Countering Chinese Incursions - India's Options

The differing perceptions of the undemarcated and disputed boundary between India and China have resulted in Chinese troops ‘transgressing’ into the Indian side a whooping 505 times since January 2010.

The LAC is 4,057-km-long and traverses areas of Himalayan states, principally in Eastern Ladakh (J&K), parts of Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. Historically, there has never been a demarcated boundary. These are strategically vital portions which are contiguous with Tibet.

Explaining ‘transgressions’, officials said India and China do not agree on the LAC, hence soldiers on either side patrol up to the point they perceive as the LAC. Soldiers on both sides show a banner asking the other party to withdraw when the LAC is crossed. Despite the underlying tension, the process of withdrawing by both sides keeps a lid on the situation along the tense frontier between the two edgy neighbours. 

The matter of transgressions was raised in the Upper House of the Indian Parliament, the Rajya Sabha recently and the Minister of State for Home Affairs Mullappally Ramachandran said, “There have been 228 reported cases of transgression in 2010, 213 in 2011 and 64 till April this year. It was clarified, “There has been no intrusion along the India-China border. However, there are cases of transgression (by People’s Liberation Army, PLA) due to different perception of the LAC.” The word ‘intrusion’ is the official nomenclature to indicate a breach of the sanctity of the border and is different from transgression on LAC, that too on sections which are disputed. 

Similar figures have recorded in the past. According to the Indian Defence Minister, A. K. Antony, the number of Chinese transgressions has been generally as per established pattern during the last five years.

But one cannot overlook the fact that the People’s Liberation Army has been flexing its muscles through an aggressive border management policy in order to stake claim to the disputed areas in all the three sectors, viz. western (Ladakh), middle (Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh) and eastern (Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh).

Incursions in the past

 

PLA soldiers, in 2011 damaged a 200-metre long wind-breaker wall in Yangtse area of Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh. India rebuilt the wall after lodging a strong protest with China. In September 2011, it was reported that two Chinese helicopters had entered into Indian air space and landed one-and-half kilometres into the Indian territory at Chumar in Chingthan area of Tehsil Nyoma. The Chinese troops also attempted to dismantle Indian army bunkers which lay unused for a long time. So also in July 2009, Chinese troops had intruded about 1.5 kilometres into Indian territory near Mount Gya, recognized as international border by both India and China, and painted boulders and rocks with red spray paint. (The 22,420 ft Mount Gya, also known as "fair princess of snow" by Army is located at the tri-junction of Ladakh in Jammu and Kashmir, Spiti in Himachal Pradesh, and Tibet).

Armed motorized as well as boat patrols by PLA in the strategically-located Trig Heights and Pangong Tso lake in eastern Ladakh have also intensified since 2009. Similarly, Chinese have stepped up claims along the 206-km border between Tibet and Sikkim, which India long considered was "a settled matter", with the so-called 2.1 sq km "finger area" in the northernmost tip of the state remaining a specific matter of concern. (See the author’s post on the flare up in the Finger Area http://kumar-theloneranger.blogspot.in/2008/05/finger-area-indian-response.html)

New Delhi hopes the new bilateral boundary coordination mechanism, which became operational two months ago after being inked during the 15th round of border talks between national security adviser Shivshankar Menon and his Chinese counterpart Dai Bingguo in January 2012, will help prevent border flare-ups between the two armies.

New Delhi also has been taking up specific incidents of transgression with the Chinese side through established mechanisms such as hotlines, flag meetings, border personnel meetings (BPM) and normal diplomatic channels. 

During the 4th India-China annual defence dialogue last December, India also told China that military patrols along the LAC should not be undertaken at night, nor should they "surprise each other". Moreover, laid-down stand-operating procedures to cool down tempers should be followed in the event of face-offs between the two armies.

Despite the transgressions, peace is maintained along the LAC following an agreement thrashed out in April 2005. India and China have worked out what is called a ‘banner drill’, which helps keep tension under check.

Whenever either side perceives that a transgression has been made across the LAC, soldiers show a 10-feet-wide banner with a slogan painted across to each other. The banner primarily cites the 2005 agreement and says there is a need to back off from the present positions of patrolling. 

The above-mentioned measures and mechanisms set up pursuant to an agreement by both the countries, howsoever commendable, only provide for peace in the short-term. These measures and mechanisms have utility for a limited duration only. These measures cannot bring about a resolution of the border dispute. 

India needs to counter China

India must not disregard the fact that Tawang is considered to be part of China’s core interests. In fact China claims the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh, referring to it as Southern Tibet. And China will not compromise on its core interests. In order to achieve its objective and in furtherance of protecting its core interests, China set up a massive military infrastructure in Tibet with five airbases, an extensive rail network through which it can rapidly mobilize troops and over 58,000 kilometres of road. With such infrastructure in place, China started resorting to what is referred to as “cartographic intrusions” in a slow and steady manner. India, instead of meeting this challenge head-on has played down the issue by referring to the intrusions as transgressions which have occurred due to differing perceptions about where exactly the LAC lies.  

