Eli Cohen – A Spy without Parallel

This post is in memory of Eli Cohen who was executed by Syrian authorities on 18^th May 1965 in Damascus after being found guilty of spying for Israel. He was unlike any other spy in the annals of espionage – a spy without any parallel. This is his story.

Eliahu (Eli) ben Shaoul Cohen was born in Alexandria, Egypt in an orthodox Jewish family in 1924. His father had moved there from Aleppo in Syria in 1914. In January 1947, Cohen chose to enlist in the Egyptian army as an alternative to paying the proscribed sum all young Jews were supposed to pay, but was declared ineligible on grounds of questionable loyalty. Later that year, he left university and began studying at home after facing harassment by the Muslim Brotherhood. Though his parents and three brothers left for Israel in 1949, Cohen remained to finish a degree in electronics and to coordinate Jewish and Zionist activities. In 1951, in the aftermath of a military coup and anti-Zionist campaign, Cohen was arrested and interrogated over his Zionist activities. Cohen is alleged to have taken part in various Israeli covert operations in Egypt during the 1950s, though the Egyptian government could never verify and provide proof of his involvement in an Israeli operation to smuggle Egyptian Jews out of the country and resettle them in Israel.

Following the Suez Crisis, the Egyptian government stepped up persecution of Jews and expelled many of them. In December 1956, Cohen was forced to leave the country. With the assistance of the Jewish Agency, he migrated to Israel.

In 1957, Cohen was recruited by Israeli Military Intelligence. His work as a counterintelligence analyst bored him, and he attempted to join the Mossad. Cohen was offended when Mossad rejected him, and resigned from military counterintelligence. For the next two years, he worked as a filing clerk in a Tel Aviv insurance office. An introvert to the core, Cohen had very few friends. Most of his leisure time was spent mastering Arabic.

The Mossad recruited Cohen after Director-General Meir Amit, looking for a special agent to infiltrate the Syrian government, came across his name while looking through the agency's files of rejected candidates, after none of the current candidates seemed suitable for the job. For two weeks he was put under surveillance, and was judged suitable for recruitment and training. Cohen then underwent an intensive, six-month course at the Mossad training school, and his graduate report stated that he had all the qualities needed to become a katsa, or field agent.

Training and the making of a Spy

His training was rather unconventional. In 1960, armed with a false identity and a thick beard, Eli Cohen was introduced to one Sheikh Mohammed Salman as a student from the University of Jerusalem. Although Cohen knew quite a lot about the culture and the way of life of an Arab Moslem, Mossad wanted him to be trained to perfection so that he could act and react like a Moslem even under the greatest strain. He spent a few months with Sheikh Salman. Towards the end of 1960, Cohen began to learn a different trade.

On 1^st March 1961, Eli Cohen boarded a Swiss Air flight from Zurich and flew to Buenos Aires. At the Argentinian capital, he passed off as a prosperous businessman who travelled first class. Cohen had become Kamel Amin Thaabet (commonly pronounced Saabet). His passport showed that he was a Syrian from Lebanon.  Buenos Aires has a large Syrian population. Cohen portrayed himself to be serious, generous, considerate and above all a devout Muslim and highly nationalistic. Thaabet gradually became a well-known and respectable member of the Syrian community in Buenos Aires.

Mossad had traversed half way round the globe to prepare a perfect “legend” for Cohen. Mossad had correctly assessed that Syrian intelligence would certainly check on Thaabet and therefore his cover was prepared with great care. Cohen’s new assumed identity was based on a real Kamel Amin Thaabet born in Lebanon of Syrian parents. The real Kamel Amin Thaabet had died long ago, but if he were alive he would have been of Cohen’s age.

The resurrected Kamel Amin Thaabet became a regular visitor to the parties and receptions hosted in the Syrian embassy in Buenos Aires. The military attaché in the Syrian Embassy, Major Amin Al-Hafiz was very impressed by Thaabet. Thaabet’s nationalist fervor and pro-Baathist views were respected by Al-Hafiz. As a result, the officer began to confide a great deal in him and urged him to shift to Damascus to serve the Baathist cause.

The Syrian intelligence in the Argentinian capital carried out a thorough check on Thaabet. One day when he came home late, he discovered that his papers and photo albums had been tampered with. Israeli intelligence had taken lot of pains to prepare ‘authentic’ papers and the old photographs of the Thaabet family were perfect. Cohen had successfully passed the final test as Thaabet. He was now a trusted Syrian national. Mossad instructed Cohen to move to Damascus. Major Al-Hafiz was posted in the Syrian capital at the time when Cohen was instructed to make the move to Syria. Thaabet, accordingly wrote to Al-Hafiz of his desire to serve the Baathist cause and his intention to shift to Damascus.

