Operation Sindoor - A brief analysis

This post is being written while the ceasefire is in force and Operation Sindoor is paused. This is by no means a detailed analysis, just a perspective.

Key pointers:

Operation Sindoor was a cold, calculated, high precision military response to not just the Pahalgam attack which took place on April 22, 2025, resulting in the deaths of 26 tourists and a pony owner, but to the brazenness with which Pakistan operated terrorist training centres and launchpads in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Pakistan. According to John Spencer, Chair of Urban Warfare Studies at the Modern War Institute this operation was a new doctrine for India.

The response from India on the intervening night of 8th May and 9th May have resulted in a new red line - any terror attack launched from Pakistan will be treated as acts of war. There would be no difference between terrorists and terrorist sponsors or backers. Thus, no distinction between the jihadis and their masters/handlers. The question is whether India will respond in the same way as they did on 7th May in response to every terror attack that may take place in future. 

The Indian military response on 7th May and 8th/9th May were conducted under a nuclear overhang, meaning that the potential for nuclear escalation was a significant factor in their actions. This effectively put an end to the nuclear blackmail which prevented strong and decisive kinetic action by India.

Operation Sindoor showcased jointness; an "absolute synergy between the three services in every single domain." The coordination between the army, air force and navy was near perfect. While strikes were carried out primarily by the Air Force with the Army playing a supporting role, the Indian Navy remained deployed in the northern Arabian Sea in a deterrent posture with full capacity to strike select targets at sea and land including Karachi.  

India projected its offensive power and defensive capabilities by use of a blend of indigenous (BrahMos, Akash, Nagastra) and foreign platforms (Harpy and S-400) in a high intensity conflict.

While drones revolutionised warfare and has been used extensively in the Ukraine conflict and in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, it cannot win wars. Pakistan was probably induced by Türkiye to use drones to overwhelm Indian air defences much like Armenian air defences. The ploy failed miserably. Drones can complement other weapons systems; they cannot replace them.

Pakistan's retaliation to India's action on 7th May was neutralized and within a few hours, India struck Pakistan targeting it with such ferocity decimating its air bases and other facilities. The attack was very calibrated and controlled in manner and India ensured that it didn't escalate into an all-out conflict.

India's military actions have been described as "non-escalatory, proportionate, calibrated and responsible because it didn't commit ground forces, especially the Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) as an integral part of the Cold Start doctrine for shallow incursions. There was no visible action for occupying territory under Pakistan's control.

India through Op Sindoor achieved all three key objectives - military, political and psychological. Spencer aptly described the operation as a limited war conducted for limited but vital aims to re-establish deterrence, impose costs on Pakistan's terror infrastructure and re-define the rules of engagement between two nuclear armed states.

Restraint is not to be construed as weakness; it is discipline in pursuit of strategic objectives.

       

Twin Terror Strikes in J & K - A Repeat of Kaluchak?

On 26^th September, at about 0645 hrs, heavily-armed four-member fedayeen group dressed in battle fatigues belonging to the Pakistan-based terror outfit Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) carried out an attack on Hiranagar Police Station on Kathua, Jammu killing six persons, including four policemen and two civilians and thereafter escaped in a vehicle and struck an Indian Army base (home to 16^th Cavalry) around 0715 hrs at Samba where at least three army personnel including the second-in-command Lt. Col. Bikramjeet Singh is reported to have been martyred. A Colonel-level Commanding Officer (CO) of the unit was among the three injured in the attack. At the time of this writing, fierce firefight was going on between the security personnel and the terrorists. [Update: According to Army sources the three terrorists were neutralised in or around 1630 hrs. A lesser-known militant outfit 'Shohada Brigade' today claimed responsibility for the twin attacks].

This attack is not the first time that an army installation has been attacked by Pak-based terrorists. In May 2002 about three terrorists reportedly crossed the Line of Control from Pakistan and boarded a bus at Vijaypur. When the bus neared Kaluchak, they shot the driver and the conductor and opened fire on the passengers. On hearing the shots in the bus the Indian army soldiers fired in their direction. The terrorists who were dressed in Indian army fatigues, while returning fire, attempted to escape in the direction of the Army's family quarters, located on the main road. They also threw grenades on some vehicles parked in the vicinity. Upon entering the family quarters they again fired on Army family members present in the premises. The terrorists were eventually cordoned off and killed by the Army.

