Belligerent
voices from Beijing
With the border dispute
at Sikkim extending beyond a month, these are some of the statements emanating
from the Chinese government and/or the Chinese media:
China told foreign
diplomats posted in Beijing that it’s “patience with India won't be indefinite”.
China's version of the dispute is that India has "illegally
transgressed" the border at Sikkim to stop a road from being built on a
plateau in what it calls the Donglang region. India agrees with Bhutan's claim
that the land belongs not to China, but to the small Himalayan kingdom. Before
the confrontation escalated, India had also warned China that the road in what
Bhutan and India call Dokalam was “a serious security concern” because it gave
China access to the "Chicken's Neck", a narrow wedge of land, which
links the seven northeastern states to the rest of India.
China is battle ready
and not afraid to go to war with India, and will face "all-out
confrontation" along the entire disputed border, a Chinese daily has
warned.
Keeping up its
sabre-rattling over the Doklam standoff, China's media said Beijing
"doesn't fear going to war" and that any escalation would see India
"face the consequence of an all-out confrontation".
A commentary in the
hawkish Global Times, a tabloid under the People's Daily known for its hardline
views, accused India of "repeatedly making provocations" since the
1962 war, the latest of which, according to writer Duo Mu, was the standoff
near the India-China-Bhutan trijunction.
"China must be
prepared for future conflicts and confrontation," the commentary said.
"China can take further countermeasures along the Line of Actual Control
(LAC). If India stirs up conflicts in several spots, it must face the
consequence of an all-out confrontation with China along the entire LAC."
India should not use "trespass"
into the Doklam area in the Sikkim sector as a "policy tool" to
achieve its "political targets", China said on Tuesday, asking New
Delhi to immediately withdraw its troops to avoid any escalation.
China also carried out
live fire drills in Tibet. There was another report on July 3 which talked
about an armoured brigade drill at 5100 metres in Tibet to test "combat
readiness". State media said the drills included "the quick delivery
of troops and different military units working together on joint attacks".
Radar units "identifying enemy aircraft and soldiers using anti-aircraft
artillery to annihilate targets" were also tested, reports said. The
official Xinhua News Agency reported from Lhasa that the drill also included
the PLA's most advanced battle tank, the Type 96B and was aimed at testing
"full combat readiness".
Pangong
Tso Incursion Bid
Indian border guards
foiled an attempt by Chinese soldiers to enter India's territory on the north
bank of Pangong Tso (Lake) in Ladakh on 15th August 2017, reported
PTI, quoting officials.
Soldiers of the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) tried to enter the Indian side in two areas – Finger Four
and Finger Five – twice between 6 am and 9 am. (The Finger Four area in the
region has been a bone of contention between India and China as both claim it
to be a part of their territory).
But on both the
occasions their attempts were thwarted by alert Indian troops, they said.
After the Chinese
troopers found their path blocked by Indian soldiers who formed a human chain,
they began hurling stones, prompting swift retaliation by Indian border guards.
Personnel from both
sides received minor injuries and the situation was brought under control after
the customary banner drill under which both sides hold banners before stepping
back to their respective positions.
The stand-off lasted 30
minutes, after which the forces pulled back.
The skirmish along the
border comes at a time when the countries are locked in a face-off in the
Doklam area of the Sikkim sector. The standoff has been ongoing for more than
50 days, after Indian troops stopped the Chinese Army from building a road in
the area.
Clearly there is a lot
of belligerence in the language and provocative actions in the form of incursions
and fire drills in the Tibetan Autonomous Region leaving very little room for
negotiations to resolve the ongoing impasse.
Almost all the Indian
electronic media channels have been referring to the Chinese military exercises
in the Tibetan region as part of its “psych ops” and that there have been no
large-scale PLA troop movement in the area suggestive of aggressive intent.
Should India dismiss the tone and tenor of the statements of the Chinese as
mere “psych ops?” According to a recent article in the Washington Post, India
and China were perilously close to a military conflict. Analysts say that there
is a potential for armed clashes elsewhere along the India-China border. PLA
could indulge in shallow incursions – the PLA could try something in eastern
Ladakh as was seen at Pangong Tso or eastern Arunachal Pradesh or Lipulekh Pass
and Barahoti in the central sector (Himachal-Uttarakhand).
Experts’
views based on the ground situation
A few of the former
senior officers of the Indian army believe that the standoff may lead to
skirmishes and not a full-fledged war between India and China. They are of the
view that the Chinese may create other trouble spots, meaning thereby
incursions in other sectors, in order to force India to withdraw from Doklam.
Buttressing the analysis
of the Generals, sources, well aware about the Chinese border informed ANI that
there has not been any significant movement of military forces in the Tibetan
region in the last two months. The sources also added that for India the
tipping point will be when there's a significant troop movement across the
eleven bridges that join the northern parts of the 1,100 kilometers of Tsangpo
with the southern part of Tibet. The PLA’s war rhetoric has not so far
translated to large-scale mobilization or deployment of troops on the ground.
