Chinese Needling in Sikkim

Note: This post must be read in conjunction with the following posts on the subject:
http://kumar-theloneranger.blogspot.in/2008/05/chinese-hand-in-finger-area-flashpoint.html

http://kumar-theloneranger.blogspot.in/2008/05/finger-area-indian-response.html

China’s recent aggressive move on the Sikkim border is nothing short of provocative. Destroying bunkers and suspending the Kailash Mansorovar yatra are hostile acts and need to be dealt with in befitting manner.

China is at it again; doing what it knows best – a blend of restrained aggression by carrying out “innocuous incursions into Indian territory” along with psychological warfare and propaganda.

In 2007 and 2008 PLA troops made incursions in the small tract of land referred to as the Finger Area  frequently — in 2008 itself about 50 Chinese transgressions had been reported in this area — and then started building a road that crossed this tract of land. It is in this context, the present standoff in the Sikkim- Bhutan-Tibet tri-junction in Sikkim between the Indian troops and the Chinese troops must be viewed.

While the media focus was on the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington, tension was brewing in Sikkim along the Tibet border with China. A highly questionable version of the events put out by the Chinese Foreign Ministry claimed that Indian border guards (probably referring to the Indo Tibetan Border Police or the ITBP) had crossed the boundary and entered “Chinese territory” and obstructed what was “normal activities” of the Chinese frontier forces in Donglang area and that the Chinese had taken counter measures. And the Chinese Defence Ministry accused Indian troops of objecting to the building of a road in what it claimed to be Chinese territory. According to the PTI, the Chinese troops were reported to have destroyed two make shift bunkers of the Indian Army in the Lalten area of Doka La. (It needs to be mentioned that the PLA had destroyed a make shift bunker in the same area of Doka La in 2008). While what is being claimed as a counter measure may have occurred as part of the time-tested tactic adopted by the Chinese, it is extremely unlikely that the ITBP personnel (who do not carry arms in that area) would have carried out any transgressions across the border. This again is part of the nefarious Chinese propaganda.

In order to exert pressure on the Indians, the Chinese shut down the Nathu La pass entry for Indian pilgrims travelling to Kailash Mansarovar (a pilgrim site revered by Hindus, Buddhists and Jains) and called for the “withdrawal of the Indian personnel who had overstepped and trespassed into Chinese border." It is unclear whether the Chinese want a complete withdrawal of Indian troops from the Indian side or only those whom the Chinese have accused of crossing the border.

The Chinese provocation may be attributed to the following factors: One, China perceives a growing threat because of the close relations between India and the US and the mutual defence cooperation which it finds unsettling; two India in no uncertain terms snubbed Beijing on the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) because of its objections to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that is slated to go through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK); third; India is going ahead with a Afghan air corridor bypassing Pakistan which the state-owned Global Times referred to as Indian stubbornness; fourth, India ignoring Chinese objections allowed the Dalai Lama to visit Tawang in April 2017, which it foolishly has been claiming to be part of Southern Tibet. Lastly, according to Subir Bhowmick, a veteran journalist Sikkim is the only sector along the border where India has a tactical and terrain advantage. India’s decision of raising the mountain strike corps, though mired in financial uncertainties, has upped the ante. And hence the coercive tactics adopted by the PLA.

China is also concerned about the proposed purchase of 22 drones by India from the US. These drones will greatly enhance India’s surveillance capability in the Indian Ocean where China has been making significant inroads in the past few years.

Indian policy makers must understand one irrefutable fact that China is an aggrandizing power, a state that would use any means possible to grab territory. China has done it in 1962 and it virtually claims more than eighty percent of the South China Sea through the means of a dubious historical nine-dash line. According to the strategic affairs expert, China has been eating away at India’s Himalayan borderlands. This is a fact, howsoever bitter it may seem. China’s Global Times in its OP-ED has stated: China avoids making an issue of border disputes, which has indulged India's unruly provocations. This time the Indian side needs to be taught the rules.  

India cannot afford a showdown with China on border issues. It lags far behind China in terms of national strength and the so-called strategic support for it from the US is superficial. China has no desire to confront India. Maintaining friendly ties with New Delhi is Beijing's basic policy. But this must be based on mutual respect. It's not time for India to display arrogance toward China. India's GDP is only one-quarter of China's and its annual defense budget is just one-third. Having a friendly relationship and cautiously handling border issues with China is its best choice. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1053801.shtml

This piece can be interpreted as nothing but a warning exhorting the PLA to teach India a lesson. China needs to be cautioned that it can ill-afford a confrontation of any sort with India at a time when it is unveiling the B&RI and more importantly 1962 is history and China cannot expect India to commit the same blunders it committed at that time to be repeated. Diplomatic niceties do not work with a bully like China. It is time for India to bare its fangs in order to deter China from carrying out its incursions.