There were a total of 31 killed, including 3 Army personnel, 18 Army family members and 10 civilians. There were 47 wounded including 12 Army personnel, 20 Army family members and 15 civilians. The dead included ten children. All the three terrorists killed in this incident were Pakistani nationals.

The lessons of Kaluchak probably were not learnt leading to the present attack at Samba. There have been reports that the fedayeen entered Jammu in the early hours of the morning from across the LoC and carried out the attack. This theory seems far-fetched, for the group appears to have a thorough knowledge of the topography and the exact location of its intended target: the Officers’ Mess of the 16^th Cavalry. This could have been possible only with fair amount of intelligence and detailed recce of the target. There also seems to have been absolutely no communication between the police station which was attacked and the army base where the terrorists later struck. Had there been some communication, the terrorists could have been waylaid and neutralized before they got access to the base. The army and the police have a lot to answer for this lack of coordination.

The attack comes in the backdrop of a proposed meeting between the Indian Prime Minister and his Pakistani counterpart set to take place in New York on the side lines of the United Nations General Assembly session. Reacting to the news of the militants' attack, the main opposition party the Bharatiya Janata Party dismissed the idea of a dialogue with Pakistan as a potential solution to tackle border issues.

"How can we have talks with a PM (referring to the Pakistani PM) who has no control over his Army and the ISI," BJP’s Yeshwant Sinha questioned. "If Pakistan Army doesn't want talks to be held with India, what is the point of taking to a PM who has no control over his Army?" Sinha hit out.

There is some substance in this argument. How can peace process go ahead when one of the constituents to the peace parleys is going to carry on a low-intensity conflict? Secondly, why should India take upon the responsibility of strengthening the civilian democratic institutions in Pakistan? Especially, considering the fact that a major chunk of Pakistani society considers India to be an arch enemy. It is also to be borne in mind that there have been innumerous cease fire violations after Nawaz Sharif came to power. Further what is the guarantee that Sharif truly aspires for peace with India considering the fact there is a K-Plan pursuant to which the Kashmir-cell (located in his office) would work on propaganda, raging separatist sentiments in the Valley and stage infiltration and cross-border fire across the LoC?

   

Pakistani establishment and its proxies have gone unpunished for all the acts of terror perpetrated against India. New Delhi has yet to answer as to the manner in which they responded to all provocations since Mumbai 26/11 to the beheadings of Indian soldiers by Pakistani troops on the LoC. New Delhi, simply put, has never mustered the courage or political will to give a fitting reply to this undeclared war waged by Pakistan.

The ruling alliance in New Delhi seems to have a penchant for talks with Pakistan, oblivious of the situation on the ground. There certainly is a disconnect between the political masters sitting in air-conditioned offices and security forces tackling the terrorists in the border areas of Kashmir. This is apparent from the statements made by the ministers and politicians. It is difficult to see the rationale of having talks between heads of states when an undeclared war is being fought between the two neighbours. 

As the situation stands, the only way in which India can respond to Pakistan is to deter Pakistan from engaging in acts of terror aimed at India. For this, there is an urgent need to draw up a policy of carrying out targeted killings of personnel belonging to Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)/Pakistani Army who are engaged in training these proxy elements. Secondly, India must have an undeclared policy to target all terror camps located in Pak-Occupied Kashmir (PoK) and elsewhere in Pakistan. Any action of this nature would also be covered under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Mumbai 26/11 – Lest We Forget

This post is not a re-run of the tragic 60 hours which the city of Mumbai was subjected to; it is a reminder to the nation to be vigilant and review the preparedness and plug the gaps in our security. 

