Countering
PLA Operations
Countering the Chinese presence along the de facto border
are elements of the Northern, Western, Central and Eastern Commands of the Indian
Army. Specifically, the Indian defense is centered around deployments made by
the Leh-based XIV Corps, the Sukma-based XXXIII Corps, the Tezpur-based 4
Corps, the Dimapur-based III Corps and the Panagarh-based XVII Corps. The
overall strength of the Indian Army here would be close to 2 lakh men and
women. China's Western Theatre Command would have a similar number of soldiers
though China doesn't deploy as many soldiers directly on the LAC but can,
instead, use its superb road and rail network to surge troops to areas along
the de facto border between the two countries. Despite the tension between the
two countries, this has not happened.
According to NDTV China cannot make any significant inroads
with the present number of soldiers it has deployed in the region and would
need to bring in soldiers from elsewhere, a move that would give Indian
military planners a clear indicator of a potential attack. At the same time,
India would be hard-pressed to deploy more soldiers along the LAC should that
be required since several formations are busy defending the border and the Line
of Control with Pakistan in addition to fighting terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir
and in parts of the Northeast.
The Indian Air Force has 22 airfields and is developing a
network of smaller air landing grounds in the Eastern sector. The Chinese air
force has 15 air bases and 27 smaller airstrips but operates at a significant
disadvantage vis-à-vis the Indian Air Force. This is because all of Chinese
bases in the region are located high in the Tibetan plateau which makes it
impossible for the jets to take off with a full weapon load because of the
rarified atmosphere. The Indian Air Force, on the other hand, does not face any
such constraints. All its major bases in the region are located in the plains
and IAF fighters can take off with a full fuel and weapons load, a significant
operating advantage in the event of a conflict between the two countries.
In the event of an armed conflict with China, apart from the
conventional operations, Indian Special Operation Forces would have a major
role to play. Success of SOF operations in this scenario will depend on the
availability of timely and accurate intelligence. India’s space-based
surveillance and high altitude unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and aerostats
may be useful but the difficult terrain imposes limitations. Thus human
intelligence (HUMINT) would be critical in detecting Chinese operations,
whether it is in the form of troop or hardware movement, incursions, illicit
infrastructure development or subversion and sabotage. Indian intelligence
agencies need to tap the resident populations of the border areas for valuable
information on the enemy. Indian intelligence needs to focus on training its
field officers and SOFs operatives in the language and culture of the people in
order to glean information. India’s conventional deterrence would be reinforced
if the tribal and local population is recruited into the armed forces like in
the case of Ladakh Scouts or Sikkim Scouts who are adept at mountain warfare
and who are physiologically acclimatized to high altitudes and have intrinsic
knowledge of the terrain and conditions.
India has enough Special Forces components to not only foil
PLA objectives in Arunachal, Sikkim, Ladakh or in Uttarakhand but may be able
to carry out operations deep behind enemy lines, if the need arises.
The Special Services Bureau which metamorphosed into the
Sahastra Seema Bal SSB was constituted in 1963, immediately after the 1962 war
debacle, to act as a bulwark to keep the Chinese manoeuvres in the region at
bay by recruiting local foot soldiers in large numbers.
Organised for winning over the border population in
Arunachal Pradesh and Bangladesh, Nepal and even Jammu borders to serve as the
eyes and ears of the security forces, the Bureau played a key role in gathering
intelligence along the border and in neighbouring countries on Chinese designs.
Being wary of Chinese designs, India decided to revive the earlier version of
the SSB.
The Special Frontier Force (SFF) also known as Establishment
22 was set up on 14th November 1962 whose main goal was to conduct
clandestine intelligence gathering and commando operations behind enemy lines
in the event of another war with China. The force based in Chakrata was put
under the direct supervision of the Intelligence Bureau and later the Research
and Analysis Wing. The SFF has seen action in Siachen in 1985-86 (Operation
Meghdoot); they participated in Operation Blue Star 1984 and during the Kargil
conflict in 1999. Manoj Joshi says that
India did create a true Special Forces set up which was intelligence led in the
SFF, which was originally created for operations in Tibet, but it has now
become obsolete and it is not clear what the mission of the force currently is.[1]
It is truly difficult to ascertain the current status of the force. While it
continues to exist, details of its organizational structure, equipment and
operational mandate are shrouded in secrecy. It appears that there is no
dilution in the operational mandate and if circumstances arise, New Delhi may
not hesitate to revive the SFF.
On the
Cyber Front
"A draft proposal for setting up a separate tri-command
on cyberwarfare was prepared in consultations with the chiefs of the Indian Air
Force, Indian Army Indian Navy after Chinese hackers broke into the computer
systems of the headquarters of the Eastern Naval Command
in Visakhapatnam in 2012 where the homemade Arihant nuclear
submarine was undergoing sea trials," according to a senior Navy official
said.
In 2013, computer systems of the Defence Research and
Development Organization were breached by Chinese hackers.
According to a defense analyst Surya Kiran
Sharma, India is ill-prepared for a cyberwar.
"India released its National Cyber Policy in 2013,
which had the ambitious aim of creating 500,000 cyber warriors," the
defense analyst said. "However, no significant work has been done on
the provisions of the cyber policy. India is inadequately prepared to counter
cyberwarfare, as is evident from the numerous attacks on national
websites." India’s cyber capabilities are at a stage of infancy. However a
beginning has been made in this area.
Currently, all army units use the Bharat Operating System
Solutions (BOSS) developed by the Center for Development of Advanced Computing
(CDAC) in Chennai.
The operating system has replaced software that was
developed abroad. BOSS is connected to a central hub and is monitored closely
by senior officers in New Delhi alerts go out if a computer registers insertion
of data-storage devices such as a thumb drive.
Army officials from the Corps of Signals - which is
responsible for maintenance and looking after the entire gamut of military
communications - are of the opinion that BOSS has become a decisive factor to
effectively secure communication.
India is also coming up with a tri-service cyber agency
which will deal with the matters of cyber security and have both offensive and
defensive capabilities while dealing with issues in that domain.
Chinese
views on Indian shortcomings
Song Zhongping, a retired official of the PLA Rocket Force,
added that "India's military has more experience in mountain combat, but
it has at least three key weaknesses.
First, its weapons are mostly imported, so how could it
maintain supply after if it engages in total war with China? Second, its
logistics are poor, because its plan to build 73 highways for military
logistics by 2020 is only a third complete. And third, its weapons [from
different countries] aren't compatible in one comprehensive combat system and
its long-range missiles are not accurate at all," he said. While these
weaknesses need to be addressed and remedial measures taken, Indian forces will
not face a resource crunch in the event of a short duration conflict, a
prolonged conflict is very unlikely.
Conclusion
To quote Kyle Mizokami, “A
war between India and China would be nasty, brutal and short, with far-reaching
consequences for the global economy. The balance of power and geographic
constraints means a war would almost certainly fail to prove decisive. Both
sides have almost certainly concluded this, which is why there hasn’t been a
war for more than fifty years. We can only hope it stays that way.”
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