In December 1961, Cohen paid a quick visit to Munich and met his “control” from Tel Aviv. In a hotel room the katsa and his control discussed details of his mission in Damascus; they re-checked on the business procedures, the codes and the radio discipline. At the same time a technical team from Mossad prepared Cohen’s luggage. A powerful transmitter was hidden in the false bottom of an electric mixer. A Minox micro-film camera was given the shape of an electric shaver, its chord, when detached, would serve as a long range antenna. Chemicals for making explosives were stored in toothpaste tubes and cans of shaving cream.

Mission - Damascus

On 1^st January 1962, Thaabet was on his way to Damascus. On arrival in Damascus he became a temporary guest of Major Al-Hafiz. Within a span of few days he settled himself on the fourth floor of a modern building in the prosperous Abu-Rummanah district across the Syrian Military High Command and close to the Indian Embassy.

Cohen alias Thaabet started an export business and was soon exporting Syrian antique furniture, backgammon tables, jewellery and objets d’art to European countries. He was often seen drinking Turkish coffee in the Hamidia market place discussing business and politics. At night, Thaabet was transformed into a deadly spy, passing information to Tel Aviv using the powerful transmitter set. The lengthy reports and microfilms were dispatched in the hollowed out antique furniture. With the help of highly placed contacts in government and friends, Thaabet visited military installations and was allowed to freely indulge in his hobby of photography even while visiting sensitive areas. His photographs of sensitive military installations proved extremely useful to Mossad and the Israeli Army during the 1967 Six-Day War. His most famous achievement was when he toured the Golan Heights, and collected intelligence on the Syrian fortifications there. Feigning sympathy for the soldiers being exposed to the sun, Cohen had trees planted at every position. The trees were used as targeting markers by the Israeli military during the 1967 War. Cohen made repeated visits to the southern frontier zone, providing photographs and sketches of Syrian positions. Cohen also learned of an important secret plan by Syria to create three successive lines of bunkers and mortars; the Israeli Army would otherwise have expected to encounter only a single line.

Capture and execution

How did Cohen get caught? There are conflicting versions as to what led to the unmasking of Thaabet. The Mossad blames the Indian Embassy in Damascus which they say, inadvertently led to Cohen getting caught. In early ’65, the Indian Mission is alleged to have complained to the Syrians that it was experiencing disturbances in its transmissions to New Delhi. The Syrians suspected, and rightly so, of an unauthorized radio transmission in the vicinity of the Indian Embassy. The Syrians pressed into a service a sophisticated mobile detection unit imported from the Soviet Union to track down the source of the illegal transmission. Thaabet was unaware of this development and he carried on his daily transmission to Tel Aviv. After a close surveillance for a few days, the Syrians caught Thaabet red handed in a pre-dawn raid on 24^th January 1965. After a trial before a military tribunal, he was found guilty of espionage and sentenced to death, without the possibility of an appeal. Israel staged an international campaign to for clemency, hoping to persuade the Syrians not to execute him. Hoping to put international pressure on Syria to spare Cohen's life, the Israelis approached many governments to press for clemency, and even appealed to the Soviets to intercede. The Syrians were determined not to spare a spy, especially if he happened to be an Israeli. On 18^th May 1965, Eli Cohen was publicly hanged in El Marga Square in Damascus.

Requests by Cohen's family for his remains to be returned to Israel have been repeatedly denied by the Syrian government. In August 2008 Monthir Maosily, the former bureau chief of the late Syrian leader Hafez al-Assad, said that Eli Cohen's burial site is unknown, claiming that the Syrians buried the executed Israeli spy three times, to stop the remains from being brought back to Israel via a special operation.

References

Wikipedia

Mossad-Israel's Knuckle-Duster by H Jesse Kochar, Probe May 1981

Countering Chinese Incursions - India's Options

The differing perceptions of the undemarcated and disputed boundary between India and China have resulted in Chinese troops ‘transgressing’ into the Indian side a whooping 505 times since January 2010.

The LAC is 4,057-km-long and traverses areas of Himalayan states, principally in Eastern Ladakh (J&K), parts of Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. Historically, there has never been a demarcated boundary. These are strategically vital portions which are contiguous with Tibet.

Explaining ‘transgressions’, officials said India and China do not agree on the LAC, hence soldiers on either side patrol up to the point they perceive as the LAC. Soldiers on both sides show a banner asking the other party to withdraw when the LAC is crossed. Despite the underlying tension, the process of withdrawing by both sides keeps a lid on the situation along the tense frontier between the two edgy neighbours. 