Four years have passed since Mumbai was witness to one of the worst terror attacks. A fedayeen or fidayeen (suicide) squad of ten Pakistanis belonging to the Lashkar-e-Taiba  who entered Mumbai through the sea wreaked havoc at some of South Mumbai’s significant landmarks such as the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST) Railway Station, Cama Hospital, the iconic Taj Hotel, the Trident and Chabad House (Nariman House) and Leopold Café. The November 2008 carnage left about 166 persons killed and more than 300 injured and equally important it left the commercial capital and the nation shocked. These series of well coordinated attacks caught Mumbai and its police off guard; the police force was not prepared or equipped to face this kind of a challenge. This unprecedented situation led to a failure of command and control and resulted in chaos. In the face of this adversity, there were individual acts of valour displayed by officers and men in khaki who took upon themselves to brave the terrorists’ bullets against all odds. A mention must be made of the brave attempts made by police personnel with obsolete weapons who took on the terror duo Ajmal Kasab and Ismail Khan at CST, the then Additional Commissioner of Police Sadanand Date who along with a few brave personnel fought the terrorists, Kasab and Ismail at Cama Hospital, the three brave officers Hemant Karkare, Ashok Kamte and Vijay Salaskar who were martyred in the lane leading to Cama Hospital and late Assistant Sub-Inspector Tukaram Omble whose bravado was instrumental in Kasab being captured alive. The bulk of the responsibility of neutralizing the other eight terrorists who were holed up at the Taj, the Trident and Chabad House were shouldered by the commandoes of the elite National Security Guards who were flown in from their main base at Manesar, Gurgaon.

The attacks on Mumbai showed that India, in general and metropolis like Mumbai were extremely vulnerable to a fedayeen-type terrorist strike. The attacks demonstrated that there were serious shortcomings in matters of intelligence gathering and analysis and response mechanisms. Thus the Central and the Maharashtra governments embarked on an ambitious program of overhauling the security infrastructure.

Firstly, at the centre, India set up the National Investigation Agency (NIA) in December 2008. The Act establishing the Agency empowers the Centre to probe terror attacks in any part of the country, covering offences, including challenge to the country's sovereignty and integrity, bomb blasts, hijacking of aircraft and ships, and attacks on nuclear installations.  In the opinion of this author, setting up a new outfit after a debacle was another case of knee-jerk reaction on India’s part. Multiple agencies with over-lapping jurisdictions only result in turf wars and shirking of responsibility. 

The Government of India embarked on an ambitious plan of setting up the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) an intelligence sharing network which would collate data from the stand alone databases of the various agencies and ministries of the Government of India. NATGRID is being implemented in four phases, the first two of which will be operationalised by the year 2014 and the first data sets would be retrievable by early 2013.

According to Ajai Sahni, the Execute director of the Institute for Conflict Management & South Asia Terrorism Portal, by simply labelling organisations with names remnant of American agencies doesn’t make them effective. He argues, “by creating a new agency at the top of the pyramid you are not solving the problem. The problem of intelligence gathering and counter-terrorism is not at the agency level, it is the lack of capacity at the bottom. The problem is with training, man power, aptitude of law enforcement personnel on ground, application of technology and no one is fixing that. NCTC is replacing MAC, but MAC till now has been unable to create a terror database (formed in 2009), by changing how will the database come about. You are creating a new body that will run like the rest, so basically it will not run.”

The National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) is a proposed federal anti-terror agency to be created in India modelled on the NCTC of the USA. The NCTC was mooted as an apex body, a single and effective point of control for all counter terrorism measures. The Indian Prime Minister had in his address to the Chief Ministers’ Conference in May 2012 stated that the antecedents of the NCTC lay in the recommendations by the Group of Ministers and by the Administrative Reforms Commission, commencing from the lessons learnt in Kargil.

Another move was the formation of four NSG hubs in major cities, namely, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Hyderabad. It is difficult to say whether this move was sound or not as the hubs where the commandoes are based do not have the kind of infrastructure and training facilities that are available at the NSG headquarters in Manesar. The government at Delhi instead of setting up regional hubs ought to have considered taking steps in order to ensure quick transportation and rapid deployment of the Special Forces to deal with 26/11 like situations. 

At the regional level, Maharashtra government set up Force One, an elite commando force to combat terror strikes like the one that occurred on 26/11 on the lines of the National Security Guards (NSG). This step was taken due to the fact that non-availability of aircraft in Delhi and lack of ground transportation in Mumbai the operations to flush out the terrorists by NSG commandoes was delayed, thereby leading to higher casualties.

The state government also set up a jumbo State Security Council comprising of 66 members. It is anybody’s guess as to how this body has been functioning since its inception and in what manner has it contributed to the state’s security. These imprudent moves of the government of the day are laughable to say the least.

