A Failed Rescue Attempt in Africa – An Analysis of a Special Forces’ Operation

In early March this year, one of Britain’s elite Special Forces, the Special Boat Service (SBS) carried out an operation in the Nigerian city of Sokoto, about 100 miles north-east of Birnin Kebbi to rescue a British national Chris McManus and an Italian national Franco Lamolinara held by gunmen belonging to the Nigerian terrorist outfit Boko Haram. The operation, unfortunately failed resulting in the two hostages being killed. Though this operation did not get a lot of media coverage, it sparked off a diplomatic row between Britain and Italy since it has been alleged that Britain did not inform Rome about the rescue attempt till it was underway. 

The hostages Chris McManus and Franco Lamolinara worked for Stabilini Visinoni Limited, an Italian construction firm, and were involved in the construction of a local headquarters for the Central Bank of Nigeria.

Gunmen seized the two engineers in the town of Birnin Kebbi on 12 May 2011. 

Birnin Kebbi is the capital of Kebbi state, in Nigeria’s North West and far from its oil-rich southern delta, where cash-driven kidnappings of Western workers are an occupational hazard. And unlike many Westerners in Nigeria, Mr. McManus was not involved in oil but in construction, as an engineer. The company, B Stabilini Visinoni Limited, which employed him was founded by Italians but has extensive Nigerian involvement.

But Kebbi borders Niger, where Al-Qaeda in the Magreb is active. In 2009, its members abducted a group of Western nationals, including Edwin Dyer, a Briton, who was murdered six months later. 

On the night of May 12 last year, Mr. McManus and his Italian colleague, Franco Lamolinara, were in their apartment with two other colleagues, a German and a Nigerian. 

According to the Nigerian police, the apartment was stormed by “a horde of gunmen”. In the melee, the German escaped, while the Nigerian was shot and wounded. Mr. McManus and Mr. Lamolinara were abducted. 

One detail of the abduction which was particularly troubling was the fact that the two men had kept a large amount of cash in their apartment but it was ignored by their abductors. 

That was seen as an ominous sign that whoever had taken Mr. McManus and Mr. Lamolinara was motivated by something other than money, but the picture remained hazy. 

Then, in early August 2011, a short video clip was sent to a French news agency in Lagos which showed the two men, bearded and blindfolded, kneeling before men carrying automatic weapons. 

In the film, Mr. McManus asked the British Government “to meet the demands of al-Qaeda”, but, significantly, there was no demand for money. 

The tape deepened British officials’ fears that the men were in the hands of Boko Haram, regarded as hardcore Islamists linked to al-Qaeda. “We’re not talking about Somali pirates or ransom gangs. These guys are ideologically-driven Islamists, part of the international AQ network,” said a British source. 

Following the appearance of the video, Whitehall’s Cobra committee, which oversees national security operations, met to consider the kidnapping. In all, the committee discussed the case about 20 times, initially chaired by civil servants but later overseen by senior ministers, including David Cameron. 

In early December 2011, a second video was released in which the hostage-takers declared that Mr. Cameron had two weeks to authorise “negotiations”. What would be the subject of talks was not clear, since the group made no clear demands. 

But they were clear about one thing: if that vague condition was not met, the hostages would be killed. 

Despite the threat, the Government, in agreement with Italy and Nigeria, decided to let the deadline pass because intelligence officials assessed that it was a “bit of macabre theatre” rather than a serious threat. But it did add urgency to the task of locating the hostages. 

It was reported that Nigerian intelligence officials tracked the group to the city of Sokoto, about 100 miles north-east of Birnin Kebbi. GCHQ at Cheltenham, Britain’s signals intelligence service was also at work, identifying and monitoring the telephone calls of the group. 

Once they were located, the option of using British Special Forces to attempt a rescue became a viable option for Mr. Cameron. 

Two weeks ago, a Squadron Group of the Special Boat Service deployed to Nigeria. The SBS was chosen to carry out the mission as it was the “Stand-By Squadron” for counter-terrorism. The post is rotated through the four SAS and four SBS squadrons every six months. 

In all, about 40 British Special Forces personnel went to Nigeria, travelling in civilian clothes and aboard commercial airlines, their weapons and gear shipped in British diplomatic bags. The commanding officer of the SBS, which recruits almost exclusively from the Royal Marines, set up his Task Group Headquarters at the British Embassy in Lagos. 

As well as intercepted telephone calls, the SBS also had access to surveillance video of the house where the hostages were being held from aircraft flying over the city. Images were fed back to the SBS command post and the monitor screens of the Cobra briefing room in Whitehall. 

For days, the SBS and their Nigerian counterparts watched, and waited. On 7^th March 2012, what officials called “a window of opportunity” opened. Intercepts of mobile phone calls disclosed that the terrorists were about to move and then kill their hostages. 

The local SBS commander briefed his chief, the Director of Special Forces, a major-general who is both one of the most admired combat commanders in the Army and a personal friend of the Prime Minister. He judged that the situation was now “go, no-go”, meaning intervention was required. That judgment was endorsed by the Prime Minister, who gave the final authorisation on 8^th March 2012 after an early morning Cobra meeting. 

Conventional planning would prefer an assault at night, preferably just before dawn. But for reasons that remain unclear, the SBS was forced to make a daylight assault. 

In a sign of haste, insiders said the soldiers carried out an “emergency response” plan, rather than the more comprehensive “deliberate response” plan. 

It appears that, due to the perceived imminent threat to the hostages, the SBS were forced to carry out their 'immediate action' plan. Such a plan is called on in an emergency such as when terrorists begin executing hostages. In such scenarios, the counter terrorism team has typically only just arrived on the scene and has had little time to build up an intelligence picture or to rehearse the operation. In such a scenario, the assault team is going in blind, not necessarily knowing exactly where the hostages are being held, what opposition to expect or what obstacles they may have to overcome.

