The arrest of one of the key conspirators and
terrorist handlers of the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, Syed Zabiuddin Ansari
alias Abu Jundal a.k.a. Abu Hamza at New Delhi’s IGI Airport in June 2012 after
being deported from Saudi Arabia not only marks a high for the Indian security
agencies but also turns the focus back on Islamabad’s complicity in the attack.
Abu Jundal who held a Pakistani passport at the time of his capture and deportation
is an Indian national from the Beed district of Maharashtra.
During the course of his interrogation, he is
reported to have disclosed that he was in Saudi Arabia at the behest of
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) to raise finances for carrying out a bigger attack on
India. According to him, the LeT had planned to execute a major terrorist
strike in India within a year. He had also been tasked to lure Indian youth
working in Saudi Arabia to join the banned terror outfit, the Indian
Mujahideen. He is also reported to have told the investigators that the LeT was
expanding its naval wing to carry out more terror strikes. At the time of
writing it was revealed that he was planning a similar strike with an Indian
Mujahideen (IM) module that he was setting up when he was nabbed in Saudi
Arabia.
Two implications clearly emerge out of this
interrogation – firstly Pakistan (its military establishment and the
Inter-Services Intelligence, the ISI) and the India-centric terror groups,
particularly the LeT are not sufficiently deterred from executing fedayeen
strikes inside India and secondly, there is no change in the Pakistani mindset of
using terrorism as an instrument of state policy at least vis-à-vis India. This
revelation by Abu Jundal is also likely to have an adverse impact on the
Indo-Pak dialogue process. One another thing that emerges from the disclosure
made is that LeT and other radical Islamic groups in Pakistan, far from being
reined in, are in a position to influence Pakistan’s foreign policy, especially
its India policy post 26/11. There is a strong suspicion that Pakistani
military establishment will not hesitate to execute another 26/11 – type attack,
of course with certain modifications and improvements so as to ensure that the
attacks cannot be traced back to Pakistan or the ISI.
The interrogation of Abu Jundal must alert the
Indian security establishment to the fact that groups inimical to India have
been in the process of plotting and will continue to plot terror strikes
against India. While the capture of a key LeT operative like Jundal may be
euphoric, it is time for Indian agencies to counter and neutralize this threat
emanating from across the western border. The international community expected India
post-26/11 to respond appropriately to this “undeclared war”. However, India
chose to rely on diplomacy rather than reprisals against Pakistan. Diplomacy
and sanctions may not be necessarily successful in countering terrorism.
Post 26/11, there is very little that Pakistan has
done in reining groups like the LeT. India must accept the fact that Pakistan
will continue to sponsor or allow outfits like LeT to freely carry out
operations against India till such time India does not respond with reprisals.
While expecting a repeat of 26/11, India must realize that Pakistani ISI will
try to avoid a repeat of the mistakes committed during 26/11. In other words,
tactically, Pakistan while planning a strike like 26/11 will try to cover up
its tracks in order to ensure that its complicity remains undetected. For one,
the ISI will desist from using Pakistani nationals to carry out any future
fedayeen attacks inside India. Instead, Pakistan may try to lure the Indian
Mujahidden to carry out the attack thereby making it look like an indigenous
terror strike. Secondly, ISI in all likelihood would avoid using a control room
to give orders and instructions as was the case during 26/11. Either, there may
be complete radio silence or a control room may be located in a third country.
Thirdly, there is every possibility of any future attack inside India being
outsourced, meaning thereby either a group with no Indian link may carry out
the attack or individuals belonging to other radical Islamic groups may be
assigned to carry out the attack.
Lashkar’s Maldivian connection assumes significance
in this context of outsourcing any future attack inside India.
It is important to note that Lashkar’s operations
have expanded over the years – it is estimated that the LeT maintains some kind
of presence in about 21 countries, including Maldives.
While there are no known organized jihadi groups
operating in or out of the Maldives, the country has proven a fertile ground
for jihadist recruitment. Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT) and al-Qaeda
have both successfully recruited youth already radicalized in Islamic schools
there.
The December 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean
provided an opening in this regard. In the aftermath of the disaster, radical
Islamists gained a foothold in the country in the guise of humanitarian
charities. The most significant of these was the Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq
(IKK), which is affiliated with the Pakistan-based Jammat ud
Dawa/Lashkar-e-Taiba. The IKK is linked to the Jamaat Ahl-e-Hadith sect
active in the Maldives, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Many Ahl-e-Hadith
groups are known to be involved in the jihadi struggle in South Asia,
and most are affiliated with Kashmir-centric terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e
Taiba and Harkat-ul Mujahideen. Its followers prefer to call
themselves Salafis, in order to stress their closeness to the Saudis.
