Wednesday, July 15, 2009

Indo-Pak Dialogue: The Futility of Engaging the Devil

Pakistan Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani will meet his Indian counterpart Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Sharm El-Sheikh on July 16, 2009. Prior to this meeting the Indian and Pakistani Foreign Secretaries will also meet on the sidelines of the summit.

While the Indian Prime Minister has agreed to meet his Pakistani counterpart, it remains to be seen whether this meeting scheduled to take place on the sidelines of the NAM summit will re-start the composite dialogue process which was suspended after the 26/11 terror attacks in Mumbai. While Pakistan is only interested in highlighting and internationalizing the Kashmir issue, India is ready to discuss Kashmir provided Pakistan gives assurances of curbing anti-India terror groups based on Pakistani soil.

Pakistan’s terror history: There is not only animosity but a deep sense of mistrust in Indo-Pak relations. The last two decades saw this animosity increase manifold and distrust aggravated. In 1989 the late General Zia-ul-Haq initiated a low-cost proxy war against India. His successors, both civilian and military only continued this low-intensity conflict. The two neighbours were on the brink of war at least on three occasions in the last one decade alone. When the Indian PM Vajpayee was visiting Lahore in February 1999, the Pakistanis were busy plotting the incursion in Kargil. Thereafter, Pakistan actively aided in the hijack of the Indian Airlines plane IC-814 to Kandahar. After the failed summit at Agra in July 2001, the Indian Parliament was attacked by terrorists belonging to Jaish-e-Mohammed headed by Masood Azhar, one of the terrorists who were released by India in exchange for the passengers of the hijacked Indian Airlines plane. In July 2008, a terror group led by Sirajuddin Haqqani (Haqqani network) with the active assistance of the ISI carried out a suicide bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul. Thereafter, in November 2008, Pakistani terrorists carried out the worst ever terrorist strike in the heart of India’s commercial capital, now infamously referred to as Mumbai 26/11.

In a majority of the incidents listed below, there was clear evidence of Pakistani involvement, directly or indirectly.

July 11, 2006, Mumbai: At least 200 killed in seven serial blasts in suburban trains.

July 11, 2006, Srinagar: At least eight people, including tourists and pilgrims, killed in five hand grenade attacks.

May 25, 2006, Srinagar: Four tourists killed in a powerful explosion at Batpora.

May 21, 2006, Srinagar: Seven people including two guerrillas killed as militants attack a Congress party rally.

March 7, 2006, Varanasi: Triple bombings killed 23 people and injured 68 others at an ancient temple and crowded railway station.

Dec 28, 2005, Bangalore: One retired professor was killed in an attack on the Indian Institute of Science.

Oct 29, 2005, New Delhi: Three blasts in the capital ahead of Hindu festival of Diwali killed 65 people and wounded about 200.
Aug 15, 2004, Assam: Three bomb explosions across the state, killing 16 people, mostly school children, in Dhemaji district.
Aug 25, 2003, Mumbai: serial blasts killed about 60.

May 14, 2003, Jammu: Militants attack an army camp near Jammu, killing more than 30, including women and children.

Sept. 24, 2002, Gandhinagar: Two terrorists attack the Akhsardham temple, killing 39 visitors.

Dec 13, 2001, New Delhi: Terrorists attacked Indian parliament, killing 12 people including six policemen. All five terrorists were also killed.

Oct 1, 2001, Srinagar: Militants attack Jammu-Kashmir assembly complex, killing about 35.

In June 2009, at Yekaterinburg on the side lines of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) summit, the Indian PM gave a strongly worded statement to the Pakistani president Zardari in presence of the international media - “Excellency, I am pleased to meet you. But I have a limited mandate to tell you that the Pakistani territory can’t be used for acts of terror against India.” With his curt message to Zardari, said in full view of the waiting media, Singh made sure it reached a much larger audience, particularly in India and Pakistan. The one-liner left Zardari embarrassed. The media ambush left Pakistan fuming and they made a hue and cry of the so-called badtamizi on part of the Indian PM. This badtamizi language ought to have been uttered long back. What Pakistan has conveniently forgotten is that India has been tolerating the Pakistani badmashi of terrorism for the past several years.

