A Rescue Operation in Badakhshan

Afghanistan is considered to be one of the dangerous places on the planet. There is danger lurking around the corner every single day given the politically volatile situation. There have been number of instances of abduction and execution of hostages, particularly of aid workers belonging to the various international aid agencies. There have been rescue attempts of hostages in the past, some of which were successful and others having ended in utter failure. One such case was that of Linda Norgrove, a British doctor, who was killed in a botched rescue operation about eighteen months ago. There have been successes as well. One such classic operation was brilliantly executed by a Special Forces team comprising British SAS and US Navy’s SEAL Team 6 in the inhospitable terrain of Badakhshan in Northern Afghanistan sometime around 1^st / 2^nd June 2012. The objective of the operation was to rescue two aid workers belonging to an international aid charity Medair and two other Afghans held along with them. 

The Abduction

The four female workers belonging to a Swiss-based aid organization Medair, including two Afghans, had been kidnapped on 22^nd May 2012 while traveling on horseback from Yafta to Yavan district in the remote Northern province of Badakhshan. After their abduction, the four hostages were held in a cave deep inside the thick Koh-e-Laram forest within the Shahri Buzurg district of North-Western Badakhshan close to the Tajikistan border. 

Shortly after the four women were seized, the kidnappers, who were known to have close links to the Taliban, released a video in which they demanded a £ 6 million ransom and the release of a comrade held in custody. 

International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) commanders hoped initially that the kidnapping would be resolved peacefully. 

Planning the Rescue

While the negotiations were on, the Special Forces began to plan for a worse case scenario and started to reconnoitre a series of potential helicopter landing sites – a difficult task given the nature of the terrain, highly mountainous and thick with forest. They were tasked to prepare for a rescue mission in the event of negotiations breaking down or if the lives of the hostages were threatened. 

While the British and US forces planned and rehearsed their rescue mission, back in London the Prime Minister chaired several Cobra (Cabinet office Briefing Room A) meetings where he kept senior members of the cabinet informed of the latest events. 

In attendance amongst others were the heads of MI5 and MI6, the Director of Special Forces, General Sir David Richards, the Chief of the Defence Staff, Tim Allen, Sir Kim Darroch, the National Security Advisor and the Philip Hammond, Defence Secretary.

“I have given my approval to COMISAF [General John Allen, Commander of the International Security and Assistance Force] for a rescue mission to be launched,” he told the meeting gathered round a large conference table in the windowless room under Downing Street. “It is just a matter of when and how”. 

Over the next few days, SAS commanders, intelligence officers and members of the Afghan National Defence Directorate, watched the activities of the abductors on real-time video transmitted via satellite from the Predator as they prepared the rescue plan within the headquarters of the Joint Special Forces Group in Kabul. 

By the evening of 28th May, a force of 28 members of the SAS and an equal number of US Navy SEALS had established a forward operating base within the headquarters of a Provincial Reconstruction Team close to the town of Fayzabad, around 30 minutes flying time from the hostages’ location. 

But by 30^th May 2012 the Predator garnered some vital intelligence. The Briton Miss Helen Johnston, 28 and 26-year-old Kenyan Moragwa Oirere also an aid worker were separated from their two Afghan colleagues and being held in a different cave. 

Of more concern, however, were the details of an intercepted phone call in which the Taliban had begun to urge the kidnappers to “make a declaration of intent”. Back in Kabul intelligence officers assumed this meant that at least one of the hostages risked being murdered. The development was what the American Special Forces called a “game changer”. It was time for “executive action”. 

Around mid-afternoon of 1^st June 2012, during the twelfth consecutive Cobra meeting chaired by David Cameron, those present were informed of the latest developments, including the imminent launch of a hostage rescue operation - no further information was given. 

In Kabul, the decision was taken to split the hostage rescue force. A 28-strong SAS detachment would be responsible for freeing Miss Johnston and her Kenyan colleague, while the US team, composed of members of Seal Team 6 - the same unit credited with having shot dead Osama Bin Laden - was tasked with rescuing the Afghan hostages. 

The intelligence from the aerial reconnaissance was at best sketchy but it was thought that at least four kidnappers were guarding Miss Johnston and Miss Oirere, while a further seven were holding the two Afghans. 

Both groups were armed with AK47 assault rifles, rocket propelled grenades and a PKM, a Russian belt-fed machine-gun, which is capable of shooting down a helicopter. 

Late on Friday morning, the British and US rescue teams were told that the operation had been confirmed. The mission was straight forward: Rescue the hostages, kill the kidnappers. H-hour, the launch time for the operation was 5 pm local time. 

The Operation

The rescue force flew to a rendezvous on the edge of the Koh-e-Laram Forest in MH-60L Blackhawk helicopters flown by pilots from 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), nicknamed the Night Stalkers. 

Each helicopter is equipped with a M230 Chain Gun and rockets pods. Riding “shotgun” were two US Apache helicopters to provide “flank support” for the operation.