India cannot expect the boundary dispute to be resolved by peaceful means if it is not adequately backed up by military force. China has been keeping up the pressure on India by means of intrusions only due to the fact that India does not have the requisite military means to counter China along the LAC and in part to its submissive attitude in dealing with Beijing. India’s poor infrastructure along the border is one of the biggest impediments facing the armed forces, especially in a crisis situation. This author, in earlier posts, has emphasized on the development of infrastructure particularly in the North-East apart from augmenting the number of troops.

Force Augmentation

In response to China's growing military strength in Tibet, India has raised two new mountain divisions with 30,000 troops in the North-East as a counter-measure and to augment its mountain warfare capabilities. The two new mountain divisions comprising of 1,260 officers and 35,011 soldiers, raised at a cost of Rs 700 crore/ Rs 7 billion each, will be under the command of the Rangapahar-based 3 Corps in Nagaland with headquarters in Zakama (56 Div) and the Tezpur-based 4 Corps in Assam with headquarters in Missamari (71 Div) of the army's Kolkata-based Eastern Command. New Delhi has also sanctioned a new mountain strike corps, of an additional 40,000 soldiers, to be permanently located in bases in northeast India. The new mountain strike corps will control two divisions, trained and equipped for an attack into Tibet. The new strike corps will have its own mountain artillery, combat engineers, anti-aircraft guns and radio equipment. It would also be supported by Indian Air Force (IAF) fighters, operating from newly renovated bases in North-Eastern India. The sanctioning of a strike corps, therefore, signals a dramatic new assertiveness in New Delhi.

India has also deployed a Sukhoi SU-30 air superiority fighter jet squadron in Tezpur as one of the aerial offensive measures apart from upgrading airfields and helipads in the North-East. The Cabinet Committee on Security had approved the raising of the two new divisions in early 2008 and preparations for raising the offensive infantry formations began the same year.

Under the first phase, the two new divisions' headquarters, along with a brigade each, have come up, including the headquarters' support elements such as signals, provost, and intelligence units. 

The divisions have been armed with state-of-the-art technology such as heavy-lift helicopters capable of carrying 50 troops each; ultra light howitzers that can be slung under the helicopters for transportation; missile and cannon-armed helicopter gunships; utility helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). 

The air assets, such as the helicopter gunships and attack helicopters, will provide the two divisions capabilities to carry out manoeuvres for countering the terrain impediments. According to an officer, the gunships and attack choppers were necessary for providing the two formations firepower in a mountain terrain, as the army would not be in a position to deploy tanks and armoured vehicles.

Notwithstanding the proposed force enhancement in the North-East, the intrusions have continued unabated. The 64 intrusions in 2012 apart from being disturbing, clearly indicates the true nature of Chinese intent and policy towards India in general and the boundary dispute in particular. 

It is suggested that India adopts the following measures to enable it manage the border with China in an effective manner as well as to settle the boundary dispute satisfactorily without succumbing to Chinese pressure tactics-

·     India needs to send out an unequivocal message across to China that Arunachal Pradesh is part of India’s core interests and incursions (or intrusions or transgressions, irrespective of the nomenclature used) must cease.

·     Improve infrastructure in the North-East (build all-weather roads and extend railway network in remote areas of the region)

·     India needs to expeditiously operationalise the two newly-raised mountain divisions as well as raise the new mountain strike corps in a compressed time frame. (The mountain strike corps is slated to be raised under the 12^th Defence Plan 2012-2017).

·     The Indian Air Force must operationalise the new airbases in the North-East in order to enable rapid deployment of air assets in case any conflict. (The former chief of the IAF had stated in June 2011 that Jorhat, Guwahati, Mohanbari, Bagdogra and Hashimara were being developed as air bases. It must be pointed out that IAF has already based Sukhoi-30MKI fighters at airbases like Tezpur and Chabua. Eastern sector ALGs (advanced landing grounds) like Pasighat, Mechuka, Walong, Tuting, Ziro and Vijaynagar as well as several helipads in Arunachal Pradesh are also now being upgraded, much like western sector ALGs like Daulat Beg Oldi, Fukche and Nyama in eastern Ladakh).

·     Operationalise and deploy the new nuclear capable Agni – V. (This will effectively counter the DF-21 deployed in Delingha in Tibet)

·     India must strengthen its military ties with Vietnam and South-East Asian states like Singapore and increase its naval presence in the South China Sea. 