The matter of transgressions was raised in the Upper House of the Indian Parliament, the Rajya Sabha recently and the Minister of State for Home Affairs Mullappally Ramachandran said, “There have been 228 reported cases of transgression in 2010, 213 in 2011 and 64 till April this year. It was clarified, “There has been no intrusion along the India-China border. However, there are cases of transgression (by People’s Liberation Army, PLA) due to different perception of the LAC.” The word ‘intrusion’ is the official nomenclature to indicate a breach of the sanctity of the border and is different from transgression on LAC, that too on sections which are disputed. 

Similar figures have recorded in the past. According to the Indian Defence Minister, A. K. Antony, the number of Chinese transgressions has been generally as per established pattern during the last five years.

But one cannot overlook the fact that the People’s Liberation Army has been flexing its muscles through an aggressive border management policy in order to stake claim to the disputed areas in all the three sectors, viz. western (Ladakh), middle (Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh) and eastern (Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh).

Incursions in the past

 

PLA soldiers, in 2011 damaged a 200-metre long wind-breaker wall in Yangtse area of Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh. India rebuilt the wall after lodging a strong protest with China. In September 2011, it was reported that two Chinese helicopters had entered into Indian air space and landed one-and-half kilometres into the Indian territory at Chumar in Chingthan area of Tehsil Nyoma. The Chinese troops also attempted to dismantle Indian army bunkers which lay unused for a long time. So also in July 2009, Chinese troops had intruded about 1.5 kilometres into Indian territory near Mount Gya, recognized as international border by both India and China, and painted boulders and rocks with red spray paint. (The 22,420 ft Mount Gya, also known as "fair princess of snow" by Army is located at the tri-junction of Ladakh in Jammu and Kashmir, Spiti in Himachal Pradesh, and Tibet).

Armed motorized as well as boat patrols by PLA in the strategically-located Trig Heights and Pangong Tso lake in eastern Ladakh have also intensified since 2009. Similarly, Chinese have stepped up claims along the 206-km border between Tibet and Sikkim, which India long considered was "a settled matter", with the so-called 2.1 sq km "finger area" in the northernmost tip of the state remaining a specific matter of concern. (See the author’s post on the flare up in the Finger Area http://kumar-theloneranger.blogspot.in/2008/05/finger-area-indian-response.html)

New Delhi hopes the new bilateral boundary coordination mechanism, which became operational two months ago after being inked during the 15th round of border talks between national security adviser Shivshankar Menon and his Chinese counterpart Dai Bingguo in January 2012, will help prevent border flare-ups between the two armies.

New Delhi also has been taking up specific incidents of transgression with the Chinese side through established mechanisms such as hotlines, flag meetings, border personnel meetings (BPM) and normal diplomatic channels. 

During the 4th India-China annual defence dialogue last December, India also told China that military patrols along the LAC should not be undertaken at night, nor should they "surprise each other". Moreover, laid-down stand-operating procedures to cool down tempers should be followed in the event of face-offs between the two armies.

Despite the transgressions, peace is maintained along the LAC following an agreement thrashed out in April 2005. India and China have worked out what is called a ‘banner drill’, which helps keep tension under check.

Whenever either side perceives that a transgression has been made across the LAC, soldiers show a 10-feet-wide banner with a slogan painted across to each other. The banner primarily cites the 2005 agreement and says there is a need to back off from the present positions of patrolling. 

The above-mentioned measures and mechanisms set up pursuant to an agreement by both the countries, howsoever commendable, only provide for peace in the short-term. These measures and mechanisms have utility for a limited duration only. These measures cannot bring about a resolution of the border dispute. 

India needs to counter China

India must not disregard the fact that Tawang is considered to be part of China’s core interests. In fact China claims the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh, referring to it as Southern Tibet. And China will not compromise on its core interests. In order to achieve its objective and in furtherance of protecting its core interests, China set up a massive military infrastructure in Tibet with five airbases, an extensive rail network through which it can rapidly mobilize troops and over 58,000 kilometres of road. With such infrastructure in place, China started resorting to what is referred to as “cartographic intrusions” in a slow and steady manner. India, instead of meeting this challenge head-on has played down the issue by referring to the intrusions as transgressions which have occurred due to differing perceptions about where exactly the LAC lies.  

India cannot expect the boundary dispute to be resolved by peaceful means if it is not adequately backed up by military force. China has been keeping up the pressure on India by means of intrusions only due to the fact that India does not have the requisite military means to counter China along the LAC and in part to its submissive attitude in dealing with Beijing. India’s poor infrastructure along the border is one of the biggest impediments facing the armed forces, especially in a crisis situation. This author, in earlier posts, has emphasized on the development of infrastructure particularly in the North-East apart from augmenting the number of troops.