The SAS troops went in relatively light - dressed in black with machine guns, pistols, knives and both stun and hand grenades. Each man was equipped with night vision goggles and a helmet-mounted camera. A medical team was also attached to each of the assault ready to give immediate first aid to the hostages. 

The first troops on the ground secured a helicopter landing site (HLS) at the top of a rocky valley and coordinated the arrival of all of the Blackhawks until the full compliment of troops had arrived. The HLS was located around two miles away from the kidnappers’ camp - but the sound of any approaching helicopters would have been muffled by the thick forest, or so the Special Forces hoped. 

In the early evening light, the US and British Special Forces were closing in on the caves where the hostages were being held. 

Back at ISAF Headquarters in Kabul, General Allen and his British deputy, Lieutenant General Adrian Bradshaw, watched the operation unfold on television screens inside the main operations room in so that they could maintain “full situational awareness”. 

Just as the sun was beginning to set the British troops approached the cave where they believed Miss Johnston and Miss Oirere were being held. The SAS held their ground until their US colleagues reached their assault positions. It was vital for both attacks to be executed concurrently. Weapons and radios were given a final check and night vision goggles activated. Minutes later the Special Forces teams rescuers were given the order to assault. 

The soldiers moved into the darkness shooting dead the kidnappers with silenced weapons. Several were dispatched with a “double tap” the preferred method of killing - two bullets in the centre of the forehead. 

The US Special Forces cleared and secured their target, killing seven kidnappers in the process but no hostages had been found. 

Momentarily, the commanders were faced with the dreadful possibility that the four aid workers had been moved. Seconds later, however, the tension was broken when the SAS team commander’s radio crackled into life, reporting that all four hostage were alive and well, before adding that a further four kidnappers had been killed.

The dead were searched for intelligence and weapons while medics checked the four women to ensure that none had been injured during the brief firefight. 

Within minutes the helicopters were brought forward to a clearing near the edge of the forest where the four exhausted but relieved hostages were flown back to ISAF headquarters in Kabul. 

At 2 am British time Downing Street was informed that the rescue operation had been a complete success. The Prime Minister was woken at 2.15 am and was given the news. He stayed up until every member of the SAS was safely back in Kabul and spoke to several of the soldiers by phone praising their courage and thanking them for achieving a successful outcome.

Spokesman for the coalition forces, US Army Col. Cummings identified the kidnappers as "a criminal armed terrorist group closely tied to the Taliban and they were armed with machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and AK-47s."

All military operations in Afghanistan, whether special or regular, are fraught with grave risk and uncertainty. This particular operation was ordered to be launched by the British Prime Minister fully aware that the outcome may not be entirely favourable. (Prime Minister Cameron had come in for sharp criticism when British Special Forces, the SBS was involved in an unsuccessful rescue of hostages in Nigeria in March 2012. Read the author’s post http://kumar-theloneranger.blogspot.in/2012/03/failed-rescue-attempt-in-africa.html). Having said that, the US and British Special Forces have during the course of the long war against Taliban and Al Qaeda have gained immense battle-field experience and sharpened their skills in one of the most adverse conditions and inhospitable terrains. Also many an operations having been conducted jointly, the co-ordination and interoperability between the two forces have been greatly enhanced. 

Another important factor contributing to the successful outcome of the mission, has been the unwavering policy of the United States, Britain and other Western nations of not giving into the demands of terrorists.

NATO Attack on Pak Check Post - Ramifications

On 26^th November 2011 (around 2.00 am local time), helicopters/aircraft belonging to NATO/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) carried out an attack, alleged to be unprovoked by Pakistan, on a military border outpost at Baizai area of Mohmand tribal region a lawless border area which abuts Afghanistan's eastern Kunar province, killing about 24 to 28 soldiers including a major and a captain. Fifteen more personnel were wounded and the death toll could rise as condition of some of the injured was reported to be serious. The attack prompted Islamabad to launch strong protest with the United States and close its frontier for supplies to allied forces in Afghanistan. Pakistani authorities responded to the attack by stopping all container trucks and tankers carrying supplies for US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. The attack threatened to further strain the already tense US-Pak relations.

According to the spokesman for the NATO-led ISAF in Kabul the coalition was aware of "an incident" near the border and was gathering information on it. Security forces blocked all entry points to Mohmand tribal agency after the incident and began checking all vehicles, TV news channels reported. Several crossings on the Afghanistan frontier, including Landikotal and Takhtbai, were closed and over 150 NATO supply vehicles sent back to Peshawar.

Pakistan rejected the regret expressed by NATO and warned that the action would have grave consequences. The regret expressed by NATO over the killing of the Pakistani soldiers is "not enough", chief military spokesman Maj Gen Athar Abbas said. "The NATO strike can have grave consequences," he said. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on Sunday said he had written to Pakistan Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani to express regret over the "tragic unintended incident".

Apart from closing all NATO supply routes, Pakistan asked the US to vacate Shamsi airbase within 15 days. The base is believed to be used by Central Investigation Agency for operating drones. 