It has been reported that the SBS approached the target building in Sokoto in trucks beginning the raid at 11.00 am Nigerian time. Other reports indicate that the SBS arrived in helicopters while the Nigerian forces arrived in vehicles to set up a cordon around the target building. The assault force consisted of around 8 SBS operatives, supported by a number of Royal Marines Commandos - possibly with the SFSG. 

As the SBS began to storm the terrorist compound, a fire fight ensued, resulting in the deaths of several of the hostage-takers. When the SBS team eventually fought its way inside the buildings, they discovered they were too late - the hostages had been killed by their captors. It is not yet clear exactly when the hostages were killed, whether it was before or during the SBS operation.

“The security agencies tried to break into the house but there was resistance,” said Mahmoud Abubakar, who lives on the same street. “The people inside were shooting at them and they returned fire. They exchanged fire for some time.” 

At least two terrorists were shot dead at this stage but for all the speed and training of the British forces, it was not enough. 

When the terrorists in the room with the hostages heard the gunfire they shot both Mr. McManus and Mr. Lamolinara in the head at close range. 

A senior official at Nigeria’s State Security Service said: “The hostage-takers shot the hostages before they [the Special Forces] even entered the compound. All the terrorists have been killed as well.” 

There are lessons to be drawn for all those involved in counter-terrorism operations. 

Theoretically, the principles of assault, namely, detailed planning, surprise, methods of entry, speed, violence of action were not adhered probably due to the rapidly changing ground situation as perceived by the SBS command.

Almost all operations of this nature are carried out either at the dead of night or in the wee hours of the morning. It is quite inexplicable as to why the SBS leadership chose to carry out an operation fraught with risk not only to the lives of hostages as well as to the rescuers themselves, but also to civilians residing in the area where the operation was to have been carried out in broad daylight. (The place where the hostages were kept was known to be densely populated). Stealth and surprise became the first casualties of the operation.

Secondly, the assault team comprising of SBS personnel was backed by, according to reports, nearly 100 Nigerian troops and helicopters for cordoning of and mopping up operations. With such a large attacking force, the element of surprise was probably non-existent. There are conflicting reports as to how the troops and the Special Forces’ team reached the place of operation.

The Special Forces cannot be faulted for the failure of the mission as the ground situation based on intelligence received forced them to adopt an emergency response plan rather than a deliberate response plan with scanty information about the target and the nature of opposition that it may expect. In other words, the assault party was going in virtually blind. Also the SBS had very little or no time to carry out a dry run before executing the operation. (The Israelis, on the other hand, while executing Operation Thunderbolt in 1976 knew the entire layout of the Entebbe Airport, had intelligence on the exact number of terrorists holding the hostages and the troop deployment at the airport). In this case, SBS personnel probably were not even aware of the topography of the target area.

It is probably unfair to the rescuers to make an analysis of the operation and sit in judgment over it. In all fairness, it must be said that such missions are always fraught with extreme risk of failure and the decision makers and the team executing such an operation were just unlucky on that fateful day.

EVEN THE BEST, AT TIMES, FAIL.

Terror Strike in Lutyens’ Delhi

On 13^th February at around 1515 hours, a bomb exploded in the car of the Israeli Defence Attaché in close proximity of the Indian Prime Minister’s official residence at New Delhi injuring a woman occupant who was later identified as the wife of the Defence Attaché Col. Yossi Refaelov. Tal Yehoshua Koren, 42, the wife of Israeli Defence Attaché, was on her way to pick up her two children from the American School run by the US Embassy.

According to eyewitness accounts, a biker wearing a red helmet and a brown jacket stuck a magnetic device on the car, following which it exploded on Aurangzeb Road, not far from the Prime Minister's 7 Race Course Road home. They said the device was probably actuated by remote control, as it exploded within seconds of the biker riding off.

The magnetic device or sticky bomb is similar to a limpet mine, a type of naval mine attached to a target by magnets; they are so named because of their superficial similarity to the limpet, a type of mollusk.

A magnetic device or "sticky bomb" and bike-borne planters were involved in the attack on the Iranian scientist Mustafa Ahmadi Roshan in January 2012.

The diplomat’s wife who also works in the Israeli Mission sustained injuries caused by shrapnel which had penetrated her liver and spine. She underwent two major emergency surgeries at a private hospital in Delhi and her condition was critical but stable according to hospital authorities. The driver of the Innova, Manoj Sharma and two occupants of a nearby car, Arun Sharma, 60, and Manjit Singh, 78 also suffered injuries. They were being treated for injuries at different hospitals.

A few hours earlier, a bomb planted in the car of an Israeli Embassy in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi was detected and diffused. Authorities in Georgia said an explosive device was planted on the car of a driver for the Israeli embassy. Shota Utiashvili, spokesperson for the Georgian interior ministry, said the driver noticed a package attached to his car's undercarriage and called the police. A grenade was found in the package and it was defused.

Thus, it appears to have been a well planned and coordinated attack on Israeli diplomats world-wide. While the attack in Tbilisi was thwarted, the attack in New Delhi was successful.

Israel accused Iran and its Lebanese protégé, the Hezbollah of carrying out the terrorist attack in New Delhi and a foiled attempt to kill another diplomat in Georgia, as tensions rose over Israeli efforts to shut down Iran's nuclear program.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu blamed the attacks on Iran and linked them to alleged threats to Israeli targets in Thailand and Azerbaijan, Georgia's southern neighbor, in January.

"We will continue to operate methodically and patiently against international terror that originates in Iran," he said, suggesting Israel didn't plan to immediately retaliate. 

