Sino-Indian Border Dispute – A Perspective

The whole gamut of Sino-Indian relations have revolved around the unresolved boundary row between the two neighbours, culminating in the 1962 conflict. Years later there appeared to be a thaw in relations with trade ties between the two countries improving. However, the relations have been far from normal and India had more than adequate reasons to be suspicious of Chinese intentions and motives particularly in relation to the border issue.

It is necessary to delve into history in order to determine why resolution of this dispute has been difficult.

India and China have for long found it difficult to resolve the border dispute which has impeded normal ties between the two Asian giants for about four and half decades. The cause of the conflict in 1962 was a dispute over the sovereignty of the widely-separated Aksai Chin (in Kashmir) and Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh border regions. Tawang district is located around latitude 27° 45’ N and longitude 90° 15’ E in North-West Arunachal Pradesh. Tawang was the scene of intense fighting during the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Chinese troops had then occupied Tawang and destroyed portions of the monastry. After the Chinese troops withdrew, Tawang was once again under Indian administration. Aksai Chin in Kashmir’s Ladakh region is the other disputed territory which is at present under the control of the Chinese. This article primarily focuses only on the disputed border area in Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh.

The core issue

The status of Tibet is central to the border dispute for the simple reason that for two millennia, there never was a border between India and China. Lt Cmdr Calvin James Bernard of the US Navy in his paper titled “China-India Border War (1962)” stated that the roots of the conflict goes back to the 18th century, when both China and British India asserted claims to desolate, remote mountain areas between China and India. Military expeditions, intrigue and unproductive diplomatic exchanges marked decades of relations between the two countries. Rather than resolving the border issue, Chinese and British Indian actions only set the stage for conflict.

According to Mohan Guruswamy, the roots of India’s problem with China go back a couple of centuries when Emperor Napoleon and Tsar Alexander met in July 1807. As the Russian empire began its eastward expansion, which many felt would culminate in the conquest of India, there was a shadow contest for political ascendancy between the British and Russian empires. The Russians’ desire for an empire and a warm water port did not diminish and so the game continued. The British response to meet the Russian threat was to establish a forward defensive line in the northern region so that a Russian thrust could be halted well before the plains of Hindustan. This called for making Afghanistan and Tibet into buffer states and for fixing suitable and convenient borders with these states. In other words, British India did not have a border with China.

It is only in October 1950, when Communist China’s troops entered Tibet to 'liberate' the Roof of the Word that suddenly India acquired a new neighbour. Tibet was always a buffer between the Chinese and the British Empire. In 1914 at Simla an agreement came to be signed between the Dalai Lama's Representative and Sir Henry McMahon to define the border between Tibet and India. The McMahon Line came into being. The border agreement was arrived at bilaterally during the tripartite Convention between British India, China and Tibet. Though the Chinese subsequently refused to ratify the Convention, they did not object to the bilateral accord between Delhi and Lhasa. The Chinese were more concerned by the demarcation of their border with Eastern Tibet. The Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (or Chou-en-lai) convinced Nehru that the British were 'imperialists' and therefore all treaties or agreements signed by them were 'imperialist treaties.' The inference drawn by the clever Chinese premier was that the McMahon line was an imperialist creation and therefore not acceptable by New China: The Chinese Premier conveniently presumed and told India's ambassador to China K N Panikkar that India had no intention of claiming special rights arising from the unequal treaties of the past. Nehru while concurring that the British were imperialists could not follow Zhou's conclusion on the McMahon Line. However, he did not want to raise the issue first. Since nothing was heard from the Chinese side about the issue of the frontier, Nehru deduced that McMahon Line was a foregone conclusion.

In 1954 the Panchsheel Agreement (known as Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India) came to be signed between the two countries. This agreement too was silent about the border.

The Chinese Premier Zhou did not bring up the topic of the border till the end of the fifties. And by that time it was a bit too late for India as the Aksai Chin was fully in possession of the Liberation Army. The Chinese stand was unequivocal that it had never accepted the McMahon line and NEFA belonged to them.