China has deployed about
15-16 divisions along the Line of Actual Control starting from the Karakoram
Pass up to the Arunachal Pradesh (LAC 3,488 km). This entire area comes under
the Western Theatre Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. In case of
the war, China can also move four to five divisions, which are stationed in the
Xinjiang province, in the north of the Jammu and Kashmir, to cover the Ladakh
sector.
There has been no
unusual movement by the Chinese at the LAC since last two months. Talking to
ANI, they explained it as Chinese tactics to pressurise India.
In
the event of an armed conflict….
Iskander Rehman, a
senior fellow at Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy at Salve Regina University has in his paper for the Naval War College Review
titled “A Himalayan Challenge: India’s Conventional Deterrent and the Role of
Special Operations Forces along the Sino-Indian Border” outlined four factors
that is likely to shape an India –China conflict. Firstly India has far greater
concentration of troops close to the border as compared to China; China
stations a limited number of troops in its interior in Tibet. Secondly, insofar
as the climate and terrain are concerned, with the exception of parts of Ladakh
and Sikkim it is rather difficult for India to conduct mechanized warfare. On
the other hand China has distinct advantages for surveillance and use of
artillery. The high altitude and extreme cold affect military equipment
including weaponry. Thirdly, there is considerable disparity in the
infrastructure – the Chinese have developed highways and rail network which can
facilitate the movement of PLA troops and equipment quite rapidly. Fourthly,
China has one unified Western Theatre Command (WTC)[1],
while the responsibility of securing India’s territorial integrity along the
Chinese border are distributed between four regional army and air force
commands. Thus the author is suggesting about the possible problems of
coordination between the various commands and arms in the event of a conflict.
Coming to the military
infrastructure in Tibet, China has five operational air fields.
In addition, there are
four-five landing strips, which may not be able to hold operations due to the
lack of operational capabilities.
Defending the nearly
4,000 km-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India is the Lhasa-based
Western Theatre Command of the Chinese army, a sprawling military formation spread
across 4 provinces including the Tibetan Autonomous Region, where the drills
were held. The command includes elements of the Chinese air force and its
rocket (missile) forces.
In the event of an escalation, China can use its massive railway infrastructure
to bring in additional troops. That has not happened. Since 2009, China has
been training in Transregional Support Operations: shifting men and weapons
between regions in training exercises.
According
to a study carried out by Kevin McCauley for Jamestown Foundation, the primary
border areas under dispute are the Chinese-occupied Aksai Chin in the west, and
Arunachal Pradesh in the east controlled by India.
“The
Sino-Indian disputed borders represent isolated high-altitude regions with
difficult terrain and weather conditions presenting problems for troops,
weapons and equipment. Ground combat will occur mainly along roads that
normally follow valleys or ridges, limiting support and cooperation between
forces operating on different axes. The lack of cross-terrain mobility limits
the ability of ground forces to conduct penetrating or outflanking operations
against enemy forces. PLA publications stress airmobile landings in the enemy
rear area to overcome the restricted terrain and enemy defensive positions.
Special operations forces available to the WTC would represent highly qualified
units to operate in the enemy rear area to disrupt operations and attack
vulnerable lines of communications. The high-altitude reduces aviation
performance and lift capabilities, and increases maintenance requirements on
equipment in general, although the thin air increases the range of projectiles
and shrapnel. Weather conditions would mostly limit air operations to June
through September. The 1962 Sino-Indian War was fought in October and November
without air support. Cold high-plateau regions place increases requirements on
engineering and support operations, and the thin air is difficult for the
troops even after acclimation. This situation reduces unit combat capabilities
and increases non-combat losses. Training new recruits could affect an
operation depending on the timing. New recruits would likely achieve a minimal
operational capability to conduct small unit combat by late spring, which
should be adequate for the restricted terrain which will limit maneuver and
dictate primarily small unit operations. Depending on the timing of the crisis,
the PLA could decide to delay mobilization of soldiers in the WTC to retain
full combat capability of units.
The
Aksai Chin border terrain mock-up at the Qingtongxia Combined Arms Tactical
Training Bases (CATTB) depicts mostly Chinese occupied territory with only a
small portion of Indian controlled terrain. This appears to indicate a focus on
a Joint Border Counterattack Campaign in response to an Indian military
incursion. However, the exact purpose of the large terrain model is unclear.