President Zardari recently made a candid confession about the fact that Islamabad created and nurtured Islamic terrorist groups for short-term tactical objectives. But what Zardari says and what Pakistan does are totally different. Either there is a disconnect between the President and the government that he is supposed to be in charge or Zardari is merely engaging in an international PR exercise.

Pakistan’s sincerity in tackling terror aimed at India questionable: Post 26/11, while doing nothing concrete or substantial against the perpetrators of the Mumbai attack or anti-India terror networks, Pakistan has been indulging in what can be crudely termed as a “tamasha” (show or spectacle). While sufficient evidence was made available by Indian authorities to Pakistan to nail the Lashkar-e- Toiba (LeT) for Mumbai 26/11 and dismantle the terrorist infrastructure, Pakistan vacillated between denial and floating conspiracy theories on their television channels of possible Mossad-RAW involvement and eventually under international pressure did what was largely symbolic – arrested a few terrorists and placed the chief of LeT under house arrest. Saeed was treated more like a guest of the state and less like a terror accused; in fact he was charged under Maintenance of Public Order law under which persons could be temporarily detained. Hafeez Saeed’s release was orchestrated through a court process, seen more as a sham in India. Prior to his release, LeT organized rallies, protest marches through Lahore against Saeed’s incarceration.

After the terror strikes in Mumbai, India submitted a formal request to the U.N. Security Council to put the group Jamaat-ud-Dawa, (JuD) the parent organization of the LeT and Saeed on the list of individuals and organizations sanctioned by the United Nations for association with terrorism. In response to the UN resolution and the government ban, the JuD reorganized itself under the name of Tehrik-e-Tahafuz Qibla Awal (TTQA).

A Pakistani journalist, Arif Jamal in his book, Shadow War – The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir writes that right from the time of partition, Pakistan was and has always been on the lookout for opportunities to foment trouble in Kashmir. There were occasional pauses in Pakistani efforts, particularly after the 1971 war. These pauses were more circumstantial rather than a change of Pakistani heart. It is difficult to see why Pakistani military leadership which refers to terrorists as “strategic assets” will be sincere about peace or the peace process.

The Road Ahead: Nothing concrete has emerged out of Indo-Pak talks in the recent past, except for spurt in terrorist activities. The Pakistani leopard cannot be expected to change its spots in the near future either. India cannot be pressurized to re-start the composite dialogue with Pakistan without any pre-conditions by the US or any other party. At this point of time, the focal point of discussion is the presence of terror networks aimed at India and steps Pakistan is taking to curb this menace. Any talks on Kashmir or any other issue will be seen as a sign of Indian weakness and send a wrong signal to terror outfits based in Pakistan as well as to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence. Since Pakistan understands the language of coercion better, India must talk to Pakistan with a big stick in Sharm El-Sheikh or at any time in the future. That is the bottom-line.

Post-Script: At the time of this writing, there has been a warning of terrorist threat to 7 targets in and around Mumbai from LeT, possibly by sea.

Saturday, March 14, 2009

The Impeccable Incident – A Legal Perspective

On March 8, 2009, the USNS Impeccable was operating 75 miles south of Hainan island belonging to China, while it was using its sonar array to monitor Chinese submarines near the island of Hainan a major submarine base. It was engaged by several Chinese ships. According to the Pentagon, the unarmed Impeccable was shadowed by five Chinese ships, including a Bureau of Maritime Fisheries Patrol Vessel, an Oceanographic Administration patrol vessel, a Chinese naval ocean surveillance ship, and two small Chinese trawlers, which manoeuvered close to the Impeccable, with two of the ships coming as close as 50 feet (15 m), waving Chinese flags, and ordering the Impeccable from the area. The civilian crew of Impeccable sprayed water at one of the nearest Chinese ships; the Chinese sailors stripped down to their underwear and their vessel closed in to within 25 feet of the American ship. Shortly after the incident, the Impeccable radioed the Chinese crews, informing them of its intentions to leave the area, and requesting a safe pass to travel. When trying to leave the area, however, the two Chinese trawlers stopped directly in front of the Impeccable, forcing it to do an emergency stop to avoid a collision. Once the Impeccable got underway, the crew aboard one of the Chinese ships used a grappling hook to try to snag Impeccable's towed sonar array.