Force Augmentation

In response to China's growing military strength in Tibet, India has raised two new mountain divisions with 30,000 troops in the North-East as a counter-measure and to augment its mountain warfare capabilities. The two new mountain divisions comprising of 1,260 officers and 35,011 soldiers, raised at a cost of Rs 700 crore/ Rs 7 billion each, will be under the command of the Rangapahar-based 3 Corps in Nagaland with headquarters in Zakama (56 Div) and the Tezpur-based 4 Corps in Assam with headquarters in Missamari (71 Div) of the army's Kolkata-based Eastern Command. New Delhi has also sanctioned a new mountain strike corps, of an additional 40,000 soldiers, to be permanently located in bases in northeast India. The new mountain strike corps will control two divisions, trained and equipped for an attack into Tibet. The new strike corps will have its own mountain artillery, combat engineers, anti-aircraft guns and radio equipment. It would also be supported by Indian Air Force (IAF) fighters, operating from newly renovated bases in North-Eastern India. The sanctioning of a strike corps, therefore, signals a dramatic new assertiveness in New Delhi.

India has also deployed a Sukhoi SU-30 air superiority fighter jet squadron in Tezpur as one of the aerial offensive measures apart from upgrading airfields and helipads in the North-East. The Cabinet Committee on Security had approved the raising of the two new divisions in early 2008 and preparations for raising the offensive infantry formations began the same year.

Under the first phase, the two new divisions' headquarters, along with a brigade each, have come up, including the headquarters' support elements such as signals, provost, and intelligence units. 

The divisions have been armed with state-of-the-art technology such as heavy-lift helicopters capable of carrying 50 troops each; ultra light howitzers that can be slung under the helicopters for transportation; missile and cannon-armed helicopter gunships; utility helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). 

The air assets, such as the helicopter gunships and attack helicopters, will provide the two divisions capabilities to carry out manoeuvres for countering the terrain impediments. According to an officer, the gunships and attack choppers were necessary for providing the two formations firepower in a mountain terrain, as the army would not be in a position to deploy tanks and armoured vehicles.

Notwithstanding the proposed force enhancement in the North-East, the intrusions have continued unabated. The 64 intrusions in 2012 apart from being disturbing, clearly indicates the true nature of Chinese intent and policy towards India in general and the boundary dispute in particular. 

It is suggested that India adopts the following measures to enable it manage the border with China in an effective manner as well as to settle the boundary dispute satisfactorily without succumbing to Chinese pressure tactics-

·     India needs to send out an unequivocal message across to China that Arunachal Pradesh is part of India’s core interests and incursions (or intrusions or transgressions, irrespective of the nomenclature used) must cease.

·     Improve infrastructure in the North-East (build all-weather roads and extend railway network in remote areas of the region)

·     India needs to expeditiously operationalise the two newly-raised mountain divisions as well as raise the new mountain strike corps in a compressed time frame. (The mountain strike corps is slated to be raised under the 12^th Defence Plan 2012-2017).

·     The Indian Air Force must operationalise the new airbases in the North-East in order to enable rapid deployment of air assets in case any conflict. (The former chief of the IAF had stated in June 2011 that Jorhat, Guwahati, Mohanbari, Bagdogra and Hashimara were being developed as air bases. It must be pointed out that IAF has already based Sukhoi-30MKI fighters at airbases like Tezpur and Chabua. Eastern sector ALGs (advanced landing grounds) like Pasighat, Mechuka, Walong, Tuting, Ziro and Vijaynagar as well as several helipads in Arunachal Pradesh are also now being upgraded, much like western sector ALGs like Daulat Beg Oldi, Fukche and Nyama in eastern Ladakh).

·     Operationalise and deploy the new nuclear capable Agni – V. (This will effectively counter the DF-21 deployed in Delingha in Tibet)

·     India must strengthen its military ties with Vietnam and South-East Asian states like Singapore and increase its naval presence in the South China Sea. 

In conclusion, the Ministry of Defence and Home Affairs ought to concentrate on formulating policies to counter China effectively and strengthen nation’s defences against Chinese incursions rather than keep count of the incursions like a statistician. The whole objective behind the qualitative and quantitative increase in force levels is not only to counter any possible Chinese adventure but also to enable India to negotiate settlement of the border issue from a position of strength rather than from a position of weakness.

RISAT-1: ISRO's Moment of Glory

India, within a week of successful testing of a long range missile, the Agni-V launched a Radar Imaging Satellite primarily meant for civilian use such as agriculture, forestry and to facilitate disaster management. Indian space program has certainly come of age.