In conclusion, the Ministry of Defence and Home Affairs ought to concentrate on formulating policies to counter China effectively and strengthen nation’s defences against Chinese incursions rather than keep count of the incursions like a statistician. The whole objective behind the qualitative and quantitative increase in force levels is not only to counter any possible Chinese adventure but also to enable India to negotiate settlement of the border issue from a position of strength rather than from a position of weakness.

RISAT-1: ISRO's Moment of Glory

India, within a week of successful testing of a long range missile, the Agni-V launched a Radar Imaging Satellite primarily meant for civilian use such as agriculture, forestry and to facilitate disaster management. Indian space program has certainly come of age.

India's Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) proved its might for the 20th time in a row on 26^th April 2012, with PSLV – C19 injecting India's first indigenous microwave all-weather Radar Imaging Satellite RISAT into orbit nearly 18 minutes after a perfect lift off at 5.47 am from Satish Dhawan Space Centre at Sriharikota. At 1858 kg, RISAT I is the heaviest payload carried by PSLV so far. Soon after the satellite separated from the rocket, the solar panel was deployed and the 6m synthetic radar antenna panel weighing 230kg opened. It will start sending images from 1^st May 2012. The images will facilitate agriculture and disaster management. 

RISAT-1 would be parked at its final orbit of 536 km altitude, has a mission life of five years and would make 14 orbits per day. 

India had in April 2009 launched a Radar Imaging Satellite (RISAT-2) with all weather capability but it was bought from Israel for $110 million largely for surveillance purposes. The launch of RISAT-1 came several years after that of RISAT-2, which carried an Israeli-built x-band radar. The RISAT-2 mission was prioritized over RISAT-1 following the attacks in Mumbai in November 2008, resulting in RISAT-1 being delayed by several years.

What is a Radar Satellite?

Optical remote sensing satellites rely on sunlight to illuminate the ground below, working much like an ordinary camera. They do not work in darkness and their view can be obstructed by clouds. Radar satellites send out radio signals and record the echoes that return. They can image the ground even at night and are unaffected by cloud cover.

 

The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has long been aware of the advantages of deploying radar in space, remarked Y.S. Rajan, who was its Scientific Secretary for many years from the late 1970s and participated in the decision-making process that shaped the remote sensing programme. 

The engineering challenges of putting a radar on a satellite are “enormous” and considerably greater than for building optical imaging satellites, he told The Hindu. The processing of radar data and interpretation of images are also vastly more complicated. In addition, there was pressure from the launch vehicle team to hold down the weight of satellites, a factor that again worked in favour of optical satellites. 

So while ISRO opted to go the optical route for India's early remote sensing satellites, it was also very clear that the technological capability to build and use space-based radars needed to be developed, he said. Led by O.P.N. Calla, a group at ISRO's Space Applications Centre at Ahmedabad built a “Side-Looking Airborne Radar” that was installed on a Dakota aircraft in 1980. It subsequently built a more sophisticated “Airborne Synthetic Aperture Radar.” The National Remote Sensing Centre at Hyderabad operates two aircraft that can carry such radars. 

Apart from learning to build the hardware, the space agency sought to develop the necessary expertise in using radar imageries for various applications. It did so by taking data from foreign radar satellites, starting with Europe's ERS-1 that was launched in 1991. 

Military use

 

Radar satellites, popularly, have a swashbuckling image that is often associated with covertly watching over other countries and tracking their military hardware. These satellites can certainly serve that sort of function. But such spacecraft also support a range of more humdrum but vital operations.

A radar satellite opens up avenues for watching over another country's military operations. Such satellites can pick out military vehicles, aircraft and ships. 

A radar satellite is “a very powerful instrument” for detecting naval movements, remarked Bhupendra Jasani of the Department of War Studies at King's College London. They could even pick up submarines moving below the surface.

Radar imageries could also aid in examining if a nuclear reactor was being used for plutonium production. In that case, there would be signs that the reactor was being shut down more frequently, he told this correspondent. 

Though RISAT-1 is not a spy satellite, it is likely to be used to keep a vigil on border areas irrespective of hostile weather conditions, which is often the case in the Indian subcontinent and will add to the ability of Indian monitors to track movements on the ground in areas considered sensitive from a defence and security viewpoint. ISRO officials said this satellite would not be used for defence applications. RISAT-2, primarily a spy spacecraft, is already doing that job.

One view which merits consideration is that “Radar satellites can look through clouds and work in darkness. However, Radar signals are highly attenuated by moisture and hence would not be effective during monsoon or in regions with high rainfall. Radar images are usually noisy and hence can easily miss smart targets. Radar images are vulnerable to terrain effects and the like, that can be used to the advantage by adversaries. Identifying missile launches are also difficult in Radar images. Camouflaging is difficult with optical satellites that use hyperspectral/multispectral images. However, that is not the case with Radar images. There are advantages and disadvantages of both the type of sensors.”

