Dragon’s presence in the Indian Ocean

Michael Cole wrote in The Diplomat recently about Chinese Navy’s attack submarines operating in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), and the possibility of it posing a serious threat to Indian interests. The IOR stretches from the Horn of Africa to the Malacca Straits and southwards to the West coast of Australia. His article was based on a report titled “Indian Navy: Perceived Threats to Subsurface Deterrent Capability and Preparedness” prepared by the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) of India’s Ministry of Defence (MOD). The report warned that the “implicit focus” of the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) appeared to be undermining Indian navy’s ability to control the highly sensitive sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the region.

Citing subsurface contact data shared by US forces, the document stated that at least 22 contacts were recorded with vessels suspected to be Chinese attack submarines patrolling well outside Chinese territorial waters. The document cites one contact with a suspected Chinese submarine took place 90 km from Indian soil in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, while six took place northwest of the Straits of Malacca, 13 south of Sri Lanka and two in the Arabian Sea. The submarines were believed to be from the South Sea Fleet based at Sanya on Hainan Island, off China’s southern coast. According to the MOD document these extended patrols may overlap with the Indian Navy’s area of operation.

The number of confirmed contacts mentioned in the report represented a marked increase from four year ago, when U.S. intelligence reportedly revealed that China’s fleet of more than 50 submarines had carried out 12 “extended patrols” outside its territorial waters in 2008, up from six the previous year. Reports then did not indicate where the extended patrols were said to have taken place, though it can be assumed that some occurred near or within the IOR. 

The report also stated that the Chinese Navy appeared to be building “expeditionary maritime capabilities” in the form of nuclear powered submarines and area denial weapons such as DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles to counter and threaten India in the IOR.

In May 2012, China had declared that it could deploy Jin Class (Type 094) nuclear submarines at Yulin Naval base at Sanya as part of its long-term strategy in the South China Sea. The SSBNs are likely to be armed with JL-2 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). 

This report must be read in the backdrop of China having set up a network of ports/facilities in Bangladesh (Chittagong), Myanmar (Sittwe and Coco Island), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Pakistan (Gwadar) and has also secured docking rights in Seychelles, in what is described as the culmination of the ‘String-of-Pearls’ strategy.

The document has warned that the Gwadar port would “facilitate enormous command and control capability for prospective Chinese presence in the IOR”.

While some strategic experts in India think the strategy is overrated and will not dilute India's influence in the region.

"Converting a port or token port facilities into a naval base is a huge leap. I don't think China can do that," said strategic affairs expert Rear Admiral (retd) Raja Menon. "Also, any country that allows China to do that will risk India's enmity."

Similarly, defence analyst Commodore (retd) Uday Bhaskar said, "The suggestion that China is strangulating India with a 'String of Pearls' is an exaggeration."

With due respect to the views of the experts, one cannot ignore the fact that China has in the past few years embarked on an ambitious program to strengthen its navy, and has been conducting long range anti-piracy missions around the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. Also, China is heavily dependent on oil and energy resources from Africa and the Gulf making the waters of IOR extremely important to China. India's relations with its neighbours is far from satisfactory.

Michael Cole’s article does not make any reference to India’s depleting submarine force levels. While China is scaling up its underwater capabilities, the Indian Navy's submarine force levels will be the lowest in its history by 2015.

The navy will be left with merely six to seven submarines, including India's first and only nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine INS Arihant, as it begins phasing out the Russian Kilo class and German HDW Type 209 submarines next year. 

The report warned India had "never before been poised in such a vulnerable situation" and the undersea force levels were "at a highly precarious state".

The navy currently operates 14 submarines, including a nuclear-powered attack submarine leased from Russia. However, the "viable strength" of its submarine arm is much less, factoring in the operational availability of the boats.

In contrast, China operates close to 45 submarines, including two ballistic missile submarines. "China may plan to construct 15 additional Yuan-class attack submarines, based on German diesel engine purchases," the report said. It said the Yuan-class boats could be equipped with air-independent propulsion systems to recharge their batteries without having to surface for more than three weeks, a capability currently unavailable with the Indian Navy.

The size of India's submarine fleet will roughly be the same as that of the Pakistani Navy in two years. "As this critical (undersea) capability is eroded, there is an inverse increase in both capability and strength of the Chinese and Pakistani navies," the report stated.

The report of the Integrated Defence Staff highlighting the threats posed by PLAN has come a bit too late. The reason is that the Chinese Navy has been undergoing a gradual transformation from being a pre-dominantly brown water navy to a blue water navy owing largely to a change in strategic priorities and to back up its belligerent claim over the South China Sea and prepare for a possible conflict with the US-Japan-South Korea alliance. 