India's Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) proved its might for the 20th time in a row on 26^th April 2012, with PSLV – C19 injecting India's first indigenous microwave all-weather Radar Imaging Satellite RISAT into orbit nearly 18 minutes after a perfect lift off at 5.47 am from Satish Dhawan Space Centre at Sriharikota. At 1858 kg, RISAT I is the heaviest payload carried by PSLV so far. Soon after the satellite separated from the rocket, the solar panel was deployed and the 6m synthetic radar antenna panel weighing 230kg opened. It will start sending images from 1^st May 2012. The images will facilitate agriculture and disaster management. 

RISAT-1 would be parked at its final orbit of 536 km altitude, has a mission life of five years and would make 14 orbits per day. 

India had in April 2009 launched a Radar Imaging Satellite (RISAT-2) with all weather capability but it was bought from Israel for $110 million largely for surveillance purposes. The launch of RISAT-1 came several years after that of RISAT-2, which carried an Israeli-built x-band radar. The RISAT-2 mission was prioritized over RISAT-1 following the attacks in Mumbai in November 2008, resulting in RISAT-1 being delayed by several years.

What is a Radar Satellite?

Optical remote sensing satellites rely on sunlight to illuminate the ground below, working much like an ordinary camera. They do not work in darkness and their view can be obstructed by clouds. Radar satellites send out radio signals and record the echoes that return. They can image the ground even at night and are unaffected by cloud cover.

 

The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has long been aware of the advantages of deploying radar in space, remarked Y.S. Rajan, who was its Scientific Secretary for many years from the late 1970s and participated in the decision-making process that shaped the remote sensing programme. 

The engineering challenges of putting a radar on a satellite are “enormous” and considerably greater than for building optical imaging satellites, he told The Hindu. The processing of radar data and interpretation of images are also vastly more complicated. In addition, there was pressure from the launch vehicle team to hold down the weight of satellites, a factor that again worked in favour of optical satellites. 

So while ISRO opted to go the optical route for India's early remote sensing satellites, it was also very clear that the technological capability to build and use space-based radars needed to be developed, he said. Led by O.P.N. Calla, a group at ISRO's Space Applications Centre at Ahmedabad built a “Side-Looking Airborne Radar” that was installed on a Dakota aircraft in 1980. It subsequently built a more sophisticated “Airborne Synthetic Aperture Radar.” The National Remote Sensing Centre at Hyderabad operates two aircraft that can carry such radars. 

Apart from learning to build the hardware, the space agency sought to develop the necessary expertise in using radar imageries for various applications. It did so by taking data from foreign radar satellites, starting with Europe's ERS-1 that was launched in 1991. 

Military use

 

Radar satellites, popularly, have a swashbuckling image that is often associated with covertly watching over other countries and tracking their military hardware. These satellites can certainly serve that sort of function. But such spacecraft also support a range of more humdrum but vital operations.

A radar satellite opens up avenues for watching over another country's military operations. Such satellites can pick out military vehicles, aircraft and ships. 

A radar satellite is “a very powerful instrument” for detecting naval movements, remarked Bhupendra Jasani of the Department of War Studies at King's College London. They could even pick up submarines moving below the surface.

Radar imageries could also aid in examining if a nuclear reactor was being used for plutonium production. In that case, there would be signs that the reactor was being shut down more frequently, he told this correspondent. 

Though RISAT-1 is not a spy satellite, it is likely to be used to keep a vigil on border areas irrespective of hostile weather conditions, which is often the case in the Indian subcontinent and will add to the ability of Indian monitors to track movements on the ground in areas considered sensitive from a defence and security viewpoint. ISRO officials said this satellite would not be used for defence applications. RISAT-2, primarily a spy spacecraft, is already doing that job.

One view which merits consideration is that “Radar satellites can look through clouds and work in darkness. However, Radar signals are highly attenuated by moisture and hence would not be effective during monsoon or in regions with high rainfall. Radar images are usually noisy and hence can easily miss smart targets. Radar images are vulnerable to terrain effects and the like, that can be used to the advantage by adversaries. Identifying missile launches are also difficult in Radar images. Camouflaging is difficult with optical satellites that use hyperspectral/multispectral images. However, that is not the case with Radar images. There are advantages and disadvantages of both the type of sensors.”

RISAT-I will be followed by a geo-imaging satellite (GISAT) that will provide "near real-time pictures of large areas". Risat I will transmit pictures only during passage over India, while GISAT will deliver data on "areas of interest...sector wise imaging every five minutes and entire Indian land surface every 30 minutes at a 50 metre resolution".

AGNI-V: Strengthening India’s Nuclear Deterrence

On 19^th April 2012, at about 8.07 a.m. (IST) India for the first time successfully test fired the nuclear-capable Agni-V from launch complex-4 of Integrated Test Range (ITR) in Wheeler Island off the Odisha coast. The test was originally scheduled for 7 p.m. (IST) on 18^th April 2012, but was put off due to inclement weather. With this, India joined an elite missile club of the US, Russia, France and China, which produce Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). France used to deploy land-based ICBMs but has decommissioned them due to high costs.