RISAT-I will be followed by a geo-imaging satellite (GISAT) that will provide "near real-time pictures of large areas". Risat I will transmit pictures only during passage over India, while GISAT will deliver data on "areas of interest...sector wise imaging every five minutes and entire Indian land surface every 30 minutes at a 50 metre resolution".

AGNI-V: Strengthening India’s Nuclear Deterrence

On 19^th April 2012, at about 8.07 a.m. (IST) India for the first time successfully test fired the nuclear-capable Agni-V from launch complex-4 of Integrated Test Range (ITR) in Wheeler Island off the Odisha coast. The test was originally scheduled for 7 p.m. (IST) on 18^th April 2012, but was put off due to inclement weather. With this, India joined an elite missile club of the US, Russia, France and China, which produce Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). France used to deploy land-based ICBMs but has decommissioned them due to high costs.

The Agni-V is a three-stage, solid-fuel missile with a range of 5,000 kilometers. Though Agni-V is referred to as an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), Agni-V is technically an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) because ICBM’s have ranges greater than 5,500 kilometers. This test however demonstrates that New Delhi has cleared all the significant technological hurdles on the pathway to an ICBM. Zachary Keck in his article "India Fires Agni-V Missile" in The Diplomat states "The most difficult of these is the missile’s ability to re-enter the earth’s atmosphere.  Because ICBM’s re-enter the atmosphere at a much higher velocity than other ballistic missiles, the re-entry vehicle’s (RV) nose tip must be able to withstand an enormous amount of heat, around 2,000 degrees Celsius. The Agni-V uses high ballistic coefficient strategy during reentry, which is the technologically more difficult option, but also the most accurate."

The Agni-V is capable of delivering an atomic warhead anywhere in China, even when positioned deep inside India’s own territory. It was developed by India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and is modeled on the Agni-III, a two-stage missile with a range of 3,500 kilometers that India first tested successfully in April 2007. According to DRDO officials, the two missiles share the same size, shape, and height. It is also said that Agni-III can go as much as 6000 km with decreased payloads. The Agni-V is about 17-metres-long and two-metres-wide with launch weight of around 50 tonnes. The missile can carry a nuclear warhead of more than one tonne. Agni-V will feature Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRVs) with each missile being capable of carrying 3–10 separate nuclear warheads. Each warhead can be assigned to a different target, separated by hundreds of kilometres; alternatively, two or more warheads can be assigned to one target. MIRVs ensure a credible second strike capability even with few missiles.

This is the first time India has produced a missile that has brought China within its range and it is being considered to possess deterrent capability vis-à-vis China.

India has at present in its arsenal of Agni series, Agni 1 with 700 km range, Agni 2 with 2,000 km range, Agni 3 and Agni 4 with 2,500 km to more than 3,500 km range.

Agni-V

 

According to the chief of DRDO, V.K. Saraswat, the missile launch was a major milestone in the strategic defence preparedness of the country. He said that DRDO would conduct about two more tests before production of the system commences. He expected the missile to be inducted into the armed forces in the next two years. 

China’s reaction

China reacted in strong terms and very negatively to the successful launch of the Agni-V. In the state-run Chinese newspaper Global Times, China denounced India's advancement in missile technology, calling it a "missile delusion" and stated that India was still poor and lagged behind in infrastructure construction, but its society was highly supportive of developing nuclear power and the West has chosen to overlook India’s disregard for nuclear and missile control treaties. China claimed that India viewed China as a benchmark for military development, and further stated: "China understands the Indian desire to catch up with China. China, as the most appropriate strategic target for India, is willing to take India as a peaceful competitor." China issued threats and warnings in the report as well, "advising" India not to "over-estimate its strength", and insisted that China's nuclear power was "stronger and more reliable". China subsequently claimed that, "For the foreseeable future, India would stand no chance in an overall arms race with China, hinting about the possibility of an arms race between the two countries. The newspaper further added that if it [India] equated long range strategic missiles with deterrence of China, and stirred up further hostility, it could be sorely mistaken." From the report it is apparent that China was not happy with India’s successful advances in missile technology. It must be pointed out that China failed to appreciate the fact that India was forced to embark on advanced long range nuclear capable missiles in response to Chinese deployment of ballistic missiles in Delingha missile base, located 1,900 km northeast of New Delhi in the central province of Qinghai. The base, complete with extensive underground storage facilities, houses China’s DF 21 Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM) that have a range of over 2,200 km and can target most cities in northern India. China ought to have realised the fact that India would have responded to this threat at some point of time.