Zhou's visit to India in 1960 was followed by several rounds of detailed discussions which were held between June and December. While India presented detailed maps and documents proving its claims, the Chinese hardly gave any evidence of their 'possessions.'

Could India have averted the 1962 War?
Thus by failing to negotiate with the Chinese on the border through the fifties, India lost the opportunity to settle the contentious issue once and for all. According to Col. (retd) Anil Athale, another opportunity (which was missed by India) to avoid the conflict came in December 1960 when Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai made a brief stopover in Delhi. Under the so-called 'Krishna Menon Plan' it was mooted that India would lease the Aksai Chin area to China and in return the Chinese would lease the strategic (from the Indian point of view) Chumbi valley that is like a dagger pointed at the line of communication with Assam and the Northeast. This would have been a very fair deal as the Aksai Chin area, besides being strategically useless to India, was also very difficult to defend. But it is believed that under the pressure from the right wing of the Congress and fear of vociferous opposition, Nehru rejected it. It is difficult to say now whether the course of history would have been different had India gone ahead with this proposal.

The border war of October 1962
The war itself was limited both in terms of place and time duration. Fighting started on 10th October 1962 and ended on 20th November 1962. The cease-fire came into effect at 0000 on 21st November 1962. Actual fighting was limited to 3 distinct areas, namely Walong, Tawang and Aksai Chin.

Post 1962

Nathu La-September 1967
In 1965, two significant events took place on the Sino-Indian border. The first was the warning issued to India about Chinese sheep not being allowed to graze on their side of the border by India. This happened in September 1965 when the Indo-Pak war was simmering on India’s western border.

At the same time, in September-December 1965, the PLA sent probing missions on the entire Sikkim-Tibet border. According to one account, there were seven border intrusions on the Sikkim-Tibet border between September 7 and December 12, 1965, involving the PLA. In all these border incursions, the Indian side responded “firmly” without provoking the other. Though details of casualties of these PLA border incursions are not reported, there were reports indicating that the PLA suffered “heavy” casualties against “moderate” loss by India.

Two years later, in September 1967, in spite of their setbacks in 1965, the PLA launched a direct attack on the lndian armed forces at Nathu La, on the Sikkim-Tibet border. The six-day “border skirmishes” from September 7-8 to 13, 1967, had all the elements of a high drama, including exchange of heavy artillery fire, and the PLA soldiers tried to cross the border in large numbers. Again the attack was repulsed at all points by the Indian troops.

The Sumdorong Chu Incident-Operation Falcon October 1986
In 1986 China decided to flex its muscles again with India. In mid-1986, it came to the notice of India that the PLA had built a helipad at Wandung in Sumdorong Chu Valley referred to as Sangduoluo He in the Chinese media in Arunachal Pradesh. India reacted swiftly and the PLA had an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with the India Army in Sumdorong Chu Valley of Arunchal Pradesh in August 1986. After a week of tense moments both sides mutually agreed to withdraw their forces inside their respective territories and create a no man’s land. India's then Army chief. General Sundarji decided to use the IAF’s new Russian-made heavy lift MI-26 helicopters to air land a brigade at a place called Zemithang, south of the Sino-Indian border but 90 kms by road from Tawang.

The airlift took place between 18 and 20 October 1986, the dates fraught in Indian history as they marked the beginning of the Sino-Indian war 24 years earlier in this very sector. They took up positions on Hathung La ridge overlooking Sumdorong Chu along with three other key mountain features. In 1962, the Chinese held the high ground; this time, the Indians.

With China scrambling to rush forces to the region, both sides began a general mobilisation along the entire border. Here again, Sundarji had a few surprises.

Innovatively using the heavy lift assets, which included Il-76 aircraft and the AN-26 helicopter, the Army placed T-72 tanks and infantry combat vehicles in the Demchok area of Ladakh and northern Sikkim.

The Chinese fumbled for a response and subsequently, a 15 November flag meeting calmed things down a bit. But now, India decided to take the opportunity to convert Arunachal, which was a centrally administered territory till then, into a full-fledged state.