The Mumbai attacks raised questions about the quality of intelligence or the lack of it, its timely availability to the end-user, surveillance, security of vital installations, deficiencies in coastal security, and the lack of quality equipment like bullet proof jackets, bomb suits, weaponry, communication tools and disaster management including hospitals with trauma care facilities. Serious questions were raised about the response by the Mumbai/State police to the terrorist strike. The Maharashtra Government appointed what was officially known as the High-Level Enquiry Committee (HLEC) on 26/11, comprising of R.D. Pradhan, a former Union Home Secretary and V Balachandran a former Special Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat to probe the lapses and to identify systemic failures on 30^th December 2008. The committee submitted its report to the Chief Minister of Maharashtra in April 2009, but the government did not release it, citing security concerns. In December 2009, after substantial portions of the report were leaked to the media and after much agitation by the opposition in the state assembly, a Marathi translation was tabled before the state assembly.

While procurement of sophisticated communication equipments, bullet proof jackets, bomb suits and weaponry can be streamlined, the collection and dissemination of intelligence, surveillance and upgrading coastal security are matters which deserve closer scrutiny. For instance, lot of questions were raised about the quality of bullet proof jackets available for use with the police and had the late Hemant Karkare worn a better quality jacket, his life may have been saved. This prompted the state to procure high quality bullet proof jackets immediately after the attack. However for three years, citing technical reasons, no company was awarded the contract. Finally, the state got quality jackets from the agencies that supplied protective gear to outfits like the NSG. Thus procurement issues are not insurmountable.

The issues which require attention are the following:

Intelligence:

A lot has been written on intelligence gathering and its dissemination by various experts on the subject as well in this blog written in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks on 26/11 (read http://kumar-theloneranger.blogspot.in/2008/12/mumbai-2611.html). Having said that, it must be pointed out that the responsibility of intelligence gathering cannot be vested in specialized agencies like the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), Intelligence Bureau (IB) or the Special Branch of the local police. Some of the most reliable pieces of information can be garnered at the police station level by beat constables through their network of informers.  Intelligence collected at the grassroots level and shared with other consumers/end users will go a long way in thwarting terror strikes. It is also extremely necessary to have handpicked personnel at the police station to handle collection of intelligence and liaise with other intelligence agencies for expeditious dissemination of intelligence. There is today too much emphasis on technical intelligence (TECHINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT). TECHINT has its own limitations and needs to be used in conjunction with human intelligence (HUMINT) particularly in counter terror operations. The human asset who is able to penetrate a terror network or module is undoubtedly the best source of accurate information which will enable the security agencies to foil terror strikes. It was HUMINT which enabled the US to carry out Operation Neptune’s Spear – the operation which led to the killing of Osama bin Laden. Unfortunately, classical tradecraft appears to be a dying art.

Coastal security

Coastal security will continue to be a matter of concern for the security agencies and policy makers considering the fact that India has a very long coast line to safeguard with very limited resources at its disposal. 

The government’s approach towards all matters concerning security and coastal security is no exception has always been reactive. Remedial measures are undertaken only after a major incident has occurred and implemented in a haphazard manner without laying the foundation for the system adopted to function effectively. To begin with, the Coast Guard was set up in August 1978 in response to large-scale smuggling along the western coast with a mandate to protect the maritime and national interests of the country as well as to assist in anti-smuggling operations. But the 1993 serial blasts in Mumbai highlighted the fact that an inadequately manned and ill-equipped coast guard alone cannot safeguard the coasts. Instead of addressing the fundamental issue of lack of manpower and inadequate equipment, the Indian government launched a new scheme to cater for the terror challenge. Pushpita Das of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) in her article  “Why India’s Coastal Security Arrangement Falters?” writes that Operation Swan was launched in August 1993 to prevent clandestine landings along the Maharashtra and Gujarat coasts. It was a three layer security arrangement involving the navy, the coast guard and a joint patrolling team drawn from personnel belonging to the navy, coast guard, state police, and customs. While the underlying idea appeared to be feasible, the bitter fact is that Operation Swan has not resulted in a single seizure even after being for 18 years. According to her inadequate attention paid to overcome the basic problems of coordination, manpower, equipment, and motivation among the various concerned agencies at the ground level has been the main reason for this failure.

