Will the Doklam Standoff Lead to Armed Conflict? - 1

Belligerent voices from Beijing

With the border dispute at Sikkim extending beyond a month, these are some of the statements emanating from the Chinese government and/or the Chinese media:

 China told foreign diplomats posted in Beijing that it’s “patience with India won't be indefinite”. China's version of the dispute is that India has "illegally transgressed" the border at Sikkim to stop a road from being built on a plateau in what it calls the Donglang region. India agrees with Bhutan's claim that the land belongs not to China, but to the small Himalayan kingdom. Before the confrontation escalated, India had also warned China that the road in what Bhutan and India call Dokalam was “a serious security concern” because it gave China access to the "Chicken's Neck", a narrow wedge of land, which links the seven northeastern states to the rest of India.

China is battle ready and not afraid to go to war with India, and will face "all-out confrontation" along the entire disputed border, a Chinese daily has warned.

Keeping up its sabre-rattling over the Doklam standoff, China's media said Beijing "doesn't fear going to war" and that any escalation would see India "face the consequence of an all-out confrontation".

A commentary in the hawkish Global Times, a tabloid under the People's Daily known for its hardline views, accused India of "repeatedly making provocations" since the 1962 war, the latest of which, according to writer Duo Mu, was the standoff near the India-China-Bhutan trijunction.

"China must be prepared for future conflicts and confrontation," the commentary said.

"China can take further countermeasures along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). If India stirs up conflicts in several spots, it must face the consequence of an all-out confrontation with China along the entire LAC."

India should not use "trespass" into the Doklam area in the Sikkim sector as a "policy tool" to achieve its "political targets", China said on Tuesday, asking New Delhi to immediately withdraw its troops to avoid any escalation.

China also carried out live fire drills in Tibet. There was another report on July 3 which talked about an armoured brigade drill at 5100 metres in Tibet to test "combat readiness". State media said the drills included "the quick delivery of troops and different military units working together on joint attacks". Radar units "identifying enemy aircraft and soldiers using anti-aircraft artillery to annihilate targets" were also tested, reports said. The official Xinhua News Agency reported from Lhasa that the drill also included the PLA's most advanced battle tank, the Type 96B and was aimed at testing "full combat readiness".

Pangong Tso Incursion Bid

Indian border guards foiled an attempt by Chinese soldiers to enter India's territory on the north bank of Pangong Tso (Lake) in Ladakh on 15^th August 2017, reported PTI, quoting officials.

Soldiers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) tried to enter the Indian side in two areas – Finger Four and Finger Five – twice between 6 am and 9 am. (The Finger Four area in the region has been a bone of contention between India and China as both claim it to be a part of their territory).

But on both the occasions their attempts were thwarted by alert Indian troops, they said.

After the Chinese troopers found their path blocked by Indian soldiers who formed a human chain, they began hurling stones, prompting swift retaliation by Indian border guards.

Personnel from both sides received minor injuries and the situation was brought under control after the customary banner drill under which both sides hold banners before stepping back to their respective positions.

The stand-off lasted 30 minutes, after which the forces pulled back.

The skirmish along the border comes at a time when the countries are locked in a face-off in the Doklam area of the Sikkim sector. The standoff has been ongoing for more than 50 days, after Indian troops stopped the Chinese Army from building a road in the area.

Clearly there is a lot of belligerence in the language and provocative actions in the form of incursions and fire drills in the Tibetan Autonomous Region leaving very little room for negotiations to resolve the ongoing impasse. 

Almost all the Indian electronic media channels have been referring to the Chinese military exercises in the Tibetan region as part of its “psych ops” and that there have been no large-scale PLA troop movement in the area suggestive of aggressive intent. Should India dismiss the tone and tenor of the statements of the Chinese as mere “psych ops?” According to a recent article in the Washington Post, India and China were perilously close to a military conflict. Analysts say that there is a potential for armed clashes elsewhere along the India-China border. PLA could indulge in shallow incursions – the PLA could try something in eastern Ladakh as was seen at Pangong Tso or eastern Arunachal Pradesh or Lipulekh Pass and Barahoti in the central sector (Himachal-Uttarakhand).  

Experts’ views based on the ground situation

A few of the former senior officers of the Indian army believe that the standoff may lead to skirmishes and not a full-fledged war between India and China. They are of the view that the Chinese may create other trouble spots, meaning thereby incursions in other sectors, in order to force India to withdraw from Doklam. 