In August '87, Indian and Chinese troops moved their respective posts slightly apart in the Sumdorong Chu Valley, following a meeting of the field commanders. During the 8th round of border talks on November '87, it was decided to upgrade the talks from the bureaucratic to the political level. Following then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988, a Joint Working Group (JWG) was set up to discuss, among other things, the alignment of the LAC. In 1993, an agreement was inked between the foreign ministers of the two countries on the reduction of troops along the LAC. This was possibly first of the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). It was decided to pull back from respective forward check posts in the Sumdorong Chu Valley from a situation of "close confrontation" and in 1994, the Indian External Affairs Ministry described the situation as one of "close proximity" where the respective posts were 50-100 yards apart. Following the JWG meeting in April 1995, the two sides agreed to a simultaneous withdrawal of their troops from the four border posts - two Indian and two Chinese - in the Sumdorong Chu Valley. As of June 1999, the valley was unoccupied by either the Indian army or Chinese, and their respective posts in the area were close to a kilometre apart [18].

A View from China
According to a leading Chinese scholar on India Ma Jiali, China's claim to the whole of Arunachal Pradesh may only be a negotiating ploy. However, he added that the demand for Tawang might well be non-negotiable. According to Ma Jiali, the disputed area in Arunachal Pradesh is very large. Tawang was the birthplace of the 6th Dalai Lama, Tsangyang Gyatso. The Tibetan people thus have very strong religious sentiments towards Tawang. It must be noted that in 1938, the Survey of India published a map of Tibet, which showed the Tawang tract as part of that country. Even the first edition of Jawaharlal Nehru's Discovery Of India showed the Indo-Tibetan boundary as running at the foot of the hills. The Tibetans did not accept this 'annexation' of the Tawang tract and challenged the British attempts to expand their government into this area. But they tacitly accepted the rest of the McMahon demarcation. It is clear that, but for the Tawang tract, there is little basis for the Chinese claim on the whole of Arunachal Pradesh. According to other Chinese scholars, India should accept the Chinese view that McMahon Line was illegal and unacceptable and once it is done, the border settlement would be easy. Scholars have also warned that “substantial adjustments” would have to be made if the border issue between India and China is to be resolved. The hint here is towards major concessions by India on Tawang. As far as the other sector of dispute, namely, Aksai Chin is concerned the Aksai Chin road is strategically too important for the Chinese, as it is the only link between its two western provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang. Thus the question of relinquishing the occupation of this area does not arise. It is important to appreciate that there have been subtle changes in the Chinese position on the border dispute. At a point of time it was felt that the North-East was the bargaining chip or the ‘pressure’ for a de jure control of Aksai Chin. Today, while Aksai Chin has become non-negotiable, China seeks concessions from India on Tawang. The pressure on Tawang has been kept up by raking up issues of the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh and even Sikkim. China is in no hurry to resolve the issue. One reason could be the repeated incursions into Tawang could provide legitimacy to China for exercising de facto control over the territory. But at the core is also the assessment that the time for striking a deal with India is not now and when that would be would depend on how the mandarins assess the respective strengths of the two sides and whether China holds the upper hand.

Don’t ignore the Sun Yuxi factor
Just a week ahead of Chinese President Hu Jintao's state visit to India in November 2006, Beijing's envoy to New Delhi Sun Yuxi claimed that Arunachal Pradesh was a Chinese territory.

“In our position the whole of what you call the state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory, and Tawang (district) is only one place in it. We are claiming all of that—that's our position,” he told the news channel CNN-IBN just days ahead of the Chinese President’s visit to India.

Sun was the man who drove Beijing's policy of stirred up tensions along the border in Arunachal. From incursions into the state, to demolition of Indian army observation posts along the Bhutan border and objections to road building in Sikkim, Sun carried out his mission with a bullheadedness that drove South Block to silent fury and prompting them to demand the recall of the envoy.

The South Block was infuriated by Sun’s manipulation of the bilateral talks on border issue: from Aksai Chin in Ladakh to thousands of miles east in Arunachal, where India's insecurities ran the deepest.