The Indian government launched yet another ambitious project in 2005 called the Coastal Security Scheme, which involved setting up a series of coastal police stations to strengthen the surveillance infrastructure along the coast. The scheme was, however, a non starter because the coastal states did not display any enthusiasm in implementing it as they did not perceive any threat to their coasts. Despite Mumbai being a preferred target of the terrorists, Maharashtra too implemented the scheme only in a piecemeal manner. Moreover, the decision to set up coastal police stations with a mandate to patrol shallow waters gave an excuse for the navy to withdraw from joint patrolling immediately. Mumbai’s coastal security was considerably weakened enabling the terrorists to carry out the strike with ease. 

Mumbai 26/11 forced the Indian government to overhaul the coastal security apparatus. Once again it insisted that the navy and the coast guard pool their resources to guard India’s territorial and coastal waters. The state governments were directed to establish coastal police stations and ensure that manpower and interceptor boats were provided to them.

The Maharashtra Government in an effort to beef up coastal security set up the Sagari Police Station in 2009 and another police station at Juhu in 2012. The lackadaisical approach to coastal security can be seen from the fact that Sagari Police Station operates from rooms in governmental quarters at Mahim and cannot even register a First Information Report (FIR) which is essential for investigating a case. Five of their 14 amphibian vehicles and 13 of their 27 patrol boats are in repair yards. Lacking a jetty, Sagari Police Station parks its boats at Malad or near the Gateway of India. Worst of all, most personnel at the two stations neither have the expertise to run the patrol boats nor basic swimming skills. The government ought to have focused attention on imparting training to the personnel for sea patrolling before opening the coastal police stations.

Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) Weapons – The unconventional threat

The continuing possibility of terrorist attacks using nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons is an ongoing concern in the national security policy arena in the face of a clear trend among terrorists to inflict greater numbers of casualties. 

Worldwide, the likelihood of terrorists being capable of producing or obtaining WMD may be growing due to looser controls of stockpiles and technology in the former Soviet states specifically and the broader dissemination of related technology and information in general. However, WMD remain significantly harder to produce or obtain than what is commonly depicted in the press. The Central Intelligence Agency has reported that it is likely that most terrorists will continue to choose conventional explosives over WMD, but warns that the al-Qaeda network has made obtaining WMD capability a very high priority. Indian security establishment needs to take cognizance of threat from unconventional weapons, particularly the “dirty bomb” – a type of radiological dispersal device (RDD) that combines radioactive material with conventional explosives whose objective is to contaminate the area around the explosion with radioactive particles. An RDD explosion could create fear and panic, contaminate property, and require potentially costly cleanup. Making prompt, accurate information available to the public could prevent the panic sought by terrorists.

Medical care and Disaster/Emergency Management

There is an urgent need to augment medical facilities, particularly trauma care which is inadequate even in a major metropolis like Mumbai.  Every time a disaster rocks Mumbai, causing mass casualties, the inadequacies of trauma care facilities at public hospitals get highlighted. During 26/11, most victims were rushed to the state-run but soon they had to be shifted to bigger centres which had better facilities to treat the injuries. Four years on, no lessons have been learnt. The question to be posed is whether the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) has the means to respond appropriately in the event of a terrorist strike. 

The issues discussed above are not exhaustive but are merely illustrative in order to assist the policy makers to take suitable steps to counter the scourge of terror within the country.

Is another 26/11 in the offing?

The arrest of one of the key conspirators and terrorist handlers of the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, Syed Zabiuddin Ansari alias Abu Jundal a.k.a. Abu Hamza at New Delhi’s IGI Airport in June 2012 after being deported from Saudi Arabia not only marks a high for the Indian security agencies but also turns the focus back on Islamabad’s complicity in the attack. Abu Jundal who held a Pakistani passport at the time of his capture and deportation is an Indian national from the Beed district of Maharashtra.

During the course of his interrogation, he is reported to have disclosed that he was in Saudi Arabia at the behest of Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) to raise finances for carrying out a bigger attack on India. According to him, the LeT had planned to execute a major terrorist strike in India within a year. He had also been tasked to lure Indian youth working in Saudi Arabia to join the banned terror outfit, the Indian Mujahideen. He is also reported to have told the investigators that the LeT was expanding its naval wing to carry out more terror strikes. At the time of writing it was revealed that he was planning a similar strike with an Indian Mujahideen (IM) module that he was setting up when he was nabbed in Saudi Arabia.