Indian Navy has been aware of China’s modernization plans as well as its strategic objectives. For instance, way back in 2008, Indian Navy was aware of the deployment of China’s Jin Class (Type 094) nuclear submarines at Sanya, a base in close proximity of India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands. 

A report in The Daily Telegraph in May 2008 said that satellite imagery indicated that a substantial harbour had been built that could house nuclear submarines and a host of aircraft carriers. 

One photograph showed China's latest nuclear submarine at the base just a few hundred miles from its neighbours; another shows warships moored at long jetties and a network of tunnels at the Sanya base on the southern tip of Hainan island. One of the issues of concern according to the news report was the immense tunnel entrances — 11 of which had been spotted — estimated to be 60 ft high, carved into the hill-side around the base. These tunnels could lead to caverns capable of concealing up to 20 nuclear submarines from spy satellites. This was seen as a major development to enable China project its sea power into the Pacific Ocean and IOR.

The location of the base off Hainan would also give the submarines access to very deep water — exceeding 15,000 feet — within a few miles, making them even harder to detect. Two 1,000-yard piers and three smaller ones could accommodate two carrier strike groups or amphibious assault ships. 

According to the Indian Express report of May 2008, the deployment of the Jin class submarine at Hainan may motivate India to speed up its indigenous nuclear submarine project that had been in the making for the past decade. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) believe that while the deployment of Jin-class submarines may help in sustaining India’s own SSBN program, for China to sail an SSBN into the India Ocean and operate it there in a meaningful way, however, will be very difficult and dangerous in a crisis and hence they are more likely to stay close to Chinese waters.

The moot question now is, why are alarm bells being rung in Delhi and not when in fact China had embarked on naval modernization several years back? Should not have India countered China’s string of pearls policy? These are uncomfortable questions for which answers are not readily available.  India, in fact, failed to thwart Chinese encirclement as well as lagged behind in upgrading its naval assets. While India’s indigenous projects may take time to fructify, it must speed up its procurement of the aircraft carrier Vikramaditya (Gorshkov) and other Principal Surface Combatants (PSCs) as well as upgrade its underwater capabilities to counter PLAN in the IOR.

Hyderabad Bombings

Terror re-visited the southern Indian city of Hyderabad around 7.00 pm on 21^st February after a five year hiatus with two massive explosions triggered by tiffin-carrier bombs planted on bicycles near an intersection in a densely populated Dilsukhnagar area leaving about sixteen dead and more than 100 injured. The first bomb exploded in front of a restaurant called Anand Tiffin Centre near the Konark theatre and the other exploded a few minutes later at a foot over bridge, near the Venkatadri theatre, about 150 metres away from the site of the first explosion.

Dilsukhnagar, in the eastern part of Hyderabad, is an education and commercial hub with several computer coaching institutions, theatres and fruit and grain markets in the vicinity. There is a temple in the neighbourhood where devotees congregate on Thursdays.

According to media reports, the Dilsukhnagar a Hindu-dominated locality with a history of communal tension has been on the terrorists' radar for long; at least since 1999 when a bomb was planted near a Hanuman temple. The device was detected in time by the police.

 

Although intelligence agencies are not rushing to a conclusion about the perpetrators of Thursday’s terror attacks, their suspicion of India Mujahideen's role is derived from the fact that the terror outfit had targeted precisely the same spot — near the foot over bridge in Dilsukhnagar — on August 25, 2007 when IM carried out serial blasts in Hyderabad.

During their interrogation in 2008 in connection with their involvement in the serial attack on Hyderabad the year before, two members of IM — a Indian proxy of Lashkar-e-Taiba which was launched to cloak Pakistan's involvement in the terror campaign against India — confirmed that Bhatkal was the mastermind.

The suspicion is derived also from the testimony of the three alleged IM terrorists to Delhi Police in October 2012. Imran, Tabrez and Syed Maqbool told the special cell that they had been assigned by Bhatkal to do a recce of Dilsukhnagar and other communally sensitive areas in Hyderabad. The duo – Syed Maqbool and Imran who were arrested by the Delhi Police for their involvement in the Pune bombings of August 2012 – revealed that they also did a recce of Hyderabad’s Begum bazaar and Abids area on a motorcycle.

