Will India Never Learn?

For the umpteenth time, Pakistan committed cross-border violation by ambushing an Indian Army Patrol deep inside Indian territory resulting in the death of five troopers. The question is will India ever learn from the lessons that Pakistan continues to teach or will it continue to pursue a foolhardy policy of "peace talks" at any cost?

Pakistani troops attacked an Indian post along the Line of Control in the Poonch sector in Jammu and Kashmir late on the night of August 5, killing five Indian soldiers.

According to defence sources the Pakistani soldiers intruded into the Indian territory well past midnight on August 5 and ambushed the Sarla post on the Indian side of the LoC. Five Indian soldiers were killed in the attack which took place at around 2 am, deep inside the Indian side of the LoC. According to army sources, “The ambush was carried out by the Border Action Team (BAT) of the Pakistan army, which comprises commandos of 801 Mujahideen, three ISI officials besides the dreaded terrorists of Lashkar-e-Taiba outfit. The attack was carried out by 801 Mujahid regiment of Pakistan army.”

They said, “One of the terrorists involved in this ambush has been identified as Mohammed Anwar, who was also involved in beheading of Indian soldiers in Poonch area on January 8, 2013. Mohammed Anwar is believed to be specialist in such operations and executing such strategies. The BAT operation was chalked out and carried out by 801 Mujahideen with technical support of Lashkar-e-Taiba.”

According to sources, the ambush was carried out at Narol area between Cheta and Hathi posts in Chakkan-Da-Bagh area in Poonch sector along the Line of Control (LoC).

They said that intelligence agencies had given inputs earlier that Mohammed Anwar was on the job to execute a BAT action in Poonch district in the month of Ramzan but they had specified target as Sawjian area.

Army said, “A group of six jawans was patrolling between Cheta and Hathi posts in Naol area along LoC near Chakkan Da Bagh at around 1.30 AM near forward post No l. Entering 450 to 500 metres inside Indian territory, a heavily armed ambush party of Border Action Team (BAT) of 801 Mujahideen and few dreaded militants of Lashkar-e-Taiba, total around 18-20 in number, were waiting for patrolling party guarding our fence. When they reached near post No l, BAT teams opened indiscriminate fire on them causing death of five Indian troops while a trooper of 21 Bihar was injured in the firing.”

“Every jawan had 10–30 bullet injuries which caused on the spot death of all five troops. After getting information, the injured troop and dead bodies were immediately shifted to Military Hospital Poonch where autopsy of the bodies were conducted,” they informed.

After carrying out the attack the BAT team went back unchallenged inside the Pak territory while some media reports claimed that the group of heavily armed militants might have infiltrated inside the Indian territory.

Pakistan Army denied that there was any cease fire violation by their troops and also any involvement in the killing of five Indian soldiers at the Line of Control in the Poonch sector in Jammu and Kashmir.

The incident could cast a shadow on the resumption of the Indo-Pak dialogue process expected later this month. The Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif are slated to meet in New York next month on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session.

The incident came hours after a BSF jawan was injured in firing from across Indo-Pak border in Samba district of J&K.

"There was sniper firing from some persons at around 15:55 hours from Pakistan side along the international border (IB) at Narainpur border out post (BOP) area in Ramgarh sector," a senior BSF officer said.

On July 27, another BSF jawan was injured when Pakistani troops violated ceasefire twice in the space of 10 hours by targeting Indian posts along the Indo-Pak border in Poonch and Kathua districts.

The Pakistani troops had used mortars, RPGs and heavy machine guns leading to heavy firing exchanges.

On July 3, Pakistan violated ceasefire when it fired on cops, who had gone to LoC in Sabzian, Poonch to collect the body of a Pakistani intruder killed in an IED blast on July 1.

Pakistani troops fired on troops trying to evacuate injured porters after two were killed in IED attack by Pakistani militants along LoC in Poonch on July 8.

On July 12, Pakistani Rangers fired on Indian forward posts in Pindi belt along international border (IB) in Jammu district.

Pakistani troops opened small arms firing on Indian posts in forward area along LoC in Poonch district on the night of July 22.