The border counterattack campaign was originally considered an Army offensive
campaign, although some PLA books now refer to it as a joint campaign. This
campaign includes initial border defense actions with a transition to the
offense to regain lost territory and restore the situation. The two mountain
brigades and independent mechanized brigade are the closest ground forces to
Arunachal Pradesh, although the 13th Group Army trains in mountain warfare and
could deploy as needed. While no PLA forces are permanently garrisoned in the
Aksai Chin area, it is likely that the mechanized infantry division in Hotan
would deploy to this area. Air and missile strikes would support the ground
operations to annihilate and expel invading enemy forces depending on the
weather, or as in the Sino-Indian Border War operations could consist of mostly
ground operations.”[2]
Chinese war planning has
traditionally placed a heavy emphasis on preemptive strike as a means of
seizing the initiative and unsettling the enemy. The PLA operations in Korea,
against India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979 have been categorized as defensive
counter attacks although China had been the aggressor in each of these
conflicts. For Chinese thinkers there is no clear conceptual firewall
separating defensive grand strategies from offensive military strategies or
tactics. To the contrary, preemptive military action is an integral part of the
Chinese concept of escalation management or war control.
Writings have emphasized
on concentration of “elite forces and sharp arms” and the importance of gaining
initiative from striking first and fighting a quick battle to force a quick
resolution. Thus in the event of an escalation to armed conflict, China is
likely to rely on its air power, airborne operations and Special Operation
Forces (SOF) operating behind enemy (Indian) lines to gain the upper hand. This
is the tactic that the PLA may adopt in the event of a short military conflict.
Thus, there may not be significant troop movement across the eleven bridges
that join the northern parts of the 1,100 kilometers of Tsangpo with the
southern part of Tibet as stated above. According to Rehman PLA SOF would be
assigned key roles to assault vital enemy targets, paralyze enemy operational
systems, reduce enemy operational capabilities and interfere, delay or disrupt
enemy’s operational activities to create favourable conditions for its main
force units. A former senior officer of the Indian Army had stated that if a
divisional size attack is launched in Tawang, then Chinese could employ its SOF
units to cut off all routes for buildup of reserves, raid artillery and
logistic locations. The deep induction of SOFs for providing early warnings and
information on the movement of Indian reserves could also be tasked.
India has closely
monitored the development and modernization of China’s airborne assault
capabilities in the form of PLAAF’s 15th Airborne Corps. The Corps
Headquarters is at Xiagon and it comprises of three divisions (with over 35,000
troops) with a light artillery and mechanized component. The Central Military
Commission accorded it priority for modernization and its capabilities were
upgraded by the induction of the Y-20 heavy aircraft. This Corps is considered
vital to the War Zone Campaign Concept and likely to be employed for disruptive
deep strikes. PLA has carried out large-scale airborne exercises in the Tibet
Autonomous Region in the past few years. Thus unlike large-scale infantry
operations in 1962, the Chinese may use Special Operation Forces and air
assault forces extensively.
The
PLA could conduct a Mountain Offensive Campaign or possibly a Joint Fire Strike
Campaign if Beijing issued orders for offensive operations. A Joint Fire Strike
campaign would support the border counterattack or mountain offensive, but
could also represent an independent campaign. The terrain, weather, and
difficult engineering and comprehensive support conditions restraining the
deployment and sustainment of forces could make a joint fire strike appear more
advantageous to a mountain offensive. A mountain offensive would require a
substantial advantage in the correlation of forces for the attacker operating
under terrain and weather restrictions. As an independent campaign, a joint
fire strike could represent punitive strikes against key Indian targets. A
joint fire strike campaign is a long-range precision strike by long-range
rocket, missile and air forces with the objective to destroy important enemy
targets, paralyze the enemy’s operational system of systems (integrated force
grouping), weaken the will to resist and destroy war potential, or create
conditions for other operations. The Chinese leadership could conclude that
conducting precision strikes against key Indian targets was preferable to
conducting difficult offensive ground operations where the defender has an
advantage.
Lt. General H.S. Panag a
former Northern Army Commander in his blog “How will Chinese use of force in
Doklam manifest?” writes: “My assessment
is that the Chinese will neutralise our strategy by not getting involved in
“close infantry combat” over unfavourable terrain. If at all it chooses to
use force, its strategy will be based on technological warfare with
overwhelming use of PGM and cyber warfare. It will restrict its initial
offensive to the Doklam and Sikkim Sector, but would be prepared for escalation
to other sectors.
Such
an attack will come in the winter, when conventional ground operations are
severely restricted. PLA will carry out minimal mobilisation to cater to the
unlikely tactical offensive by India in the winter. A massive PGM attack will
be launched on our troops at Doklam and Doka La using cruise missiles and
artillery after pulling out its own troops to safety.
Simultaneously,
a massive cyber attack will be launched to neutralize our command and control
systems and our fire power means. The strike will be with a declared limited
aim of evicting us from Doklam. Depending upon our strategic and operational
response, the PLA will escalate with similar attacks on more defensive
positions in Sikkim and other sectors.” (cont'd)
In
February 2016, China announced a major military rezoning that merged the former
Chengdu and Lanzhou Military Regions into one unified Western Theatre Command.