The Indian government angrily rejected the statement, and a year later Sun was recalled. New Delhi conveyed to Beijing a message that unless Sun was recalled, the Indian Prime Minister would not send a final list of dates for his visit to China. The Prime Minister’s Office held its ground despite China’s initial refusal to concede. Delhi may seem to have been one up on the Chinese but it must be remembered that it could well be a case of two steps forward and one step backward. It is important to note that the envoy could not have taken a unilateral decision to claim the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh. Surely, there was some sort of official backing for him to make this provocative statement. Secondly, it took nearly a year for the Chinese to concede to the Indian demand for withdrawing him. Sun’s statement could very well be the unstated Chinese policy on the border issue. India can ill-afford to ignore the Sun Yuxi factor.

The Nation needs to know
On the eve of the Indian Prime Minister’s recent visit to China, India’s External Affairs Minister Mr. Pranab Mukherjee candidly admitted in an interview to a TV news channel that Chinese incursions in the Tawang area of Arunachal Pradesh were taking place. He also added that though it was matter of concern, the incursions were not worrisome and that there was no reason to press panic buttons. The manner in which it was said gave the impression that it was China’s prerogative to intrude and India’s privilege to ignore it. This is only inference that can be drawn considering the fact that about 141 incursions had taken place in the past 12 months as of October 2007. It is quite disturbing as to why the government had chosen to play down the incursions. The interviewer also did not question the Hon’ble Minister about this. The incursions were highlighted by the MP from the area who repeatedly raised this issue in Parliament.

The Hon’ble Minister added that they (meaning the Indian government) took it up with the Chinese and that mechanisms were in place through which these types of problems were addressed. The nation is entitled to know, what are these mechanisms in the first place and if such mechanisms existed how effective have they been in dealing with the incursions.

According to B Raman, there have been recurring instances of innumerable border intrusions by the Chinese troops. Two of these incidents are of great concern. The first was an intrusion into Bhutan and the second was about the Chinese raising an objection to the construction of two military bunkers inside Indian territory in Sikkim.

Apart from the incursions which are regularly taking place, the Indian Army is also concerned about an all weather highway being laid by the Chinese towards the Jechepla Pass in Myanmar. The pass provides direct entry into Arunachal and other sensitive eastern states. Farther west in Tawang, similar concerns have been raised about the pace at which China's network of roads and highways is being laid close to the Line of Actual Control. The Indian Prime Minister, after his recent trip to China is convinced that the border talks will make headway. However, it remains to be seen how sincere are the Chinese in negotiating a settlement.

Sources: Articles by Lt. Col. (Retd) Anil Athale, Claude Arpi, Mohan Guruswamy published in Rediff.com, V Natarajan (Bharat Rakhshak), Manoj Joshi's Operation Falcon (The Quint), Sreedhar's "China Becoming a Superpower and India's Options", Lt. Cmdr Calvin James Bernard's paper - China-India Border War (1962), Wikipedia.

Who Killed Benazir?

Former Prime Minister of Pakistan and a leading opposition leader Benazir Bhutto was assassinated on 27th December 2007 in a suicide bomb attack at an election rally Liaquat Bagh Park, in garrison town of Rawalpindi. About 20 persons were also killed in the attack.

More than 24 hours after the gruesome incident, there are conflicting theories surrounding the assassination. One theory doing the rounds was that 5 bullets were fired at Benazir by a sniper who later blew himself. Police said a suicide bomber fired shots at Bhutto as she was leaving the rally venue in a park before blowing himself up. According to columnist Hamid Mir Benazir was shot at by a sniper rifle from close range and a few moments later a suicide bomber blew himself to make sure that she did not survive. It was a determined effort. They made sure she didn't survive the attack. She died due to the injury in her neck. Some reports suggest that Bhutto was shot by two men with AK 47 rifles as she was entering her car after addressing an election rally. She was injured in the head and chest. At the same time a blast took place close to her car. She was rushed to the hospital where she was declared dead at 6.16 pm nearly 40 minutes after the attack. (The spokesman for the Pakistani Interior Ministry, Brigadier Cheema in an interview claimed that Benazir died due to shrapnel injuries and not due to bullets fired at her). Though no terror group or organization has so far claimed responsibility for the attack, the blame game has begun with former PM Sharif blaming Musharraf and the establishment of carrying on the attack. Musharraf in turn has blamed the Islamic militants for the assassination.