Given the nature of intelligence available to the central agencies and / or the state police, can it be said that specific intelligence was not available? Specific intelligence does not mean that the intelligence agencies will always get information on the specific target/s which will be attacked and the timing of the attack. It is foolish to assume that the input will state that a bomb would be placed near the foot over-bridge in Dilsukhnagar. At the same time, if alerts pertaining to specific targets are issued at regular intervals, it may be difficult to place the specific targets under surveillance 24x7. In the present case, it appears that neither Delhi Police nor the central agencies and the Andhra Police who participated in the interrogation of Maqbool and Imran Khan in October 2012 could pick up the leads and deduce that Dilsukhnagar could be targeted.  A leading national daily in its edition dated 23^rd February 2013 reported: “A team led by Superintendent of Police (Intelligence) B Sumathi spent several days in Delhi interrogating Maqbool and Khan soon after they were arrested by the Delhi police’s Special Cell in October 2012.”

 

An officer from Hyderabad said, “This information was never shared with us by the Delhi police. We cannot go by media reports and if there was a specific mention of Hyderabad, it ought to have to been communicated to us officially.”

The Delhi police, however, maintained that the tip-offs were passed on. An officer said that information was given promptly to the Maharashtra police and they in turn even released pictures of Waqas and Tabrez, who are being considered as suspects in the Hyderabad blasts.

According to Delhi police officials, the local police and special cell (Hyderabad) had information about Maqbool. They should have followed up the case as soon as he was arrested and sought more details.

This information had also been passed on to the Intelligence Bureau, which had issued alerts to many police stations including Hyderabad, they claim.

The analytical abilities of the security agencies based on available inputs were found to be lacking. The bulk of the blame lies on the Andhra Pradesh police for not having analyzed the information available first-hand and for failing to initiate pro-active steps to foil the attack. In the present case, an oft-quoted charge of lack of coordination between various state police and the central intelligence agencies cannot be leveled because personnel of the AP police were directly involved in the interrogation of Syed Maqbool and Imran Khan in Delhi. However, the AP police denied being informed by Delhi police about the information derived from the two suspects.

Assuming that the media reports were misleading or untrue, the AP police will still have to be held responsible for the failure to pick up ground intelligence and activation of a terror module in communally sensitive Hyderabad.

An oft asked question is why India fails or has failed to control terror, be it indigenous or sponsored from across the border? Though there are no straight answers, certain changes are necessary in the manner in which Indian agencies combat terror.

Firstly, as has been repeatedly mentioned in this blog, India has created far too many agencies with over-lapping responsibilities in collection of intelligence and for counter-terrorism. In the ultimate analysis, as was the case in Kargil, responsibility for collection of the intelligence and its dissemination cannot be fixed or attributed to a single agency.

Secondly, it is essential to shift the emphasis from intelligence collection through electronic means (ELINT) or communication intercepts (COMINT) to collection of intelligence through human assets (HUMINT). No intelligence agency can combat terror successfully without HUMINT. Today, India’s intelligence lapses are largely due to lack of human penetration of terror cells or modules. Only human assets can provide timely and accurate information on targets likely to be attacked. The US which relies on sophisticated technology for intelligence gathering and for countering terrorism, relied on human agents to track down Osama bin Laden. While India can go in for National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) – an intelligence sharing network that collates data from stand alone data bases of the various agencies and ministries of the government, it is absolutely necessary to focus on grass root intelligence gathering. This in effect would mean that the beat constable of the local police station is vested with the responsibility of cultivating and tapping local resources for information. [In Mumbai, Anti-terror Cells (ATC) have been set up in every police station for this purpose]. 

Thirdly, Indian agencies are unwilling to learn from the mistakes of the past. Hence, they are prone to repeating the same mistakes. The findings and recommendations made by Inquiry Committees which are set up to probe lapses after major incidents of terror are never made public and thus it is unclear whether any recommendations have been ever implemented. In India, committees are constituted more to lessen the political fallout and assuage public ire rather than for strengthening the system.

Fourthly, as a democracy, there is a need to enact a law in order to have better control and supervision of affairs relating to intelligence agencies. A parliamentary over-sight will ensure that misuse of intelligence agencies is minimized and there would be greater accountability to the nation.

Lastly, the citizenry through seminars and programmes need to be made aware of terror threats and the need to be alert and most importantly must be encouraged to interact with the local police. A tip off from an alert citizen is as important as any intelligence input sourced from an agent. Today there is a wide gulf between the public at large and the police, with the common man unwilling to repose faith in the police. If the existing trust deficit between the citizens and the police is minimized, community policing can reap rich dividends in the area of detection of terrorist crime and its prevention.