Two implications clearly emerge out of this interrogation – firstly Pakistan (its military establishment and the Inter-Services Intelligence, the ISI) and the India-centric terror groups, particularly the LeT are not sufficiently deterred from executing fedayeen strikes inside India and secondly, there is no change in the Pakistani mindset of using terrorism as an instrument of state policy at least vis-à-vis India. This revelation by Abu Jundal is also likely to have an adverse impact on the Indo-Pak dialogue process. One another thing that emerges from the disclosure made is that LeT and other radical Islamic groups in Pakistan, far from being reined in, are in a position to influence Pakistan’s foreign policy, especially its India policy post 26/11. There is a strong suspicion that Pakistani military establishment will not hesitate to execute another 26/11 – type attack, of course with certain modifications and improvements so as to ensure that the attacks cannot be traced back to Pakistan or the ISI.

The interrogation of Abu Jundal must alert the Indian security establishment to the fact that groups inimical to India have been in the process of plotting and will continue to plot terror strikes against India. While the capture of a key LeT operative like Jundal may be euphoric, it is time for Indian agencies to counter and neutralize this threat emanating from across the western border. The international community expected India post-26/11 to respond appropriately to this “undeclared war”. However, India chose to rely on diplomacy rather than reprisals against Pakistan. Diplomacy and sanctions may not be necessarily successful in countering terrorism. 

Post 26/11, there is very little that Pakistan has done in reining groups like the LeT. India must accept the fact that Pakistan will continue to sponsor or allow outfits like LeT to freely carry out operations against India till such time India does not respond with reprisals. While expecting a repeat of 26/11, India must realize that Pakistani ISI will try to avoid a repeat of the mistakes committed during 26/11. In other words, tactically, Pakistan while planning a strike like 26/11 will try to cover up its tracks in order to ensure that its complicity remains undetected. For one, the ISI will desist from using Pakistani nationals to carry out any future fedayeen attacks inside India. Instead, Pakistan may try to lure the Indian Mujahidden to carry out the attack thereby making it look like an indigenous terror strike. Secondly, ISI in all likelihood would avoid using a control room to give orders and instructions as was the case during 26/11. Either, there may be complete radio silence or a control room may be located in a third country. Thirdly, there is every possibility of any future attack inside India being outsourced, meaning thereby either a group with no Indian link may carry out the attack or individuals belonging to other radical Islamic groups may be assigned to carry out the attack.

Lashkar’s Maldivian connection assumes significance in this context of outsourcing any future attack inside India.

It is important to note that Lashkar’s operations have expanded over the years – it is estimated that the LeT maintains some kind of presence in about 21 countries, including Maldives.

While there are no known organized jihadi groups operating in or out of the Maldives, the country has proven a fertile ground for jihadist recruitment. Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT) and al-Qaeda have both successfully recruited youth already radicalized in Islamic schools there.

The December 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean provided an opening in this regard. In the aftermath of the disaster, radical Islamists gained a foothold in the country in the guise of humanitarian charities. The most significant of these was the Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq (IKK), which is affiliated with the Pakistan-based Jammat ud Dawa/Lashkar-e-Taiba. The IKK is linked to the Jamaat Ahl-e-Hadith sect active in the Maldives, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Many Ahl-e-Hadith groups are known to be involved in the jihadi struggle in South Asia, and most are affiliated with Kashmir-centric terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e Taiba and Harkat-ul Mujahideen. Its followers prefer to call themselves Salafis, in order to stress their closeness to the Saudis. Intelligence sources confirm that the IKK has spearheaded LeT’s activities in the Maldives, which prioritizes youth recruitment. The IKK claims to have spent 17.2 million Pakistani Rupees (roughly $282,000) on tsunami relief in the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Indonesia during 2005 as post-tsunami relief although the Maldivian government denies that the organization provided any relief. Ostensibly as part of that aid, the IKK reportedly facilitated trips for many Maldivian youth to Pakistan, enrolling them in various radical madrassas (Islamic seminaries) there.