This was the latest in a string of incidents involving the Impeccable and Chinese vessels. On March 5, 2009, a Chinese frigate approached Impeccable, crossing its bow at a range of approximately 100 yards. This was followed less than two hours later by a Chinese Y-12 aircraft, conducting 11 flyovers of Impeccable at an altitude of 600 feet (180 m) and a range from 100–300 feet (30–90 m). The frigate then crossed Impeccable's bow again, this time at a range of approximately 400–500 yards, without notifying Impeccable its intentions.

On March 7, a Chinese intelligence collection ship contacted the Impeccable over bridge-to-bridge radio, informing her that her operations were illegal and directing Impeccable to leave the area or "suffer the consequences."

The United States lodged formal protests following the incident.

This is the second time that the Chinese warships have been involved in a controversial incident in the past couple of months. In the middle of January 2009, an Indian submarine played "cat-and-mouse" with two Chinese warships off the coast of Africa before it was spotted and “forced” to surface in the latest round of cold-war games between the two countries.

Neither India nor China officially confirmed or denied the reports. But Chinese media reported the incident and an Indian Navy source said “we do not discuss our deployments”.

Why were the Chinese provoked? In order to understand the Chinese apprehensions it is necessary to understand the background of this vessel and its operations.

The ship USNS Impeccable is an Impeccable-class ocean surveillance ship aquired by the US Navy in 2001 and assigned to the Navy’s Special Missions Program.[1] Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) is a towed array sonar system of the US Navy. SURTASS systems developed in the 1980s were deployed on Stalwart-Class Ocean Surveillance Ships and were passive, receive only sonar systems. The array was towed miles behind the ships and were designed for long range detection of submarines.

SURTASS Low Frequency Active (LFA) systems were designed for long range detection using both active and passive sensors. The active component transmits an audio signal between 100 Hz and 500 Hz from an array suspended below the ship while the passive SURTASS array is towed miles behind to receive the signal. LFA has been criticized for its potential to injure undersea wildlife.

SURTASS Twin-Line consists of either the long passive SURTASS array or the Twin-line array consisting of two shorter passive arrays towed side by side. The Twin-line Engineering Development Model was installed on USNS Assertive, and the first production model was installed on USNS Bold. Both ships are no longer serving as SURTASS units. As of 2006, SURTASS was deployed on T-AGOS 19 Victorious class and T-AGOS 23 Impeccable class Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull (SWATH) vessels as well as MV Cory Chouest, the developmental ship for SURTASS LFA.

China alleged that the US Navy ship involved in a confrontation with its vessels off the southern island of Hainan violated international and Chinese law. Admittedly, the USNS Impeccable was 75 miles off the coast of Hainan, much beyond the territorial waters (12- nautical miles) of China. According to Beijing the ship was conducting activities within the waters of its exclusive economic zone.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze key legal issues from the perspective of international law The question that arises is whether the activities conducted by USNS Impeccable, viz. surveillance or gathering intelligence in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) was in violation of international law?

The Law of the Sea: The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea or United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) adopted on 30th April 1982 for the first time provided that coastal states had sovereign rights in a 200-nautical mile zone – called the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) with respect to natural resources and certain economic activities and exercise jurisdiction over marine science research and protection of the environment.

“Article 56 of UNCLOS 1982 provides for the rights and duties of the coastal state in the Exclusive Economic Zone –
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention.
It is important to note that the coastal states do not enjoy complete sovereignty over the EEZ, but only sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources and jurisdiction with regard to establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; marine scientific research; the protection and preservation of the marine environment. The coastal states cannot in any manner impede the freedom of navigation, which China sought to do in this case.

Article 58 of UNCLOS 1982 stipulates the rights and duties of other states in the Exclusive Economic Zone –
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part. (These provisions relate to the High Seas)
3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.”

