Will the Doklam Standoff Lead to Armed Conflict? - 1

Belligerent voices from Beijing

With the border dispute at Sikkim extending beyond a month, these are some of the statements emanating from the Chinese government and/or the Chinese media:

 China told foreign diplomats posted in Beijing that it’s “patience with India won't be indefinite”. China's version of the dispute is that India has "illegally transgressed" the border at Sikkim to stop a road from being built on a plateau in what it calls the Donglang region. India agrees with Bhutan's claim that the land belongs not to China, but to the small Himalayan kingdom. Before the confrontation escalated, India had also warned China that the road in what Bhutan and India call Dokalam was “a serious security concern” because it gave China access to the "Chicken's Neck", a narrow wedge of land, which links the seven northeastern states to the rest of India.

China is battle ready and not afraid to go to war with India, and will face "all-out confrontation" along the entire disputed border, a Chinese daily has warned.

Keeping up its sabre-rattling over the Doklam standoff, China's media said Beijing "doesn't fear going to war" and that any escalation would see India "face the consequence of an all-out confrontation".

A commentary in the hawkish Global Times, a tabloid under the People's Daily known for its hardline views, accused India of "repeatedly making provocations" since the 1962 war, the latest of which, according to writer Duo Mu, was the standoff near the India-China-Bhutan trijunction.

"China must be prepared for future conflicts and confrontation," the commentary said.

"China can take further countermeasures along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). If India stirs up conflicts in several spots, it must face the consequence of an all-out confrontation with China along the entire LAC."

India should not use "trespass" into the Doklam area in the Sikkim sector as a "policy tool" to achieve its "political targets", China said on Tuesday, asking New Delhi to immediately withdraw its troops to avoid any escalation.

China also carried out live fire drills in Tibet. There was another report on July 3 which talked about an armoured brigade drill at 5100 metres in Tibet to test "combat readiness". State media said the drills included "the quick delivery of troops and different military units working together on joint attacks". Radar units "identifying enemy aircraft and soldiers using anti-aircraft artillery to annihilate targets" were also tested, reports said. The official Xinhua News Agency reported from Lhasa that the drill also included the PLA's most advanced battle tank, the Type 96B and was aimed at testing "full combat readiness".

Pangong Tso Incursion Bid

Indian border guards foiled an attempt by Chinese soldiers to enter India's territory on the north bank of Pangong Tso (Lake) in Ladakh on 15^th August 2017, reported PTI, quoting officials.

Soldiers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) tried to enter the Indian side in two areas – Finger Four and Finger Five – twice between 6 am and 9 am. (The Finger Four area in the region has been a bone of contention between India and China as both claim it to be a part of their territory).

But on both the occasions their attempts were thwarted by alert Indian troops, they said.

After the Chinese troopers found their path blocked by Indian soldiers who formed a human chain, they began hurling stones, prompting swift retaliation by Indian border guards.

Personnel from both sides received minor injuries and the situation was brought under control after the customary banner drill under which both sides hold banners before stepping back to their respective positions.

The stand-off lasted 30 minutes, after which the forces pulled back.

The skirmish along the border comes at a time when the countries are locked in a face-off in the Doklam area of the Sikkim sector. The standoff has been ongoing for more than 50 days, after Indian troops stopped the Chinese Army from building a road in the area.

Clearly there is a lot of belligerence in the language and provocative actions in the form of incursions and fire drills in the Tibetan Autonomous Region leaving very little room for negotiations to resolve the ongoing impasse. 

Almost all the Indian electronic media channels have been referring to the Chinese military exercises in the Tibetan region as part of its “psych ops” and that there have been no large-scale PLA troop movement in the area suggestive of aggressive intent. Should India dismiss the tone and tenor of the statements of the Chinese as mere “psych ops?” According to a recent article in the Washington Post, India and China were perilously close to a military conflict. Analysts say that there is a potential for armed clashes elsewhere along the India-China border. PLA could indulge in shallow incursions – the PLA could try something in eastern Ladakh as was seen at Pangong Tso or eastern Arunachal Pradesh or Lipulekh Pass and Barahoti in the central sector (Himachal-Uttarakhand).  