Countering Chinese Incursions - India's Options

The differing perceptions of the undemarcated and disputed boundary between India and China have resulted in Chinese troops ‘transgressing’ into the Indian side a whooping 505 times since January 2010.

The LAC is 4,057-km-long and traverses areas of Himalayan states, principally in Eastern Ladakh (J&K), parts of Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. Historically, there has never been a demarcated boundary. These are strategically vital portions which are contiguous with Tibet.

Explaining ‘transgressions’, officials said India and China do not agree on the LAC, hence soldiers on either side patrol up to the point they perceive as the LAC. Soldiers on both sides show a banner asking the other party to withdraw when the LAC is crossed. Despite the underlying tension, the process of withdrawing by both sides keeps a lid on the situation along the tense frontier between the two edgy neighbours. 

The matter of transgressions was raised in the Upper House of the Indian Parliament, the Rajya Sabha recently and the Minister of State for Home Affairs Mullappally Ramachandran said, “There have been 228 reported cases of transgression in 2010, 213 in 2011 and 64 till April this year. It was clarified, “There has been no intrusion along the India-China border. However, there are cases of transgression (by People’s Liberation Army, PLA) due to different perception of the LAC.” The word ‘intrusion’ is the official nomenclature to indicate a breach of the sanctity of the border and is different from transgression on LAC, that too on sections which are disputed. 

Similar figures have recorded in the past. According to the Indian Defence Minister, A. K. Antony, the number of Chinese transgressions has been generally as per established pattern during the last five years.

But one cannot overlook the fact that the People’s Liberation Army has been flexing its muscles through an aggressive border management policy in order to stake claim to the disputed areas in all the three sectors, viz. western (Ladakh), middle (Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh) and eastern (Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh).

Incursions in the past

 

PLA soldiers, in 2011 damaged a 200-metre long wind-breaker wall in Yangtse area of Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh. India rebuilt the wall after lodging a strong protest with China. In September 2011, it was reported that two Chinese helicopters had entered into Indian air space and landed one-and-half kilometres into the Indian territory at Chumar in Chingthan area of Tehsil Nyoma. The Chinese troops also attempted to dismantle Indian army bunkers which lay unused for a long time. So also in July 2009, Chinese troops had intruded about 1.5 kilometres into Indian territory near Mount Gya, recognized as international border by both India and China, and painted boulders and rocks with red spray paint. (The 22,420 ft Mount Gya, also known as "fair princess of snow" by Army is located at the tri-junction of Ladakh in Jammu and Kashmir, Spiti in Himachal Pradesh, and Tibet).

Armed motorized as well as boat patrols by PLA in the strategically-located Trig Heights and Pangong Tso lake in eastern Ladakh have also intensified since 2009. Similarly, Chinese have stepped up claims along the 206-km border between Tibet and Sikkim, which India long considered was "a settled matter", with the so-called 2.1 sq km "finger area" in the northernmost tip of the state remaining a specific matter of concern. (See the author’s post on the flare up in the Finger Area http://kumar-theloneranger.blogspot.in/2008/05/finger-area-indian-response.html)

New Delhi hopes the new bilateral boundary coordination mechanism, which became operational two months ago after being inked during the 15th round of border talks between national security adviser Shivshankar Menon and his Chinese counterpart Dai Bingguo in January 2012, will help prevent border flare-ups between the two armies.

New Delhi also has been taking up specific incidents of transgression with the Chinese side through established mechanisms such as hotlines, flag meetings, border personnel meetings (BPM) and normal diplomatic channels. 

During the 4th India-China annual defence dialogue last December, India also told China that military patrols along the LAC should not be undertaken at night, nor should they "surprise each other". Moreover, laid-down stand-operating procedures to cool down tempers should be followed in the event of face-offs between the two armies.

Despite the transgressions, peace is maintained along the LAC following an agreement thrashed out in April 2005. India and China have worked out what is called a ‘banner drill’, which helps keep tension under check.

Whenever either side perceives that a transgression has been made across the LAC, soldiers show a 10-feet-wide banner with a slogan painted across to each other. The banner primarily cites the 2005 agreement and says there is a need to back off from the present positions of patrolling. 

The above-mentioned measures and mechanisms set up pursuant to an agreement by both the countries, howsoever commendable, only provide for peace in the short-term. These measures and mechanisms have utility for a limited duration only. These measures cannot bring about a resolution of the border dispute. 

India needs to counter China

India must not disregard the fact that Tawang is considered to be part of China’s core interests. In fact China claims the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh, referring to it as Southern Tibet. And China will not compromise on its core interests. In order to achieve its objective and in furtherance of protecting its core interests, China set up a massive military infrastructure in Tibet with five airbases, an extensive rail network through which it can rapidly mobilize troops and over 58,000 kilometres of road. With such infrastructure in place, China started resorting to what is referred to as “cartographic intrusions” in a slow and steady manner. India, instead of meeting this challenge head-on has played down the issue by referring to the intrusions as transgressions which have occurred due to differing perceptions about where exactly the LAC lies.  