Article 301 of the 1982 Convention also provides: “In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention, States Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”

Can the Impeccable’s mission be construed as a hostile act or be considered in any manner as a threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of China? The US ship, assuming that it was indulging in surveillance or intelligence gathering, was firstly unarmed and was not part of any naval fleet or battle group. Hence, it would be stretching the law, particularly Article 301 a bit too far to bring its alleged surveillance activities within its ambit.

From a purely legal perspective, although aircraft and ships are expressly prohibited from spying in the twelve mile territorial zone, they are not so prohibited from engaging in spying in the EEZ. Indeed, Article 19(2) (a), applicable to the territorial zone, contains virtually the same provision as Article 301 requiring states to refrain from any threat or use of force. In addition, however, Article 19(2) (c) then expressly prohibits intelligence-gathering activities. This suggests that the drafters and state signatories meant to distinguish between (i) spying and “any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the Coast state” and (ii) spying in the territorial zone and the EEZ or high seas. Had the states wanted to make spying in the EEZ illegal, they could have included an express prohibition against it just as they did for spying in the 12 mile territorial zone. Moreover, a general principle of international law is that whatever is not explicitly prohibited is permitted (see S.S. Lotus (1927)). Had the Chinese gone ahead with their threats and by their acts caused loss or damage to life and property, it would have been their action that would have been contrary to international law and the Chinese would have been guilty of impeding maritime freedoms.

[1] Military Sealift Command's Special Mission Program controls 24 ships that provide operating platforms and services for unique US military and federal government missions. Oceanographic and hydrographic surveys, underwater surveillance, missile flight data collection and tracking, acoustic research and submarine support are just a few of the specialized services this program supports.

Thursday, January 8, 2009

Pakistani Terror and India’s Options

Pakistan’s historical ties to jihadi terror

Pakistan’s jihadi factory has been in operation since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Pakistan’s focus shifted to India when it started assisting Sikh separatist groups who were fighting India for a separate homeland – Khalistan. When the Khalistan movement failed, Pakistan in the late 80s started concentrating on training, financing and actively assisting so-called indigenous Kashmiri militant groups to achieve freedom (azaadi) from India.

The extent of Pakistani involvement in terrorism aimed against India is documented in a book titled Frontline Pakistan The Path To Catastrophe And The Killing Of Benazir Bhutto authored by Zahid Hussain, the Pakistan correspondent for The Times, London, and The Wall Street Journal. Very early in the book, Hussain lays out, in considerable detail, the extent of Pakistan's involvement and active support for terrorism by trying to 'Islamise a secular separatist movement' in Kashmir. The book also gives an account of how the ISI was used by its head Javed Nasir beyond Kashmir in the 1993 Mumbai blasts.

The book also reveals the close co-ordination of the Hafiz Saeed-led Lashkar-e-Tayiba with the ISI to infiltrate terrorists into Kashmir. The author wryly mentions the 'hundreds of LeT centres operating openly across the country.'

These centres drew recruits not merely from the unemployed but also from university students, thereby giving the lie to the still-repeated myth of an absence of education and material comforts being a contributory factor to terrorism.

Interestingly, most Lashkar terrorists are Pakistani Punjabis with few, if any, Kashmiris in their ranks.

Given Pakistan’s close links with terror it is stupid on India’s part to talk about co-operation and to expect any co-operation from terrorists to combat terror emanating from within their borders.

Pakistan’s reactions to Mumbai 26/11

After the terrorist attack on Mumbai, President Asif Ali Zardari said that he felt hurt and was pained by the carnage. The Prime Minister offered to send the Director General of the ISI to help in the investigations. The President later back tracked saying it was a case of misunderstanding on the part of the Indians and offered to send a lower ranking functionary. As the Pakistani hand in the terror attacks became apparent, it was a case of somersaults and flip-flops. Thereafter it was “show us the evidence and then we will take action.” Pakistanis did everything possible from denials to whipping up war hysteria and deflect world attention to a potential all out Indo-Pak war. However, India and the US kept up the pressure on Pakistan and the world saw Pakistan as the epicentre of Islamic terror.