Experts’ views based on the ground situation

A few of the former senior officers of the Indian army believe that the standoff may lead to skirmishes and not a full-fledged war between India and China. They are of the view that the Chinese may create other trouble spots, meaning thereby incursions in other sectors, in order to force India to withdraw from Doklam. 

Buttressing the analysis of the Generals, sources, well aware about the Chinese border informed ANI that there has not been any significant movement of military forces in the Tibetan region in the last two months. The sources also added that for India the tipping point will be when there's a significant troop movement across the eleven bridges that join the northern parts of the 1,100 kilometers of Tsangpo with the southern part of Tibet. The PLA’s war rhetoric has not so far translated to large-scale mobilization or deployment of troops on the ground.

China has deployed about 15-16 divisions along the Line of Actual Control starting from the Karakoram Pass up to the Arunachal Pradesh (LAC 3,488 km). This entire area comes under the Western Theatre Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. In case of the war, China can also move four to five divisions, which are stationed in the Xinjiang province, in the north of the Jammu and Kashmir, to cover the Ladakh sector. 

There has been no unusual movement by the Chinese at the LAC since last two months. Talking to ANI, they explained it as Chinese tactics to pressurise India. 

In the event of an armed conflict….

Iskander Rehman, a senior fellow at Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy at Salve Regina University has in his paper for the Naval War College Review titled “A Himalayan Challenge: India’s Conventional Deterrent and the Role of Special Operations Forces along the Sino-Indian Border” outlined four factors that is likely to shape an India –China conflict. Firstly India has far greater concentration of troops close to the border as compared to China; China stations a limited number of troops in its interior in Tibet. Secondly, insofar as the climate and terrain are concerned, with the exception of parts of Ladakh and Sikkim it is rather difficult for India to conduct mechanized warfare. On the other hand China has distinct advantages for surveillance and use of artillery. The high altitude and extreme cold affect military equipment including weaponry. Thirdly, there is considerable disparity in the infrastructure – the Chinese have developed highways and rail network which can facilitate the movement of PLA troops and equipment quite rapidly. Fourthly, China has one unified Western Theatre Command (WTC)[1], while the responsibility of securing India’s territorial integrity along the Chinese border are distributed between four regional army and air force commands. Thus the author is suggesting about the possible problems of coordination between the various commands and arms in the event of a conflict.

Coming to the military infrastructure in Tibet, China has five operational air fields. 

In addition, there are four-five landing strips, which may not be able to hold operations due to the lack of operational capabilities. 

Defending the nearly 4,000 km-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India is the Lhasa-based Western Theatre Command of the Chinese army, a sprawling military formation spread across 4 provinces including the Tibetan Autonomous Region, where the drills were held. The command includes elements of the Chinese air force and its rocket (missile) forces.

In the event of an escalation, China can use its massive railway infrastructure to bring in additional troops. That has not happened. Since 2009, China has been training in Transregional Support Operations: shifting men and weapons between regions in training exercises.

According to a study carried out by Kevin McCauley for Jamestown Foundation, the primary border areas under dispute are the Chinese-occupied Aksai Chin in the west, and Arunachal Pradesh in the east controlled by India.

“The Sino-Indian disputed borders represent isolated high-altitude regions with difficult terrain and weather conditions presenting problems for troops, weapons and equipment. Ground combat will occur mainly along roads that normally follow valleys or ridges, limiting support and cooperation between forces operating on different axes. The lack of cross-terrain mobility limits the ability of ground forces to conduct penetrating or outflanking operations against enemy forces. PLA publications stress airmobile landings in the enemy rear area to overcome the restricted terrain and enemy defensive positions. Special operations forces available to the WTC would represent highly qualified units to operate in the enemy rear area to disrupt operations and attack vulnerable lines of communications. The high-altitude reduces aviation performance and lift capabilities, and increases maintenance requirements on equipment in general, although the thin air increases the range of projectiles and shrapnel. Weather conditions would mostly limit air operations to June through September. The 1962 Sino-Indian War was fought in October and November without air support. Cold high-plateau regions place increases requirements on engineering and support operations, and the thin air is difficult for the troops even after acclimation. This situation reduces unit combat capabilities and increases non-combat losses. Training new recruits could affect an operation depending on the timing. New recruits would likely achieve a minimal operational capability to conduct small unit combat by late spring, which should be adequate for the restricted terrain which will limit maneuver and dictate primarily small unit operations. Depending on the timing of the crisis, the PLA could decide to delay mobilization of soldiers in the WTC to retain full combat capability of units.