India cannot expect the boundary dispute to be resolved by peaceful means if it is not adequately backed up by military force. China has been keeping up the pressure on India by means of intrusions only due to the fact that India does not have the requisite military means to counter China along the LAC and in part to its submissive attitude in dealing with Beijing. India’s poor infrastructure along the border is one of the biggest impediments facing the armed forces, especially in a crisis situation. This author, in earlier posts, has emphasized on the development of infrastructure particularly in the North-East apart from augmenting the number of troops.

Force Augmentation

In response to China's growing military strength in Tibet, India has raised two new mountain divisions with 30,000 troops in the North-East as a counter-measure and to augment its mountain warfare capabilities. The two new mountain divisions comprising of 1,260 officers and 35,011 soldiers, raised at a cost of Rs 700 crore/ Rs 7 billion each, will be under the command of the Rangapahar-based 3 Corps in Nagaland with headquarters in Zakama (56 Div) and the Tezpur-based 4 Corps in Assam with headquarters in Missamari (71 Div) of the army's Kolkata-based Eastern Command. New Delhi has also sanctioned a new mountain strike corps, of an additional 40,000 soldiers, to be permanently located in bases in northeast India. The new mountain strike corps will control two divisions, trained and equipped for an attack into Tibet. The new strike corps will have its own mountain artillery, combat engineers, anti-aircraft guns and radio equipment. It would also be supported by Indian Air Force (IAF) fighters, operating from newly renovated bases in North-Eastern India. The sanctioning of a strike corps, therefore, signals a dramatic new assertiveness in New Delhi.

India has also deployed a Sukhoi SU-30 air superiority fighter jet squadron in Tezpur as one of the aerial offensive measures apart from upgrading airfields and helipads in the North-East. The Cabinet Committee on Security had approved the raising of the two new divisions in early 2008 and preparations for raising the offensive infantry formations began the same year.

Under the first phase, the two new divisions' headquarters, along with a brigade each, have come up, including the headquarters' support elements such as signals, provost, and intelligence units. 

The divisions have been armed with state-of-the-art technology such as heavy-lift helicopters capable of carrying 50 troops each; ultra light howitzers that can be slung under the helicopters for transportation; missile and cannon-armed helicopter gunships; utility helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). 

The air assets, such as the helicopter gunships and attack helicopters, will provide the two divisions capabilities to carry out manoeuvres for countering the terrain impediments. According to an officer, the gunships and attack choppers were necessary for providing the two formations firepower in a mountain terrain, as the army would not be in a position to deploy tanks and armoured vehicles.

Notwithstanding the proposed force enhancement in the North-East, the intrusions have continued unabated. The 64 intrusions in 2012 apart from being disturbing, clearly indicates the true nature of Chinese intent and policy towards India in general and the boundary dispute in particular. 

It is suggested that India adopts the following measures to enable it manage the border with China in an effective manner as well as to settle the boundary dispute satisfactorily without succumbing to Chinese pressure tactics-

·     India needs to send out an unequivocal message across to China that Arunachal Pradesh is part of India’s core interests and incursions (or intrusions or transgressions, irrespective of the nomenclature used) must cease.

·     Improve infrastructure in the North-East (build all-weather roads and extend railway network in remote areas of the region)

·     India needs to expeditiously operationalise the two newly-raised mountain divisions as well as raise the new mountain strike corps in a compressed time frame. (The mountain strike corps is slated to be raised under the 12^th Defence Plan 2012-2017).

·     The Indian Air Force must operationalise the new airbases in the North-East in order to enable rapid deployment of air assets in case any conflict. (The former chief of the IAF had stated in June 2011 that Jorhat, Guwahati, Mohanbari, Bagdogra and Hashimara were being developed as air bases. It must be pointed out that IAF has already based Sukhoi-30MKI fighters at airbases like Tezpur and Chabua. Eastern sector ALGs (advanced landing grounds) like Pasighat, Mechuka, Walong, Tuting, Ziro and Vijaynagar as well as several helipads in Arunachal Pradesh are also now being upgraded, much like western sector ALGs like Daulat Beg Oldi, Fukche and Nyama in eastern Ladakh).

·     Operationalise and deploy the new nuclear capable Agni – V. (This will effectively counter the DF-21 deployed in Delingha in Tibet)

·     India must strengthen its military ties with Vietnam and South-East Asian states like Singapore and increase its naval presence in the South China Sea. 

In conclusion, the Ministry of Defence and Home Affairs ought to concentrate on formulating policies to counter China effectively and strengthen nation’s defences against Chinese incursions rather than keep count of the incursions like a statistician. The whole objective behind the qualitative and quantitative increase in force levels is not only to counter any possible Chinese adventure but also to enable India to negotiate settlement of the border issue from a position of strength rather than from a position of weakness.