An official at Iran's embassy in New Delhi denied any Iranian involvement in the explosion or other attacks. "We condemn such incidents," the official said.

U.S. officials condemned the attacks and said they were working with Israeli intelligence agencies to investigate them, but stopped short of agreeing that Iran or its militant allies were responsible.

The nature of the bombing in New Delhi and the attempt in Georgia raised the prospect of escalating tit-for-tat strikes by Israel and Iran or its allies.

Timing of the Attack

Why were the Israeli diplomats in India and Georgia targeted and what is the significance of the timing of the attack?

One possible explanation is that four years ago, (on 12^th February 2008) the deputy commander of the terrorist outfit based in Lebanon, the Hezbollah, Imad Fayez Mughniyah (or Mughniyeh) alias al-Hajj Radwan was assassinated by a car bomb by suspected Israeli agents in the Syrian capital Damascus. Hezbollah which swore revenge for the killing of its leader have attempted to target Israelis in retaliation. It is possible that the New Delhi attack and the attempted strike in Tbilisi were in retaliation for Mughniyeh’s killing.

The second explanation which sounds more plausible as of today, is Iran had vowed to retaliate against Israel for the assassinations of its nuclear scientists and technicians. Tehran has blamed Israel and Washington for the killings of scientists working on its controversial nuclear programme. 

Iran emerges as the prime suspect in both these incidents because in the past the Iranian President Ahmadinejad and the clerics who rule Iran, have called for the destruction of the state of Israel. Interestingly, just before the attacks took place, Professor Alan M Dershowitz in an article titled “Warning Iran Against Hitting 'Soft' American Targets” and published in the Wall Street Journal online wrote: “The Iranian government has now made crystal clear that it is at war not only with Israel and Zionism but with Jewish communities throughout the world. As Iran's Rafah news website—identified with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—threatened last month, Iran plans to "take the war beyond the borders of Iran, and beyond the borders of the region." And last week an Iranian News Agency headline declared that "Israeli people must be annihilated."

These and other recent threats have, according to news reports, led Israeli and American authorities to believe that Iran is preparing attacks against Israeli embassies and consulates world-wide, as well as against Jewish houses of prayer, schools, community centers, restaurants and other soft targets.”

He further goes on to state that “If this were to happen, it would not be the first time that Iranian agents have bombed or attacked Israeli and Jewish targets in distant countries. Back in 1992, Iranian agents blew up the Israeli Embassy and a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, killing and injuring hundreds of civilians, many of whom were children. The Argentine government conducted a thorough criminal investigation and indicted several Iranian officials, but those officials were well beyond the reach of Argentine legal authorities and remain at liberty.”

The 1992 attack referred to by Professor Dershowitz was a bomb attack on the building of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires carried out on March 17, 1992. About 29 people were killed in the attack and 242 others were injured.

Messages intercepted by the US National Security Agency revealed Iranian knowledge of the impending attack, as well as the complicity of Hezbollah operative Imad Mughniyeh.

In May 1998, Moshen Rabbani, (the Cultural Attaché in the Iranian Embassy in Argentina until December 1997) was detained in Germany, and the Argentine government expelled seven Iranian diplomats from the country, stating that it had "convincing proof" of Iranian involvement in the bombing. However, none of the suspects have been prosecuted. In fact the attack occurred when Iran and Argentina were hoping for a resumption of nuclear cooperation, although Argentina had announced the suspension of the shipments of nuclear materials to Iran a couple months before the bombing. A number of sources report on Hezbollah involvement with the assistance of Syria.

Why India?

It may be too early to blame Iran (or the Hezbollah) for the terrorist strike in New Delhi. Though it does appear that Iran, given its past track record and the only actor with a motive, may have carried out the attack, thorough investigations are needed to determine the perpetrators. However the question is why was New Delhi chosen for attacking the Israeli diplomat? Firstly, India is perceived to be a soft state and the internal security apparatus is considered to be inept. Secondly, any act of terror carried out within India, particularly in one of the major metropolitan cities is likely to get maximum coverage in the Indian as well as foreign media.

Compounding the difficulty of pinning blame was the question as to why Iran would stage a terrorist attack in New Delhi, a country which recently resisted further sanctions being imposed on Iran by the US. Also, India last month surpassed China as Tehran's top oil consumer, defying international pressure to cut back imports of Iranian oil. Having said that, one must also acknowledge the fact that India does not support Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons. It is also a well-known fact that Iran’s international behaviour in the past has defied rationale and logic as can be seen from the attack by "Iranian protestors" on the British Embassy in Tehran in November 2011. (See http://kumar-theloneranger.blogspot.in/2011/11/international-legal-perspective-of.html)

If it is established that Iran or its proxy the Hezbollah were involved then the question arises as to whether the terrorist who planted the bomb was a foreigner or an Indian working on behalf of Iran or the Hezbollah. According to Mr. B. Raman, the Hizbollah had operated in the 1990s in Bangkok and Buenos Aires and was known to have a local support base in Tbilisi. But it had neither operated in New Delhi in the past nor was it known to have sleeper cells in India. Unless the terrorist involved is arrested and interrogated, it would be difficult to say whether he had come into India from outside to cause the blast or whether he is an Indian Muslim recruited by the Hizbollah for the attack.

While it is a known fact that there are sleeper cells of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) operating in India, there are no known groups or individuals with ties to Iranian-backed groups like the Hezbollah in India.

It must be pointed out that the Lashkar-e-Toiba’s attack on the Narriman House in Mumbai, housing an Israeli religious-cum-cultural centre, during its terrorist strikes in Mumbai on 26/11, was the first instance of a terrorist attack on Israeli targets inside Indian territory outside Kashmir. It is also relevant to point out that foreign diplomats posted in India have not been targeted by terror groups, save and except, the case of the British Deputy High Commissioner, Percy Norris, who was assassinated in Mumbai (then Bombay) in November 1984.