The increase in cease fire violations by the Pakistanis seems to be following a pattern. The unprovoked Pakistani attacks must not be viewed in isolation; it must be seen in the context of incursions carried out by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army troops in Ladakh along the Line of Actual Control. There appears to be some kind of understanding between the two all-weather friends on Kashmir. Since April 2013, it must be noted that the personnel of the PLA have repeatedly intruded across the LAC stepping up pressure on India and the Indian Army. Strangely, though these eyeball-to-eyeball confrontations have not resulted in a firefight till date, it is anybody’s guess whether this restraint will continue. In the past few months, China and its generals both by words and action have been provoking India. On the Western front, the perennial delinquent Pakistan has been in the habit of violating the cease fire across the Line of Control for the past more than eight months with considerable regularity.  Pakistan’s obsession in wresting Kashmir by force since 1947 has ended in failure every time. The axis of evil (China and Pakistan) seems to have embarked on a concerted plan to achieve their independent objectives, namely, to alter the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh and of taking Kashmir by optimal use of force. This is a likely scenario considering the fact that Pakistan’s infiltration of terrorists into Kashmir have not succeeded and China is wary of India rapidly developing infrastructure facilities along the LAC and the raising of a Mountain Strike Corps.

The other possibility is the K – Plan of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. According to reports, as soon as Nawaz Sharif became the Pakistan Prime Minister, he asked his most trusted intelligence agency, ISI, to devise a plan for the troubled Indian state of Kashmir. The recent attack on Indian posts in Poonch are said to be a small part of this devious plan, named- K-Plan or Kashmir-Plan.

It should also be noted that there has been unprecedented rise in violence in Kashmir Valley and numerous incidents of infiltrations and cross-border fire on LoC, since Nawaz Sharif came to power after the elections held in May, this year. So much so, the new PM wants a special cell of the plan to be situated inside his office. As per the report, cell will try to implement the Pakistan’s Kashmir-policy with renewed vigour. 

ISI has been asked to instruct militants to re-group and revive its proxy war in Kashmir. The aim is to bring Kashmir back on international radar, while Pakistan denies its role completely.

The second and the most important part of this plan is 'high voltage propaganda'. ISI has already activated its propaganda cells in Kashmir, Brussels, London, Washington, Toronto and New York. According to the plan these cell will not be operated by High Commissions, diplomatic missions or even the Pakistani intelligence agencies. They will be looked after by Non Governmental Organisations (staffed probably with ISI officials) and support groups based across the globe that support secession of Kashmir from India.

Given the above scenario, apart from political bickering among the political parties in India there does not seem to exist a coherent policy vis-à-vis Pakistan and China. The Indian foreign policy establishment apparently suffers from policy paralysis. After every act of cease fire violation by Pakistan and/or incursions across the LAC by China, the political class of this country adopts the Standard Operating Procedure of condemnation and issuing of strong verbal messages that these attacks or incursions would not be tolerated and followed importantly by total inaction on the ground. The political dispensation in Delhi by its inaction is sending a message not only to the two delinquent neighbours but to the international community as a whole that India lacks the political will to take concrete action in the form of reprisals. The framers of Indian foreign policy, if at all a policy exists, need to be told that one of the important determinants of foreign policy is public opinion; today the public mood certainly does not favour any talks with the two all-weather friends given the nature of their recurring acts of violence and transgressions. Again infinite rounds of talks with these two countries have yielded nothing till date – one keeps the LoC hot and the other keeps pushing the LAC. Talks at any cost or talks for the sake of talks satisfy only the fringe elements of our polity who reiterate on having uninterrupted and uninterruptable dialogue with the rogue states like Pakistan. Noted Strategic Affairs expert Dr. Subhash Kapila has very aptly put it thus: “This is the classic degenerated ‘peace at any cost’ dictum which is being bandied around by US-apologists in India and India’s ‘bleeding hearts’ who advocate the Pakistan-India peace process should ‘not be interrupted or be interruptible’ without reference to the situation on the Pakistan-India borders and proxy disruptive activities inflicted on India.”

Another basic but important aspect is for India to have a foreign minister trained in the art of diplomacy unlike the present incumbent who suffers from a foot-in-the mouth disease. Given below are some of the statements given in an interview to a news channel.

“We are vigilant. We are awake. We are conscious. We are watchful,”

 “We have a categorical commitment from Pakistan that they will not allow their territory to be used for attacks on India,” Khurshid said. “We expect them to deliver on this commitment.”

“Neighbours have to find a way of talking to each other,”

“We can’t proceed as if nothing has happened. We have taken some steps. Let’s see what the response to those are.”