The Aksai Chin border terrain mock-up at the Qingtongxia Combined Arms Tactical Training Bases (CATTB) depicts mostly Chinese occupied territory with only a small portion of Indian controlled terrain. This appears to indicate a focus on a Joint Border Counterattack Campaign in response to an Indian military incursion. However, the exact purpose of the large terrain model is unclear. The border counterattack campaign was originally considered an Army offensive campaign, although some PLA books now refer to it as a joint campaign. This campaign includes initial border defense actions with a transition to the offense to regain lost territory and restore the situation. The two mountain brigades and independent mechanized brigade are the closest ground forces to Arunachal Pradesh, although the 13th Group Army trains in mountain warfare and could deploy as needed. While no PLA forces are permanently garrisoned in the Aksai Chin area, it is likely that the mechanized infantry division in Hotan would deploy to this area. Air and missile strikes would support the ground operations to annihilate and expel invading enemy forces depending on the weather, or as in the Sino-Indian Border War operations could consist of mostly ground operations.”[2]

Chinese war planning has traditionally placed a heavy emphasis on preemptive strike as a means of seizing the initiative and unsettling the enemy. The PLA operations in Korea, against India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979 have been categorized as defensive counter attacks although China had been the aggressor in each of these conflicts. For Chinese thinkers there is no clear conceptual firewall separating defensive grand strategies from offensive military strategies or tactics. To the contrary, preemptive military action is an integral part of the Chinese concept of escalation management or war control.

Writings have emphasized on concentration of “elite forces and sharp arms” and the importance of gaining initiative from striking first and fighting a quick battle to force a quick resolution. Thus in the event of an escalation to armed conflict, China is likely to rely on its air power, airborne operations and Special Operation Forces (SOF) operating behind enemy (Indian) lines to gain the upper hand. This is the tactic that the PLA may adopt in the event of a short military conflict. Thus, there may not be significant troop movement across the eleven bridges that join the northern parts of the 1,100 kilometers of Tsangpo with the southern part of Tibet as stated above. According to Rehman PLA SOF would be assigned key roles to assault vital enemy targets, paralyze enemy operational systems, reduce enemy operational capabilities and interfere, delay or disrupt enemy’s operational activities to create favourable conditions for its main force units. A former senior officer of the Indian Army had stated that if a divisional size attack is launched in Tawang, then Chinese could employ its SOF units to cut off all routes for buildup of reserves, raid artillery and logistic locations. The deep induction of SOFs for providing early warnings and information on the movement of Indian reserves could also be tasked.  

India has closely monitored the development and modernization of China’s airborne assault capabilities in the form of PLAAF’s 15^th Airborne Corps. The Corps Headquarters is at Xiagon and it comprises of three divisions (with over 35,000 troops) with a light artillery and mechanized component. The Central Military Commission accorded it priority for modernization and its capabilities were upgraded by the induction of the Y-20 heavy aircraft. This Corps is considered vital to the War Zone Campaign Concept and likely to be employed for disruptive deep strikes. PLA has carried out large-scale airborne exercises in the Tibet Autonomous Region in the past few years. Thus unlike large-scale infantry operations in 1962, the Chinese may use Special Operation Forces and air assault forces extensively.