Buttressing the analysis of the Generals, sources, well aware about the Chinese border informed ANI that there has not been any significant movement of military forces in the Tibetan region in the last two months. The sources also added that for India the tipping point will be when there's a significant troop movement across the eleven bridges that join the northern parts of the 1,100 kilometers of Tsangpo with the southern part of Tibet. The PLA’s war rhetoric has not so far translated to large-scale mobilization or deployment of troops on the ground.

China has deployed about 15-16 divisions along the Line of Actual Control starting from the Karakoram Pass up to the Arunachal Pradesh (LAC 3,488 km). This entire area comes under the Western Theatre Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. In case of the war, China can also move four to five divisions, which are stationed in the Xinjiang province, in the north of the Jammu and Kashmir, to cover the Ladakh sector. 

There has been no unusual movement by the Chinese at the LAC since last two months. Talking to ANI, they explained it as Chinese tactics to pressurise India. 

In the event of an armed conflict….

Iskander Rehman, a senior fellow at Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy at Salve Regina University has in his paper for the Naval War College Review titled “A Himalayan Challenge: India’s Conventional Deterrent and the Role of Special Operations Forces along the Sino-Indian Border” outlined four factors that is likely to shape an India –China conflict. Firstly India has far greater concentration of troops close to the border as compared to China; China stations a limited number of troops in its interior in Tibet. Secondly, insofar as the climate and terrain are concerned, with the exception of parts of Ladakh and Sikkim it is rather difficult for India to conduct mechanized warfare. On the other hand China has distinct advantages for surveillance and use of artillery. The high altitude and extreme cold affect military equipment including weaponry. Thirdly, there is considerable disparity in the infrastructure – the Chinese have developed highways and rail network which can facilitate the movement of PLA troops and equipment quite rapidly. Fourthly, China has one unified Western Theatre Command (WTC)[1], while the responsibility of securing India’s territorial integrity along the Chinese border are distributed between four regional army and air force commands. Thus the author is suggesting about the possible problems of coordination between the various commands and arms in the event of a conflict.

Coming to the military infrastructure in Tibet, China has five operational air fields. 

In addition, there are four-five landing strips, which may not be able to hold operations due to the lack of operational capabilities. 

Defending the nearly 4,000 km-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India is the Lhasa-based Western Theatre Command of the Chinese army, a sprawling military formation spread across 4 provinces including the Tibetan Autonomous Region, where the drills were held. The command includes elements of the Chinese air force and its rocket (missile) forces.

In the event of an escalation, China can use its massive railway infrastructure to bring in additional troops. That has not happened. Since 2009, China has been training in Transregional Support Operations: shifting men and weapons between regions in training exercises.

According to a study carried out by Kevin McCauley for Jamestown Foundation, the primary border areas under dispute are the Chinese-occupied Aksai Chin in the west, and Arunachal Pradesh in the east controlled by India.

“The Sino-Indian disputed borders represent isolated high-altitude regions with difficult terrain and weather conditions presenting problems for troops, weapons and equipment. Ground combat will occur mainly along roads that normally follow valleys or ridges, limiting support and cooperation between forces operating on different axes. The lack of cross-terrain mobility limits the ability of ground forces to conduct penetrating or outflanking operations against enemy forces. PLA publications stress airmobile landings in the enemy rear area to overcome the restricted terrain and enemy defensive positions. Special operations forces available to the WTC would represent highly qualified units to operate in the enemy rear area to disrupt operations and attack vulnerable lines of communications. The high-altitude reduces aviation performance and lift capabilities, and increases maintenance requirements on equipment in general, although the thin air increases the range of projectiles and shrapnel. Weather conditions would mostly limit air operations to June through September. The 1962 Sino-Indian War was fought in October and November without air support. Cold high-plateau regions place increases requirements on engineering and support operations, and the thin air is difficult for the troops even after acclimation. This situation reduces unit combat capabilities and increases non-combat losses. Training new recruits could affect an operation depending on the timing. New recruits would likely achieve a minimal operational capability to conduct small unit combat by late spring, which should be adequate for the restricted terrain which will limit maneuver and dictate primarily small unit operations. Depending on the timing of the crisis, the PLA could decide to delay mobilization of soldiers in the WTC to retain full combat capability of units.