If suspicion that individuals or groups owing allegiance to or sympathizing with cause of Iran or the Hezbollah turn out to be true, then it does not augur well for India and its over-stretched security agencies who will have a lot to do to cope with international terror outfits, apart from the home-grown terror groups like Indian Mujahideen and Pak-based groups like LeT.

Indian response

India must wake up to the fact that such types of attacks on foreign diplomats and nationals within India have become a reality. The attack on Mumbai in November 2008 in which several foreign nationals were killed was not an exception; rather it was the norm. India must appreciate that cordial bilateral ties with states such as Iran and Syria who sponsor terrorism do not necessarily prevent or deter these states from making use of India as a battleground to settle scores with its enemies. If India, through its investigations, is able to unearth any possible connection between Iran or its protégés and the terror attack, it must take steps to expel Iranian diplomats posted in India who may have connived in the attack and prosecute Indian or foreign nationals involved in the execution of the crime.

Iran-US Standoff: The Crisis in the Strait of Hormuz - II

Maintaining political stability and the free flow of oil to the global economy have been the primary objectives of U.S. foreign policy in the Persian Gulf for almost half a century. The U.S. Navy has been one of the primary instruments of that policy, in both peace and war. These twin objectives have not changed much in the last several decades.

Before examining the nature of deployment of US forces in the area, it is necessary to throw light on a relatively less known but a significant battle that took place between the US and Iranian Navies in 1988 during the Iran-Iraq War.

Operation Praying Mantis

On 14 April, 1988 one of the US naval ships a guided missile frigate, USS Samuel B Roberts struck a mine while deployed in the Persian Gulf as part of Operation Earnest Will, the 1987–88 convoy missions in which U.S. warships escorted re-flagged Kuwaiti oil tankers to protect them from Iranian attacks. The explosion blew a 25-foot (7.6-meter) hole in the Roberts's hull and nearly sank it. The crew saved their ship with no loss of life, and Roberts was towed to Dubai on 16 April. After the mining, U.S. Navy divers recovered other mines in the area. When the serial numbers were found to match those of mines seized along with the Iran Ajr (Japanese-built landing craft used by Iran to lay mines) the previous September, U.S. military officials planned a retaliatory operation against Iranian targets in the Persian Gulf.

Three days after the mine blast, forces of Joint Task Force Middle East executed the American response -- Operation PRAYING MANTIS. During a two-day period, the Navy, Marine Corps, Army and Air Force units of Joint Task Force Middle East destroyed two oil platforms being used by Iran to coordinate attacks on merchant shipping, sank or destroyed three Iranian warships and neutralized at least six Iranian speedboats. 

Operation Praying Mantis exposed the weakness of the Iranian naval forces in the event of a conventional conflict. Iran too, must have learnt a lesson or two from this battle. Iran would try and avoid an overt encounter with the US forces. Instead, Iran may adopt irregular warfare in the form of ‘hit and run’ using fast patrol boats and/or try to ram explosive-laden boats against US vessels. The US on its part needs to maintain constant vigil and frustrate Iranian attempts at mine-laying and neutralize speed boats approaching US ships or other commercial vessels in the area. The US given its sophisticated Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capability would be able to effectively counter threats posed by Iran’s diesel submarines. (It is worth mentioning that in the early 1980s, the U.S. Navy began development of a new mine countermeasures (MCM) force, which included two new classes of ships and minesweeping helicopters. The vital importance of a state-of-the-art mine countermeasures force was strongly underscored in the Persian Gulf during the eight years of the Iran-Iraq war, and in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991 when the Avenger and Guardian ships conducted MCM operations. Meanwhile the Iranian semi-official FARS news agency reported that its navy’s sub-surface vessels possessed capabilities to confront enemy’s threats and that its submarines were capable enough to ambush and hit enemy vessels, especially the US aircraft carriers traversing the Persian Gulf.

US Deployment in the Persian Gulf

The Fifth Fleet of the United States Navy is responsible for naval forces in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and coast off East Africa as far south as Kenya. It shares a commander and headquarters with US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT).

In the light of the impending crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, the top US commander on the ground heading the CENTCOM, Marine Corps General James N Mattis warned that additional troops may be required to deal with Iran. In response to the commander’s warning, Pentagon is reported to have quietly approved deployment of additional troops in the Gulf region.

Officials said that the deployments were not to be construed as a buildup to war, but rather was intended as a quick-reaction and contingency force in case a military crisis erupts in the standoff with Tehran over its suspected nuclear weapons program.

The new deployments include two Army infantry brigades and a helicopter unit, a substantial increase in combat power after nearly a decade in which Kuwait chiefly served as a staging area for supplies and personnel heading to Iraq.

The aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson joined the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis in the Arabian Sea recently, giving commanders major naval and air assets in case Iran carried out its recent threats to close the Strait of Hormuz.

US Navy officials have been saying that Iran might be able to temporarily block tanker traffic through the strait using anti-ship missiles, mines and other weapons, but U.S. commanders say they would be able to re-open the waterway quickly if need be.

U.S. officials are divided over how much to publicize the deployments. Regional allies tend to dislike public discussion about their cooperation with Washington. But the Pentagon wants Iran's rulers to know that the U.S. still has adequate forces available in the event of a crisis.

They include the Army's 1st Cavalry Division's 1st Brigade, which shifted to Kuwait from Iraq when the last U.S. forces left last month. The brigade, which has more than 4,500 soldiers and is equipped with tanks and artillery, has been designated a "mobile response force" for the region, according to Col. Scott L. Efflandt, the brigade commander.