These are standard lines of this Minister, not to forget his ‘acne comment’ made in the context of the Chinese army incursion in Ladakh in April 2013. One needs to ask the minister how many times in the past, have the Pakistanis given such categorical commitments and violated them without any compunction. The minister alone may be able to explain what he meant by “neighbours have to find a way of talking to each other”. This can be interpreted to mean that India is more than keen on having a dialogue with Pakistan. And what “steps” does he refer to having been taken by India for which he is awaiting a response. Pakistan has denied the incident and warned India against making baseless allegations which could undermine the ‘peace process’. The Minister must be reminded that short of being declared as a terrorist state by the international community, Pakistan for all practical purposes is an international pariah.

The options for India have always been very limited. The harsh reality for India is that neither can it wish its two neighbours away being a geographical reality nor can it expect them to mend their ways through mere talks and agreements. Agreements for the dragon in the north and the rogue in the west are meant to be observed in the breach. The Pakistanis and Chinese have scant regard or respect for agreements.  The Panchsheel and Shimla Agreements were probably consigned to the dust bins even before the ink had dried. The harsher reality is that for them power flows out of the barrel of a gun. If at all then if India needs to talk, then it needs to do so at the local level, at a functional level; not at the level of Heads of State or Government. India while talking to its two perennial foes must rapidly develop its military capability, a capability that will enable it to engage effectively two nuclear neighbours. Only and only if India works and develops its hard power capabilities as opposed to soft power can it force the two delinquents to behave in a civilized manner.

In conclusion, it must be emphasized that irrespective of the fact that whether the political class, particularly the party in power wants talks or not with Pakistan, the public perception is that the government has been too weak in dealing with threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity from across the border and the only message by which a country like Pakistan can be made to see reason is through the language of force. The peaceniks in the Indian establishment have undermined the nation's interests for far too long. It is time to give the hawks a chance. Israel could enter into a peace treaty with Egypt (Camp David Accords) largely due to the hawkish Prime Minister Menachem Begin's leadership backed by Israel's superior military power and capabilities.  There is no reason why India cannot emulate the Jewish State with a hawkish leader at its helm.

Confronting the Dragon in Ladakh

The last post “Dragon's presence in the Indian Ocean” highlighted the Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean Region. Many Indian experts on China were of the opinion that a change of guard in Beijing may bring about a change of policy on bilateral relations and in particular bring about an amicable and just resolution of the border dispute between the two countries. Just as these views were being expressed, People’s Liberation Army upped the ante and carried out a well-planned incursion into Indian territory.

A Platoon-strength contingent of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) intruded ten kilometres inside the Indian territory in Burthe in Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) sector, which is at an altitude of about 16,568 feet (5050 metres), on the night of April 15, 2013 and established a tented post there. A Chinese Army Platoon usually consists of around 50 men. The troops were provided logistical support by two helicopters to enable them to set up a camp on Indian territory. Within two days of the Chinese putting up a camp in Daulat Beg, the Indian Army dispatched the 5th Battalion of Ladakh Scouts which set up its own camp barely 500 metres away from the Chinese camp.

When the Indian foreign minister was asked about the incursion, he said that India and China were holding flag meetings to address the issue of incursion by Chinese troops in Ladakh. "We are addressing this issue in an appropriate manner. We just do not want any departure from proportionality. I do not think we should allow this to get beyond the immediate area and we should retain at that level and not allow it to escape that level," Khurshid said. The Defence Minister A. K. Antony said that India would take "every step" to protect its interests to resolve the situation arising out of deep incursion by Chinese troops into Indian territory in eastern Ladakh. 

It is relevant to point out that Daulat Beg Oldi lies at the easternmost point of the Karakoram Range in a cold desert region in the far north of India in Kashmir, just 8 km south of the Chinese border and 9 km northwest of the Aksai Chin Line of Actual Control (LAC).

The base was established during the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962. It was operated with American-supplied Fairchild Packets from 1962 to 1966. It was closed down after an earthquake which caused loosening of the surface soil, making it unsuitable for fixed wing aircraft. The base was re-opened in May 2008 in response to Chinese activities in the Aksai Chin region. The decision to reactivate this advance landing ground in the Aksai Chin was announced in the third week of April 2008.