Line of No Control - Pakistan's Brutality Exposed

The First Kashmir War (1947-48) fought between Indian and Pakistani forces concluded with the establishment of a cease fire line (CFL) later designated the Line of Control (commonly referred to as the LoC) after the conclusion of the Simla Agreement of July 1972. The LoC does not constitute a legally recognized international boundary but is today considered to be a de facto border. Firing across the border by the armed forces of both Pakistan and India is a regular feature given the animosity and tension that exists between the two countries. However in November 2003 a cease fire came into force and has continued to exist at least on paper; the adherence to the cease fire is followed more in its breach. The Line of Control can now more appropriately be referred to as the Line of No Control. The incident of  8^th January 2013 was not only a violation of the cease fire but exposed the brutality of the Pakistani Army personnel.

In what is considered to be a highly “provocative" attack, soldiers belonging to the Pakistani Army, on Tuesday 8^th January 2013 crossed the Line of Control (LoC) into Indian territory in the Mendhar sector in Poonch district of Kashmir and ambushed an Indian patrol killing two soldiers, one of whom was decapitated. According to Indian Army sources, the heads of the two Indian soldiers, Lance Naik Hemraj and Lance Naik Sudhakar Singh were chopped off and head of one of the two killed were taken away by the intruding Pakistani troops. This brutal act was preceded by days of firing across the LoC by Pakistani troops in flagrant violation of the cease-fire agreement reached in November 2003.

The Indian Army’s Northern Command based in Udhampur released a statement terming the attack as a ‘significant escalation’ to the continuing ceasefire violations and infiltration attempts of terrorists aided and abetted by the Pakistani Army. The statement further said that "A group of their regular soldiers intruded across the Line of Control in the Mendhar Sector on January 8. Pakistan army troops, having taken advantage of thick fog and mist in the forested area, were moving towards our posts when an alert area domination patrol spotted and engaged the intruders".

"The fire fight between Pakistan and our troops continued for approximately half an hour after which the intruders retreated towards their side of LoC. Two soldiers Lance Naik Hemraj and Lance Naik Sudhakar Singh belonging to the 13 Rajputana Rifles laid down their lives while fighting the Pakistani troops," the statement said.

This attack, as the statement of the Northern Army, indicates is a significant escalation, and also indicates a significant departure from earlier ceasefire violations by Pakistan. One is that firing across the LoC by Pakistan has been a regular feature to which the Indian Army has been giving a proportionate response. However, on 8^th January the ambush is believed to have been carried out well within Indian territory by Border Action Team (BAT) of the Pakistani Army (which comprises of personnel from Special Services Group and terrorists belonging to the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Toiba) and was provided with intelligence and ground support by the 29 Baloch Regiment. It appears to have been a well-planned operation sanctioned probably sanctioned at the local commander's level. Some reports indicate the presence of Hafiz Saeed, chief of the LeT near the LoC on the Pakistani side about a week prior to this incident. The composition of the BAT and presence of the LeT chief indicate the close co-operation of the Pakistani military establishment and the Kashmir-centric terror groups in planning and executing tactical operations against India. Second, the mutilation of the body of a soldier brings back memories of the first weeks of the Kargil War when Captain Saurabh Kalia along with five soldiers of the 4 Jat Regiment were captured by Pakistani troops and kept in captivity for over twenty-two days and subjected to torture as evident from their bodies handed over by Pakistan Army on June 9, 1999. The autopsy revealed that the Pakistan army had tortured their prisoners by burning their bodies with cigarettes, piercing ear-drums with hot rods, puncturing eyes before removing them, breaking most of the teeth and bones, fractures of the skull, cutting the lips, chipping of nose, chopping off limbs and private organs of these soldiers besides inflicting all sorts of physical and mental tortures and finally shooting them dead, as evidenced by the bullet wound to the temple. The postmortem report also confirmed that injuries were inflicted ante-mortem.

In February, 2000, a former soldier in the Pakistani army and later an Al Qaida terrorist Ilyas Kashmiri had led a raid on the Indian Army's "Ashok Listening Post" in the Nowshera sector which resulted in the killing of seven Indian soldiers. Kashmiri is reported to have taken back to Pakistan the head of a 24-year-old Indian jawan, Bhausaheb Maruti Talekar of the 17 Maratha Light Infantry, as a trophy to brandish. He is believed to have been honoured by General Musharraf for this inhuman act at a ceremony later. Pakistan has had a dubious record of committing flagrant violations of international humanitarian law.