According to a US Navy Spokesperson, the U.S. also have deployed a marine expeditionary unit and a group of landing warships, including the Makin Island groups and the USS New Orleans and Pearl Harbor amphibious transport dock ships, to the Persian Gulf.

The sailors, marines and airmen aboard the ships will be reinforced by a general support battalion and attack helicopters. They are to replace U.S. warships and Navy troops who have been patrolling the area for the last 10 months.

A National Guard brigade from Minnesota has been in Kuwait since August, and a combat aviation brigade arrived in December. Another major unit is heading to Kuwait shortly, though officials would not provide details.

Despite the buildup in Kuwait, the total number of U.S. troops in the region has declined with the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraq and the drawdown of U.S. troops that began last summer in Afghanistan.

Sometime in the beginning of this year, Iran’s Army Chief Ataollah Salehi is reported to have warned the US aircraft carrier John C Stennis against returning to the Gulf. The carrier had left the area prior to the commencement of Iranian naval exercises. The state news agency IRNA quoted army chief Ataollah Salehi as saying that "Iran will not repeat its warning ... the enemy's carrier has been moved to the Sea of Oman because of our drill. I recommend and emphasize to the American carrier not to return to the Persian Gulf." In response, the Telegraph reported that Britain, America and France delivered a pointed signal to Iran, sending six warships led by a 100,000 ton aircraft carrier through the highly sensitive waters of the Strait of Hormuz. USS Abraham Lincoln, a nuclear-powered carrier capable of embarking 90 aircraft, passed through the Strait and entered the Gulf without any incident on January 21-22, 2012. HMS Argyll, a Type 23 frigate from the Royal Navy, was one of the escort vessels making up the carrier battle-group. A guided missile cruiser and two destroyers from the US Navy completed the flotilla, along with one warship from the French navy.

Iran-US Standoff: The Crisis in the Strait of Hormuz

Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons and its threat to close the Strait of Hormuz in response to sanctions aimed at hindering the weapons program is fast becoming a casus belli for the United States. While Israel views a nuclear Iran to be an existential threat, the states of the Gulf consider a nuclear Iran to be a major threat to the region’s stability. The year 2012 could be tumultuous and prove suicidal for Iran if it proceeds to carry out the threats – both of acquiring nuclear weapons and closing the Strait of Hormuz. While it may be early to say in what manner the US, its Western allies and Israel would respond if evidence emerges that Iran in fact has been able to cross the nuclear threshold, certainly a military action would be imminent if Iran closes the Strait to shipping.

The Geography

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow, strategically important strait between the Gulf of Oman in the southeast and the Persian Gulf. On the north coast is Iran and on the south coast is the United Arab Emirates and Musandam, an exclave of Oman.

The strait at its narrowest is 54 kilometres (34 miles) wide. It is the only sea passage to the open ocean for large areas of the petroleum-exporting Persian Gulf. About 14 tankers carrying 15.5 million barrels (2,460,000 m³) of crude oil traverse the strait on an average day, making it one of the world's most strategically important choke points. This represents 35% of the world's seaborne oil shipments, and 20% of oil traded worldwide in 2011.

Ships moving through the Strait follow a Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS), which separates inbound from outbound traffic to reduce the risk of collision. The traffic lane is six miles (10 km) wide, including two two-mile (3 km)-wide traffic lanes, one inbound and one outbound, separated by a two-mile (3 km) wide separation median.

To traverse the Strait, ships pass through the territorial waters of Iran and Oman under the transit passage provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Although not all countries have ratified the convention, most countries, including the U.S., accept these customary navigation rules as codified in the Convention. Oman has a radar site Link Quality Indicator (LQI) to monitor the TSS in the Strait of Hormuz. This site is located on a small island on the peak of Musandam Peninsula.

The navigable waters of the Strait of Hormuz are roughly 20 miles wide at their narrowest point. Commercial and naval maritime traffic, transits two designated shipping lanes inside Omani waters. Each lane (one into the Gulf, one out) is two miles wide and is separated by a two mile-wide buffer. (Almost the entire strait south of Qeshm and Larak islands is deep enough to support tanker traffic, so there is certainly room to shift the traffic further from the Iranian coast.)

 

Tehran has long been aware of the geo-strategic importance of its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz. The threat of mining the Strait or targeting tankers with anti-ship missiles is an important constituent of Iran’s strategy. By threatening shipping in these waters, Iran may be able to engage in psychological warfare and in fact has to some extent succeeded in pushing the prices of crude upwards (Crude for February delivery on the New York Mercantile Exchange rose as much as 98 cents, or 1 percent, to $101.69 a barrel, the highest price since Jan. 12, and was at $101.56 at 10:56 a.m. London time).

Iran’s Strengths and Weakness

In the light of rising tensions in the Persian Gulf, the question is whether Iran possess the military capability to keep the Strait of Hormuz closed?

It must be in borne in mind that there is considerable difference in closing the Strait and keeping the Strait closed for a considerable length of time. This is not a question of semantics. Strategic experts all across the spectrum have expressed varying opinions on Iran’s capabilities on this issue. Just what is the composition of the Iranian forces? Anthony Cordesman of the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in his paper which was included in the US Institute of Peace’s book “The Iran Primer” states that Iran is comparatively a weak conventional military power. Iran’s defence budget is relatively small and further it is barred from procuring military hardware from the West. According to Cordesman Iran spends about $12 billion to $14 billion on defence. This is very small compared to the expenditure incurred by the Gulf States on defence.

Iran has in its arsenal about 300-odd combat aircraft and out of which nearly 60% have little or no mission capability because of most of the aircraft are of the Cold War era procured during the time of the Shah and are obsolete.