An Al Qaeda leader Mustafa Abu Al-Yazid based in Afghanistan has claimed responsibility for the assassination of former Pakistan Premier Benazir Bhutto, whom he described as 'the most precious American asset.' "We terminated the most precious American asset, which vowed to defeat (the) mujahadeen," Al Qaeda commander and spokesman Mustafa Abu Al-Yazid told Italian news agency Adnkronos International in a phone call from an unknown location. "The radical elements of Pakistan viewed Bhutto as a Westernised heretic and an American stooge and had repeatedly threatened to kill her. Earlier in October, two Pakistani militant warlords based in the country's northwestern areas had threatened to kill her. One was Baitullah Mehsud, head of Tekrik Taliban-e-Pakistan - a coalition of Pakistani Taliban groups, a top militant commander fighting the Pakistani Army in South Waziristan, who has ties to al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. The other was Haji Omar, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, who is also from South Waziristan and fought with the Afghan Mujahidin against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

Al-Yazid was described by AKI as the 'main Al Qaeda commander in Afghanistan.' It reported that the decision to kill Bhutto was made by Al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri in October. The veracity of the Al Qaeda claims is yet to be verified.

Though Al Qaeda has claimed responsibility for the assassination, according to British media reports, Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence and Islamist militants are the main suspects in the assassination of former premier Benazir Bhutto. There is considerable force in this belief as Musharraf and the radical mullahs were the ones who would have benefited most from her death.

A suicide bomber killed nearly 150 people in an attack on Bhutto on October 18 as her cavalcade was passing through the southern city of Karachi after returning home from eight years in self-imposed exile. She narrowly escaped being killed in that attack. Shortly after the failed attempt on her life, Bhutto wrote to Musharraf naming four persons whom she suspected of carrying out the attack. She named Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi, a rival PML-Q politician and chief minister of Pakistan's Punjab province, Hamid Gul, former director of the ISI, and Ijaz Shah, the director general of the Intelligence Bureau.

Incidentally, Liaquat Bagh Park is where Pakistan's first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated in October 1951. Bhutto's father Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was hanged in April 1979 at a spot not very far from where his daughter was killed.

US Radars in Sri Lanka: War on Terror or Snooping on India

On 8th November 2007, the US handed over a radar-based surveillance system and Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs) to Sri Lanka to enhance its maritime surveillance capabilities and security. The radar and the boats were given to the Lankan navy to help them in their ongoing war against the LTTE. The location of the facility in the Vavuniya region of North-Eastern Sri Lanka is a cause of concern for India as this post can be used to snoop on India’s key strategic assets such as Kalpakkam nuclear station in Tamil Nadu, naval dockyard at Vishakapatnam and the Thumba rocket launch station near Thiruvananthapuram.

The Sri Lankan Armed Forces have been dependent on Indian radar systems. However as a result of the three ‘successful’ air raids by the Tamil Eelam Air Force, questions were raised about the effectiveness of these systems. Whether the Lankans approached India for assistance and if so what was the Indian response is not quite known. India, however, has been unwilling to mediate directly in the conflict despite appeals from both Sri Lankan government and the Tamil Tigers. New Delhi had post-Rajiv Gandhi assassination refused to negotiate with the LTTE, which it has banned as a terrorist outfit. However, at the same time, it has also not implicitly endorsed or armed Colombo's crackdown on the Tamil rebels, since that would have direct repercussions in the present political dispensation and the regional politics of Tamil Nadu. India decided to play safe by steering clear of the conflict. Which is why when approached by Colombo for military aid, New Delhi offered everything else but weaponry. While, India was willing to provide non-lethal military aid, it avoided entering into a defence agreement with Sri Lanka on one or the other pretext, and then had to watch helplessly as Colombo took its military wish list elsewhere, including China and Pakistan. It has also been reported that Pakistan is involved in training the Sri Lankan Air Force. Though Lanka has denied involvement of Pakistan in training its armed forces.

