Brief History
Crimea is not new to
conflicts. Crimea, a peninsula
separating the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, has been at the centre of
military and commercial competition throughout history. The Romans set up naval
bases there as early as the first century AD, ancient peoples from the
Scythians to Byzantine Greeks used it as a base for farming and maritime
commerce, and empires clashed over it as a prime Black Sea possession for
centuries. Russia took possession in 1783.
In the mid-1800s, Britain and France, backing the feeble
Ottoman sultan, fought the Russian empire over Crimea – and more importantly,
its importance for control of the passage from the Black Sea to the
Mediterranean. Then, as now, Sevastopol was home to the Russian Black Sea fleet,
and the European powers fought furiously to seize it. Although the Crimean War
ended in an effective stalemate, its fierce and epic battles left a lasting
mark on European memory, including the Battle of Balaklava that inspired Alfred
Tennyson’s Charge of the Light
Brigade and, years later, Rudyard Kipling’s The Last of the Light Brigade.
In 1954, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev gave the peninsula
as a gift to Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine. At the time, neither he nor
anyone else foresaw the Soviet Union’s collapse. But collapse it did, and
Crimea stayed within newly independent Ukraine in 1992 as an autonomous region.
The Russian fleet, though, settled in the only deep-water port providing access
to Western markets, has been an irritant between Moscow and Kiev ever since.
Civil Strife and Intervention
The ongoing crisis in Crimea began with Euromaidan (literally meaning Eurosquare) a wave of ongoing demonstrations, civil unrest and revolution in Ukraine, which began on the night of 21 November 2013 in the Ukrainian capital Kiev with public protests demanding closer European integration. The scope of the protests expanded, with many calls for the resignation of President Viktor Yanukovych and his government. The events led to the downfall of the government of Yanukovych. The Russian military intervention in Ukraine began in the aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution, when, on 1 March 2014, Russian troops (with no insignia on their uniforms) seized control of most of the Crimean peninsula of Ukraine located on the northern coast of the Black Sea, including civil buildings, airports, and military bases. The same day, the Russian legislature approved the use of the Russian military in Ukraine, and Russian officials stated that their military forces in Crimea were not a breach of existing agreements between Russia and Ukraine. The Ukrainian response has so far been muted, with no military action on the part of Ukraine's government, which was formed in Kiev a few days before the intervention. The Russian military intervention has been compared to what Adolf Hitler had done in Sudetenland in the 1930s when he moved his troops into a region of what was Czechoslovakia at that time, with a regional ethnic German majority. The Russian move is also being compared to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
The ongoing crisis in Crimea began with Euromaidan (literally meaning Eurosquare) a wave of ongoing demonstrations, civil unrest and revolution in Ukraine, which began on the night of 21 November 2013 in the Ukrainian capital Kiev with public protests demanding closer European integration. The scope of the protests expanded, with many calls for the resignation of President Viktor Yanukovych and his government. The events led to the downfall of the government of Yanukovych. The Russian military intervention in Ukraine began in the aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution, when, on 1 March 2014, Russian troops (with no insignia on their uniforms) seized control of most of the Crimean peninsula of Ukraine located on the northern coast of the Black Sea, including civil buildings, airports, and military bases. The same day, the Russian legislature approved the use of the Russian military in Ukraine, and Russian officials stated that their military forces in Crimea were not a breach of existing agreements between Russia and Ukraine. The Ukrainian response has so far been muted, with no military action on the part of Ukraine's government, which was formed in Kiev a few days before the intervention. The Russian military intervention has been compared to what Adolf Hitler had done in Sudetenland in the 1930s when he moved his troops into a region of what was Czechoslovakia at that time, with a regional ethnic German majority. The Russian move is also being compared to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Russian
Interests and Strategy
Russia’s role in this
unfolding crisis flows uniquely from its geography and its history. As
Ukraine’s eastern neighbour, Russia shares a strategic border as well as a
tortured history together as part of the former Soviet Union. What happens in
Ukraine matters mightily to Moscow. Ever since the breakup of the Soviet Union
in 1991, Moscow has been extremely wary of the expanding the North Atlantic Alliance.
Since its collapse, former satellite states of the Soviet Union, namely, Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria have joined the NATO.