The Agni-V is a three-stage, solid-fuel missile with a range of 5,000 kilometers. Though Agni-V is referred to as an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), Agni-V is technically an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) because ICBM’s have ranges greater than 5,500 kilometers. This test however demonstrates that New Delhi has cleared all the significant technological hurdles on the pathway to an ICBM. Zachary Keck in his article "India Fires Agni-V Missile" in The Diplomat states "The most difficult of these is the missile’s ability to re-enter the earth’s atmosphere.  Because ICBM’s re-enter the atmosphere at a much higher velocity than other ballistic missiles, the re-entry vehicle’s (RV) nose tip must be able to withstand an enormous amount of heat, around 2,000 degrees Celsius. The Agni-V uses high ballistic coefficient strategy during reentry, which is the technologically more difficult option, but also the most accurate."

The Agni-V is capable of delivering an atomic warhead anywhere in China, even when positioned deep inside India’s own territory. It was developed by India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and is modeled on the Agni-III, a two-stage missile with a range of 3,500 kilometers that India first tested successfully in April 2007. According to DRDO officials, the two missiles share the same size, shape, and height. It is also said that Agni-III can go as much as 6000 km with decreased payloads. The Agni-V is about 17-metres-long and two-metres-wide with launch weight of around 50 tonnes. The missile can carry a nuclear warhead of more than one tonne. Agni-V will feature Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRVs) with each missile being capable of carrying 3–10 separate nuclear warheads. Each warhead can be assigned to a different target, separated by hundreds of kilometres; alternatively, two or more warheads can be assigned to one target. MIRVs ensure a credible second strike capability even with few missiles.

This is the first time India has produced a missile that has brought China within its range and it is being considered to possess deterrent capability vis-à-vis China.

India has at present in its arsenal of Agni series, Agni 1 with 700 km range, Agni 2 with 2,000 km range, Agni 3 and Agni 4 with 2,500 km to more than 3,500 km range.

Agni-V

 

According to the chief of DRDO, V.K. Saraswat, the missile launch was a major milestone in the strategic defence preparedness of the country. He said that DRDO would conduct about two more tests before production of the system commences. He expected the missile to be inducted into the armed forces in the next two years. 

China’s reaction

China reacted in strong terms and very negatively to the successful launch of the Agni-V. In the state-run Chinese newspaper Global Times, China denounced India's advancement in missile technology, calling it a "missile delusion" and stated that India was still poor and lagged behind in infrastructure construction, but its society was highly supportive of developing nuclear power and the West has chosen to overlook India’s disregard for nuclear and missile control treaties. China claimed that India viewed China as a benchmark for military development, and further stated: "China understands the Indian desire to catch up with China. China, as the most appropriate strategic target for India, is willing to take India as a peaceful competitor." China issued threats and warnings in the report as well, "advising" India not to "over-estimate its strength", and insisted that China's nuclear power was "stronger and more reliable". China subsequently claimed that, "For the foreseeable future, India would stand no chance in an overall arms race with China, hinting about the possibility of an arms race between the two countries. The newspaper further added that if it [India] equated long range strategic missiles with deterrence of China, and stirred up further hostility, it could be sorely mistaken." From the report it is apparent that China was not happy with India’s successful advances in missile technology. It must be pointed out that China failed to appreciate the fact that India was forced to embark on advanced long range nuclear capable missiles in response to Chinese deployment of ballistic missiles in Delingha missile base, located 1,900 km northeast of New Delhi in the central province of Qinghai. The base, complete with extensive underground storage facilities, houses China’s DF 21 Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM) that have a range of over 2,200 km and can target most cities in northern India. China ought to have realised the fact that India would have responded to this threat at some point of time.

Completing the nuclear triad

Having successfully tested a potential ICBM, India must expedite the development of Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) to complete the nuclear triad and give India an effective second strike capability. India is reportedly working on the K Missile family; K-4 was reported to have been tested covertly off the Visakhapatnam coast in the beginning of 2010. However, DRDO sources neither acknowledge nor deny the existence of this project, sometimes referred to as “Black Project”. While there are some reports that claim that K-4 is a submarine launched version of AGNI-V, other reports state that it is actually a SLBM Version of the Agni-III missile that is being worked on. The goal of this project is to expand the second-strike options for the country. The missile is said to have two variants. One with a range of 3,500 km that is 10 m long and the other with a range of 5,000 km will be 12 m long to arm future nuclear submarines of the Arihant class. INS Arihant will be able to carry 4 (10m long) K-4s or 12 K-15s (Sagarika). K-5 missile is the SLBM version of Agni-IV is purportedly under development by DRDO. It will arm the future variants of Arihant class submarines of the Indian Navy. DRDO also disclosed in 2011 that it is also in the process of developing a variant of Agni missiles which would be a submarine launched solid fuel missile with a maximum range of 6,000 kilometers and a payload of one tone (probably the Agni-V’s naval version??). However, there is no clarity regarding the existence of such a project.

