Monday, July 6, 2015

India’s Bid for SCO Membership – A Perspective

The Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi left on a visit to five Central Asian countries and Russia aiming to enhance strategic, economic and energy ties as well attending summits of BRICS and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO).

The SCO Summit, to be held in Ufa in Russia, may see India getting the membership of the six-nation grouping comprising China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which could be a major highlight of the visit. India has only an observer status since June 2005. A formal application for full-fledged membership was submitted in September 2014 during the last SCO summit. Pakistan’s application for the full membership is also being taken into consideration.

Sana Hashmi in her article India's entry into the SCO may bring it closer to China writes: “The 2015 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit, to be held on July 9-10 in Russia will be yet another test case for Modi’s diplomatic skill probing whether he can get New Delhi its due place at the international stage. It may be noted that Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan hold observer status in the grouping. The focus of the summit is likely to be on enlarging the scope of membership and widening economic cooperation, regional connectivity and security issues that make SCO more significant than ever for India.”

Strangely, India has shown increasing interest in becoming a full-fledged member of an organization which has People’s Republic of China as one of its founding-member and Pakistan which is likely to be accorded full membership. Ms Hashmi in her article writes that China was reluctant to approve India’s candidature and is now ready to back India’s entry into the organization. In the article she highlights the ‘conditionalities’ to be met before a state can be admitted as a member of the organization, namely, First, the applicant country should be geographically contiguous to one of the SCO members; Second, it should not have United Nations sanctions imposed on it; Third, it should have diplomatic relations with all SCO members; Fourth, it should have the status of an observer or a dialogue partner in the grouping before applying for the full membership; Fifth, it should have active trade, economic and humanitarian linkages with SCO members and; Finally, the applicant country should not be involved in any armed/territorial disputes with either of the member states. India while meeting most of the essentials, cannot overcome the final hurdle because India has an ongoing territorial/boundary dispute with both China and Pakistan.

Why has China changed its stance? Is it to seek India’s cooperation and support for China’s proposed ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative? China's interest in India and Pakistan has increased since adopting its Maritime Silk Road strategy and that could be behind its acquiescence to their joining the SCO, added Li Lifan, a researcher at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. "I think China supports India and Pakistan to become full members simultaneously in line with the development of the grand 'Maritime Silk Road' scheme proposed by China. Or is it to woo India away from a possible US-Japan-India alliance which may be used as counterweight against China? Or is China trying to use an Asian version of NATO to blunt the US pivot or re-balance to Asia? 

So what will an expansion do to the organization? It may strengthen China's role as a regional security provider. "An expanded SCO will be in a better position to achieve Xi’s vision of becoming the regional security heavyweight," wrote Shannon Tiezzi in an analysis in The Diplomat. "Despite a tendency to see the SCO as a competitor to NATO, Chinese leaders stress that the SCO is something entirely new. In the Dushanbe Summit (Sept 2014), Xi announced that 'SCO members have created a new model of international relations — partnership instead of alliance.'”

A theory that has been put forth is that with the US withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan and the impending security vacuum may have made China realize that Indian involvement in counter-terrorism efforts and stability in the region were essential. Pakistan’s military establishment will not permit any Indian participation through the SCO in Afghanistan as it would run counter to its primary objectives and core interests. 

Three years ago, the renowned strategic affairs expert, late B Raman in an article India must be cautious while seeking SCO full membership expressed reservations on India’s proposed entry into the SCO. He wrote: “While China has been trying to use the security mechanism of the SCO for dealing with organisations which are perceived as posing a threat to Beijing and the Central Asian Republics, it does not look upon anti-India organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Tayiba, the Jaish-e-Mohammad, the Harkt-ul-Jihad-al-Islami and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen  which are sponsored by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, or the Afghan Taliban or the Haqqani Network, which are the allies of Pakistan, as coming within the ambit of the SCO security mechanism.” China in keeping with the policy of shielding its “all weather friend” Pakistan, a few days ago, blocked a bid by India to question the release of Mumbai 26/11 mastermind Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi from captivity. China’s flimsy justification for blocking India’s bid was that India had not provided adequate information.