While Pakistan has alleged that the air strike was unprovoked, there are reports suggesting that Afghan troops operating near the Pakistani border came under fire and in response called in NATO air strikes. The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue, said it was unclear who attacked the Afghan troops before dawn Saturday, but that the soldiers were fired upon from the direction of the Pakistani border posts that were hit in the strikes.

The border area where the soldiers were operating contains a mix of Pakistani forces and Islamist militants.

But there are forces working against a total rupture in the relationship. Pakistan continues to rely on billions of dollars in American military and civilian aid, and the U.S. needs Islamabad's help to push Afghan insurgents to engage in peace talks.

Tensions are likely to exacerbate if militants unleash attacks against hundreds of trucks carrying supplies to U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan that were backed up at Pakistani border crossings after Islamabad closed the frontier.

Suspected militants had destroyed around 150 trucks a year ago after Pakistan closed one of its Afghan border crossings to NATO supplies for about 10 days in retaliation for a U.S. helicopter attack that accidentally killed two Pakistani soldiers.

The situation could become worse this time because Pakistan has closed both its crossings. Nearly 300 trucks carrying coalition supplies are now stranded at Torkham in the northwest Khyber tribal area and Chaman in southwestern Baluchistan province. A prolonged closure of Pakistan's two Afghan border crossings to NATO supplies could cause serious problems for the coalition. Recent reports suggest that the closure of the crossings is permanent. The U.S., which is the largest member of the NATO force in Afghanistan, ships more than 30 per cent of its non-lethal supplies through Pakistan. The coalition has alternative routes through Central Asia into northern Afghanistan, but they are costlier and less efficient. According to the Telegraph, although the US is transporting more of its equipment, food and fuel through Central Asia in an attempt to reduce Pakistani leverage, the route through Karachi still accounts for 49% of supplies destined for the 140,000-strong foreign force.

The incident will have far-reaching ramifications not only on US-Pak relations, but also for the ISAF operations in Afghanistan and the US-led war on terror.

Firstly, ISAF will have to explore the possibilities of opening and maintaining alternate routes for transport of food, equipment and fuel for its forces stationed and operating in Afghanistan. Secondly, Pakistan’s action of closure of the border crossings will most likely be met with cut US military and non-military aid to Pakistan, something which it can ill-afford.

Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy is highly suspect. The US Government and its lawmakers are highly skeptical of Pakistani intentions and its policy of hunting with the hounds and running with the hare. Western officials have alleged that Pakistan has played a "double-game" since 2001, by allying with the US but at the same time providing support to the Taliban and other Afghan insurgents. US officials suspected that the Pakistani ISI had conspired with the Haqqani network in the September 2011 attack on the US Embassy in Kabul. The relations between the two sides have nose-dived since then. This incident may give Pakistan a pretext to withdraw support to the US war on terror, particularly because of the unpopularity of the drone attacks inside Pakistan. And the US too may be looking for an excuse to carry out military strikes inside Pakistan because of Pakistan’s reluctance to take action against groups like the Haqqani network, which Pakistan considers to be a strategic asset.

The most important ramification of this incident is Pakistan’s call to vacate the Shamsi air base operated by the CIA.

First offered to Washington in the early days after 9/11 by the Musharraf regime when it simpered before the American threat that it will be bombed back to the Stone Age if it did not cooperate, Shamsi's US operations was a well-kept secret till February 2009 when Internet trawlers ferreted out Google earth photos showing drone aircraft at the base. News that the US was using Pakistani facilities to carry out its Predator campaign within Pakistani territory against Pakistani targets embarrassed Islamabad no end, sparking off a campaign to evict American assets. Pakistan, it must be noted managed to get US to vacate the Jacobabad airbase, the second of the air base operated by the US. Reports suggest that Pakistan has not been successful in getting the US to vacate the Shamsi base. How did the US manage to cling on to this base? The answer lay in the fact that the air base was not even under Pakistani control. Like with some other parts of the country like areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir ceded to China and parts of the Khyber Pakhtunwa given up to extremists, Islamabad earned itself the dubious reputation as a rentier state, it turned out that Shamsi Air Base had been leased out to some Gulf potentates.

During the Pakistan national assembly debate following the Abbottabad operation, Pakistan air chief Rao Qamar Suleman reportedly told lawmakers in camera than Shamsi has been under the control of the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan Air Force had no say in the matter. In fact, the Shamsi air strip was originally built for Arab sheikhs who flew into Pakistan to hunt for the houbara bustard, a rare bird some Arabs believe has aphrodisiac properties.

Now, the US-UAE arrangement in Shamsi rendered the Pakistani establishment impotent. 

In the event of closure of the Shamsi Air Base, the drone operations being carried out by CIA may be adversely affected. The US may have to shift these operations to a secure location in Afghanistan or elsewhere. If such a situation were to arise, then the US may probably adopt a no holds barred approach to taking on terrorists in Pakistan. 

In conclusion, Pakistan must realise that playing a dangerous double game as they have done so far in Afghanistan is fraught with serious risks wherein allied forces may carry out military strikes as highlighted  by this incident "accidentally". None, but Pakistan alone, will be responsible for such actions.