A Failed Rescue Attempt in Africa – An Analysis of a Special Forces’ Operation

In early March this year, one of Britain’s elite Special Forces, the Special Boat Service (SBS) carried out an operation in the Nigerian city of Sokoto, about 100 miles north-east of Birnin Kebbi to rescue a British national Chris McManus and an Italian national Franco Lamolinara held by gunmen belonging to the Nigerian terrorist outfit Boko Haram. The operation, unfortunately failed resulting in the two hostages being killed. Though this operation did not get a lot of media coverage, it sparked off a diplomatic row between Britain and Italy since it has been alleged that Britain did not inform Rome about the rescue attempt till it was underway. 

The hostages Chris McManus and Franco Lamolinara worked for Stabilini Visinoni Limited, an Italian construction firm, and were involved in the construction of a local headquarters for the Central Bank of Nigeria.

Gunmen seized the two engineers in the town of Birnin Kebbi on 12 May 2011. 

Birnin Kebbi is the capital of Kebbi state, in Nigeria’s North West and far from its oil-rich southern delta, where cash-driven kidnappings of Western workers are an occupational hazard. And unlike many Westerners in Nigeria, Mr. McManus was not involved in oil but in construction, as an engineer. The company, B Stabilini Visinoni Limited, which employed him was founded by Italians but has extensive Nigerian involvement.

But Kebbi borders Niger, where Al-Qaeda in the Magreb is active. In 2009, its members abducted a group of Western nationals, including Edwin Dyer, a Briton, who was murdered six months later. 

On the night of May 12 last year, Mr. McManus and his Italian colleague, Franco Lamolinara, were in their apartment with two other colleagues, a German and a Nigerian. 

According to the Nigerian police, the apartment was stormed by “a horde of gunmen”. In the melee, the German escaped, while the Nigerian was shot and wounded. Mr. McManus and Mr. Lamolinara were abducted. 

One detail of the abduction which was particularly troubling was the fact that the two men had kept a large amount of cash in their apartment but it was ignored by their abductors. 

That was seen as an ominous sign that whoever had taken Mr. McManus and Mr. Lamolinara was motivated by something other than money, but the picture remained hazy. 

Then, in early August 2011, a short video clip was sent to a French news agency in Lagos which showed the two men, bearded and blindfolded, kneeling before men carrying automatic weapons. 

In the film, Mr. McManus asked the British Government “to meet the demands of al-Qaeda”, but, significantly, there was no demand for money. 

The tape deepened British officials’ fears that the men were in the hands of Boko Haram, regarded as hardcore Islamists linked to al-Qaeda. “We’re not talking about Somali pirates or ransom gangs. These guys are ideologically-driven Islamists, part of the international AQ network,” said a British source. 

Following the appearance of the video, Whitehall’s Cobra committee, which oversees national security operations, met to consider the kidnapping. In all, the committee discussed the case about 20 times, initially chaired by civil servants but later overseen by senior ministers, including David Cameron. 

In early December 2011, a second video was released in which the hostage-takers declared that Mr. Cameron had two weeks to authorise “negotiations”. What would be the subject of talks was not clear, since the group made no clear demands. 

But they were clear about one thing: if that vague condition was not met, the hostages would be killed. 

Despite the threat, the Government, in agreement with Italy and Nigeria, decided to let the deadline pass because intelligence officials assessed that it was a “bit of macabre theatre” rather than a serious threat. But it did add urgency to the task of locating the hostages. 

It was reported that Nigerian intelligence officials tracked the group to the city of Sokoto, about 100 miles north-east of Birnin Kebbi. GCHQ at Cheltenham, Britain’s signals intelligence service was also at work, identifying and monitoring the telephone calls of the group. 

Once they were located, the option of using British Special Forces to attempt a rescue became a viable option for Mr. Cameron. 

Two weeks ago, a Squadron Group of the Special Boat Service deployed to Nigeria. The SBS was chosen to carry out the mission as it was the “Stand-By Squadron” for counter-terrorism. The post is rotated through the four SAS and four SBS squadrons every six months. 

In all, about 40 British Special Forces personnel went to Nigeria, travelling in civilian clothes and aboard commercial airlines, their weapons and gear shipped in British diplomatic bags. The commanding officer of the SBS, which recruits almost exclusively from the Royal Marines, set up his Task Group Headquarters at the British Embassy in Lagos. 

