is claiming inside the dotted-line.
This has led some to conclude that China is claiming all the waters
within the dotted-line as its territorial waters or historic waters. Such a
position would be contrary to UNCLOS.
While
much attention has been given to the dotted-line map attached to China’s
Note Verbale, it should be remembered that the Note does not assert sovereignty
over the waters in the dotted-line except for the waters “adjacent” to the
islands which arguably only refers to a 12 nm territorial sea. The Note
contains no language suggesting that China claims that all the waters
inside the dotted-line are its territorial waters or historic waters, or that
it has any historic rights in the waters inside the dotted-line. This suggests
that China’s claim is only to the islands inside the dotted-line, and to
the maritime zones that can be generated from such islands, a position
consistent with UNCLOS.”
The
SCS contains vital shipping lanes and being rich in hydrocarbons and fish,
China constructed artificial islands in the South China Sea, militarized them
with airstrips, radar systems, and other facilities in order to assert its
rights over the SCS. China has laid claim to the key land features in the
SCS like Scarborough Shoal, Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands and subsequent
seizure of the reefs and islands have become a bone of contention between China
and the littoral states including Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei
and other states.
The
Malacca Dilemma
Apart
from the fact that China is geographically distant from the Indian Ocean and
bulk of its crude oil import is by sea, the heavy reliance on the Strait of
Malacca as a waterway adds to its problems. This is compounded by the fact that
China has very little influence over it. Its reliance on the Strait makes it
vulnerable to disruptions such as naval blockade, piracy or terror attacks or
asymmetric warfare or harassment attacks by one of the littoral states inimical
to China which could have a damaging impact on the Chinese economy. The Malacca
dilemma as the vulnerability is referred to, is further complicated by
geopolitical tensions in the region, particularly the presence of major powers
like the United States or India, which could potentially exploit China's
vulnerability and hamper the movement of its vessels. China has been
seeking to use Gwadar and China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) or Sittwe as
overland routes in order to overcome the vulnerability posed by the Malacca
Strait.
Chinese
Bases and Debt-trap Diplomacy
India
has been apprehensive over the increasing Chinese footprint in the Indian Ocean
over the past few years, which it considers to be its backyard. China has used
its diplomatic clout and subtle coercive economic tools, corruption and
predatory loans to achieve its objectives in the Indian Ocean Region. China has
been using economic machination to obtain bases/facilities for its
fast-expanding naval fleet. The BRI has served this purpose. The Sri Lankan
port of Hambantota is a classic example, according to some experts of debt-trap
diplomacy. Here, China advanced loans to Sri Lanka for construction of the port
and when Colombo struggled to repay the loans, it was forced, in 2017 to lease
Hambantota to the Chinese entity China Merchant Port Holdings for 99 years.
Thus, strategic influence is gained by granting predatory loans with highly
unfavourable terms, completely opaque and a key infrastructure gets taken over.
However, according to a leading think tank, Chatham House, the Hambantota case
is more complex than a simple debt-trap policy and the lease was not a quid pro
quo for the loan. Apparently, China paid Sri Lanka for the lease and the
original loans remain in place. Notwithstanding the Chatham House view, the
debt-trap diplomacy has been the of used modus operandi by China. According to
the Associated Press, in May 2023, many countries including Pakistan, Kenya,
Zambia, Laos and Mongolia were on the brink of economic collapse under the
weight of crushing foreign debt, much of it from the world’s biggest lender,
China. India has tried to warn countries that BRI is not an economically
enriching venture but part of a geopolitical strategy by Beijing to dominate
the region and Asia and keep India encircled with bases obtained through the
devious debt-trap and take control of regional choke points. India, on its part
has tried to ease the financial burdens of some of the states like Sri Lanka.
India converted loans worth over USD 100 million into grants and reduced
interest rates on existing credit in the six months leading up to April 2025,
providing immediate relief to the Sri Lankan people.