According to Prashant Dikshit, former director of Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS)[1], a 50-strong contingent of Chinese soldiers had been spotted building a road in the vicinity of DBO, back in 1999. There have been reports since that "China made 24 attempts to take hold of the DBO air base during the last India-Pakistan conflict in Kargil." They were thwarted, albeit, through persuasion. Analysts have painstakingly recorded that China, as of 2008 was pursuing 13 different projects to build infrastructure in the region with a view to enable speedy movement of military wherewithal to the area. This has been going on for a very long time on the Chinese side but the Indian side has woken up "very late," according to one experienced analyst. 

Firstly, how confident is India of resolving this incursion? For in the past Chinese troops have never camped inside Indian territory for a long time. Secondly, the timing of the incursion is baffling. Thirdly, why has China chosen to intrude close to a strategic Advanced Landing Ground? While the answers to these questions are not easy, one can only speculate that the PLA contingent has probably been assigned to test Indian will and defence preparedness.

China rejected reports of intrusion by its troops in Ladakh, saying the People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers patrolled the Chinese side of Line of Actual Control (LAC) without "trespassing" into it.

Presenting China's stand, the Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying also called for resolution of the issue through talks.

"China's frontier troops have been abiding by the agreement between the two countries and abiding by the LAC agreed by the two countries.

"Our frontier troops have been patrolling on the China's side of LAC", Hua said at a media briefing here, responding to a spate of questions.

"Our troops are patrolling on the Chinese side of the LAC and have never trespassed the line", she said.

China having denied the intrusion, what are India’s options? India should, without much fanfare firstly determine the intention behind this border violation and thereafter with the minimal use of force evict the enemy platoon from the area. While carrying out this exercise, India must be prepared to counter any form of Chinese retaliatory action. In other words, it is necessary to convey a strong message to the enemy that intrusions and encamping on the Indian side would not be tolerated. Anything short of this will convey a lack of political will and timidity on the part of New Delhi. This blog has often called for qualitative and quantitative improvement of Indian naval and air assets; in the event of any hostile Chinese action in the high Himalayas, India must be prepared to choke the Chinese at sea.  

The action on the ground is totally contrary to what Chinese leaders talk. Less than a month ago, China’s new leader Xi Jinping during his meeting in Durban on the sidelines of the just concluded BRICS Summit with the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh called for India and China to boost military contact and deepen trust. On the border issue, he said “China and India should improve and make good use of the mechanism of special representatives to strive for a fair, rational solution framework acceptable to both sides as soon as possible,” Xinhua said. 

He also called on both sides to “continue to safeguard peace in their border areas and prevent the issue from affecting bilateral relations.” 

The author has been of the firm opinion that China and its leadership cannot be trusted. Chinese actions on the ground have never matched with their utterances. China has always talked of a peaceful solution to the boundary problem while its troops have intruded across the Line of Actual Control on numerous occasions. According to Indian government sources, there have been more than 600 intrusions or border violations since 2010. And the Indian response has been far from satisfactory. This is probably the reason why China has gone a step further and started encampment on the Indian side. The last time such an incident had taken place was in 1986 at Wangdung in the Sumdorung Chu area in Arunachal Pradesh. The Indian Army chief General Krishnaswami Sundarji responded swiftly to air-lift an entire infantry brigade under Operation Falcon to Zimithang, a makeshift landing area close to Sumdorong Chu, to counter Chinese moves in the region. Troop reinforcements from both sides continued till about mid-1987 when diplomatic engagement finally led to cooling down of the stand-off, with even a pact to move back some border outposts of either side.

While continuing to engage China diplomatically, India must continue to develop and upgrade its military capabilities and be ever-prepared to thwart Chinese territorial ambitions.

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[1]Daulat Beg Oldi: Taking Wing Again http://www.ipcs.org/article_details.php?articleNo=2595

Dragon’s presence in the Indian Ocean

Michael Cole wrote in The Diplomat recently about Chinese Navy’s attack submarines operating in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), and the possibility of it posing a serious threat to Indian interests. The IOR stretches from the Horn of Africa to the Malacca Straits and southwards to the West coast of Australia. His article was based on a report titled “Indian Navy: Perceived Threats to Subsurface Deterrent Capability and Preparedness” prepared by the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) of India’s Ministry of Defence (MOD). The report warned that the “implicit focus” of the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) appeared to be undermining Indian navy’s ability to control the highly sensitive sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the region.