He further wrote: “While seeking full membership of the SCO, India should carefully consider to what extent it would be advisable for it to participate in an internal security co-operation mechanism of which China and Pakistan would be members. There would be very little compatibility between our internal security concerns and interests and those of China and Pakistan and it could be counter-productive for us to participate in this mechanism.” Further can India achieve success against Pak-based terror groups through the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS)? Even if an agreement is reached to tackle terrorism of all hues, very little is likely to be achieved by India on the ground in its battle against Pakistan based terror outfits such as the Lashkar, Jeish, HUJI and HUM.

The internal security co-operation mechanism of the SCO is proposed to be extended to the area of cyber security. The Council of Shanghai Co-operation Organisation’s Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS), at its 22nd Session in Tashkent in April 2013 reached an agreement on new measures to combat cyber terrorism. The main threats to India’s cyber security arise from Pakistan and China. Will it be in India’s interest to participate in any connectivity and inter-operability mechanism relating to cyber security with China? Or Pakistan for that matter? The views expressed by late B Raman, three years ago continue to hold true even today.

It would be extremely foolhardy for India to rush and join an organisation which may not sub-serve India’s interests and also undermine India’s security. India can further its interests in the region by promoting bilateral cooperation with Central Asian republics bypassing the SCO.

Thursday, June 11, 2015

Lessons of the Surgical Strike in Myanmar

In the early hours of 9th June 2015, Indian Army’s Special Forces launched a cross-border attack on two rebel camps in Myanmar. The operation was not just a retaliatory response to the 4th June attack on an Indian Army convoy that killed about 18 army personnel, but was also pre-emptive in nature. India must seriously consider setting up a unified Special Forces Command in the wake of a changed geo-strategic environment in the sub-continent.

On 4th June 2015, in one of the worst attacks suffered by the Indian Army in a decade, at least 18 soldiers of the 6 Dogra Regiment were killed and 11 injured when Naga militants ambushed their convoy in Manipur's Chandel district.

The attack occurred between Paralong and Charong villages around 8.30 am when militants used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) at the convoy.

Most of the bodies were charred, officials said.

They laid an ambush on the road from Tengnoupal and, as an administrative convoy of four to seven vehicles reached the spot, the attack was launched. The attackers detonated country-made mines and opened fire with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) - called "Lathods" - on the soldiers of the 6 Dogras, according to reports reaching army headquarters.

This was the first time the Indian Army had lost 18 soldiers in a single strike in 20 years. It was also the first time that RPGs were used by insurgents on the army.

"An elite strike unit of Naga Army, Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) and the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) carried out the ambush today (Thursday)," The NSCN-K said in a statement issued to the media.

The 9th June Operation – 

Intelligence and Planning

Sources said once clearance for the raid was given by the highest level of the government, detailed plans were drawn up for the assault by troops of the elite 21 Para (Special Force) Regiment.

Prior to the operation, intelligence was gathered by operatives who crossed over into Myanmar a couple of days earlier and returned with precise co-ordinates of the terror dens along with photographs.

Once specific intelligence inputs came on the two camps, showing that they were housing several National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) militants, and of other groups such as PLA (Peoples Liberation Army of Manipur), UNLF (United National Liberation Front) and the MNRF (Manipur Naga Revolutionary Front), the plan for the commando raid moved quickly. "Inputs clearly said that some militants in the camp were involved in the attack on our troops in Chandel last Thursday," one source said.

At a camp in the Ponyu area, the NSCN (K)'s 3rd brigade is based. And among its cadres were those who participated in operations against the Army. In Aungzeya area was the other camp which housed a mixed group of militants. Both camps had about 25 militants.

The Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) had the necessary data ready since many months about the activities of the insurgent groups in the area which is called ‘Greater Nagaland’ by the militants. The local insurgent groups want a ‘Greater Nagaland’ carved out of the Naga-dominated areas in the neighbouring states within India and contiguous areas in Myanmar.

The commandos trained for three days at a make shift camp before carrying out the strike.

The Strike

Contrary to media reports, an Army source said: "There was no heli-drop. It was a one-night, ground operation. We couldn't have carried out a heli-drop because that would have alerted the militants." The SF troops were moved close to the border in advance by helicopters and were dropped off at Manipur-Nagaland junction with Myanmar. On the night prior to the strike, about 20-25 commandos trekked across the porous border into Myanmar. For some stretch of the approach to the target, they crawled in order to avoid detection.

Once on the ground, the contingent of the Special Forces split into two groups and headed for two camps being run by NSCN (K) and KYKL, who are believed to be responsible for the deadly ambush on June 4, they said.