Pakistan as per its standard practice denied the incident and that its troops had crossed the LoC and that it had any role in the killing of the two soldiers and mutilation of the body of one of the soldiers. The Pakistan army spokesman called the claims of killing and mutilation a "cover-up story" for an Indian incursion alleged to have taken place on 6^th January on to Pakistan's side of Line of Control in the Rampur sector, during which he said one Pakistani soldier died and another was injured. Pakistan continues to be in denial and will always be in denial.

Pakistan has alleged that on 6^th January following a low-grade exchange of fire that night, commander of the 161 brigade, stationed in the Churchunda sub-sector, Brigadier Gulab Singh Rawat, decided to take aggressive action. Sources said that he asked the commanding officer of 9 Maratha Light Infantry to take “proactive action”, to launch a quick raid against a post that was harassing Indian positions. Pakistan insists its post, Sawan Patra, was raided by Indian troops. India has denied the allegation.

India is entitled to pursue two courses of action. The first is politico-military because this is probably the first time when Pakistani troops have been engaged on the Indian side of the LoC, which in effect means the Pakistani action amounts a breach of the Line of Control, a line which is considered to be sacrosanct. The second is to pursue a legal remedy for violation of the Geneva Conventions for the inhuman act of mutilation of the soldier’s body. The main obligation to the dead is contained in Article 15 of the First Geneva Convention. The thrust of that article is the need to aid the wounded. The article also provides that the parties must “at all times, and particularly after an engagement… search for the dead and prevent their being despoiled.” The article also says that “whenever circumstances permit,” an armistice should be concluded so as to facilitate the search for the wounded. Of course, while searching for the wounded, the dead would also be found. 

How does India respond? 

The Indian establishment is prone to taking the easy way out, viz. lodge protests and make a lot of noise and warn Pakistan of serious consequences. At the time of writing this post, the Indian Foreign Minister is reported to have said that “India was awaiting a response from Pakistan on the gruesome killing of the soldiers”. The Foreign Minister’s responses in an interview to a TV news channel were hardly convincing. Pakistan will be least perturbed with India’s rants, protests and calls for probe. At the time of writing the Pakistani Foreign Minister denied the incident in its entirety and stated that since it had happened in Indian territory, it was for India to investigate and inquire into the matter. The Minister’s replies only reinforce the fact that not only is India a soft state but is impotent to give a fitting reply.  Apart from lodging protests has India done anything till date? The Minister and the Government needs to be reminded that national interests and national security are supreme and have to be protected and secured at all costs. It is shocking that a nation with an army numbering nearly 1.2 million men can only issue démarches. 

What are the options available to India? 

India should retaliate at a time and place of its choosing. India under international law is entitled to take action in the form of reprisals. The Indian Army’s Special Forces have the means and capability to initiate an operation similar to the one carried out by Pakistan. However, more important is that the Army needs to have a contingency plan to carry out limited cross-border strikes at regular intervals to deter the enemy from engaging in such adventures. Of course, the essential pre-requisite for sanctioning a one-off military operation in retaliation or regular strikes as and by way of deterrence is the existence of a strong political will and the unqualified support of the political leadership. Unfortunately the present political dispensation in New Delhi is devoid of any real leadership and centres of political power are scattered. Armed response is not the only response which India needs to plan for. India needs to draw up an elaborate plan of covert operations ranging from targeting Pak interests world-wide to the targeted killings of figures who pose a threat to India’s national security.

India can also adopt soft countermeasures (preferred by the peaceniks both inside and outside the government establishment) like recalling the High Commissioner, suspending trade, over-flights and the dialogue process. These soft measures in the past have had little effect on Pakistan’s policy towards India and are unlikely to have any effect in the future as well. 

Preparing for the future 

If India has the foresight and is able to appreciate the intricacies of the geopolitical environment in the not so distant future then it must plan for the contingencies. This planning is essential considering the fact that the US and allied forces will withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014. The year 2014 could very well be a turning point not only for Afghanistan but also for a possible recalibration of Pak’s India policy meaning thereby Pakistan may seek to revive and pursue the Kashmir issue aggressively. India also must review its nuclear doctrine of “no first use” and the assertion that nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence and will be used in retaliation only. Given the fact that India is surrounded by highly volatile neighbours like Pakistan with no comparable nuclear doctrine and the fear of nuclear weapons falling in the hands of terror groups like the LeT, it is only appropriate that India rescinds its policy of “no first use”. India must also continue to review and upgrade both qualitatively as well as quantitatively its nukes from time to time. Hence the above-mentioned pro-active measures are required to be in place by 2014. 