Citing subsurface contact data shared by US forces, the document stated that at least 22 contacts were recorded with vessels suspected to be Chinese attack submarines patrolling well outside Chinese territorial waters. The document cites one contact with a suspected Chinese submarine took place 90 km from Indian soil in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, while six took place northwest of the Straits of Malacca, 13 south of Sri Lanka and two in the Arabian Sea. The submarines were believed to be from the South Sea Fleet based at Sanya on Hainan Island, off China’s southern coast. According to the MOD document these extended patrols may overlap with the Indian Navy’s area of operation.

The number of confirmed contacts mentioned in the report represented a marked increase from four year ago, when U.S. intelligence reportedly revealed that China’s fleet of more than 50 submarines had carried out 12 “extended patrols” outside its territorial waters in 2008, up from six the previous year. Reports then did not indicate where the extended patrols were said to have taken place, though it can be assumed that some occurred near or within the IOR. 

The report also stated that the Chinese Navy appeared to be building “expeditionary maritime capabilities” in the form of nuclear powered submarines and area denial weapons such as DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles to counter and threaten India in the IOR.

In May 2012, China had declared that it could deploy Jin Class (Type 094) nuclear submarines at Yulin Naval base at Sanya as part of its long-term strategy in the South China Sea. The SSBNs are likely to be armed with JL-2 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). 

This report must be read in the backdrop of China having set up a network of ports/facilities in Bangladesh (Chittagong), Myanmar (Sittwe and Coco Island), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Pakistan (Gwadar) and has also secured docking rights in Seychelles, in what is described as the culmination of the ‘String-of-Pearls’ strategy.

The document has warned that the Gwadar port would “facilitate enormous command and control capability for prospective Chinese presence in the IOR”.

While some strategic experts in India think the strategy is overrated and will not dilute India's influence in the region.

"Converting a port or token port facilities into a naval base is a huge leap. I don't think China can do that," said strategic affairs expert Rear Admiral (retd) Raja Menon. "Also, any country that allows China to do that will risk India's enmity."

Similarly, defence analyst Commodore (retd) Uday Bhaskar said, "The suggestion that China is strangulating India with a 'String of Pearls' is an exaggeration."

With due respect to the views of the experts, one cannot ignore the fact that China has in the past few years embarked on an ambitious program to strengthen its navy, and has been conducting long range anti-piracy missions around the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. Also, China is heavily dependent on oil and energy resources from Africa and the Gulf making the waters of IOR extremely important to China. India's relations with its neighbours is far from satisfactory.

Michael Cole’s article does not make any reference to India’s depleting submarine force levels. While China is scaling up its underwater capabilities, the Indian Navy's submarine force levels will be the lowest in its history by 2015.

The navy will be left with merely six to seven submarines, including India's first and only nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine INS Arihant, as it begins phasing out the Russian Kilo class and German HDW Type 209 submarines next year. 

The report warned India had "never before been poised in such a vulnerable situation" and the undersea force levels were "at a highly precarious state".

The navy currently operates 14 submarines, including a nuclear-powered attack submarine leased from Russia. However, the "viable strength" of its submarine arm is much less, factoring in the operational availability of the boats.

In contrast, China operates close to 45 submarines, including two ballistic missile submarines. "China may plan to construct 15 additional Yuan-class attack submarines, based on German diesel engine purchases," the report said. It said the Yuan-class boats could be equipped with air-independent propulsion systems to recharge their batteries without having to surface for more than three weeks, a capability currently unavailable with the Indian Navy.

The size of India's submarine fleet will roughly be the same as that of the Pakistani Navy in two years. "As this critical (undersea) capability is eroded, there is an inverse increase in both capability and strength of the Chinese and Pakistani navies," the report stated.

The report of the Integrated Defence Staff highlighting the threats posed by PLAN has come a bit too late. The reason is that the Chinese Navy has been undergoing a gradual transformation from being a pre-dominantly brown water navy to a blue water navy owing largely to a change in strategic priorities and to back up its belligerent claim over the South China Sea and prepare for a possible conflict with the US-Japan-South Korea alliance. 

Indian Navy has been aware of China’s modernization plans as well as its strategic objectives. For instance, way back in 2008, Indian Navy was aware of the deployment of China’s Jin Class (Type 094) nuclear submarines at Sanya, a base in close proximity of India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands. 