The teams trekked through the thick jungles for at least five kilometers before they reached the training camps. "Each of the two teams was further divided into two sub-groups. While one was responsible for the direct assault, the second formed an outer ring to prevent any of insurgents from running and escaping," the sources said.

The strike by the Indian forces on the two locations across Tuensang in Nagaland and Ukhrul in Manipur lasted about 45 minutes and the camps were annihilated. There are conflicting reports on the number of militants killed in the operation. The army sources state that the militants suffered significant casualties - the number of militants killed has been between 22 and 50. The Indian raiding party returned safely without suffering any casualties.

Thermal imagery was also used to track the operation about which Myanmar authorities were kept in the loop, they said. Mi-17 helicopters of the Indian Air Force were put on standby, ready to be pressed into service to evacuate the commandos in case anything went wrong.  "The operation was carried out based on specific and very accurate intelligence" and the operation was overseen by General Officer Commanding (GoC) of the Dimapur-based 3 Corps Lt Gen Bipin Rawat, the sources said.

The government of Myanmar was reportedly informed about the strike after their offices opened on the morning of 9th June. India and Myanmar have a "Hot Pursuit" Agreement pursuant to which, both the states' forces can cross the border, with consent, if they get any information on militant activity on the territory of the other state. In the past, Operation Golden Bird had been conducted along the Myanmar border in 1995 and Operation All Clear inside Bhutan in 2003. 

There is no doubt euphoria, on the successful surgical strike by the troops of the Indian Army’s 21 Para across the border in Myanmar. But one must appreciate the fact that faced with an existential threat, considering that Myanmar may not be a safe haven after all, the militant groups are likely to re-group and respond. Indian forces may have to be on the alert to foil attacks on civilian and military targets in the region in the foreseeable future.

Joint Special Forces Command

It is high time that India establishes a Joint Special Forces Command which will oversee and exercise operational control over the Special Forces of the three branches.

The Special Forces of states like the US, UK and France are placed under a unified command to enable optimal utilization of resources and achieve operational synergy.

In the US, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is a unified combatant command which oversees the various Special Operations Command of the four branches of the armed forces, namely, the Army, Air Force, Navy and the Marine Corps. USSOCOM conducts several covert and clandestine missions, such as direct action, special reconnaissance, counter-terror operations, etc. Each branch has a Special Operations Command that is unique and capable of running its own operations, but when the different special operations forces need to work together for an operation, USSOCOM becomes the joint component command of the operation, instead of a SOC of a specific branch.

Joint Special Operations Command is a constituent command of the USSOCOM and is tasked to study special operations requirements and techniques to ensure interoperability and equipment standardization, plan and conduct special operations exercises and training, and develop Joint Special Operations Tactics.

In the United Kingdom, the Special Air Service (SAS), Special Reconnaissance Regiment (SRR) and the Royal Navy’s Special Boat Service (SBS) are under the control of the UK Special Forces, a unified command of the Ministry of Defense.   
The proposal to establish a Special Forces Command in India was made in 2012 by a select panel on national security called the Naresh Chandra Committee.

“The Indian concept of employment of Special Forces has yet to graduate from that of tactical in support of conventional operations to strategic employment, as the US [Navy] SEALs,” or the British Special Air Service, said Rahul Bhonsle, a retired Indian Army brigadier and defense analyst. “This will have to be a political decision and would require a high degree of strategic sophistication, which I do not think the Indian political leadership is displaying for now.”

An Army official said India’s special ops forces — which number about 10,000 troops from the Navy, Air Force, Army and paramilitary units — have been used only for conventional warfare and internal security threats. The officer argued the special ops forces should be used for strategic tasks, such as deterrence against irregular threats and asymmetrical warfare.

According to General Katoch, asymmetric war is not launched against the military, but a nation. “Special Forces must be central to asymmetric response, but in the current context, we neither have the political will nor even the military will, and hence have not been able to establish deterrence to this asymmetric war.”

Bureaucratic barriers also may have played a role in the government’s inaction.

“The Indian bureaucracy, which supposedly handles these issues, has neither the expertise nor the structure needed for the purpose. The reluctance to allow the creation of a professional body can only be attributed to the bureaucracy’s fear of losing their clout and turf,” said Venkataraman Mahalingam, a retired Army brigadier and defense analyst.