The Aksai Chin border terrain mock-up at the Qingtongxia Combined Arms Tactical Training Bases (CATTB) depicts mostly Chinese occupied territory with only a small portion of Indian controlled terrain. This appears to indicate a focus on a Joint Border Counterattack Campaign in response to an Indian military incursion. However, the exact purpose of the large terrain model is unclear. The border counterattack campaign was originally considered an Army offensive campaign, although some PLA books now refer to it as a joint campaign. This campaign includes initial border defense actions with a transition to the offense to regain lost territory and restore the situation. The two mountain brigades and independent mechanized brigade are the closest ground forces to Arunachal Pradesh, although the 13th Group Army trains in mountain warfare and could deploy as needed. While no PLA forces are permanently garrisoned in the Aksai Chin area, it is likely that the mechanized infantry division in Hotan would deploy to this area. Air and missile strikes would support the ground operations to annihilate and expel invading enemy forces depending on the weather, or as in the Sino-Indian Border War operations could consist of mostly ground operations.”[2]

Chinese war planning has traditionally placed a heavy emphasis on preemptive strike as a means of seizing the initiative and unsettling the enemy. The PLA operations in Korea, against India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979 have been categorized as defensive counter attacks although China had been the aggressor in each of these conflicts. For Chinese thinkers there is no clear conceptual firewall separating defensive grand strategies from offensive military strategies or tactics. To the contrary, preemptive military action is an integral part of the Chinese concept of escalation management or war control.

Writings have emphasized on concentration of “elite forces and sharp arms” and the importance of gaining initiative from striking first and fighting a quick battle to force a quick resolution. Thus in the event of an escalation to armed conflict, China is likely to rely on its air power, airborne operations and Special Operation Forces (SOF) operating behind enemy (Indian) lines to gain the upper hand. This is the tactic that the PLA may adopt in the event of a short military conflict. Thus, there may not be significant troop movement across the eleven bridges that join the northern parts of the 1,100 kilometers of Tsangpo with the southern part of Tibet as stated above. According to Rehman PLA SOF would be assigned key roles to assault vital enemy targets, paralyze enemy operational systems, reduce enemy operational capabilities and interfere, delay or disrupt enemy’s operational activities to create favourable conditions for its main force units. A former senior officer of the Indian Army had stated that if a divisional size attack is launched in Tawang, then Chinese could employ its SOF units to cut off all routes for buildup of reserves, raid artillery and logistic locations. The deep induction of SOFs for providing early warnings and information on the movement of Indian reserves could also be tasked.  

India has closely monitored the development and modernization of China’s airborne assault capabilities in the form of PLAAF’s 15^th Airborne Corps. The Corps Headquarters is at Xiagon and it comprises of three divisions (with over 35,000 troops) with a light artillery and mechanized component. The Central Military Commission accorded it priority for modernization and its capabilities were upgraded by the induction of the Y-20 heavy aircraft. This Corps is considered vital to the War Zone Campaign Concept and likely to be employed for disruptive deep strikes. PLA has carried out large-scale airborne exercises in the Tibet Autonomous Region in the past few years. Thus unlike large-scale infantry operations in 1962, the Chinese may use Special Operation Forces and air assault forces extensively.

The PLA could conduct a Mountain Offensive Campaign or possibly a Joint Fire Strike Campaign if Beijing issued orders for offensive operations. A Joint Fire Strike campaign would support the border counterattack or mountain offensive, but could also represent an independent campaign. The terrain, weather, and difficult engineering and comprehensive support conditions restraining the deployment and sustainment of forces could make a joint fire strike appear more advantageous to a mountain offensive. A mountain offensive would require a substantial advantage in the correlation of forces for the attacker operating under terrain and weather restrictions. As an independent campaign, a joint fire strike could represent punitive strikes against key Indian targets. A joint fire strike campaign is a long-range precision strike by long-range rocket, missile and air forces with the objective to destroy important enemy targets, paralyze the enemy’s operational system of systems (integrated force grouping), weaken the will to resist and destroy war potential, or create conditions for other operations. The Chinese leadership could conclude that conducting precision strikes against key Indian targets was preferable to conducting difficult offensive ground operations where the defender has an advantage.

Lt. General H.S. Panag a former Northern Army Commander in his blog “How will Chinese use of force in Doklam manifest?” writes: “My assessment is that the Chinese will neutralise our strategy by not getting involved in “close infantry combat” over unfavourable terrain. If at all it chooses to use force, its strategy will be based on technological warfare with overwhelming use of PGM and cyber warfare. It will restrict its initial offensive to the Doklam and Sikkim Sector, but would be prepared for escalation to other sectors.