A report in The Daily Telegraph in May 2008 said that satellite imagery indicated that a substantial harbour had been built that could house nuclear submarines and a host of aircraft carriers. 

One photograph showed China's latest nuclear submarine at the base just a few hundred miles from its neighbours; another shows warships moored at long jetties and a network of tunnels at the Sanya base on the southern tip of Hainan island. One of the issues of concern according to the news report was the immense tunnel entrances — 11 of which had been spotted — estimated to be 60 ft high, carved into the hill-side around the base. These tunnels could lead to caverns capable of concealing up to 20 nuclear submarines from spy satellites. This was seen as a major development to enable China project its sea power into the Pacific Ocean and IOR.

The location of the base off Hainan would also give the submarines access to very deep water — exceeding 15,000 feet — within a few miles, making them even harder to detect. Two 1,000-yard piers and three smaller ones could accommodate two carrier strike groups or amphibious assault ships. 

According to the Indian Express report of May 2008, the deployment of the Jin class submarine at Hainan may motivate India to speed up its indigenous nuclear submarine project that had been in the making for the past decade. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) believe that while the deployment of Jin-class submarines may help in sustaining India’s own SSBN program, for China to sail an SSBN into the India Ocean and operate it there in a meaningful way, however, will be very difficult and dangerous in a crisis and hence they are more likely to stay close to Chinese waters.

The moot question now is, why are alarm bells being rung in Delhi and not when in fact China had embarked on naval modernization several years back? Should not have India countered China’s string of pearls policy? These are uncomfortable questions for which answers are not readily available.  India, in fact, failed to thwart Chinese encirclement as well as lagged behind in upgrading its naval assets. While India’s indigenous projects may take time to fructify, it must speed up its procurement of the aircraft carrier Vikramaditya (Gorshkov) and other Principal Surface Combatants (PSCs) as well as upgrade its underwater capabilities to counter PLAN in the IOR.

Hyderabad Bombings

Terror re-visited the southern Indian city of Hyderabad around 7.00 pm on 21^st February after a five year hiatus with two massive explosions triggered by tiffin-carrier bombs planted on bicycles near an intersection in a densely populated Dilsukhnagar area leaving about sixteen dead and more than 100 injured. The first bomb exploded in front of a restaurant called Anand Tiffin Centre near the Konark theatre and the other exploded a few minutes later at a foot over bridge, near the Venkatadri theatre, about 150 metres away from the site of the first explosion.

Dilsukhnagar, in the eastern part of Hyderabad, is an education and commercial hub with several computer coaching institutions, theatres and fruit and grain markets in the vicinity. There is a temple in the neighbourhood where devotees congregate on Thursdays.

According to media reports, the Dilsukhnagar a Hindu-dominated locality with a history of communal tension has been on the terrorists' radar for long; at least since 1999 when a bomb was planted near a Hanuman temple. The device was detected in time by the police.

 

Although intelligence agencies are not rushing to a conclusion about the perpetrators of Thursday’s terror attacks, their suspicion of India Mujahideen's role is derived from the fact that the terror outfit had targeted precisely the same spot — near the foot over bridge in Dilsukhnagar — on August 25, 2007 when IM carried out serial blasts in Hyderabad.

During their interrogation in 2008 in connection with their involvement in the serial attack on Hyderabad the year before, two members of IM — a Indian proxy of Lashkar-e-Taiba which was launched to cloak Pakistan's involvement in the terror campaign against India — confirmed that Bhatkal was the mastermind.

The suspicion is derived also from the testimony of the three alleged IM terrorists to Delhi Police in October 2012. Imran, Tabrez and Syed Maqbool told the special cell that they had been assigned by Bhatkal to do a recce of Dilsukhnagar and other communally sensitive areas in Hyderabad. The duo – Syed Maqbool and Imran who were arrested by the Delhi Police for their involvement in the Pune bombings of August 2012 – revealed that they also did a recce of Hyderabad’s Begum bazaar and Abids area on a motorcycle.