The PLA could conduct a Mountain Offensive Campaign or possibly a Joint Fire Strike Campaign if Beijing issued orders for offensive operations. A Joint Fire Strike campaign would support the border counterattack or mountain offensive, but could also represent an independent campaign. The terrain, weather, and difficult engineering and comprehensive support conditions restraining the deployment and sustainment of forces could make a joint fire strike appear more advantageous to a mountain offensive. A mountain offensive would require a substantial advantage in the correlation of forces for the attacker operating under terrain and weather restrictions. As an independent campaign, a joint fire strike could represent punitive strikes against key Indian targets. A joint fire strike campaign is a long-range precision strike by long-range rocket, missile and air forces with the objective to destroy important enemy targets, paralyze the enemy’s operational system of systems (integrated force grouping), weaken the will to resist and destroy war potential, or create conditions for other operations. The Chinese leadership could conclude that conducting precision strikes against key Indian targets was preferable to conducting difficult offensive ground operations where the defender has an advantage.

Lt. General H.S. Panag a former Northern Army Commander in his blog “How will Chinese use of force in Doklam manifest?” writes: “My assessment is that the Chinese will neutralise our strategy by not getting involved in “close infantry combat” over unfavourable terrain. If at all it chooses to use force, its strategy will be based on technological warfare with overwhelming use of PGM and cyber warfare. It will restrict its initial offensive to the Doklam and Sikkim Sector, but would be prepared for escalation to other sectors.

Such an attack will come in the winter, when conventional ground operations are severely restricted. PLA will carry out minimal mobilisation to cater to the unlikely tactical offensive by India in the winter. A massive PGM attack will be launched on our troops at Doklam and Doka La using cruise missiles and artillery after pulling out its own troops to safety.

Simultaneously, a massive cyber attack will be launched to neutralize our command and control systems and our fire power means. The strike will be with a declared limited aim of evicting us from Doklam. Depending upon our strategic and operational response, the PLA will escalate with similar attacks on more defensive positions in Sikkim and other sectors.” (cont'd)

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[1]  In February 2016, China announced a major military rezoning that merged the former Chengdu and Lanzhou Military Regions into one unified Western Theatre Command.

[2] China’s Western Theater Command – Kevin McCauley, Jamestown Foundation

A Perspective on the Sino-Indian Border Dispute

(Note: This post was originally written in 2008. It has been revised in the light of the on-going standoff on the Sikkim border)

The whole gamut of Sino-Indian relations has revolved around the unresolved boundary row between the two neighbours, culminating in the 1962 conflict. Years later there appeared to be a thaw in relations with trade ties between the two countries improving. However, the relations have been far from normal and India had more than adequate reasons to be suspicious of Chinese intentions and motives particularly in relation to the border issue. And the incursions and wanton provocations by the PLA have not helped matters

It is necessary to delve into history in order to determine why resolution of this dispute has been difficult.

India and China have for long found it difficult to resolve the border dispute which has impeded normal ties between the two Asian giants for about four and half decades. The cause of the conflict in 1962 was a dispute over the sovereignty of the widely-separated Aksai Chin (in Kashmir) and Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh border regions. Tawang district is located around latitude 27° 45’ N and longitude 90° 15’ E in North-West Arunachal Pradesh. Tawang was the scene of intense fighting during the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Chinese troops had then occupied Tawang and destroyed portions of the monastry. After the Chinese troops withdrew, Tawang was once again under Indian administration. Aksai Chin in Kashmir’s Ladakh region is the other disputed territory which is at present under the control of the Chinese. This article primarily focuses only on the disputed border area in Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh.

The core issue

 

The status of Tibet is central to the border dispute for the simple reason that for two millennia, there never was a border between India and China. Lt Cmdr Calvin James Bernard of the US Navy in his paper titled “China-India Border War (1962)” stated that the roots of the conflict goes back to the 18th century, when both China and British India asserted claims to desolate, remote mountain areas between China and India. Military expeditions, intrigue and unproductive diplomatic exchanges marked decades of relations between the two countries. Rather than resolving the border issue, Chinese and British Indian actions only set the stage for conflict.

According to Mohan Guruswamy, the roots of India’s problem with China go back a couple of centuries when Emperor Napoleon and Tsar Alexander met in July 1807. As the Russian empire began its eastward expansion, which many felt would culminate in the conquest of India, there was a shadow contest for political ascendancy between the British and Russian empires. The Russians’ desire for an empire and a warm water port did not diminish and so the game continued. The British response to meet the Russian threat was to establish a forward defensive line in the northern region so that a Russian thrust could be halted well before the plains of Hindustan. This called for making Afghanistan and Tibet into buffer states and for fixing suitable and convenient borders with these states. In other words, British India did not have a border with China.