Such an attack will come in the winter, when conventional ground operations are severely restricted. PLA will carry out minimal mobilisation to cater to the unlikely tactical offensive by India in the winter. A massive PGM attack will be launched on our troops at Doklam and Doka La using cruise missiles and artillery after pulling out its own troops to safety.

Simultaneously, a massive cyber attack will be launched to neutralize our command and control systems and our fire power means. The strike will be with a declared limited aim of evicting us from Doklam. Depending upon our strategic and operational response, the PLA will escalate with similar attacks on more defensive positions in Sikkim and other sectors.” (cont'd)

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[1]  In February 2016, China announced a major military rezoning that merged the former Chengdu and Lanzhou Military Regions into one unified Western Theatre Command.

[2] China’s Western Theater Command – Kevin McCauley, Jamestown Foundation

Analysis of the Standoff in Sikkim

The drums of war may not have been beaten as yet. However, the standoff on the Sikkim border has continued since early June of this year. A peaceful resolution does not appear to be in sight with both sides locked in an eyeball to eyeball confrontation.

Genesis of the Confrontation

The Indian defence establishment is opposed to China's attempts to construct a road on the Doklam plateau leading right up to the Sikkim-Bhutan-Tibet tri-junction, which has emerged as the major flashpoint in the ongoing face-off between the two armies in the remote border region. 

 Source: https://thewire.in/153189/construction-doklam-will-harm-security-interests-india-tells-china/

The Doklam plateau is Bhutanese territory but China, which calls it Donglang, regularly sends its patrols to the area to lay claim to it. Beijing is anxious to integrate the plateau in its adjoining Chumbi Valley. China is desperate to incorporate the plateau in its adjoining Chumbi Valley, which is shaped like a dagger jutting into India, separating Sikkim from Bhutan for geo-strategic reasons. 

China claims a total of about 764 square kilometers of Bhutanese territory – in the North West about 269 square kilometers constituting Doklam, Sinchulung, Dramana and Shakhatoe in Samste, Haa and Paro districts; and in the Central parts about 495 square kilometers constituting the Pasamlung and the Jakarlung valley in the Wangdue Phodrang district.

In 1996, China offered Bhutan a “resolution package deal” proposing an exchange of Pasamlung and Jakarlung valleys aggregating an area of 495 square kilometers in Central Bhutan with the pasture land of Doklam, Sinchulung, Dramana and Shakhatoe, amounting to 269 square kilometers in North Western Bhutan. However, Bhutan rejected it. In 1998, Bhutan and China signed a peace agreement promising to maintain peace and tranquility on the Bhutan-China Border Areas. 

China violated this peace agreement by trying to construct roads in Doklam. According to Bhutanese ambassador to India, Doklam is a disputed territory and there is a written agreement between the two countries that pending the final resolution of the boundary issue, peace and tranquility should be maintained in the area. China thus cannot describe the area as a part of its territory.

Strategic Dimensions

Chumbi Valley is only 500 kilometres from Siliguri corridor – a place called the Chicken’s Neck which connects India to North East India and Nepal to Bhutan. 

This explains the rationale behind the aforesaid package deal that China has offered to Bhutan – Central areas for Bhutan in exchange the North-Western areas, which lie next to the Chumbi Valley tri-junction, for China.

The Chumbi Valley has enormous strategic importance for India in the sense that dominance here by China will adversely affect the stability in the Siliguri corridor, vital not only for the linkage between Indian mainland and the north-eastern Indian states but also to ensure security for Kolkata and the north Bihar plains.

And this is all the more important after China opened a railway network in August 2014 connecting Lhasa with Shigatse, a small town near the Indian border in Sikkim. China now wants to extend this line up to Yadong, situated at the mouth of the Chumbi valley. And once this is done, potential threats to the Siliguri corridor from China will take a menacing proportion.

India-Bhutan relations are guided by the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed in 1949 and renewed in 2007. Bhutan and India are supposed to consult each other closely on foreign affairs and defence matters.

The Indian Army has always been present in Bhutan and is posted on many China-Bhutan border posts. The Indian Army maintains a training mission in Bhutan, known as the Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT), not to speak of the exemplary work done in that country by the Border Roads Organisation (BRO), a subdivision of the Indian Army Corps of Engineers.

Besides, the Royal Bhutan Army relies on the Eastern Command of the Indian Air Force for air support during emergencies. In 1958, the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had declared in the Indian Parliament that any aggression against Bhutan would be seen as aggression against India.