In another move aimed against the LTTE, the US froze all assets of the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), a front of the LTTE, as part of its aim to financially isolate terrorist groups and their support networks.

The US Department of the Treasury on 15th November 2007, announced that it would freeze the US held assets of the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation, a charitable organisation which has been involved in fund-raising and procurement for LTTE.

India, as usual, expressed concern over the induction of the surveillance system. India needs to do better than expressing its concerns. Firstly, it needs to understand that appeasing its alliance partner in government is one thing and national security is totally another. Secondly, India has been perceived to be insensitive to the bona fide defense requirements of Sri Lanka. Sri Lankan media reported that the Lankan government has sought to purchase 3D radars from China. However Lanka acceded to India’s protests and security concerns and accepted 2D radars which India offered. The Lankan authorities later denied this report.

India’s policy or the lack of it has resulted in big powers slowly encroaching in India’s neighbourhood. The Chinese with its string of pearls policy has led to ‘encirclement’ of India. The recent US-Lankan bonhomie has brought the US close to Indian shores. Today the southern neighbour has sought and received military assistance from the US and Pakistan. Because of its intransigence, tomorrow, India may have to face the stark reality of facing a full-fledged US naval facility at Trincomalee. And of course India may very well have lost out on a chance to play a meaningful role in the strife-torn island nation.

RAW facts

K Shankaran Nair who succeeded Rameshwarnath Kao, the founding father of RAW, as its chief has recently written a book “Inside IB and RAW: The Rolling Stones that Gathered Moss” narrating his experiences. Morarji Desai who became prime minister in 1977 was out to wreak havoc not only on the Gandhi family but also on the top civil servants and intelligence officers. The late PM's policies had a serious impact on intelligence collection and operations.

His hatred for the head of the premier intelligence organization can be seen from the excerpts of the conversation which appeared in the book Inside RAW by Asoka Raina.

M. Desai: I believe RAW was involved in the internal affairs of the country during emergency.

Nair: No Sir. That is not correct, all were external operations.

MD: But your activities were highly immoral, highly irregular.

Nair: These are RAW’s external operations, sir….

MD: This does not reduce the immorality – stop operations you are handling at present.

Nair: If we do that, sir, some of them might mean a loss of faith in our promises and in the credibility of the government.

MD: I do not care. Stop all operations and also reduce the RAW strength by 50%.

This resulted many an operations being aborted and operatives compromised. One such was “Tiger” Siddiqui of Bangladesh who felt betrayed. Mr. Nair is reported to have remarked that Morarji Desai was the greatest enemy of India’s national security. Pakistan certainly would have celebrated on that fateful day.

This act of Desai was nothing short of treason for which he ought to have been severely punished.

Pakistan at the Crossroads-I

Experts have been debating about the future of Pakistan given the nature of civil strife and political instability that has dogged that country for the past few years.[1] It needs to be emphasized that Pakistan’s problems are not of yesterday’s making. They are systemic and congenital, if one can use the expression for a nation-state.

The Beginnings

The state of Pakistan was doomed since its birth in 1947. The creation of Pakistan in 1947 was tumultuous and marked by violence unprecedented in the sub-continent. Pakistan came into international limelight by invading Kashmir in 1948 which was contiguous to both India and Pakistan In just over a year after its independence, its first founding father, Jinnah passed away. In October 1951, its first PM Liaqat Ali Khan was assassinated. His assassin, an Afghan was killed and hence the causative factors behind the assassination remained unknown. In the absence of leaders of stature and substance to lead Pakistan post-Jinnah and Khan, Pakistan’s troubles began.

Pakistan became a republic on March 23, 1956, with Maj. Gen. Iskander Mirza as the first president. The first Constitution was adopted in 1956, nearly 9 years after its independence. But it was suspended in 1958. The first elected President of Pakistan, Iskander Mirza was deposed in a bloodless coup carried out by martial law administrator, General Ayub Khan.