Given the nature of intelligence available to the central agencies and / or the state police, can it be said that specific intelligence was not available? Specific intelligence does not mean that the intelligence agencies will always get information on the specific target/s which will be attacked and the timing of the attack. It is foolish to assume that the input will state that a bomb would be placed near the foot over-bridge in Dilsukhnagar. At the same time, if alerts pertaining to specific targets are issued at regular intervals, it may be difficult to place the specific targets under surveillance 24x7. In the present case, it appears that neither Delhi Police nor the central agencies and the Andhra Police who participated in the interrogation of Maqbool and Imran Khan in October 2012 could pick up the leads and deduce that Dilsukhnagar could be targeted.  A leading national daily in its edition dated 23^rd February 2013 reported: “A team led by Superintendent of Police (Intelligence) B Sumathi spent several days in Delhi interrogating Maqbool and Khan soon after they were arrested by the Delhi police’s Special Cell in October 2012.”

 

An officer from Hyderabad said, “This information was never shared with us by the Delhi police. We cannot go by media reports and if there was a specific mention of Hyderabad, it ought to have to been communicated to us officially.”

The Delhi police, however, maintained that the tip-offs were passed on. An officer said that information was given promptly to the Maharashtra police and they in turn even released pictures of Waqas and Tabrez, who are being considered as suspects in the Hyderabad blasts.

According to Delhi police officials, the local police and special cell (Hyderabad) had information about Maqbool. They should have followed up the case as soon as he was arrested and sought more details.

This information had also been passed on to the Intelligence Bureau, which had issued alerts to many police stations including Hyderabad, they claim.

The analytical abilities of the security agencies based on available inputs were found to be lacking. The bulk of the blame lies on the Andhra Pradesh police for not having analyzed the information available first-hand and for failing to initiate pro-active steps to foil the attack. In the present case, an oft-quoted charge of lack of coordination between various state police and the central intelligence agencies cannot be leveled because personnel of the AP police were directly involved in the interrogation of Syed Maqbool and Imran Khan in Delhi. However, the AP police denied being informed by Delhi police about the information derived from the two suspects.

Assuming that the media reports were misleading or untrue, the AP police will still have to be held responsible for the failure to pick up ground intelligence and activation of a terror module in communally sensitive Hyderabad.

An oft asked question is why India fails or has failed to control terror, be it indigenous or sponsored from across the border? Though there are no straight answers, certain changes are necessary in the manner in which Indian agencies combat terror.

Firstly, as has been repeatedly mentioned in this blog, India has created far too many agencies with over-lapping responsibilities in collection of intelligence and for counter-terrorism. In the ultimate analysis, as was the case in Kargil, responsibility for collection of the intelligence and its dissemination cannot be fixed or attributed to a single agency.

Secondly, it is essential to shift the emphasis from intelligence collection through electronic means (ELINT) or communication intercepts (COMINT) to collection of intelligence through human assets (HUMINT). No intelligence agency can combat terror successfully without HUMINT. Today, India’s intelligence lapses are largely due to lack of human penetration of terror cells or modules. Only human assets can provide timely and accurate information on targets likely to be attacked. The US which relies on sophisticated technology for intelligence gathering and for countering terrorism, relied on human agents to track down Osama bin Laden. While India can go in for National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) – an intelligence sharing network that collates data from stand alone data bases of the various agencies and ministries of the government, it is absolutely necessary to focus on grass root intelligence gathering. This in effect would mean that the beat constable of the local police station is vested with the responsibility of cultivating and tapping local resources for information. [In Mumbai, Anti-terror Cells (ATC) have been set up in every police station for this purpose]. 

Thirdly, Indian agencies are unwilling to learn from the mistakes of the past. Hence, they are prone to repeating the same mistakes. The findings and recommendations made by Inquiry Committees which are set up to probe lapses after major incidents of terror are never made public and thus it is unclear whether any recommendations have been ever implemented. In India, committees are constituted more to lessen the political fallout and assuage public ire rather than for strengthening the system.

Fourthly, as a democracy, there is a need to enact a law in order to have better control and supervision of affairs relating to intelligence agencies. A parliamentary over-sight will ensure that misuse of intelligence agencies is minimized and there would be greater accountability to the nation.

Lastly, the citizenry through seminars and programmes need to be made aware of terror threats and the need to be alert and most importantly must be encouraged to interact with the local police. A tip off from an alert citizen is as important as any intelligence input sourced from an agent. Today there is a wide gulf between the public at large and the police, with the common man unwilling to repose faith in the police. If the existing trust deficit between the citizens and the police is minimized, community policing can reap rich dividends in the area of detection of terrorist crime and its prevention.