In order to get a bigger hold on the area and a wider depth in the event of a military deployment are attempting to shift down the tri-junction point in the Chumbi valley by almost 12 kilometres. China thus claims Gyemochen is the tri-junction between India, China (Tibet) and Bhutan whereas the Survey of India maps of 1956 show Batang La, north of Gyemochan, as the tri-junction.

The difference of 18 kms would affect the claims of both countries regarding the border with reference to the McMahon Line, which Beijing describes as 'illegal' beyond Myanmar.

They intend building a road which they want to extend further so that it will bring them as close as possible to Chicken's Neck.

'The Chinese troops have even been patrolling areas up to a place called Gemochin, where the Royal Bhutanese Army has its posts and PLA troops marched to their positions and reportedly even confronted them for being in their territory,' the sources said.

From the Chinese Army's point of view, the Chumbi valley has to be widened as they want to move closer to the strategically important Chicken's Neck corridor in Siliguri - which is under the watch of Army's 33 Corps headquarters situated in Sukna in West Bengal.

The Indian establishment is obviously concerned about Chinese incursions into the Bhutanese territory. For one, India will lose its "strategic advantage" in the region if the road is constructed. 

According to a source, "Though our troops don't hold the plateau, the watershed they hold dominates it. The Dhok La, in which we are present, opens into the Chumbi Valley."

Moreover, China can militarily threaten the strategically-vulnerable and narrow Siliguri Corridor just about 50-km away in West Bengal — the so-called "Chicken's Neck" that connects the rest of India with the north-east states — if China manages to extend the road up to the tri-junction.

"China already has a couple of roads coming up to a certain point in the Chumbi Valley. If one of them is extended till the tri-junction, through what we consider is Bhutanese territory, it will help the PLA in military logistics and maneuverability, like rapidly moving artillery and other equipment, in the case of a conflict with India," said the source. 

Cartographic Aggression

The Chinese have adopted one strategy – embark on a cartographic aggression, followed by a physical aggression on the ground. This is the reason why the Chinese are reluctant to share their final official Claim Line of 1960 of their perception of LAC, as this gives them the freedom to engage in further cartographic aggression leading to physical confrontation. 

 Source: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/china-releases-new-map-territorial-claims-stand-off-site/1/991733.html

Stepping up its claims that India had "trespassed", China has now released a map showing the site of the stand-off as well as China's territorial claims at the India-China-Bhutan tri-junction that are in conflict with India's and Bhutan's claims.

The map claims the Indian Army crossed the border at Doka La pass, depicted with a blue arrow, into the Doklam plateau which India and Bhutan see as Bhutanese territory but is claimed by China.

The map, released on Friday, also reveals China's substantial territorial claims at the tri-junction that are conflicting with India's and Bhutan's. It shows that China fixes the tri-junction far south of where India and Bhutan do, which explains the current stand-off.

WHAT THE MAP SHOWS

The Chinese tri-junction, marked by an arrow that claims it is under the 1890 Britain-China treaty, is at the Mount Gipmochi. This is far south of where India and Bhutan mark the tri-junction, which the map acknowledged with a dotted line.

The area on the Doklam plateau south of the dotted line is claimed by China, and it is here that Beijing was building a road into what Bhutan sees as its territory, triggering the stand-off with Bhutan and India.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry said on Friday: "The line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier, and follows the above-mentioned water-parting to the point where it meets Nepal territory. It is without any doubt that the spot where the Indian border troops trespassed is on the Chinese side of the boundary."

Indian Reaction

 

India, however, on 30^th June 2017, reminded China that building a road in this disputed area was a violation. "India is deeply concerned at the recent Chinese actions and has conveyed to the Chinese Government that such construction would represent a significant change of status quo with serious security implications for India," the Ministry of External Affairs said.

"In this context, the Indian side has underlined that the two Governments had in 2012 reached agreement that the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalized in consultation with the concerned countries. Any attempt, therefore, to unilaterally determine tri-junction points is in violation of this understanding. Where the boundary in the Sikkim sector is concerned, India and China had reached an understanding also in 2012 reconfirming their mutual agreement on the "basis of the alignment". Further discussions regarding finalization of the boundary have been taking place under the Special Representatives framework." 

Conclusion

India needs to call China’s bluff. India through diplomatic channels and other outlets must expose China’s cartographic aggression and must thwart the physical land grabbing carried out by the Chinese (where it invariably uses civilian resources like herders to settle on disputed territory and then follow it up with PLA control). And if minimum use of force is required to be used, India must not hesitate to use it, more so as a message than as a strategy.  Beijing understands the language of force and bullet than of words.