After nearly 45 days of 26/11, India compiled a dossier comprising evidence of Pakistani involvement in the terrorist strike on Mumbai. The evidence was handed over to the Pakistanis on 5th January 2009. Pakistan’s reaction to the evidence submitted by India has been on expected lines – rejected as being insufficient. It has stated that the dossier on 26/11 given to it by India was based on interrogation of the sole surviving terrorist Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab, a resident of Faridkot, Pakistan. Pakistan has reportedly told the US that the evidence provided by India is insufficient and no action can be based upon it.

"India's dossier contained nothing new and it was compilation of allegations against Pakistan that had already appeared in Indian media," the Nation quoted a Pakistan official, as saying.
Questioning the authenticity of Kasab's confession, Pakistan said: "The proof given by India are too insufficient to be made a ground for any action and that the statement evoked from Kasab under torture and violence of investigation agencies has no legal status," the Pak official said.

Naïve, it would have been for India to have even remotely expected the terrorist state to have looked into the evidence and acted upon it. A state which has denied that the lone surviving terrorist was Pakistani after the Pakistani media reported that he indeed was one; the denial of the evidence was only to be expected. But then how will Pakistan would react to the findings of the US law enforcement agencies which have been working closely with the Indian police and intelligence agencies in the investigation into 26/11? It remains to be seen whether Pakistan would do a limited “investigation” to satisfy the US and the West. Pakistan’s rejection of evidence dashes all hopes of so-called Pak co-operation in the war against terror. At least now India needs to realize that it cannot expect any responsible behaviour or neighborliness from an entity whose India-centric foreign policy has been based on spreading jihadi terror and bleeding India by means of thousand cuts.

The Poonch Encounter – Hill Kaka or worse a mini Kargil?

While India is cornering Pakistan with proof of its complicity in Mumbai 26/11 an encounter (which is considered quite routine in Kashmir) which started in the Batidhar forest of the Mendhar sector in Poonch on January 1, 2009 is turning out to be a sort of mini-Kargil with possibly well entrenched Pakistani army personnel passing of as Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Toiba, militants battling the Indian security forces for over 5 days. The terrain i.e. Mendhar has been well chosen, being forested and the techniques adopted quite similar to the one adopted at Mumbai. The reaction within India has been muted only because the combat zone is removed from civilian areas and close to the Line of Control and there have been no civilian casualties so far. However, this infiltration and engagement only shows the defiant approach of the Pakistanis and the determination to continue the proxy war against India.

The terrorists are suspected to be taking shelter in concrete hideouts, built deep inside the forest area. According to media reports, ten terrorists are believed to be holed up with adequate food, arms and ammunitions. 1500 security force personnel, comprising of troops from Rashtriya Rifles, Army's para commandos and special ops group of the J&K police are involved in the operations against the terrorists. The operation is spread over 8 square kilometers of forests. India has so far lost a Junior Commissioned Officer and a jawan, while four infiltrators are reported to have been killed in the encounter. At the time of this writing, the encounter was still continuing.

Like Mumbai 26/11, a dozen or so well-trained militants have been engaging more than one thousand troops thereby sapping our resources. Again an operation of this nature could not have been possible without the active support of the Pakistani army.

How does India move forward?

India while appealing to the UN and the international community for tackling terrorism emanating from Pakistan must hasten the pace of counter-terror measures. Firstly Pakistan with the evidence provided by India as well as Western security/law-enforcement agencies will not only NOT ACT, but try to avoid the pitfalls in the execution of future terrorist strikes. (The biggest pitfall in 26/11 was the capture of Ajmal Kasab, which provided evidence of Pakistani hand as well as a source of embarrassment)
India by giving evidence is only indirectly aiding Pakistan perfect the technique of asymmetric warfare. Sharing evidence with a criminal and seeking his assistance to solve a crime is ludicrous.