Anthony Cordesman’s assessment of the Iranian navy is most relevant to the present discussion.

Iran’s 18,000-man navy and 12,000- to 15,000-man Naval Guards pose the most serious threat to other Gulf States and the U.S. Navy. Iran’s Navy oversees operations in the Caspian and the Gulf of Oman. The naval branch of the IRGC oversees Gulf operations. Both have serious limitations. They lack modern surface vessel combat capability and depend on four obsolete frigates and three obsolete corvettes from the shah’s era with limited modernization and uncertain combat readiness. Iran is apparently building a prototype Mowaj-class corvette/destroyer, which is not yet operational.

The navy does, however, have three Russian Kilo-class submarines—which some reports indicate can lay smart mines and fire long-range homing torpedoes. The IRGC has four to seven North Korean/Iranian-made Yono and Nahand-class midget submarines, and is producing four more. It also has small, semi-submersible craft. The navy also has an aviation branch with three aging P-3F maritime patrol and airborne command and control aircraft, three Falcon aircraft modified for electronic warfare and intelligence, and anti-submarine and mine warfare helicopters.

The IRGC has a wide range of mine warfare and smaller, more modern missile patrol boats armed with Chinese and Iranian-made anti-ship missiles. It also has land-based anti-ship missile batteries, including HY-2s with ranges of approximately 100 kilometers, which can be directed to a target by an aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicle. (China has anti-ship missiles with 200-280 kilometer ranges, but it is not believed these have been sold to Iran.) U.S. experts note that Iran can attack targeted ships with C-701, C-801, C-802 and Iranian-made anti-ship cruise missiles from its own shores, islands, and oil platforms using relatively small mobile launchers.

The navy and IRGC cannot close the Gulf for an extended period, but they could severely restrict shipping through the Gulf for five to 10 days. IRGC naval forces can operate from bases along the Gulf coast, bases near Strait of Hormuz shipping channels, Gulf islands and in the Gulf of Oman. Its anti-ship missile vessels include 13 Kaman-class and 38-meter Thondor (Hudong)-class vessels with C-802 anti-ship missiles, and 9 C-14 and 10 Mk-13 smaller patrol boats with short range Chinese anti-ship missiles. Iran has made and deployed at least 25 Peykapp II-class missile boats and 15 of its own Peykaap I-class coastal patrol craft. The IRGC also has some 100 other, smaller patrol boats, many of which are small enough to be difficult to detect reliably by radar. A number of Iran’s patrol boats are armed with torpedoes and short-range or man-portable anti-air missiles.

The Iranian Navy and IRGC regularly exercise laying mines. The navy can use submarines and five aging mine warfare ships. But all IRGC patrol vessels and many Iranian commercial vessels can lay mines. U.S. Navy intelligence estimates that Iran has the Chinese EM52, a rocket-propelled anti-ship mine, and that the Iranian purchase of three Russian KILO-class submarines probably included modern magnetic, acoustic and pressure-sensitive mines. Iran also produces its own mines, although these may still be limited to less advanced designs. U.S. experts estimate that Iran had at least 2,000 mines by 2004. This is a key threat. The United States normally deploys limited mine warfare capabilities in the Gulf. And Gulf naval capabilities include only five Saudi mine layers and some helicopters with uncertain readiness and training. The Marines and IRGC could use patrol boats, small craft and commercial vessels to raid key offshore facilities in the Gulf, attack key petroleum facilities on the cost, strike at shipping vessels, or raid shore facilities such as desalination or power plants. Iran could also use marines and specially trained IRGC forces to seize ships and infiltrate land targets. It has amphibious ships, but some exercises include activities that train small craft with teams of IRGC fighters in ways suitable for raids on offshore or coastal targets.

Finding and destroying all of the active elements of the naval branch of the IRGC and Iran’s smaller surface craft would be difficult. While Iran’s smaller craft have limited ability to stay at sea, they can be remotely located and used in a war of attrition to launch sudden raids with anti-ship missiles, using direct fire weapons, or drop mines. The IRGC and some elements of the Iranian Navy regularly practice the use of small craft, commercial vessels and amphibious vessels in moving forces that can defend and seize targets in the Gulf and on its coast, and support the deployment of medium to long-range, land-based anti-ship missiles and operations of small craft and missile patrol boats outside regular peacetime bases.

Possibly the most effective tool that the Iranians have is their mine warfare capability. The Iranians have an extensive (and underrated) naval mining capability, which can be launched from boats, planes, mini-submarines and even from the shore. Mines are the poor man's most lethal naval weapon. Since the end of the Second World War, mines have seriously damaged or sunk four times more US navy ships than all other means of attack combined.

Iran's naval mining capability looks like the wild card in such a conflict. There is no command and control structure in mine warfare that the US type of "shock and awe" strategy could effectively attack and destroy.

According to Christian Koch, Director of the International Studies Research Program at the Gulf Research Center, Iran’s objective was to increase the sense of insecurity. He says the most serious threat posed by Iran is in the form of asymmetrical warfare that employs irregulars or proxies to engage in acts of terror and sabotage. He further adds that Iran doesn’t need to close the Strait of Hormuz to wreak havoc; it could target oil fields, power plants and other critical and vulnerable installations located in the Gulf.

The Iranian Navy and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) may not be able to close the Strait for an extended period of time; these forces by the use of unconventional means of warfare may be in a position to hamper normal shipping for a period of a week or two. This period however, would be critical as it could result in sky-rocketing of crude prices, thereby impacting the global economy. However, considering the fact that the US would be able to augment its force levels in the region in a short time-span and the continued vigil maintained by the Bahrain-based Fifth Fleet, Iranian attempts at hampering shipping could very well be thwarted.