Thus within a decade of its birth, Pakistani polity started dithering. Institutions of democracy that were nurtured in neighbouring India were not allowed to take roots in Pakistan. Forces of democracy were subverted by the Army, which came to play a pivotal role in its governance. Pakistani society also came to be divided on regional or linguistic lines, with the Punjabi elite dominating the West and the East being dominated by Bengali-speaking Muslims. This division was to cost Pakistan dearly in 1971 with the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent state.

Though political parties such as Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) (led by Z A Bhutto) and MQM emerged, what Pakistan failed to get was an able leader; a statesman who would take the nation on the path of progress and prosperity.

Pakistan was under military rule from 1958 to 1972, with two generals Ayub Khan (1958-69) and Yahya Khan (1969-71) being at the helm of affairs. Pakistan went to war twice with India in 1965 and 1971 under both the generals; the 1971 war resulting in the emergence of Bangladesh. Pakistan returned to civilian rule under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1972 after the debacle in East Pakistan in 1971. Under Z A Bhutto, a new constitution was framed which came into effect on 14th August 1973. The constitution represented a compromise consensus on three issues: the role of Islam; the sharing of power between the federal government and the provinces; and the division of responsibility between the president and the prime minister, with a greatly strengthened position for the latter. Neither Bhutto nor his government lasted long. In 1978 he was deposed in a bloodless coup and sent to the gallows and General Zia-ul-Haq took over the reigns of the country. General Zia’s policies took Pakistani society on the path of radical Islam.

In December 1978, on the occasion of the first day of Hijra, Zia delivered a nationwide address to usher in the Islamic system in Pakistan. The government began a programme to enforce Nizam-e-Islam (Islamic system) and established Sharia benches to enforce Islamic law. By enacting draconian laws such as the Zina ordinance and Hudood Ordinance[2], Zia ensured that Pakistan would become Talibanized or at any rate Islamicized.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 saw Pakistan being catapulted as a frontline state in the war against communism. The Mujahideen backed by Pakistan’s ISI with financial assistance from the West carried out attacks in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan. Pakistan was deeply involved in this jihad against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. After the pull-out of Soviet troops in the late eighties, Pakistan continued to be involved in the internecine conflict in Afghanistan.

On August 19, 1988, Zia was killed in a midair explosion of a Pakistani Air Force plane. Elections which were held at the end of 1988 brought longtime opponent of General Zia, Benazir Bhutto, into office as prime minister. Civilian rule meant political instability and a constant struggle to survive rather than rule.

The corruption, brutality and incessant fighting of the Mujahideen prompted Mullah Omar and his students, the Taliban, to rid Afghanistan of these rebels. The Pakistan-trained Taliban let loose a reign of terror in the war-ravaged country. The Taliban gained control of the country with the active assistance of Pakistan. The casualty of these policies were economic progress. It is said violence begets violence; these very policies have come back to haunt Pakistan post-9/11.

Part II Pakistan at the Crossroads - The Musharraf Regime

[1] Emergency was declared in Pakistan on the night of 3rd November 2007.
[2] Under Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood Ordinance 1979), the punishment of imprisonment or fine, or both, as provided in the existing Pakistan Penal Code for theft, was substituted by the amputation of the right hand of the offender from the joint of the wrist by a surgeon. For robbery, the law provided for amputation of the right hand of the offender from the wrist and his left foot from the ankle.

Is the LTTE behind Thamilchelvan Killing?

Some experts have speculated that the killing of the head of the political wing of the LTTE may have been an inside job, executed by the LTTE itself to prevent him from becoming a threat to Prabhakaran. And the reason for this primarily was due to the fact that the Air Force did not make any immediate claims of success achieved by the air strike. And that it did not make any sense to kill him especially considering the fact that he was an acceptable and human face of the LTTE. The question then is why has the Air Force claimed ‘credit’ for the killing. It is also quite baffling as to how the body of the slain LTTE leader could have been intact had he been killed in the air raid.

Further the question of the air strike on the basis of precise information defies logic because Thamilchelvan’s whereabouts were not shrouded in secrecy. He was known to receive international mediators and interlocutors at his residence.