It is only in October 1950, when Communist China’s troops entered Tibet to 'liberate' the Roof of the Word that suddenly India acquired a new neighbour. Tibet was always a buffer between the Chinese and the British Empire. In 1914 at Simla an agreement came to be signed between the Dalai Lama's Representative and Sir Henry McMahon to define the border between Tibet and India. The McMahon Line came into being. The border agreement was arrived at bilaterally during the tripartite Convention between British India, China and Tibet. Though the Chinese subsequently refused to ratify the Convention, they did not object to the bilateral accord between Delhi and Lhasa. The Chinese were more concerned by the demarcation of their border with Eastern Tibet. The Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (or Chou-en-lai) convinced Nehru that the British were 'imperialists' and therefore all treaties or agreements signed by them were 'imperialist treaties.' The inference drawn by the clever Chinese premier was that the McMahon line was an imperialist creation and therefore not acceptable by New China: The Chinese Premier conveniently presumed and told India's ambassador to China K N Panikkar that India had no intention of claiming special rights arising from the unequal treaties of the past. Nehru while concurring that the British were imperialists could not follow Zhou's conclusion on the McMahon Line. However, he did not want to raise the issue first. Since nothing was heard from the Chinese side about the issue of the frontier, Nehru deduced that McMahon Line was a foregone conclusion.

In 1954 the Panchsheel Agreement (known as Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India) came to be signed between the two countries. This agreement too was silent about the border.

The Chinese Premier Zhou did not bring up the topic of the border till the end of the fifties. And by that time it was a bit too late for India as the Aksai Chin was fully in possession of the Liberation Army. The Chinese stand was unequivocal that it had never accepted the McMahon line and NEFA belonged to them.

Zhou's visit to India in 1960 was followed by several rounds of detailed discussions which were held between June and December. While India presented detailed maps and documents proving its claims, the Chinese hardly gave any evidence of their 'possessions.'

Could India have averted the 1962 War?

Thus by failing to negotiate with the Chinese on the border through the fifties, India lost the opportunity to settle the contentious issue once and for all. According to Col. (retd) Anil Athale, another opportunity (which was missed by India) to avoid the conflict came in December 1960 when Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai made a brief stopover in Delhi. Under the so-called 'Krishna Menon Plan' it was mooted that India would lease the Aksai Chin area to China and in return the Chinese would lease the strategic (from the Indian point of view) Chumbi valley that is like a dagger pointed at the line of communication with Assam and the Northeast. This would have been a very fair deal as the Aksai Chin area, besides being strategically useless to India, was also very difficult to defend. But it is believed that under the pressure from the right wing of the Congress and fear of vociferous opposition, Nehru rejected it. It is difficult to say now whether the course of history would have been different had India gone ahead with this proposal.

The border war of October 1962

The war itself was limited both in terms of place and time duration. Fighting started on 10th October 1962 and ended on 20th November 1962. The cease-fire came into effect at 0000 on 21st November 1962. Actual fighting was limited to 3 distinct areas, namely Walong, Tawang and Aksai Chin.

Post 1962

Nathu La-September 1967

In 1965, two significant events took place on the Sino-Indian border. The first was the warning issued to India about Chinese sheep not being allowed to graze on their side of the border by India. This happened in September 1965 when the Indo-Pak war was simmering on India’s western border.

At the same time, in September-December 1965, the PLA sent probing missions on the entire Sikkim-Tibet border. According to one account, there were seven border intrusions on the Sikkim-Tibet border between September 7 and December 12, 1965, involving the PLA. In all these border incursions, the Indian side responded “firmly” without provoking the other. Though details of casualties of these PLA border incursions are not reported, there were reports indicating that the PLA suffered “heavy” casualties against “moderate” loss by India.