[Update: An update became necessary because one day after having authored the present post expressing apprehensions and the manner in which Pakistani establishment is likely to behave and formulate policies post-2014, the Pakistani daily The Nation in its internet edition has carried a column dated 11^th January 2013 authored by one Nadir Mir, a former brigadier of the Pak Army wherein he states that India continues to pose an existential threat to Pakistan and calls for refocus on the eastern border (i.e. India), building friendly relations with Afghan Taliban (as if the world is not aware of Pak Army’s Taliban links) and for peace with India to be achieved, recommends Pak should be lavishly nuclear armed, meaning point the nuclear gun at India and achieve the objective of wresting Kashmir from India. This column can be read at http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/columns/11-Jan-2013/strategic-direction-of-pakistan-army].

 

Mumbai 26/11 – Lest We Forget

This post is not a re-run of the tragic 60 hours which the city of Mumbai was subjected to; it is a reminder to the nation to be vigilant and review the preparedness and plug the gaps in our security. 

Four years have passed since Mumbai was witness to one of the worst terror attacks. A fedayeen or fidayeen (suicide) squad of ten Pakistanis belonging to the Lashkar-e-Taiba  who entered Mumbai through the sea wreaked havoc at some of South Mumbai’s significant landmarks such as the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST) Railway Station, Cama Hospital, the iconic Taj Hotel, the Trident and Chabad House (Nariman House) and Leopold Café. The November 2008 carnage left about 166 persons killed and more than 300 injured and equally important it left the commercial capital and the nation shocked. These series of well coordinated attacks caught Mumbai and its police off guard; the police force was not prepared or equipped to face this kind of a challenge. This unprecedented situation led to a failure of command and control and resulted in chaos. In the face of this adversity, there were individual acts of valour displayed by officers and men in khaki who took upon themselves to brave the terrorists’ bullets against all odds. A mention must be made of the brave attempts made by police personnel with obsolete weapons who took on the terror duo Ajmal Kasab and Ismail Khan at CST, the then Additional Commissioner of Police Sadanand Date who along with a few brave personnel fought the terrorists, Kasab and Ismail at Cama Hospital, the three brave officers Hemant Karkare, Ashok Kamte and Vijay Salaskar who were martyred in the lane leading to Cama Hospital and late Assistant Sub-Inspector Tukaram Omble whose bravado was instrumental in Kasab being captured alive. The bulk of the responsibility of neutralizing the other eight terrorists who were holed up at the Taj, the Trident and Chabad House were shouldered by the commandoes of the elite National Security Guards who were flown in from their main base at Manesar, Gurgaon.

The attacks on Mumbai showed that India, in general and metropolis like Mumbai were extremely vulnerable to a fedayeen-type terrorist strike. The attacks demonstrated that there were serious shortcomings in matters of intelligence gathering and analysis and response mechanisms. Thus the Central and the Maharashtra governments embarked on an ambitious program of overhauling the security infrastructure.

Firstly, at the centre, India set up the National Investigation Agency (NIA) in December 2008. The Act establishing the Agency empowers the Centre to probe terror attacks in any part of the country, covering offences, including challenge to the country's sovereignty and integrity, bomb blasts, hijacking of aircraft and ships, and attacks on nuclear installations.  In the opinion of this author, setting up a new outfit after a debacle was another case of knee-jerk reaction on India’s part. Multiple agencies with over-lapping jurisdictions only result in turf wars and shirking of responsibility. 

The Government of India embarked on an ambitious plan of setting up the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) an intelligence sharing network which would collate data from the stand alone databases of the various agencies and ministries of the Government of India. NATGRID is being implemented in four phases, the first two of which will be operationalised by the year 2014 and the first data sets would be retrievable by early 2013.

According to Ajai Sahni, the Execute director of the Institute for Conflict Management & South Asia Terrorism Portal, by simply labelling organisations with names remnant of American agencies doesn’t make them effective. He argues, “by creating a new agency at the top of the pyramid you are not solving the problem. The problem of intelligence gathering and counter-terrorism is not at the agency level, it is the lack of capacity at the bottom. The problem is with training, man power, aptitude of law enforcement personnel on ground, application of technology and no one is fixing that. NCTC is replacing MAC, but MAC till now has been unable to create a terror database (formed in 2009), by changing how will the database come about. You are creating a new body that will run like the rest, so basically it will not run.”