An International Legal Perspective of the British Embassy Attack in Tehran

Iran has done it again. On 28^th November 2011, Iranian protestors stormed the British Embassy compound and a diplomatic residence, tearing down the British flag, breaking windows, vandalizing walls and  holding six embassy staffers “hostage” for a short time. The protest which appeared to have the full support of the Iranian government was in response to Britain’s harsh new sanctions against Iran for its ongoing nuclear weapons’ programme. The incident brought back memories of the diplomatic crisis between Iran and the US when 52 American Embassy personnel were held hostage for 444 days from 4^th November 1979 to 20^th January 1981 after a group of Islamist students and militants took over the US Embassy in Tehran in support of the Iranian Revolution.

The attack on Tuesday began when about 50 protesters invaded the offices in the vast walled compound housing the British Embassy and its manicured grounds, situated in a busy neighborhood in the heart of Tehran. Outside the gates, thousands of student protesters chanted religious slogans and demanded the expulsion of the British ambassador. In the meantime, 200 to 300 others broke into a British diplomatic residence a few miles north of the embassy, called Qolhak Garden. The facility also houses a school. 

Television images showed protesters, some armed with gasoline bombs, rampaging through offices strewn with papers, and at least one vehicle was shown burning inside the compound. There was ample evidence of the state’s complicity in the attack: police was shown as silent spectators in television footage, and in any case the security forces have maintained strict control over all large protests in Iran ever since the disputed presidential election of 2009. Further evidence of Tehran’s complicity in the attack is apparent from the fact that the embassy attack came a day after Iran’s Parliament approved a measure to expel the British ambassador and downgrade diplomatic relations between the two countries, in retaliation for Britain’s new economic sanctions.

Iran’s semi-official Fars news agency reported that police officers freed six British staff members who had been surrounded by the Qolhak Garden protesters and that 12 of those protesters were later arrested.

The Iranian authorities have organized similar political demonstrations against foreign embassies in the past, intervening only after the protest was well under way and the message was clear.

This attack very clearly proves that Iran has scant regard for the provisions of international law and particularly the provisions of Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961.

Article 22 (1) of the Vienna Convention stipulates that the premises of the mission are inviolable and the agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.

 

Article 22 (2) of the 1961 Convention enjoins on the receiving State (the host country) take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.

So also Article 30 provides that the private residence of a diplomatic agent shall enjoy the same inviolability and protection as the premises of the mission.

Article 29 lays down that the person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.

All the three provisions referred to above were infringed with impunity in the incident in Tehran.

Iran, by permitting this attack, is also guilty of violation of the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 1973

A diplomat is an internationally protected person within the meaning of the above-mentioned Convention and at the time when and in the place where a crime against him, his official premises, his private accommodation or his means of transport is committed, is entitled pursuant to international law to special protection from any attack on his person, freedom or dignity, as well as members of his family forming part of his household.

The 1973 Convention vide Article 2 provides

1. The intentional commission of:

(a) A murder, kidnapping or other attack upon the person or liberty of an internationally protected person;

b) A violent attack upon the official premises, the private accommodation or the means of transport of an internationally protected person likely to endanger his person or liberty;

(c) A threat to commit any such attack;

(d) An attempt to commit any such attack; and

(e) An act constituting participation as an accomplice in any such attack shall be made by each State Party a crime under its internal law.

2. Each State Party shall make these crimes punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature.

3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article in no way derogate from the obligations of States Parties under international law to take all appropriate measures to prevent other attacks on the person, freedom or dignity of an internationally protected person.

Iran needs to be reminded that apart from the provisions of Vienna Convention, in Islamic tradition too, a messenger should not be harmed, even if coming from an arch-enemy and bearing a highly provocative or offensive message. A hadith attributes this sunnah to the time when Musaylimah sent to the Prophet Muhammad messengers who proclaimed Musaylimah be a Prophet of Allah and the co-equal of Muhammad himself.

Iran has in the past been indicted and held guilty by the International Court of Justice in the case involving seizure of the US Embassy and its personnel in 1979. In the case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran decided on 24^th May 1980 by the International Court of Justice, the Court, inter alia, held that the Islamic Republic of Iran, had violated in several respects, obligations owed by it to the United States of America under international conventions in force between the two countries, as well as under long-established rules of general international law. The Court also held that Iran was under an obligation to make reparation to the Government of the United States of America for the injury caused by the events of 4^th November 1979 and what followed from these events.

Given Iran’s past record, it is indeed far-fetched to expect Iran to abide by the rules of international law. In such circumstances, international community must take cognizance of the inherently delinquent behaviour and adopt “strong measures” to deter and prevent Iran from violating the law of nations in general as well as international treaty obligations.

NATO Attack on Pak Check Post - Ramifications

On 26^th November 2011 (around 2.00 am local time), helicopters/aircraft belonging to NATO/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) carried out an attack, alleged to be unprovoked by Pakistan, on a military border outpost at Baizai area of Mohmand tribal region a lawless border area which abuts Afghanistan's eastern Kunar province, killing about 24 to 28 soldiers including a major and a captain. Fifteen more personnel were wounded and the death toll could rise as condition of some of the injured was reported to be serious. The attack prompted Islamabad to launch strong protest with the United States and close its frontier for supplies to allied forces in Afghanistan. Pakistani authorities responded to the attack by stopping all container trucks and tankers carrying supplies for US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. The attack threatened to further strain the already tense US-Pak relations.

According to the spokesman for the NATO-led ISAF in Kabul the coalition was aware of "an incident" near the border and was gathering information on it. Security forces blocked all entry points to Mohmand tribal agency after the incident and began checking all vehicles, TV news channels reported. Several crossings on the Afghanistan frontier, including Landikotal and Takhtbai, were closed and over 150 NATO supply vehicles sent back to Peshawar.