Two years later, in September 1967, in spite of their setbacks in 1965, the PLA launched a direct attack on the lndian armed forces at Nathu La, on the Sikkim-Tibet border. The six-day “border skirmishes” from September 7-8 to 13, 1967, had all the elements of a high drama, including exchange of heavy artillery fire, and the PLA soldiers tried to cross the border in large numbers. Again the attack was repulsed at all points by the Indian troops.

The Sumdorong Chu Incident-Operation Falcon October 1986

In 1986 China decided to flex its muscles again with India. In mid-1986, it came to the notice of India that the PLA had built a helipad at Wandung in Sumdorong Chu Valley referred to as Sangduoluo He in the Chinese media in Arunachal Pradesh. India reacted swiftly and the PLA had an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with the India Army in Sumdorong Chu Valley of Arunchal Pradesh in August 1986. After a week of tense moments both sides mutually agreed to withdraw their forces inside their respective territories and create a no man’s land. India's then Army chief General Sundarji decided to use the IAF’s new Russian-made heavy lift MI-26 helicopters to air land a brigade at a place called Zemithang, 90 kilometres from Tawang, south of the Sino-Indian border. 

The airlift took place between 18 and 20 October 1986 (the very dates which marked the beginning of the 1962 Conflict) in this sector. They took up ppositions on Hathung La ridge overlooking Sumdorong Chu along with three other key mountain features. In 1962, the Chinese held the high ground; this time the Indians.

With China scrambling to rush forces to the region, both sides began a general mobilization along the entire border. Here again, the Indian General had a few surprises.

Innovatively using the heavy lift transport aircraft and helicopters of the IAF including the IL-76 and AN-26, the Army placed T-72 tanks and infantry combat vehicles in the Demchok area of Ladakh and northern Sikkim.

The Chinese fumbled for a response and subsequently, a November 15 flag meeting calmed things down a bit. But now, India decided to take the opportunity to covert Arunachal Pradesh, which was a centrally administered territory till then, into a full-fledged state of the Indian Union.

In August '87, Indian and Chinese troops moved their respective posts slightly apart in the Sumdorong Chu Valley, following a meeting of the field commanders. During the 8th round of border talks on November '87, it was decided to upgrade the talks from the bureaucratic to the political level. Following then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988, a Joint Working Group (JWG) was set up to discuss, among other things, the alignment of the LAC. In 1993, an agreement was inked between the foreign ministers of the two countries on the reduction of troops along the LAC. This was possibly first of the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). It was decided to pull back from respective forward check posts in the Sumdorong Chu Valley from a situation of "close confrontation" and in 1994, the Indian External Affairs Ministry described the situation as one of "close proximity" where the respective posts were 50-100 yards apart. Following the JWG meeting in April 1995, the two sides agreed to a simultaneous withdrawal of their troops from the four border posts - two Indian and two Chinese - in the Sumdorong Chu Valley. As of June 1999, the valley was unoccupied by either the Indian army or Chinese, and their respective posts in the area were close to a kilometre apart.

A View from China

According to a leading Chinese scholar on India Ma Jiali, China's claim to the whole of Arunachal Pradesh may only be a negotiating ploy. However, he added that the demand for Tawang might well be non-negotiable. According to Ma Jiali, the disputed area in Arunachal Pradesh is very large. Tawang was the birthplace of the 6th Dalai Lama, Tsangyang Gyatso. The Tibetan people thus have very strong religious sentiments towards Tawang. It must be noted that in 1938, the Survey of India published a map of Tibet, which showed the Tawang tract as part of that country. Even the first edition of Jawaharlal Nehru's Discovery Of India showed the Indo-Tibetan boundary as running at the foot of the hills. The Tibetans did not accept this 'annexation' of the Tawang tract and challenged the British attempts to expand their government into this area. But they tacitly accepted the rest of the McMahon demarcation. It is clear that, but for the Tawang tract, there is little basis for the Chinese claim on the whole of Arunachal Pradesh. According to other Chinese scholars, India should accept the Chinese view that McMahon Line was illegal and unacceptable and once it is done, the border settlement would be easy. Scholars have also warned that “substantial adjustments” would have to be made if the border issue between India and China is to be resolved. The hint here is towards major concessions by India on Tawang. As far as the other sector of dispute, namely, Aksai Chin is concerned the Aksai Chin road is strategically too important for the Chinese, as it is the only link between its two western provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang. Thus the question of relinquishing the occupation of this area does not arise. It is important to appreciate that there have been subtle changes in the Chinese position on the border dispute. At a point of time it was felt that the North-East was the bargaining chip or the ‘pressure’ for a de jure control of Aksai Chin. Today, while Aksai Chin has become non-negotiable, China seeks concessions from India on Tawang. The pressure on Tawang has been kept up by raking up issues of the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh and even Sikkim. China is in no hurry to resolve the issue. One reason could be the repeated incursions into Tawang could provide legitimacy to China for exercising de facto control over the territory. But at the core is also the assessment that the time for striking a deal with India is not now and when that would be would depend on how the mandarins assess the respective strengths of the two sides and whether China holds the upper hand.