Completing the nuclear triad

Having successfully tested a potential ICBM, India must expedite the development of Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) to complete the nuclear triad and give India an effective second strike capability. India is reportedly working on the K Missile family; K-4 was reported to have been tested covertly off the Visakhapatnam coast in the beginning of 2010. However, DRDO sources neither acknowledge nor deny the existence of this project, sometimes referred to as “Black Project”. While there are some reports that claim that K-4 is a submarine launched version of AGNI-V, other reports state that it is actually a SLBM Version of the Agni-III missile that is being worked on. The goal of this project is to expand the second-strike options for the country. The missile is said to have two variants. One with a range of 3,500 km that is 10 m long and the other with a range of 5,000 km will be 12 m long to arm future nuclear submarines of the Arihant class. INS Arihant will be able to carry 4 (10m long) K-4s or 12 K-15s (Sagarika). K-5 missile is the SLBM version of Agni-IV is purportedly under development by DRDO. It will arm the future variants of Arihant class submarines of the Indian Navy. DRDO also disclosed in 2011 that it is also in the process of developing a variant of Agni missiles which would be a submarine launched solid fuel missile with a maximum range of 6,000 kilometers and a payload of one tone (probably the Agni-V’s naval version??). However, there is no clarity regarding the existence of such a project.

A Failed Rescue Attempt in Africa – An Analysis of a Special Forces’ Operation

In early March this year, one of Britain’s elite Special Forces, the Special Boat Service (SBS) carried out an operation in the Nigerian city of Sokoto, about 100 miles north-east of Birnin Kebbi to rescue a British national Chris McManus and an Italian national Franco Lamolinara held by gunmen belonging to the Nigerian terrorist outfit Boko Haram. The operation, unfortunately failed resulting in the two hostages being killed. Though this operation did not get a lot of media coverage, it sparked off a diplomatic row between Britain and Italy since it has been alleged that Britain did not inform Rome about the rescue attempt till it was underway. 

The hostages Chris McManus and Franco Lamolinara worked for Stabilini Visinoni Limited, an Italian construction firm, and were involved in the construction of a local headquarters for the Central Bank of Nigeria.

Gunmen seized the two engineers in the town of Birnin Kebbi on 12 May 2011. 

Birnin Kebbi is the capital of Kebbi state, in Nigeria’s North West and far from its oil-rich southern delta, where cash-driven kidnappings of Western workers are an occupational hazard. And unlike many Westerners in Nigeria, Mr. McManus was not involved in oil but in construction, as an engineer. The company, B Stabilini Visinoni Limited, which employed him was founded by Italians but has extensive Nigerian involvement.

But Kebbi borders Niger, where Al-Qaeda in the Magreb is active. In 2009, its members abducted a group of Western nationals, including Edwin Dyer, a Briton, who was murdered six months later. 

On the night of May 12 last year, Mr. McManus and his Italian colleague, Franco Lamolinara, were in their apartment with two other colleagues, a German and a Nigerian. 

According to the Nigerian police, the apartment was stormed by “a horde of gunmen”. In the melee, the German escaped, while the Nigerian was shot and wounded. Mr. McManus and Mr. Lamolinara were abducted. 

One detail of the abduction which was particularly troubling was the fact that the two men had kept a large amount of cash in their apartment but it was ignored by their abductors. 

That was seen as an ominous sign that whoever had taken Mr. McManus and Mr. Lamolinara was motivated by something other than money, but the picture remained hazy. 

Then, in early August 2011, a short video clip was sent to a French news agency in Lagos which showed the two men, bearded and blindfolded, kneeling before men carrying automatic weapons. 

In the film, Mr. McManus asked the British Government “to meet the demands of al-Qaeda”, but, significantly, there was no demand for money. 

The tape deepened British officials’ fears that the men were in the hands of Boko Haram, regarded as hardcore Islamists linked to al-Qaeda. “We’re not talking about Somali pirates or ransom gangs. These guys are ideologically-driven Islamists, part of the international AQ network,” said a British source. 

Following the appearance of the video, Whitehall’s Cobra committee, which oversees national security operations, met to consider the kidnapping. In all, the committee discussed the case about 20 times, initially chaired by civil servants but later overseen by senior ministers, including David Cameron. 

In early December 2011, a second video was released in which the hostage-takers declared that Mr. Cameron had two weeks to authorise “negotiations”. What would be the subject of talks was not clear, since the group made no clear demands. 

But they were clear about one thing: if that vague condition was not met, the hostages would be killed. 

Despite the threat, the Government, in agreement with Italy and Nigeria, decided to let the deadline pass because intelligence officials assessed that it was a “bit of macabre theatre” rather than a serious threat. But it did add urgency to the task of locating the hostages. 

It was reported that Nigerian intelligence officials tracked the group to the city of Sokoto, about 100 miles north-east of Birnin Kebbi. GCHQ at Cheltenham, Britain’s signals intelligence service was also at work, identifying and monitoring the telephone calls of the group. 

Once they were located, the option of using British Special Forces to attempt a rescue became a viable option for Mr. Cameron. 