The Tamil Tigers has been plagued by groupism since its inception. The biggest fallout of this groupism was the split from the LTTE by the special commander of the eastern Batticoloa-Amparai districts, Colonel Karuna suspected to have been engineered bythe Sri Lankan Army. Even after this split, there has been a lot of infighting among the top leadership of the LTTE for the past 2-3 years. LTTE’s intelligence head Pottu Amman joined by S P Thamilchelvan on one side and the head of international operations Veerakathi Manivannan alias Castro and the Tamileelam Police head P Nadesan on the other side were said to be involved in the in-fighting. Castro has evidently established his own intelligence network within the LTTE.

By eliminating Thamilchelvan, the Castro faction has exerted its authority and has extended the Valvettithurai/Myliddy control over the administration of the LTTE. The LTTE leader Prabhakaran hails from northern fishing village of Valvettithurai. And so also is Nadesan who has succeeded Thamilchelvan. In fact Natesan’s appointment as political head only confirms the Castro faction’s influence over the LTTE.

It is no secret that the LTTE in the past have ruthlessly eliminated rivals and enemies both within the organization and outside by adopting this modus operandi. The killings of Chellakili and Victor in the past were carried out in a clandestine manner to ensure that the control of the organization remained with the Valvettithurai/Myliddy group. It remains to be seen as to what would be the fate of Pottu Amman who hails from Nayanmarkaddu in central Jaffna.

The LTTE: On the back foot?

The much-hyped euphoria after the daring attack on the Sri Lankan Air Force base at Anuradhapura on October 22, 2007 was short lived. Within a span of just ten days of the attack carried out by a 21-member suicide commando team belonging to the Black Tigers on the base, jets belonging to the Sri Lankan Air Force carried out precision raid in an area at Thuruaiaru in Iranamadu, Kilinochi district about 70 kms north of Vavuniya in the early hours of November 2, 2007. 6 top members of the Tamil Tigers were reportedly killed in the air strike. The LTTE confirmed the death of the chief of its political wing Suppaya Paramu Thamilchelvam, self-styled Lt. Col Anupumani alias Alex who headed the “strategic communication division” of the Tigers, Mikuthan, Neathaji, Aadchiveal and Vaakaikkumaran.

According to sources in the Sri Lankan Defence Ministry, the raid was successfully carried out due to the synergy achieved through excellent co-ordination between the military intelligence and the air arm.

On October 31, 2007 the Sri Lankan government decided to impose press censorship under the Public Security Ordinance on news coverage related to military confrontations and offensive operations. The clamp down came in the wake of the recent LTTE raid on Anuradhapura air base. It could also signal the start of a possible ground offensive to be launched by the army in the north to take out the Tigers.

LTTE’s recent setbacks:

Over the past two years, since the breakdown of the truce and the split in the LTTE, the Tigers have been facing reverses on the ground.

Kokkadicholai, approximately 20 km south-west of Batticaloa, fell on March 28, 2007

In July 2007, the security forces had captured Thoppigala (Baron's Cap ), the last stronghold of the Tigers in the east.

The Sri Lankan Navy for the first time in the conflict achieved unprecedented success against the LTTE.

Sri Lankan Navy sank the 10th LTTE ship "Matsushima", with a capacity of 3000 tons was the largest ever arms smuggling vessel that belonged to the LTTE, about 1700 km south of Dondra point, the southern tip of Sri Lanka on 07th October 2007, around 0930 hrs.

“Manyoshi” was destroyed on September 10, 2007 at 7.00 a.m.

The second LTTE ship to be destroyed was “Seishin” on 10th September at 5.00 p.m.

The third LTTE ship, “Koshia”, was destroyed after a hot pursuit, which lasted well over four hours, on the 11th around 3.30 a.m.

Since the bulk of the arms and equipment for the LTTE came from the sea, the loss of the ships dealt a severe blow to their arms shipment network.

It remains to be seen whether the LTTE will retaliate with a sensational strike or a suicide bombing on a high value target to boost the flagging morale of its cadres or has the will to resist been broken with the loss of key leaders and reverses on the ground.