Sporadic incidents of jihadi activity within the Maldives have also occurred. In April 2005, for example, Indian police arrested Maldivian national Asif Ibrahim who allegedly frequented the Indian state of Kerala to procure arms and ammunition for the LeT's Maldives operation. Ibrahim confessed to planning to blow up a government-run mosque and assassinate then-President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom. An official release from the Maldivian government indicated that Asif Ibrahim had become a member of the UK-based extremist Islamic group Jama'ah-tul-Muslimeen in 2001. In the early weeks of February 2010, nine alleged Maldivian terrorists arrested in Pakistan’s troubled South Waziristan tribal region in March 2009 were repatriated to the Maldives. According to national police, the nine have ties to the bombing that took place in Malé’s Sultan Park in September 2007, and may have left the country for Pakistan via Sri Lanka for further training and indoctrination. 

The Maldivian government admitted that Pakistan-based terrorist groups have successfully recruited hundreds of Maldivian Muslims to fight against government forces in Pakistan.  The bin Laden network has done so as well; an al-Qaeda video circulated in November 2009 featured Ali Jaleel, a Maldivian national who fought alongside pro-Taliban forces in Pakistan.  Soon thereafter, another recruitment video featured a previously unknown al-Qaeda cell operating in the Maldives, and exhorted jihadists to travel to the country, stating "Your brothers in the Maldives are calling you.”

International concerns over the growth of Islamic extremism in the Maldives have risen since the May 2002 arrest of Ibrahim Fauzee. Fauzee, a Muslim cleric (now heading the Islamic Foundation of Maldives), was arrested in a suspected al-Qaeda safe house in Karachi, Pakistan and subsequently held in the Guantanamo Bay detention camp until his release and repatriation to the Maldives in March 2005. The incident sparked concerns about the spread of radical Islam and the penetration of international terror groups like al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba into the social fabric of this Indian Ocean archipelago. 

The Fauzee case was not an isolated event, however. There is growing evidence of Maldivian youths frequenting Pakistan for reasons unknown or suspicious in nature, though enrollment in various madrassas (Islamic seminaries) is usually cited as the prime reason for their travel. Intelligence agencies of the United States and India have noted this development with concern, and believe that growing religious extremism in the Maldives is a Pakistani import.

Another significant aspect which Indian security establishment must look into is the recent reports of three African terrorist groups al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Shabaab in Somalia, and Boko Haram in Nigeria seeking to “coordinate and synchronize” their operations. Since the groups in question are affiliated to the Al Qaeda and with reports of Somalis being trained in terrorist training camps in Pakistan, the possibility of using African nationals to execute an attack cannot be ruled out. It is also important to bear in mind the fact that in August 2010, a blast in the Somali capital Mogadishu left ten Al Shabaab terrorists dead while they were trying to assemble a suicide car bomb. Two of the suspected terrorists were Indian nationals according to the Somali Ministry of Information. A co-operation of this nature is not unknown amongst international terror groups. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-08-23/india/28291614_1_islamist-terror-al-shabaab-jihadis

One of the recommendations made to the US policy makers contained in the report titled “The Menace that is Lashkar-e-Taiba” prepared by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is to destroy the LeT for, left unchecked, it would eventually evolve into a formidable threat. Together with its allies, the US should use all available means to eviscerate the LeT – with or without Pakistan’s help. The US has realized albeit, a bit too late that LeT has assumed dangerous proportions and use of force is the only viable option available to it and its allies to neutralize the Pak-based terror outfits.

India irrespective of the action initiated or proposed to be initiated by the US and its allies must itself draw up a plan of action to counter and neutralize the ISI-backed LeT and other groups. For India, the best option is use of covert operations. While India’s experience in this area is limited, there is now an urgent need to penetrate Pakistani society and carry out subversive activities aimed at disrupting/undermining the ability of ISI and its proxies to carry out terrorist activities against India. Special Forces may also be tasked to carry out limited but punitive strikes across the Line of Control with the objective of destroying terror training camps and launch pads located in the border regions. Briefly put, India needs to wrest the initiative from Pak by its limited offensive actions. India has countered Pak actions on Indian territory since the time proxy war was initiated by Pakistan. It is time to turn the tables now.