Two weeks ago, a Squadron Group of the Special Boat Service deployed to Nigeria. The SBS was chosen to carry out the mission as it was the “Stand-By Squadron” for counter-terrorism. The post is rotated through the four SAS and four SBS squadrons every six months. 

In all, about 40 British Special Forces personnel went to Nigeria, travelling in civilian clothes and aboard commercial airlines, their weapons and gear shipped in British diplomatic bags. The commanding officer of the SBS, which recruits almost exclusively from the Royal Marines, set up his Task Group Headquarters at the British Embassy in Lagos. 

As well as intercepted telephone calls, the SBS also had access to surveillance video of the house where the hostages were being held from aircraft flying over the city. Images were fed back to the SBS command post and the monitor screens of the Cobra briefing room in Whitehall. 

For days, the SBS and their Nigerian counterparts watched, and waited. On 7^th March 2012, what officials called “a window of opportunity” opened. Intercepts of mobile phone calls disclosed that the terrorists were about to move and then kill their hostages. 

The local SBS commander briefed his chief, the Director of Special Forces, a major-general who is both one of the most admired combat commanders in the Army and a personal friend of the Prime Minister. He judged that the situation was now “go, no-go”, meaning intervention was required. That judgment was endorsed by the Prime Minister, who gave the final authorisation on 8^th March 2012 after an early morning Cobra meeting. 

Conventional planning would prefer an assault at night, preferably just before dawn. But for reasons that remain unclear, the SBS was forced to make a daylight assault. 

In a sign of haste, insiders said the soldiers carried out an “emergency response” plan, rather than the more comprehensive “deliberate response” plan. 

It appears that, due to the perceived imminent threat to the hostages, the SBS were forced to carry out their 'immediate action' plan. Such a plan is called on in an emergency such as when terrorists begin executing hostages. In such scenarios, the counter terrorism team has typically only just arrived on the scene and has had little time to build up an intelligence picture or to rehearse the operation. In such a scenario, the assault team is going in blind, not necessarily knowing exactly where the hostages are being held, what opposition to expect or what obstacles they may have to overcome.

It has been reported that the SBS approached the target building in Sokoto in trucks beginning the raid at 11.00 am Nigerian time. Other reports indicate that the SBS arrived in helicopters while the Nigerian forces arrived in vehicles to set up a cordon around the target building. The assault force consisted of around 8 SBS operatives, supported by a number of Royal Marines Commandos - possibly with the SFSG. 

As the SBS began to storm the terrorist compound, a fire fight ensued, resulting in the deaths of several of the hostage-takers. When the SBS team eventually fought its way inside the buildings, they discovered they were too late - the hostages had been killed by their captors. It is not yet clear exactly when the hostages were killed, whether it was before or during the SBS operation.

“The security agencies tried to break into the house but there was resistance,” said Mahmoud Abubakar, who lives on the same street. “The people inside were shooting at them and they returned fire. They exchanged fire for some time.” 

At least two terrorists were shot dead at this stage but for all the speed and training of the British forces, it was not enough. 

When the terrorists in the room with the hostages heard the gunfire they shot both Mr. McManus and Mr. Lamolinara in the head at close range. 

A senior official at Nigeria’s State Security Service said: “The hostage-takers shot the hostages before they [the Special Forces] even entered the compound. All the terrorists have been killed as well.” 

There are lessons to be drawn for all those involved in counter-terrorism operations. 

Theoretically, the principles of assault, namely, detailed planning, surprise, methods of entry, speed, violence of action were not adhered probably due to the rapidly changing ground situation as perceived by the SBS command.

Almost all operations of this nature are carried out either at the dead of night or in the wee hours of the morning. It is quite inexplicable as to why the SBS leadership chose to carry out an operation fraught with risk not only to the lives of hostages as well as to the rescuers themselves, but also to civilians residing in the area where the operation was to have been carried out in broad daylight. (The place where the hostages were kept was known to be densely populated). Stealth and surprise became the first casualties of the operation.

Secondly, the assault team comprising of SBS personnel was backed by, according to reports, nearly 100 Nigerian troops and helicopters for cordoning of and mopping up operations. With such a large attacking force, the element of surprise was probably non-existent. There are conflicting reports as to how the troops and the Special Forces’ team reached the place of operation.

The Special Forces cannot be faulted for the failure of the mission as the ground situation based on intelligence received forced them to adopt an emergency response plan rather than a deliberate response plan with scanty information about the target and the nature of opposition that it may expect. In other words, the assault party was going in virtually blind. Also the SBS had very little or no time to carry out a dry run before executing the operation. (The Israelis, on the other hand, while executing Operation Thunderbolt in 1976 knew the entire layout of the Entebbe Airport, had intelligence on the exact number of terrorists holding the hostages and the troop deployment at the airport). In this case, SBS personnel probably were not even aware of the topography of the target area.