The National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) is a proposed federal anti-terror agency to be created in India modelled on the NCTC of the USA. The NCTC was mooted as an apex body, a single and effective point of control for all counter terrorism measures. The Indian Prime Minister had in his address to the Chief Ministers’ Conference in May 2012 stated that the antecedents of the NCTC lay in the recommendations by the Group of Ministers and by the Administrative Reforms Commission, commencing from the lessons learnt in Kargil.

Another move was the formation of four NSG hubs in major cities, namely, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Hyderabad. It is difficult to say whether this move was sound or not as the hubs where the commandoes are based do not have the kind of infrastructure and training facilities that are available at the NSG headquarters in Manesar. The government at Delhi instead of setting up regional hubs ought to have considered taking steps in order to ensure quick transportation and rapid deployment of the Special Forces to deal with 26/11 like situations. 

At the regional level, Maharashtra government set up Force One, an elite commando force to combat terror strikes like the one that occurred on 26/11 on the lines of the National Security Guards (NSG). This step was taken due to the fact that non-availability of aircraft in Delhi and lack of ground transportation in Mumbai the operations to flush out the terrorists by NSG commandoes was delayed, thereby leading to higher casualties.

The state government also set up a jumbo State Security Council comprising of 66 members. It is anybody’s guess as to how this body has been functioning since its inception and in what manner has it contributed to the state’s security. These imprudent moves of the government of the day are laughable to say the least.

The Mumbai attacks raised questions about the quality of intelligence or the lack of it, its timely availability to the end-user, surveillance, security of vital installations, deficiencies in coastal security, and the lack of quality equipment like bullet proof jackets, bomb suits, weaponry, communication tools and disaster management including hospitals with trauma care facilities. Serious questions were raised about the response by the Mumbai/State police to the terrorist strike. The Maharashtra Government appointed what was officially known as the High-Level Enquiry Committee (HLEC) on 26/11, comprising of R.D. Pradhan, a former Union Home Secretary and V Balachandran a former Special Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat to probe the lapses and to identify systemic failures on 30^th December 2008. The committee submitted its report to the Chief Minister of Maharashtra in April 2009, but the government did not release it, citing security concerns. In December 2009, after substantial portions of the report were leaked to the media and after much agitation by the opposition in the state assembly, a Marathi translation was tabled before the state assembly.

While procurement of sophisticated communication equipments, bullet proof jackets, bomb suits and weaponry can be streamlined, the collection and dissemination of intelligence, surveillance and upgrading coastal security are matters which deserve closer scrutiny. For instance, lot of questions were raised about the quality of bullet proof jackets available for use with the police and had the late Hemant Karkare worn a better quality jacket, his life may have been saved. This prompted the state to procure high quality bullet proof jackets immediately after the attack. However for three years, citing technical reasons, no company was awarded the contract. Finally, the state got quality jackets from the agencies that supplied protective gear to outfits like the NSG. Thus procurement issues are not insurmountable.

The issues which require attention are the following:

Intelligence:

A lot has been written on intelligence gathering and its dissemination by various experts on the subject as well in this blog written in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks on 26/11 (read http://kumar-theloneranger.blogspot.in/2008/12/mumbai-2611.html). Having said that, it must be pointed out that the responsibility of intelligence gathering cannot be vested in specialized agencies like the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), Intelligence Bureau (IB) or the Special Branch of the local police. Some of the most reliable pieces of information can be garnered at the police station level by beat constables through their network of informers.  Intelligence collected at the grassroots level and shared with other consumers/end users will go a long way in thwarting terror strikes. It is also extremely necessary to have handpicked personnel at the police station to handle collection of intelligence and liaise with other intelligence agencies for expeditious dissemination of intelligence. There is today too much emphasis on technical intelligence (TECHINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT). TECHINT has its own limitations and needs to be used in conjunction with human intelligence (HUMINT) particularly in counter terror operations. The human asset who is able to penetrate a terror network or module is undoubtedly the best source of accurate information which will enable the security agencies to foil terror strikes. It was HUMINT which enabled the US to carry out Operation Neptune’s Spear – the operation which led to the killing of Osama bin Laden. Unfortunately, classical tradecraft appears to be a dying art.

Coastal security

Coastal security will continue to be a matter of concern for the security agencies and policy makers considering the fact that India has a very long coast line to safeguard with very limited resources at its disposal. 