Not all Special Forces’ operations can be publicly acknowledged or given publicity. In the Myanmar operation, the government of Myanmar had cooperated by allowing Indian troops to carry out the strike. In other situations, the forces may have to be inserted into enemy territory without the knowledge of the host country and objectives must be achieved in utmost secrecy. These types of clandestine operations can be carried out more effectively if a unified command is set up.

Saturday, June 6, 2015

US Special Forces' Operation in Syria - The Killing of Islamic Leader Abu Sayyaf

Unlike other operations of the US Special Forces, the raid which resulted in the killing of an Islamic State leader in Syria in mid-May 2015 did not receive much publicity. The raid, nevertheless, illustrates the effectiveness of the Delta Force and the intelligence gathered on the shadowy organization and its leaders. 

The US Special Forces carried out a rare raid in Eastern Syria around the middle of May 2015 killing an Islamic State leader Tunisian-born Abu Sayyaf described as the Islamic State’s “emir of oil and gas.” About a dozen IS fighters were also killed in the raid. The commandos captured the wife of Abu Sayyaf, known as Umm Sayaff and rescued an 18 year old Yazidi woman who had been held as a slave. While details of the operation have not been revealed, it has been reported that that about two dozen commandos belonging to the Delta Force entered Syria aboard Black Hawk helicopters and V-22 Ospreys on 15-16 May 2015 and killed Abu Sayyaf.

“Abu Sayyaf was a senior ISIL leader who, among other things, had a senior role in overseeing ISIL’s illicit oil and gas operations — a key source of revenue that enables the terrorist organization to carry out their brutal tactics and oppress thousands of innocent civilians,” said National Security Council spokeswoman Bernadette Meehan in a statement.

Oil smuggling provides "a key source of revenue that enables [Islamic State] to carry out their brutal tactics and oppress thousands of innocent civilians". the White House said.

According to an official of the Department of Defense IS fighters who defended the building and Abu Sayyaf tried to use women and children as shields, but Delta Force commandos used precision fire and separated the women and children. The operation, it is learnt, involved close hand-to-hand combat.

The commandos involved in the raid came under fire as soon as they landed near a multi-storey building used by Abu Sayyaf as his residence, in al-Amr, about 20 miles south-east of Deir al-Zour, near the oil facilities that he administered for the Islamic State. Around a dozen Islamic State fighters were killed in the exchange of fire with the US forces. According to reports, Abu Sayyaf “tried to engage” the commandos and was shot and killed. The commandos thereafter took his wife and the Yazidi woman back to the waiting aircraft. The raiding team was back in Iraq with the two women around dawn. Defense Department officials stated that the commandos succeeded in seizing laptop computers, cell phones and other materials from the site which may assist in intelligence assessments.

The objective of the night raid was perhaps to capture Sayyaf alive, but, he was reportedly killed after trying to “engage” U.S. forces. Still, both the Pentagon and the White House hailed the mission as a success, resulting not only in the seizure of some of Sayyaf’s communications equipment and other potentially valuable materials, but also the capture of his wife, Umm Sayyaf, who is also suspected to be a member of the Islamic State and a key player in the group’s terrorist activities.

The Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, in a statement said that the killing of Sayyaf dealt a significant blow to the group. The slain leader was said to be involved in the terror group’s military operations and managed its “illicit oil, gas and financial operations” that enabled the Islamic State to raise funds for it to operate. According to DoD officials, the raid was approved by President Obama. While Carter declared the operation — Sayyaf’s death included — a “significant blow” to the Islamic State, some experts responded to the announcement with caution.

In an interview with the New York Times, former CIA analyst and White House national security advisor Bruce Riedel said it seemed like the raid was “a collection mission, the goal to capture someone or two someones who can explain how ISIS works.”

While suggesting that, in lieu of Sayyaf, “perhaps the wife can do that,” Riedel added, “To me, it demonstrates we still have large gaps in our understanding of the enemy and how it is organized.”

CNN’s analyst Peter Bergen was also skeptical. Pointing out that raids like the one on Sayyaf likely put the Islamic State’s leadership on high alert to operate more carefully, he questioned the real value of the mission.

“Taking out the guy who runs effectively the most important financing stream is obviously significant,” he said. “But what’s really significant is the computer records and all the materials that he would have with him as the head of this financing arm, if indeed that is the case that he is really that important.”