It is probably unfair to the rescuers to make an analysis of the operation and sit in judgment over it. In all fairness, it must be said that such missions are always fraught with extreme risk of failure and the decision makers and the team executing such an operation were just unlucky on that fateful day.

EVEN THE BEST, AT TIMES, FAIL.

Terror Strike in Lutyens’ Delhi

On 13^th February at around 1515 hours, a bomb exploded in the car of the Israeli Defence Attaché in close proximity of the Indian Prime Minister’s official residence at New Delhi injuring a woman occupant who was later identified as the wife of the Defence Attaché Col. Yossi Refaelov. Tal Yehoshua Koren, 42, the wife of Israeli Defence Attaché, was on her way to pick up her two children from the American School run by the US Embassy.

According to eyewitness accounts, a biker wearing a red helmet and a brown jacket stuck a magnetic device on the car, following which it exploded on Aurangzeb Road, not far from the Prime Minister's 7 Race Course Road home. They said the device was probably actuated by remote control, as it exploded within seconds of the biker riding off.

The magnetic device or sticky bomb is similar to a limpet mine, a type of naval mine attached to a target by magnets; they are so named because of their superficial similarity to the limpet, a type of mollusk.

A magnetic device or "sticky bomb" and bike-borne planters were involved in the attack on the Iranian scientist Mustafa Ahmadi Roshan in January 2012.

The diplomat’s wife who also works in the Israeli Mission sustained injuries caused by shrapnel which had penetrated her liver and spine. She underwent two major emergency surgeries at a private hospital in Delhi and her condition was critical but stable according to hospital authorities. The driver of the Innova, Manoj Sharma and two occupants of a nearby car, Arun Sharma, 60, and Manjit Singh, 78 also suffered injuries. They were being treated for injuries at different hospitals.

A few hours earlier, a bomb planted in the car of an Israeli Embassy in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi was detected and diffused. Authorities in Georgia said an explosive device was planted on the car of a driver for the Israeli embassy. Shota Utiashvili, spokesperson for the Georgian interior ministry, said the driver noticed a package attached to his car's undercarriage and called the police. A grenade was found in the package and it was defused.

Thus, it appears to have been a well planned and coordinated attack on Israeli diplomats world-wide. While the attack in Tbilisi was thwarted, the attack in New Delhi was successful.

Israel accused Iran and its Lebanese protégé, the Hezbollah of carrying out the terrorist attack in New Delhi and a foiled attempt to kill another diplomat in Georgia, as tensions rose over Israeli efforts to shut down Iran's nuclear program.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu blamed the attacks on Iran and linked them to alleged threats to Israeli targets in Thailand and Azerbaijan, Georgia's southern neighbor, in January.

"We will continue to operate methodically and patiently against international terror that originates in Iran," he said, suggesting Israel didn't plan to immediately retaliate. 

An official at Iran's embassy in New Delhi denied any Iranian involvement in the explosion or other attacks. "We condemn such incidents," the official said.

U.S. officials condemned the attacks and said they were working with Israeli intelligence agencies to investigate them, but stopped short of agreeing that Iran or its militant allies were responsible.

The nature of the bombing in New Delhi and the attempt in Georgia raised the prospect of escalating tit-for-tat strikes by Israel and Iran or its allies.

Timing of the Attack

Why were the Israeli diplomats in India and Georgia targeted and what is the significance of the timing of the attack?

One possible explanation is that four years ago, (on 12^th February 2008) the deputy commander of the terrorist outfit based in Lebanon, the Hezbollah, Imad Fayez Mughniyah (or Mughniyeh) alias al-Hajj Radwan was assassinated by a car bomb by suspected Israeli agents in the Syrian capital Damascus. Hezbollah which swore revenge for the killing of its leader have attempted to target Israelis in retaliation. It is possible that the New Delhi attack and the attempted strike in Tbilisi were in retaliation for Mughniyeh’s killing.

The second explanation which sounds more plausible as of today, is Iran had vowed to retaliate against Israel for the assassinations of its nuclear scientists and technicians. Tehran has blamed Israel and Washington for the killings of scientists working on its controversial nuclear programme. 

Iran emerges as the prime suspect in both these incidents because in the past the Iranian President Ahmadinejad and the clerics who rule Iran, have called for the destruction of the state of Israel. Interestingly, just before the attacks took place, Professor Alan M Dershowitz in an article titled “Warning Iran Against Hitting 'Soft' American Targets” and published in the Wall Street Journal online wrote: “The Iranian government has now made crystal clear that it is at war not only with Israel and Zionism but with Jewish communities throughout the world. As Iran's Rafah news website—identified with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—threatened last month, Iran plans to "take the war beyond the borders of Iran, and beyond the borders of the region." And last week an Iranian News Agency headline declared that "Israeli people must be annihilated."