SAGAR
and MAHASAGAR – India’s Maritime Doctrine and Diplomatic Outreach
India
has always emphasized on a free, open, and inclusive region that thrives on
trade and investment. In the naval doctrine of 2004, India stressed on the
freedom of navigation and securing vital maritime trade and communication
pathways. India has been a net security provider in the region which means
reinforcing collective security by tackling common threats like piracy
emanating primarily from Somalia, rendering humanitarian assistance at sea and
co-ordinating disaster relief efforts as was seen during the tsunami. The
emergence of Indo-Pacific as a geostrategic concept which considered the Indian
Ocean and the Western Pacific as a single strategic theatre had a telling
impact on the entire security architecture. The Indian Prime Minister, in 2015,
inaugurated the “Security and Growth for All in the Region” called the SAGAR
doctrine which conceptualises the idea of Indo-Pacific and advocates for the
Indo-Pacific region to be free, open, inclusive, peaceful and prosperous. This
doctrine aimed to position India as a net security provider in the
region. In 2025, the Indian Prime Minister articulated a revised framework
for the country in the Indian Ocean Region called MAHASAGAR “Mutual and
Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth for All in the Region.” The basis
for MAHASAGAR is the incontrovertible fact that India is a first responder in
the region, be it for rendering humanitarian assistance or disaster relief and
developmental aid. India has also been endeavouring to strengthen maritime
security cooperation in the region through the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
(IONS) which is a voluntary and inclusive initiative that brings together
navies of the IOR littorals to enhance maritime cooperation and security and
serves as a platform for discussing maritime issues and formulate responses to
various challenges like natural disasters. The Information Fusion Centre –
Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR), an initiative under the IONS which is jointly
managed by the Indian Navy and the Indian Coast Guard is a regional maritime
security centre established in Gurugram, India, in December 2018 and serves as
a hub for maritime security information sharing with a view to strengthening
maritime safety and security in the IOR. The Colombo Security Conclave formed
in 2020 is a framework for maritime cooperation between India, Sri Lanka and
Maldives. Mauritius and Bangladesh joined the grouping subsequently. Its core
objective is to address regional security challenges related to maritime
security, counter-terrorism and transnational crime. India has thus been
actively pursuing a policy of keeping China out of the region’s affairs since
China is not geographically located in the region. These initiatives and the
objectives that they seek to achieve may be noteworthy, but their importance in
the larger geopolitical scenario has been limited because of domestic political
compulsions obtaining in the member countries.
Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue (QUAD)
The
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) is an informal strategic forum
established in 2007 comprising four states, namely the US, India, Australia and
Japan whose primary objective is to work for a free, open and inclusive
Indo-Pacific region. The core objective of this forum is to secure a
rules-based international order, freedom of navigation and a liberal trading
system. Though viewed as an anti-China alliance, the QUAD does not target China
directly, but its objective of having a free and open Indo-Pacific runs counter
to Chinese belligerence in the SCS, its disputes with the littoral states of
the region and beyond. Thus, in a way QUAD does act as a counterweight to
China’s growing assertiveness and influence in the region. Chinese leaders,
less than a decade ago were dismissive of the QUAD as the members had divergent
interests and lacked coherence. According to the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang
Yi, the grouping was merely “a headline-grabbing idea” without much substance
and like the ocean foam would dissipate. China between the 2020s and 2035 saw
an opportunity to be the dominant economic, technological and military power
and that its dominance in Asia and the world was inevitable. China, being a
revisionist power had dreamt of re-writing the rules of international order and
establish its position as a global leader without firing a shot.
Within
a few years of the November 2017 gathering of QUAD members in Manila, however,
Beijing had started to rethink its initial dismissiveness. The forum got
further impetus after the Indian and Chinese forces clashed in the Galwan
Valley in June 2020. India, which till then had reservations on the “security”
aspect of the QUAD, realised that China’s belligerence had to be countered
strongly and, if necessary, by the use of force. By March
of 2021, when the QUAD held its first leader-level summit and issued its
first leader-level communique, Chinese officials had begun to view the QUAD
with growing concern. Since then, Beijing has concluded that the QUAD
represented one of the most significant challenges to Chinese ambitions in the
years ahead. From the Chinese perspective the geopolitical wei qi board
was beginning to look grim.