As well as intercepted telephone calls, the SBS also had access to surveillance video of the house where the hostages were being held from aircraft flying over the city. Images were fed back to the SBS command post and the monitor screens of the Cobra briefing room in Whitehall. 

For days, the SBS and their Nigerian counterparts watched, and waited. On 7^th March 2012, what officials called “a window of opportunity” opened. Intercepts of mobile phone calls disclosed that the terrorists were about to move and then kill their hostages. 

The local SBS commander briefed his chief, the Director of Special Forces, a major-general who is both one of the most admired combat commanders in the Army and a personal friend of the Prime Minister. He judged that the situation was now “go, no-go”, meaning intervention was required. That judgment was endorsed by the Prime Minister, who gave the final authorisation on 8^th March 2012 after an early morning Cobra meeting. 

Conventional planning would prefer an assault at night, preferably just before dawn. But for reasons that remain unclear, the SBS was forced to make a daylight assault. 

In a sign of haste, insiders said the soldiers carried out an “emergency response” plan, rather than the more comprehensive “deliberate response” plan. 

It appears that, due to the perceived imminent threat to the hostages, the SBS were forced to carry out their 'immediate action' plan. Such a plan is called on in an emergency such as when terrorists begin executing hostages. In such scenarios, the counter terrorism team has typically only just arrived on the scene and has had little time to build up an intelligence picture or to rehearse the operation. In such a scenario, the assault team is going in blind, not necessarily knowing exactly where the hostages are being held, what opposition to expect or what obstacles they may have to overcome.

It has been reported that the SBS approached the target building in Sokoto in trucks beginning the raid at 11.00 am Nigerian time. Other reports indicate that the SBS arrived in helicopters while the Nigerian forces arrived in vehicles to set up a cordon around the target building. The assault force consisted of around 8 SBS operatives, supported by a number of Royal Marines Commandos - possibly with the SFSG. 

As the SBS began to storm the terrorist compound, a fire fight ensued, resulting in the deaths of several of the hostage-takers. When the SBS team eventually fought its way inside the buildings, they discovered they were too late - the hostages had been killed by their captors. It is not yet clear exactly when the hostages were killed, whether it was before or during the SBS operation.

“The security agencies tried to break into the house but there was resistance,” said Mahmoud Abubakar, who lives on the same street. “The people inside were shooting at them and they returned fire. They exchanged fire for some time.” 

At least two terrorists were shot dead at this stage but for all the speed and training of the British forces, it was not enough. 

When the terrorists in the room with the hostages heard the gunfire they shot both Mr. McManus and Mr. Lamolinara in the head at close range. 

A senior official at Nigeria’s State Security Service said: “The hostage-takers shot the hostages before they [the Special Forces] even entered the compound. All the terrorists have been killed as well.” 

There are lessons to be drawn for all those involved in counter-terrorism operations. 

Theoretically, the principles of assault, namely, detailed planning, surprise, methods of entry, speed, violence of action were not adhered probably due to the rapidly changing ground situation as perceived by the SBS command.

Almost all operations of this nature are carried out either at the dead of night or in the wee hours of the morning. It is quite inexplicable as to why the SBS leadership chose to carry out an operation fraught with risk not only to the lives of hostages as well as to the rescuers themselves, but also to civilians residing in the area where the operation was to have been carried out in broad daylight. (The place where the hostages were kept was known to be densely populated). Stealth and surprise became the first casualties of the operation.

Secondly, the assault team comprising of SBS personnel was backed by, according to reports, nearly 100 Nigerian troops and helicopters for cordoning of and mopping up operations. With such a large attacking force, the element of surprise was probably non-existent. There are conflicting reports as to how the troops and the Special Forces’ team reached the place of operation.

The Special Forces cannot be faulted for the failure of the mission as the ground situation based on intelligence received forced them to adopt an emergency response plan rather than a deliberate response plan with scanty information about the target and the nature of opposition that it may expect. In other words, the assault party was going in virtually blind. Also the SBS had very little or no time to carry out a dry run before executing the operation. (The Israelis, on the other hand, while executing Operation Thunderbolt in 1976 knew the entire layout of the Entebbe Airport, had intelligence on the exact number of terrorists holding the hostages and the troop deployment at the airport). In this case, SBS personnel probably were not even aware of the topography of the target area.

It is probably unfair to the rescuers to make an analysis of the operation and sit in judgment over it. In all fairness, it must be said that such missions are always fraught with extreme risk of failure and the decision makers and the team executing such an operation were just unlucky on that fateful day.

EVEN THE BEST, AT TIMES, FAIL.