These and other recent threats have, according to news reports, led Israeli and American authorities to believe that Iran is preparing attacks against Israeli embassies and consulates world-wide, as well as against Jewish houses of prayer, schools, community centers, restaurants and other soft targets.”

He further goes on to state that “If this were to happen, it would not be the first time that Iranian agents have bombed or attacked Israeli and Jewish targets in distant countries. Back in 1992, Iranian agents blew up the Israeli Embassy and a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, killing and injuring hundreds of civilians, many of whom were children. The Argentine government conducted a thorough criminal investigation and indicted several Iranian officials, but those officials were well beyond the reach of Argentine legal authorities and remain at liberty.”

The 1992 attack referred to by Professor Dershowitz was a bomb attack on the building of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires carried out on March 17, 1992. About 29 people were killed in the attack and 242 others were injured.

Messages intercepted by the US National Security Agency revealed Iranian knowledge of the impending attack, as well as the complicity of Hezbollah operative Imad Mughniyeh.

In May 1998, Moshen Rabbani, (the Cultural Attaché in the Iranian Embassy in Argentina until December 1997) was detained in Germany, and the Argentine government expelled seven Iranian diplomats from the country, stating that it had "convincing proof" of Iranian involvement in the bombing. However, none of the suspects have been prosecuted. In fact the attack occurred when Iran and Argentina were hoping for a resumption of nuclear cooperation, although Argentina had announced the suspension of the shipments of nuclear materials to Iran a couple months before the bombing. A number of sources report on Hezbollah involvement with the assistance of Syria.

Why India?

It may be too early to blame Iran (or the Hezbollah) for the terrorist strike in New Delhi. Though it does appear that Iran, given its past track record and the only actor with a motive, may have carried out the attack, thorough investigations are needed to determine the perpetrators. However the question is why was New Delhi chosen for attacking the Israeli diplomat? Firstly, India is perceived to be a soft state and the internal security apparatus is considered to be inept. Secondly, any act of terror carried out within India, particularly in one of the major metropolitan cities is likely to get maximum coverage in the Indian as well as foreign media.

Compounding the difficulty of pinning blame was the question as to why Iran would stage a terrorist attack in New Delhi, a country which recently resisted further sanctions being imposed on Iran by the US. Also, India last month surpassed China as Tehran's top oil consumer, defying international pressure to cut back imports of Iranian oil. Having said that, one must also acknowledge the fact that India does not support Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons. It is also a well-known fact that Iran’s international behaviour in the past has defied rationale and logic as can be seen from the attack by "Iranian protestors" on the British Embassy in Tehran in November 2011. (See http://kumar-theloneranger.blogspot.in/2011/11/international-legal-perspective-of.html)

If it is established that Iran or its proxy the Hezbollah were involved then the question arises as to whether the terrorist who planted the bomb was a foreigner or an Indian working on behalf of Iran or the Hezbollah. According to Mr. B. Raman, the Hizbollah had operated in the 1990s in Bangkok and Buenos Aires and was known to have a local support base in Tbilisi. But it had neither operated in New Delhi in the past nor was it known to have sleeper cells in India. Unless the terrorist involved is arrested and interrogated, it would be difficult to say whether he had come into India from outside to cause the blast or whether he is an Indian Muslim recruited by the Hizbollah for the attack.

While it is a known fact that there are sleeper cells of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) operating in India, there are no known groups or individuals with ties to Iranian-backed groups like the Hezbollah in India.

It must be pointed out that the Lashkar-e-Toiba’s attack on the Narriman House in Mumbai, housing an Israeli religious-cum-cultural centre, during its terrorist strikes in Mumbai on 26/11, was the first instance of a terrorist attack on Israeli targets inside Indian territory outside Kashmir. It is also relevant to point out that foreign diplomats posted in India have not been targeted by terror groups, save and except, the case of the British Deputy High Commissioner, Percy Norris, who was assassinated in Mumbai (then Bombay) in November 1984.

If suspicion that individuals or groups owing allegiance to or sympathizing with cause of Iran or the Hezbollah turn out to be true, then it does not augur well for India and its over-stretched security agencies who will have a lot to do to cope with international terror outfits, apart from the home-grown terror groups like Indian Mujahideen and Pak-based groups like LeT.

Indian response

India must wake up to the fact that such types of attacks on foreign diplomats and nationals within India have become a reality. The attack on Mumbai in November 2008 in which several foreign nationals were killed was not an exception; rather it was the norm. India must appreciate that cordial bilateral ties with states such as Iran and Syria who sponsor terrorism do not necessarily prevent or deter these states from making use of India as a battleground to settle scores with its enemies. If India, through its investigations, is able to unearth any possible connection between Iran or its protégés and the terror attack, it must take steps to expel Iranian diplomats posted in India who may have connived in the attack and prosecute Indian or foreign nationals involved in the execution of the crime.