The Sun Yuxi factor

Just a week ahead of Chinese President Hu Jintao's state visit to India in November 2006, Beijing's envoy to New Delhi Sun Yuxi claimed that Arunachal Pradesh was a Chinese territory.

“In our position the whole of what you call the state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory, and Tawang (district) is only one place in it. We are claiming all of that—that's our position,” he told the news channel CNN-IBN just days ahead of the Chinese President’s visit to India.

Sun was the man who drove Beijing's policy of stirred up tensions along the border in Arunachal. From incursions into the state, to demolition of Indian army observation posts along the Bhutan border and objections to road building in Sikkim, Sun carried out his mission with a bullheadedness that drove South Block to silent fury and prompting them to demand the recall of the envoy.

The South Block was infuriated by Sun’s manipulation of the bilateral talks on border issue: from Aksai Chin in Ladakh to thousands of miles east in Arunachal, where India's insecurities ran the deepest.

The Indian government angrily rejected the statement, and a year later Sun was recalled. New Delhi conveyed to Beijing a message that unless Sun was recalled, the Indian Prime Minister would not send a final list of dates for his visit to China. The Prime Minister’s Office held its ground despite China’s initial refusal to concede. Delhi may seem to have been one up on the Chinese but it must be remembered that it could well be a case of two steps forward and one step backward. It is important to note that the envoy could not have taken a unilateral decision to claim the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh. Surely, there was some sort of official backing for him to make this provocative statement. Secondly, it took nearly a year for the Chinese to concede to the Indian demand for withdrawing him. Sun’s statement could very well be the unstated Chinese policy on the border issue. India can ill-afford to ignore the Sun Yuxis of China's political set up.

Incursions

According to the late B Raman, former Additional Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat, there have been recurring instances of innumerable border intrusions by the Chinese troops. Since the last decade there have been numerous incursions into Indian territory by PLA patrols. There have been air space violations as well by Chinese choppers flying into India's Uttarakhand region. According to the Strategic Affairs expert, Dr. Brahma Chellaney "Bite by kilometre-size bite, China is eating away at India’s Himalayan borderlands. For decades, Asia’s two giants have fought a bulletless war for territory along their high-altitude border. Recently, though, China has become more assertive, underscoring the need for a new Indian containment strategy."

He further adds that on average, China launches one stealth incursion into India every 24 hours. Kiren Rijiju, India’s minister of state for home affairs, says the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is actively intruding into vacant border space with the objective of occupying it. And according to a former top official with India’s Intelligence Bureau, India has lost nearly 2,000 sq. km to PLA encroachments over the last decade. Strangely, India has downplayed these violations and very little visible action has been taken against the intruding Chinese on the ground.

Sources: Articles by Lt. Col. (Retd) Anil Athale, Claude Arpi, Mohan Guruswamy published in Rediff.com, V Natarajan (Bharat Rakhshak), Manoj Joshi's Operation Falcon (The Quint), Sreedhar's "China Becoming a Superpower and India's Options", Lt. Cmdr Calvin James Bernard's paper - China-India Border War (1962), Wikipedia.