Pakistan rejected the regret expressed by NATO and warned that the action would have grave consequences. The regret expressed by NATO over the killing of the Pakistani soldiers is "not enough", chief military spokesman Maj Gen Athar Abbas said. "The NATO strike can have grave consequences," he said. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on Sunday said he had written to Pakistan Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani to express regret over the "tragic unintended incident".

Apart from closing all NATO supply routes, Pakistan asked the US to vacate Shamsi airbase within 15 days. The base is believed to be used by Central Investigation Agency for operating drones. 

While Pakistan has alleged that the air strike was unprovoked, there are reports suggesting that Afghan troops operating near the Pakistani border came under fire and in response called in NATO air strikes. The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue, said it was unclear who attacked the Afghan troops before dawn Saturday, but that the soldiers were fired upon from the direction of the Pakistani border posts that were hit in the strikes.

The border area where the soldiers were operating contains a mix of Pakistani forces and Islamist militants.

But there are forces working against a total rupture in the relationship. Pakistan continues to rely on billions of dollars in American military and civilian aid, and the U.S. needs Islamabad's help to push Afghan insurgents to engage in peace talks.

Tensions are likely to exacerbate if militants unleash attacks against hundreds of trucks carrying supplies to U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan that were backed up at Pakistani border crossings after Islamabad closed the frontier.

Suspected militants had destroyed around 150 trucks a year ago after Pakistan closed one of its Afghan border crossings to NATO supplies for about 10 days in retaliation for a U.S. helicopter attack that accidentally killed two Pakistani soldiers.

The situation could become worse this time because Pakistan has closed both its crossings. Nearly 300 trucks carrying coalition supplies are now stranded at Torkham in the northwest Khyber tribal area and Chaman in southwestern Baluchistan province. A prolonged closure of Pakistan's two Afghan border crossings to NATO supplies could cause serious problems for the coalition. Recent reports suggest that the closure of the crossings is permanent. The U.S., which is the largest member of the NATO force in Afghanistan, ships more than 30 per cent of its non-lethal supplies through Pakistan. The coalition has alternative routes through Central Asia into northern Afghanistan, but they are costlier and less efficient. According to the Telegraph, although the US is transporting more of its equipment, food and fuel through Central Asia in an attempt to reduce Pakistani leverage, the route through Karachi still accounts for 49% of supplies destined for the 140,000-strong foreign force.

The incident will have far-reaching ramifications not only on US-Pak relations, but also for the ISAF operations in Afghanistan and the US-led war on terror.

Firstly, ISAF will have to explore the possibilities of opening and maintaining alternate routes for transport of food, equipment and fuel for its forces stationed and operating in Afghanistan. Secondly, Pakistan’s action of closure of the border crossings will most likely be met with cut US military and non-military aid to Pakistan, something which it can ill-afford.

Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy is highly suspect. The US Government and its lawmakers are highly skeptical of Pakistani intentions and its policy of hunting with the hounds and running with the hare. Western officials have alleged that Pakistan has played a "double-game" since 2001, by allying with the US but at the same time providing support to the Taliban and other Afghan insurgents. US officials suspected that the Pakistani ISI had conspired with the Haqqani network in the September 2011 attack on the US Embassy in Kabul. The relations between the two sides have nose-dived since then. This incident may give Pakistan a pretext to withdraw support to the US war on terror, particularly because of the unpopularity of the drone attacks inside Pakistan. And the US too may be looking for an excuse to carry out military strikes inside Pakistan because of Pakistan’s reluctance to take action against groups like the Haqqani network, which Pakistan considers to be a strategic asset.

The most important ramification of this incident is Pakistan’s call to vacate the Shamsi air base operated by the CIA.

First offered to Washington in the early days after 9/11 by the Musharraf regime when it simpered before the American threat that it will be bombed back to the Stone Age if it did not cooperate, Shamsi's US operations was a well-kept secret till February 2009 when Internet trawlers ferreted out Google earth photos showing drone aircraft at the base. News that the US was using Pakistani facilities to carry out its Predator campaign within Pakistani territory against Pakistani targets embarrassed Islamabad no end, sparking off a campaign to evict American assets. Pakistan, it must be noted managed to get US to vacate the Jacobabad airbase, the second of the air base operated by the US. Reports suggest that Pakistan has not been successful in getting the US to vacate the Shamsi base. How did the US manage to cling on to this base? The answer lay in the fact that the air base was not even under Pakistani control. Like with some other parts of the country like areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir ceded to China and parts of the Khyber Pakhtunwa given up to extremists, Islamabad earned itself the dubious reputation as a rentier state, it turned out that Shamsi Air Base had been leased out to some Gulf potentates.

During the Pakistan national assembly debate following the Abbottabad operation, Pakistan air chief Rao Qamar Suleman reportedly told lawmakers in camera than Shamsi has been under the control of the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan Air Force had no say in the matter. In fact, the Shamsi air strip was originally built for Arab sheikhs who flew into Pakistan to hunt for the houbara bustard, a rare bird some Arabs believe has aphrodisiac properties.

Now, the US-UAE arrangement in Shamsi rendered the Pakistani establishment impotent. 

In the event of closure of the Shamsi Air Base, the drone operations being carried out by CIA may be adversely affected. The US may have to shift these operations to a secure location in Afghanistan or elsewhere. If such a situation were to arise, then the US may probably adopt a no holds barred approach to taking on terrorists in Pakistan. 

In conclusion, Pakistan must realise that playing a dangerous double game as they have done so far in Afghanistan is fraught with serious risks wherein allied forces may carry out military strikes as highlighted  by this incident "accidentally". None, but Pakistan alone, will be responsible for such actions.