Naval
Capabilites
Much
of India’s energy imports pass through the IOR and the Arabian Sea. The Indian
SLOCs through the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea is important as it is
challenging; they are critical for its economy and security. Indian SLOCs face
challenges in the form of piracy, terrorism and threats from PLA-N and
Pakistani Navy in the event of a conflict. Being in close geographical
proximity, these waters can be monitored on a continuous basis effectively
without the Indian Navy having to stretch its resources thin. The Indian Navy’s
capabilities at its current level can pose serious challenges to the PLA-N.
Having said that, India needs to be cognizant of the fact that the PLA-N with
370 ships is the world’s largest navy, if not the most powerful. And this
number is likely to increase to 435 by the year 2030 as per projections. The
sheer numbers that the PLA-N can deploy in the event of a conflict is quite
overwhelming. Though it must be emphasized that numbers alone cannot determine
the outcome of a conflict because the PLA-N lacks combat experience at sea,
unlike India and its western partners. Operating a fleet or carrier group in
peacetime or for anti-piracy operations is one thing, while engaging in a
full-fledged sea battle is quite another. The Chinese have another distinct
disadvantage – lack of operational bases, (save and except Djibouti), either in
the vast expanse of the Indian Ocean or in the Arabian Sea. This will most
likely hamper PLA-N operations for an extended period of time. The geographical
challenge to the Chinese navy acts as a significant and arguably the most
important structural limitation on PLA-N’s ability to wage high-intensity naval
warfare in the Indian Ocean. The tyranny of geography would require the Chinese
navy to either reload in a friendly port (extremely remote possibility in the
event of war) or to replenish at sea. This scenario may change in
the foreseeable future if China can manage to obtain bases in Gwadar, Sittwe
(Myanmar) or Chittagong or in Maldives. It must be said that these are possible
bases for the future because no arrangement is in the offing as of today. While
China has been building aircraft carriers, operating carrier-based aircraft
requires extensive training and the competence of the pilots is questionable.
India
has its fair share of worries as well. It is lagging behind the PLA-N both
quantitatively and qualitatively because for nearly a decade from 2004-05 to
2014 India had not acquired any significant naval weapons platform. There has
been a big gap in numbers between India and China. India’s challenges lie in
its somewhat depleted underwater capabilities. India operates seventeen diesel
powered attack submarines; importantly none of them are equipped with Air
Independent Propulsion (AIP) and one nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarine. The AIP technology allows submarines to stay submerged for
longer durations. India is in the process of actively integrating Air
Independent Propulsion (AIP) systems into its submarine fleet, primarily
for the Kalvari-class (Scorpene-class) submarines. This involves
retrofitting existing submarines with indigenous AIP modules developed by the
Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). It is unclear how
successful will this integration of indigenous modules be in an imported
platform. India's long-term plans include the construction of six additional
submarines with AIP systems under Project 75(I), though these are not expected
to join the fleet until after 2033.
To
offset the advantage gained by the PLA-N, India must look to develop indigenous
weapons systems, particularly underwater drones for surveillance and offensive
operations. The Indian Navy is in the process of actively developing and
acquiring underwater drones, also known as unmanned underwater vehicles
(UUVs), to enhance its capabilities in maritime surveillance, reconnaissance,
and potentially, even offensive operations. These advancements include
both smaller, autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) and larger, extra-large
UUVs (XLUUVs) with potential strike capabilities. The development is
largely driven by the need to monitor and protect India's vast maritime
interests, including the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), the South China Sea, and
the Indo-Pacific.
Conclusion
From
an Indian perspective, the power disparity is a matter of concern for Indian
policy makers and strategic thinkers. This is offset to some extent by the
geographical advantage enjoyed by India. India also has the benefits arising
from strategic partnerships with the US, Japan and France and that gives it
greater flexibility and manoeuvrability in the Indian Ocean. Beijing
has far too many problems to tackle; it has the US and Japan to counter in the
Pacific; reunification of Taiwan and the problems associated with it and the
littorals in the SCS are hostile. Thus, China, notwithstanding a huge navy will
still be better off addressing issues closer home than expand its area of
operations to the Indian Ocean where it clearly faces logistical problems. This
is the critical time for India to beef up its naval capabilities both
quantitatively and in quality and narrow the gap with the PLA-N.
[1] China’s Massive Belt and Road
Initiative – Council For Foreign Relations, February 02, 2023
China’s Massive Belt and Road
Initiative | Council on Foreign Relations