Intelligence sources confirm that the IKK has spearheaded LeT’s activities in
the Maldives, which prioritizes youth recruitment. The IKK claims to have spent
17.2 million Pakistani Rupees (roughly $282,000) on tsunami relief in the
Maldives, Sri Lanka and Indonesia during 2005 as post-tsunami relief although
the Maldivian government denies that the organization provided any relief. Ostensibly
as part of that aid, the IKK reportedly facilitated trips for many Maldivian
youth to Pakistan, enrolling them in various radical madrassas (Islamic
seminaries) there.
Sporadic incidents of jihadi activity
within the Maldives have also occurred. In April 2005, for example, Indian
police arrested Maldivian national Asif Ibrahim who allegedly frequented the
Indian state of Kerala to procure arms and ammunition for the LeT's Maldives
operation. Ibrahim confessed to planning to blow up a government-run mosque and
assassinate then-President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom. An official release from the
Maldivian government indicated that Asif Ibrahim had become a member of the
UK-based extremist Islamic group Jama'ah-tul-Muslimeen in 2001. In the
early weeks of February 2010, nine alleged Maldivian terrorists arrested in
Pakistan’s troubled South Waziristan tribal region in March 2009 were
repatriated to the Maldives. According to national police, the nine
have ties to the bombing that took place in Malé’s Sultan Park in
September 2007, and may have left the country for Pakistan via Sri Lanka for
further training and indoctrination.
The Maldivian government admitted that
Pakistan-based terrorist groups have successfully recruited hundreds of
Maldivian Muslims to fight against government forces in Pakistan. The bin Laden network has done so as
well; an al-Qaeda video circulated in November 2009 featured Ali Jaleel, a
Maldivian national who fought alongside pro-Taliban forces in Pakistan. Soon thereafter, another recruitment
video featured a previously unknown al-Qaeda cell operating in the Maldives,
and exhorted jihadists to travel to the country, stating "Your
brothers in the Maldives are calling you.”
International concerns over the growth of Islamic
extremism in the Maldives have risen since the May 2002 arrest of Ibrahim
Fauzee. Fauzee, a Muslim cleric (now heading the Islamic Foundation of
Maldives), was arrested in a suspected al-Qaeda safe house in Karachi, Pakistan
and subsequently held in the Guantanamo Bay detention camp until his release
and repatriation to the Maldives in March 2005. The incident sparked
concerns about the spread of radical Islam and the penetration of international
terror groups like al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba into the social fabric
of this Indian Ocean archipelago.
The Fauzee case was not an isolated event, however.
There is growing evidence of Maldivian youths frequenting Pakistan for reasons
unknown or suspicious in nature, though enrollment in various madrassas (Islamic
seminaries) is usually cited as the prime reason for their travel. Intelligence
agencies of the United States and India have noted this development with
concern, and believe that growing religious extremism in the Maldives is a
Pakistani import.
Another significant
aspect which Indian security establishment must look into is the recent reports
of three African terrorist groups al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Shabaab
in Somalia, and Boko Haram in Nigeria seeking to “coordinate and synchronize”
their operations. Since the groups in question are affiliated to the Al Qaeda
and with reports of Somalis being trained in terrorist training camps in
Pakistan, the possibility of using African nationals to execute an attack cannot
be ruled out. It is also important to bear in mind the fact that in August
2010, a blast in the Somali capital Mogadishu left ten Al Shabaab terrorists
dead while they were trying to assemble a suicide car bomb. Two of the
suspected terrorists were Indian nationals according to the Somali Ministry of
Information. A co-operation of this nature is not unknown amongst international
terror groups. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-08-23/india/28291614_1_islamist-terror-al-shabaab-jihadis
One of the recommendations made to the US policy
makers contained in the report titled “The Menace that is Lashkar-e-Taiba”
prepared by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is to destroy the
LeT for, left unchecked, it would eventually evolve into a formidable threat.
Together with its allies, the US should use all available means to eviscerate
the LeT – with or without Pakistan’s help. The US has realized albeit, a bit
too late that LeT has assumed dangerous proportions and use of force is the
only viable option available to it and its allies to neutralize the Pak-based
terror outfits.
India irrespective of the action initiated or
proposed to be initiated by the US and its allies must itself draw up a plan of
action to counter and neutralize the ISI-backed LeT and other groups. For
India, the best option is use of covert operations. While India’s experience in
this area is limited, there is now an urgent need to penetrate Pakistani
society and carry out subversive activities aimed at disrupting/undermining the
ability of ISI and its proxies to carry out terrorist activities against India.
Special Forces may also be tasked to carry out limited but punitive strikes
across the Line of Control with the objective of destroying terror training
camps and launch pads located in the border regions. Briefly put, India needs
to wrest the initiative from Pak by its limited offensive actions. India has
countered Pak actions on Indian territory since the time proxy war was
initiated by Pakistan. It is time to turn the tables now.