So also, some of the former republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union, Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania also joined the Western Alliance.
Putin’s been cautioning
the U.S. and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization states for at least six
years not to impede Russian interests in Ukraine, particularly in Crimea, where
the Black Sea Fleet has been based since its founding by Catherine the Great in
1783 after the Ottoman Empire ceded the peninsula.
Putin told a closed NATO
summit in Romania in 2008 that the military alliance was threatening Ukraine’s
very existence by courting it as a member, according to a secret cable
published by Wikileaks. Putin said Ukraine’s borders were “sewn together” after
World War II and its claims to Crimea, which belonged to Russia until Nikita
Khrushchev gave it to Ukraine in 1954, are legally dubious, Kurt Volker, the
U.S. ambassador to NATO at the time, said in the cable. Russia also strongly opposed US plans for a missile shield in Europe.
According to some
experts, Russia’s willingness to intervene and escalate a conflict is a sign of
panic at what it sees as a possible loss of influence in Ukraine as a result of
the Maidan revolution. Russia probably did not foresee the fall of Yanukovych. Moscow seemed to have outmaneuvered the European Union (EU) by offering Yanukovych a $ 15 billion bail out package as a quid pro quo for not signing an association agreement with the EU. Had the agreement with the EU been signed, it would have meant one another former Soviet republic joining the Western fold.
Mr. Putin has fought
bitterly to defend what the Kremlin calls its "sphere of privileged
interests" in former Soviet republics. Since the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991, Russia has inserted itself into ethnic conflicts with
neighboring states to assert its influence. In 2008 it invaded the former
Soviet republic of Georgia to defend the breakaway region of South Ossetia. South Ossetia and Abkhazia were
subsequently recognised by Moscow as separate states, though effectively
protectorates of Russia.
Mr. Putin is taking a
much bigger gamble in Ukraine because the loss of influence there could deal a
blow to his presidency. Many Russians still struggle to see Ukraine as an
independent country, given the bonds of history and religious ties.
Crimea is even closer,
having been Russian territory until 1954, when Nikita Khrushchev transferred it
to Ukraine, then a Soviet republic. When the Soviet Union collapsed Crimea
remained part of newly independent Ukraine, despite its majority of ethnic
Russians.
The
Budapest Memorandum
Budapest
Memorandum on Security Assurances is an international treaty signed
on 5 December 1994 in the Hungarian capital Budapest by Ukraine, the US, Russia
and the United Kingdom concerning the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine and its
security relationship with the signatory countries. The terms of the memorandum
is seen as being violated by Russia's military intervention.
According to the memorandum, Russia, the USA, and the UK
confirmed, in recognition of Ukraine becoming party to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in effect abandoning its nuclear
arsenal to Russia that they would:
·
Respect
Ukrainian independence and sovereignty within its existing borders.
·
Refrain
from the threat or use of force against Ukraine.
·
Refrain
from using economic pressure on Ukraine in order to influence its politics.
·
Seek
United Nations Security Council action if nuclear weapons are used against
Ukraine.
·
Refrain
from the use of nuclear arms against Ukraine.
·
Consult
with one another if questions arise regarding these commitments.
Russia, by its actions
is seen not only to be in breach of international law and the provisions of the
UN Charter in general, but also the provisions of the Budapest Memorandum.
Strategic
importance of Sevastopol
Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Moscow refused to
recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty over the port city of Sevastopol and the
surrounding Crimean oblast on the
ground that the city (Sevastopol) was never integrated into Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic. The issue was resolved with the signing of a treaty in 1997
wherein the Russian naval base was allowed to be located in the city on a
20-year renewable lease.
The Crimean port of Sevastopol, home of the Black Sea fleet,
is vital to Russia’s naval power in the Mediterranean and beyond. As such the
base is of critical importance as Russia seeks to regain some of the global
clout that has been dwindling since the disintegration of the Soviet empire.
“In the past five to 10 years, there has been a resurgence
in Russian naval operations, particularly in the Black Sea and the
Mediterranean,” says Lee Willett, a naval analyst at IHS Jane’s, the security
consultancy. “Sevastopol has been an important hub to project Russian naval
power.”