The government’s approach towards all matters concerning security and coastal security is no exception has always been reactive. Remedial measures are undertaken only after a major incident has occurred and implemented in a haphazard manner without laying the foundation for the system adopted to function effectively. To begin with, the Coast Guard was set up in August 1978 in response to large-scale smuggling along the western coast with a mandate to protect the maritime and national interests of the country as well as to assist in anti-smuggling operations. But the 1993 serial blasts in Mumbai highlighted the fact that an inadequately manned and ill-equipped coast guard alone cannot safeguard the coasts. Instead of addressing the fundamental issue of lack of manpower and inadequate equipment, the Indian government launched a new scheme to cater for the terror challenge. Pushpita Das of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) in her article  “Why India’s Coastal Security Arrangement Falters?” writes that Operation Swan was launched in August 1993 to prevent clandestine landings along the Maharashtra and Gujarat coasts. It was a three layer security arrangement involving the navy, the coast guard and a joint patrolling team drawn from personnel belonging to the navy, coast guard, state police, and customs. While the underlying idea appeared to be feasible, the bitter fact is that Operation Swan has not resulted in a single seizure even after being for 18 years. According to her inadequate attention paid to overcome the basic problems of coordination, manpower, equipment, and motivation among the various concerned agencies at the ground level has been the main reason for this failure.

The Indian government launched yet another ambitious project in 2005 called the Coastal Security Scheme, which involved setting up a series of coastal police stations to strengthen the surveillance infrastructure along the coast. The scheme was, however, a non starter because the coastal states did not display any enthusiasm in implementing it as they did not perceive any threat to their coasts. Despite Mumbai being a preferred target of the terrorists, Maharashtra too implemented the scheme only in a piecemeal manner. Moreover, the decision to set up coastal police stations with a mandate to patrol shallow waters gave an excuse for the navy to withdraw from joint patrolling immediately. Mumbai’s coastal security was considerably weakened enabling the terrorists to carry out the strike with ease. 

Mumbai 26/11 forced the Indian government to overhaul the coastal security apparatus. Once again it insisted that the navy and the coast guard pool their resources to guard India’s territorial and coastal waters. The state governments were directed to establish coastal police stations and ensure that manpower and interceptor boats were provided to them.

The Maharashtra Government in an effort to beef up coastal security set up the Sagari Police Station in 2009 and another police station at Juhu in 2012. The lackadaisical approach to coastal security can be seen from the fact that Sagari Police Station operates from rooms in governmental quarters at Mahim and cannot even register a First Information Report (FIR) which is essential for investigating a case. Five of their 14 amphibian vehicles and 13 of their 27 patrol boats are in repair yards. Lacking a jetty, Sagari Police Station parks its boats at Malad or near the Gateway of India. Worst of all, most personnel at the two stations neither have the expertise to run the patrol boats nor basic swimming skills. The government ought to have focused attention on imparting training to the personnel for sea patrolling before opening the coastal police stations.

Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) Weapons – The unconventional threat

The continuing possibility of terrorist attacks using nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons is an ongoing concern in the national security policy arena in the face of a clear trend among terrorists to inflict greater numbers of casualties. 

Worldwide, the likelihood of terrorists being capable of producing or obtaining WMD may be growing due to looser controls of stockpiles and technology in the former Soviet states specifically and the broader dissemination of related technology and information in general. However, WMD remain significantly harder to produce or obtain than what is commonly depicted in the press. The Central Intelligence Agency has reported that it is likely that most terrorists will continue to choose conventional explosives over WMD, but warns that the al-Qaeda network has made obtaining WMD capability a very high priority. Indian security establishment needs to take cognizance of threat from unconventional weapons, particularly the “dirty bomb” – a type of radiological dispersal device (RDD) that combines radioactive material with conventional explosives whose objective is to contaminate the area around the explosion with radioactive particles. An RDD explosion could create fear and panic, contaminate property, and require potentially costly cleanup. Making prompt, accurate information available to the public could prevent the panic sought by terrorists.

Medical care and Disaster/Emergency Management

There is an urgent need to augment medical facilities, particularly trauma care which is inadequate even in a major metropolis like Mumbai.  Every time a disaster rocks Mumbai, causing mass casualties, the inadequacies of trauma care facilities at public hospitals get highlighted. During 26/11, most victims were rushed to the state-run but soon they had to be shifted to bigger centres which had better facilities to treat the injuries. Four years on, no lessons have been learnt. The question to be posed is whether the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) has the means to respond appropriately in the event of a terrorist strike. 

The issues discussed above are not exhaustive but are merely illustrative in order to assist the policy makers to take suitable steps to counter the scourge of terror within the country.