There is an immediate need for India to draw plans to bleed Pakistan with at least a hundred cuts in response to its policy of thousand cuts. India needs to recognize that Pakistan is a failed state (Pakistanis being unable to control large parts of North-West Frontier Province and FATA, day is not far when Pakistan may cease to exist as a state as understood in international law) with little or no control over its subjects and the army. India must not make the mistake of giving benefit of doubt to the civilian government of Asif Ali Zardari. Pakistani civilian government is as much culpable as the Army and ISI. India ought also not to make any distinctions between state and non-state actors. Pakistan has all along being stating that non-state actors may have been involved in the Mumbai carnage. In Kargil too, the Pakistanis kept repeating that Kashmiri freedom-fighters were battling Indian forces, till they were exposed.

India needs to talk less and act. Indian politicians including the Hon’ble Prime Minister and his cabinet colleagues must exercise restraint while tackling this issue. A spokesman must be authorized to brief the media about developments to avoid conflicting opinions being aired on the issue.

India’s Options

Firstly, an undeclared policy that Pakistani citizens and Pakistani interests world-wide will be considered legitimate targets. This may include Pakistani missions abroad as well as its commercial interests.

Secondly, targeted assassinations of the military leadership of Pakistan, the ISI apart from terrorist operatives of all terrorist outfits operating from Pakistani soil or with Pakistani sponsorship.

Thirdly, a difficult but not impossible option is targeting financiers of terror outfits based in Pakistan and the Middle East. This will affect the fund flow to the groups.

Fourthly, targeting terror infrastructure in Bangladesh, (including the Bangladesh military intelligence) which serves as a launch pad for the ISI-backed HUJI and other groups through covert action.

Several experts have opined that surgical strikes on terror training camps need to be carried out. However, it must be pointed out that once the surprise element and stealth are lost, these strikes will have only symbolic value. Further, precision attacks on terror camps will be futile because these training camps consist of tents which are moved from place to place. Terror training camps may shift to virgin and new areas. According to B Raman, a noted counter terrorism expert, “air strikes may temporarily put a training infrastructure out of action, but not permanently. The American Cruise missile attacks of October, 1998, and their post 9/11 air strikes have not destroyed the training infrastructure of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The terrorists did suffer some casualties, which they were able to absorb and move to other places.” Moreover, these attacks will necessarily have to based on real-time intelligence and involvement of Special Forces.

According to Mr. Raman, a state cannot succeed against terrorism if it targets terrorists operating from foreign territory and not against the States sponsoring them and using the terrorists. For the same reason, the US-led coalition is unlikely to succeed in Afghanistan so long as they do not end the Pakistani sponsorship of the Taliban and its complicity with Al Qaeda. He also opines that Israel was unlikely to succeed against the Hezbollah and the Hamas so long as sponsorship by Iran and Syria did not end. In other words, in order to combat terror originating from Pakistan, India must be ready to take on Pak militarily.

In case of jihadi terrorism, the world needs to go one step further. The terror financing which comes primarily from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states must be stopped. As long as finance is available and the cause of jihad exists, terrorism will continue. It is difficult to root out the latter, namely the cause. But certainly efforts can be made to cut off the finance. One way would be targeting the financiers of terror by means of selective assassination/liquidation. The day we are able to instill fear in the minds of the so-called charitable organizations, jihadi terror will come to an end.

Another option which India should consider is physical elimination of families staying in India of certain wanted fugitives who are given asylum in Pakistan. This, though an unconventional option was used by the KGB in Lebanon in 1985. Four Soviet diplomats were kidnapped on September 30, 1985. Arkady Katkov, a consular attaché, was killed by his captors; the other three (Oleg Spirin, Valery Mirikov, and Nikolai Svirsky) were released a month later. KGB operatives in the area had identified several Hamas and Hezbollah operatives in the area. Prior to the release of the Soviet hostages a Hamas leader had been kidnapped by operatives from the Soviet Alpha Group. His mutilated and castrated body was left on the steps of the local headquarters with a note attached reading 'Two of yours a day until we get ours back’.
India must consider adopting a suitable option or a combination of measures which befits the situation; measures and options which will undermine the enemy’s ability to wage this type of war while at the same time impacting India minimally.