Under agreements signed with Ukraine in 2010, the Russian
military can continue to use Sevastopol until 2042, with an option of extending
the lease to 2047.
The base’s significance was highlighted during the 2008 war
with Georgia, when the Russian fleet staged blockades in the Black Sea and was
used to launch amphibious landings. It has also proved its usefulness to Russia
in the Libya crisis, anti-piracy missions in the Indian Ocean and Moscow’s role
in dismantling Syria’s chemical weapons.
After Syria’s civil war forced Russia to stop using its
naval base in the Syrian port of Tartus last year, Sevastopol became even more
crucial.
Can
the US and Europe respond effectively?
The bitter fact is that
the US and the West failed to anticipate the Russian military intervention in
Crimea. The ongoing crisis in Ukraine is another indicator of the failure of
Obama Administration’s foreign policy. Beyond strong words and economic
sanctions which may have little or no bite, there is very little that the Obama
Administration can do. President Obama’s warning and telephonic discussions has
had very little effect on Russia. On the contrary, Crimea seems to have been
subdued without a single shot being fired.
“There have been strong
words from the US and other counties and NATO,” said Keir Giles, a Russian
military analyst at the Chatham House think tank in London. “But these are
empty threats. There is really not a great deal that can be done to influence
the situation.”
US officials say they
are in discussions now with European officials about Obama and other leaders
possibly skipping the Group of Eight economic summit scheduled for June in
Sochi, the site of the just-concluded Winter Olympics. Obama’s top advisers
gathered at the White House Saturday to discuss other options.
The White House appears
to be giving no serious consideration to American military involvement in
Ukraine. In his carefully worded statement Friday, Obama avoided saying that a
destabilized Ukraine would be a national security concern for the US. Instead,
he said only that it was “not in the interest of Ukraine, Russia or Europe.”
In Europe, officials
expressed concern about the Russian military escalation, but offered few
specific options for stopping or punishing Putin. The European Union, dealing
with its own internal problems, has appeared reluctant to fully embrace
troubled Ukraine or risk the economic consequences of confronting Russia, one
of its largest trading partners.
The US has its own
limitations which prevent it from formulating a robust response. Its efforts to
punish Russia on Ukraine have been complicated by the White House’s need for
Russian cooperation on stopping Syria’s civil war, negotiating a nuclear accord
with Iran, and transporting American troops and equipment out of Afghanistan
through Russian supply routes.
The crisis may also prove to
be a game-changer for President Barack Obama's national security policy,
forcing him re-think his foreign policy shift to Asia and to maintain U.S.
troop levels in Europe to limit Russia's reach.
Russian President
Vladimir Putin has so far dismissed the few specific threats from the United
States, which include scrapping plans for Obama to attend an international
summit in Russia this summer and cutting off trade talks sought by Moscow.
Because Ukraine does not have full-member status in NATO, the US and Europe
have no obligation to come to its defense. And broader international action
through the United Nations seems all but impossible, given Russia’s veto power
as a member of the Security Council.
Last summer, Washington
threatened Moscow with cancellation of a bilateral summit between Obama and
Putin as it pressed Russia to return National Security Agency leaker Edward
Snowden to the United States.
When Russia instead
granted Snowden temporary asylum, Obama canceled his one-on-one meeting with
Putin, but still attended an international meeting in St. Petersburg.
Another reason why
economic pressures may not work is because Ukraine depends on Russia for 60
percent of its gas and is the main transit route for OAO Gazprom’s shipments to
Europe, where the state-run company has a quarter of the market. Russia had halted
gas flows to Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 — before Yanukovych’s presidency — amid
disputes over prices and volumes, leading to shortages throughout Europe.
According to Amanda
Paul, an analyst at the European Policy Center in Brussels, “President Putin
doesn’t really care what the rest of the world thinks about his foreign
policy,” Paul said by phone. “Ukraine is a neighbor country that Russia views
as indivisible from itself. Russia is prepared to go to any length to stop
Ukraine’s deeper integration with Europe.” It remains to be seen, of course, if Russia
extends its military campaign into Eastern Ukraine with the objective of
partitioning the country, whether the West’s response may be different.
Sources: Financial Times, Wikipedia, BBC, The Globe and Mail, CNN